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Up to the late seventies all airports were owned by the public sector and 
only small general aviation airports were privately owned. The biggest 
airports around Europe as well as many airports in the world were owned by 
the national governments: Paris, London, Madrid, Singapore, Bangkok, 
Sydney and Johannesburg just to name a few. Regarding US and European 
regional airports in both Germany and the UK, the ownership was 100% 
held by public sector but often at a regional or municipal level; an example 
was Manchester airport whose ownership was split between a consortium of 
local authorities resting with Manchester City Council (55%) and eight 
councils of other nearby towns (45% all together).  
Another option – quite common in the EU countries, in particular with 
reference to capital city’s airports - was the shared interest between local 
and national government. A few examples are Frankfurt, Amsterdam and 
Vienna. A rather unique case was the Basel–Mulhouse or Euro Airport, 
situated on the border between Switzerland and France, which is jointly 
owned by the national governments of both Switzerland and France. 
Those airports are administrated as public service obligations with few 
importance given to marketing and commercial management. To be more 
clear, in some cases the airport’s costs and revenues were treated as items 
within the government department’s overall financial accounts (Graham, 
2008).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the air transport market made a 
breakthrough toward deregulation and the whole industry started to be 
considered under a different point of view. The changing process of airport 
regulation, as it was for the air traffic regulation, was not even worldwide, 
the first step being the establishment of more independent authorities or 
airport companies with public shareholders. With reference to airport 
regulation, the countries who initially adopted the philosophy of the 
“commercialization of airport” were in most cases European countries; in 
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North America, where the pressure for air traffic liberalization was stronger 
than elsewhere and where a lot of transport industries have gone private, 
there has been a reluctance to move away from public or local ownership 
(Gillen, 2008). The countries pushing towards full privatization were the 
UK, Australia and New Zealand. In continental Europe there has been a 
preference for partial privatization, with the public sector holding the 
majority of the total shares. 
The first airports that were fully privatized in 1987 were those owned – at 
that time (it is necessary to highlight this aspect as we’ll go through this 
topic later on in the next chapters) - by BAA: London Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted and Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Prestwick. No notable 
privatization took place up to 1995 with the only exceptions being Vienna 
(first wave in 1992), East Midlands (1993), Belfast International (1994) and 
Copenhagen (1994). 
In 1995 the floated share of Copenhagen airport grew to 49% and in 1996 a 
further 21% of shares in Vienna airport was floated. 
1996: Cardiff, Athens 
1997: Düsseldorf, Sandford Orlando, Naples, Rome, Birmingham, Bristol, 
Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth.  
1998: first privatization took place in South America (Argentina); more 
airport were privatized in Eu (Luton and Stockholm) an Australia (Auckland 
and Wellington) 
1999-2000: further privatization in Central and South America (Mexico, the 
Dominican Republic, Chile, Costa Rica and Cuba), far East and China 
(Malaysia, Cochin and Beijing) 
2001: Frankfurt, Newcastle, Seeb and Salahah in Oman and Sharm El 
Sheikh in Egypt. But after 9/11 and because of the subsequent economic 
downturn due to terrorism’s menace (SARS, Iraq War II) no notable 
privatization took place up to 2004 
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2004: Brussels in EU and private investment in Indian greenfield airports of 
Bangalore and Hyderabad. 
2005: Larnaca, Budapest and Venice 
2006: Kosice, Varna, regional airports in Peru and private involvement at 
Delhi and Mumbai 
2007: Xi’an, Pisa, Leeds–Bradford, Antalya and Amman; the first Russian 
airport, namely Mukhino, was sold to foreign investors.(Graham, 2008) 
2008-2010: There had been rumors about privatizing some US airports like, 
for example, Chicago, New Orleans, S. Juan, Baltimore-Washington, 
Detroit city, Kansas city, Long Beach, Minneapolis but nothing has been 
decided yet. St. Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport in Russia is the only actual 
privatization which took place in Europe while privatizations in Prague, 
Lisbon, Madrid and Barcelona airports have been put to a hold due to the 
economic crisis. A privatization plan will probably be established in Brazil 
to modernize Galeao International and Sao Paulo’s Viracopos Airports in 
Rio de Janeiro by the beginning of Football World Cup in 2014 and 
Summer Olympics in 2016. In Mexico, the government seems disposed to 
the privatization of Mexico City airport and is looking for investors to 
modernize Guadalajara, Los Cabos and Puerto Vallarta Airports. Finally, 
the government of Jamaica is planning to privatize Norman Manley 
International Airport in Kingston after the successful privatization of its 
major tourist airport (Sangster International in Montego Bay). (Poole, 2011)  
 
However, it is noticeable that the privatization process is – like most of the 
topics regarding air market – deeply connected to the political and economic 
situation: in fact, as aforementioned, the process eased down or stopped 
whenever a war or an economic crisis broke out (it happened so also during 
the crisis of 2008). Other reasons that may slow down or harm the process 
are bureaucracy and conflict between the government and the private 
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investors (especially when the latter is a foreign investor) and 
inappropriate/unrealistic estimations of passenger/airline demand. 
With commercialization, much greater attention began to be placed on 
financial management, non-aeronautical revenue generation and airport 
marketing. Nevertheless the goal of commercialization is not meant to be 
the full privatization; in fact at present the majority of the airports are run on 
a commercial basis but are still controlled by authorities with both public 
and private shareholders. 
With reference to the governance of airport and ownership, many possible 
solutions are feasible; each country decides which one to adopt on the basis 
of political and economic reasons and framework. In fact, talking about 
privatization, we have to take into consideration both the ownership and the 
control; thus the degree of government participation in the broad range of 
the elements of management and strategic direction of an activity is an 
important issue. A comprehensive typology of airport governance would 
need to account for at least the following variables, presented as questions 
that might be asked for each airport: 
1. Does primary decision-making responsibility for airport 
operations and development reside in a general purpose government 
or special purpose authority? If a general-purpose government, what 
are the level of government (federal, state, county, municipal) and 
form of government (e.g., strong legislative, strong executive)? What 
role do elected officials play in day-to-day airport decision-making 
process? Is there a delegated body that exercises some authority or 
oversight for the airport? To what extent is the airport subject to 
generally applicable rules (e.g., civil service, contracting)? 
If a special-purpose authority, what is the nature of the authority 
(port authority, airport authority) and what is the role, if any, of a 
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general purpose government in decision-making (e.g., appointment 
of authority commissioners, etc.) process? Who chooses the 
commissioners or board members, and how are they selected? 
2. Has significant decision-making power or operational control been 
commercialized or privatized? 
3. How many transportation assets are under the public entity’s 
control? Does the public entity operate multiple airports as a system? 
Does the public entity control modes of transportation in addition to 
airports? 
4. Does the entity with primary decision-making responsibility for 
the airport own the underlying property? 
5. Does the entity with primary decision-making responsibility 
maintain land use and zoning jurisdiction over the airport and over 
the surrounding areas? 
 
As stated by the 1995 GAO Report on Privatization/Divestiture Practices in 
Other Nations,“...the term “privatization” can refer to a broad range of 
activities that, to varying degrees, lessen the government’s involvement in 
the provision of goods and services.... The privatization spectrum includes: 
contracting out, public-private partnerships, vouchers and franchising, as 
well as the actual divestiture of government assets and operations”. 
In short, privatization can occur in many possible ways and over many 
elements. If an activity is not fully privatized, control will be divided; it will 
either be shared through some kind of partnership, or the government will 
regulate the activity. 
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1. Publically owned and operated airports  
 
Namely: direct control and management through a Civil Aviation Authority, 
a Ministerial Department or a lower level of Government (Region, 
Municipalities) or through an autonomous entity with financial and 
operational autonomy established under the provision of the law. 
 
Those airports are owned and operated by the government of the country. At 
a general level, no distinction is made between the level of government 
(municipal or federal) or whether ownership and/or operation of the airport 
is shared between multiple levels of government. This definition also 
includes public yet independent authorities to whom the government has 
transferred the ownership or the responsibility for the daily operation of the 
airport.  
Public owned and operated airports are expected to operate focusing on the 
public interest fulfilment rather than on the commercial point of view. The 
objectives of these airports might be the protection of a national airline or 
the fostering of the economic development within a region. Nevertheless, 
some form of best practices and targets to achieve may be set. 
The airports will develop according to the government requirements and 
decisions. The appointed head of the airport is focused on the daily 
operations of the airport and on the personnel management and is therefore 
responsible of the efficiency of the airport while the decisions on major 
investments and charges are taken at a higher level.  
 
This ownership structure applies to entire systems of airports in countries 
such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Norway and Finland, while, despite a 
degree of private airport ownership, one or more airports in Switzerland, 
China, Indonesia, Bahrain, Qatar, Dubai, Japan and Singapore remain 
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publicly owned. Brazil’s airports are run under concession, but the airport 
operator is 100% state owned. In Germany, Munich Airport remains one of 
the few publicly owned airports. Most of the airports in the US are also 
publicly owned and operated. However, the airport operator effectively 
contracts out the majority of operations and undertakes few functions itself. 
In many cases, as Gillen (2010) notes, this has resulted in vertical 
integration with regard to the market for air transport, with the airlines 
effectively engaged in joint ventures with the airport 
 
1.1 - Government owned and operated airports 
The form of business model whereby the airport is entirely owned and 
operated by the national Government is very common in Greece, Sweden, 
Asia-Pacific, Africa, Latin America and in secondary airports outside USA.  
Under this business model, the airport is operated directly by a Government 
Department, typically the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Ministry of 
Transport or in a few cases, the army.  
It has been thought that only the central government would have been able 
to invest large amounts of money in airports and would have been 
competent to manage the multitude of legal, community and intra-
governmental issues that arise in airport management. 
The Department will generally oversee regulation, air traffic control, air 
navigation and in some case operation of a national airline in addition to 
airport operations.  
Otherwise, all aviation related duties are assigned to a semi-independent 
government agency, rather than being a direct responsibility of the 
Department/Minister of Transport. The Department is responsible for the 
establishment of broad policy toward aviation, but the Agency is responsible 
for day to day regulations as well as operations. AENA in Spain presents an 
example of such model. In this case, the agency is only responsible for 
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airport/airway/air navigation operations, with the Department retaining 
regulatory powers. 
 
Strengths: 
- direct accountability of the airport to the public and to users.  
- the airport is often endowed with certain privileges. Such privileges may 
include exclusive right to provide certain services or even exemptions 
from certain laws or regulations. Therefore, they have strategic 
importance and are then likely to gain a dominant position from their 
monopoly power in the area 
 
Weaknesses: 
- the objectives are vaguely defined, and tend to change as the political 
situation and relative strengths of different interest groups change: also 
investments are affected by the changes  in government priorities 
- inefficient use of airport assets and lack of transparency in decision 
making 
- poorly customer service-oriented 
- airports often rely on a substantial government subsidy to break even. 
They survive on government subsidy for that they are much needed by 
population. The phenomenon may lead to combination of enterprise 
management with government, stiffness of managerial mechanism, 
overstaffing in organization and financial mismanagement.  
 
If the semi-independent govern Agency turns in a Government Corporation 
we have a format where the airports ownership is held by 
Governments/Department of Transports (which is entitled with direct 
responsibility for the establishment and enforcement of regulations) while 
the management operate the airport on a commercial basis.  
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The model aims to the separation of the enterprise management from 
governments so as to improve the operation mechanism and economic 
efficiency of airports. 
Although the corporation will report to the Department of Transport, it has a 
degree of independence due to its corporate structure: it has some 
independence in its financial planning because in some cases can even issue 
bonds to finance major projects. Under that business model, airports are 
recognized as enterprises and have much decision making powers and 
financial rights. As a consequence, they are capable to taking more flexible 
measures to airports operation.  
Some remarkable examples are Aéroports de Paris (which manages the two 
major airports in Paris), Narita-Haneda-Kansai Airports (jointly managed by 
the Ministry of Transport and the Japanese international airport authorities), 
Capital Airport Holdings Company (which has exclusively invested or 
entrust 39 airports in Chinese airports such as Beijing Capital, Tianjin 
Binhai, Chongqing Jiangbei), Dublin, Sydney, Singapore Changi and Oslo 
Airport. While some airport corporations are wholly owned by the national 
government, others are jointly owned by federal and local governments 
(e.g., Germany, the Netherlands). (Tretheway, 2001; Zhang, 2010, Kong, 
2010, AGPC, 2011) 
 
1.2 - Municipal and quasi-Municipal Operation 
An autonomous entity is created to operate and manage an airport with the 
aim of better meeting the needs of the local community. This form of 
governance is quite common in the US and in some EU countries. The 
authority may manage only the major international airports within a country 
or some regional, financially un-self-sufficient airports.  
In the US many airports are run by the local communities: cities (Chicago, 
San Francisco and Los Angeles) and counties (Milwaukee and Miami). City 
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run airports may establish boards (which primarily consist of local business 
groups and social associations) which provide an advisory role. However, 
they have no power on day to day operation decisions of the airport. The 
airport head in this case might be entitled with the operation and 
management of air navigation services as well.  
Some US airports are also operated by authorities, an independent form of 
government which normally operate more than one transport facility: for 
example the Seattle-Tacoma airport is operated by an elected port/airport 
authority. These authorities might exceptionally exercise taxation, zoning or 
veto powers. 
 
From 2003 onwards, this form of governance has been adopted also in 
China: Sichuan, Guanxi, Guangdong Baiyun and Xinjiang Airport are 
operated by a corporation management with the ownership resting with the 
province or the municipality. 
Besides those circumstances, airport ownerships might also be shared by 
multiple local governments; this is the case of Manchester Airport and also 
of some Italian airports. A unique airport authority or company entity is 
required for the airport organization, coordination and management. Finally, 
some airports can be jointly operated by both state and local governments. 
 
The scope of the services and areas the airport entity is responsible of may 
differ from country to country; with general reference: aircraft movement 
area, passenger terminal and cargo facilities, aircraft parking areas; 
sometimes also air traffic control and meteorological services are granted.  
The entity may have to pay the government an annual rent and draw a 
financial plan; moreover each country has rules regarding the airport 
revenues, for example whether they are to be transferred to the country 
government or not. (Tretheway, 2001; Zhang, 2010, Kong, 2010, AGPC, 
2011) 
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Strengths:  
- the ownership of airports rests with the local level 
- experiences worldwide have proven that this kind of governance is more 
cost-effective than the former one. 
 
Weaknesses:  
- like the previous model, the financing of airport infrastructures can be 
problematic as it depends on political decision making 
- local governments have limited funds and priorities which place airports 
low on the list. 
 
1.3 - Operations by independent not-for-profit corporations 
This structure is the current regime in Canada and stems from a gradual 
devolution from government operation that began in the early 1990’s. 
Canadian airport authorities operate airports under a 60 years lease 
agreement (extendable) after which the land and assets revert to the federal 
government. The authorities pay the federal government the ground lease 
plus a surcharge of 12% of airports’ overall revenue once the airport 
revenue exceeds 2.5 million Canadian dollars 
The Airport Authority in Canada is a private sector corporate alternative to 
the government corporation. The private sector corporation is not-for-profit. 
There are some significant differences between the government corporation 
format and that of the private not-for-profit airport authority model: the 
board’s members are selected independently from the government and so 
the members will stay in charge even when there is a government change. 
Moreover, authorities are financially independent from the government, the 
source of the revenues being the passenger taxation. Since raising of equity 
capital via the shares on the stock market is precluded, the only source of 
financing is daily operations, trough the Airport Improvement Fee (AIF) 
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which is charged on passengers. Similar charges on cargo users have been 
considered, but have been rejected due to the high degree of shippers’ price 
sensitivity. Non-aeronautical revenues have still little importance on 
absolute terms. The Canadian law doesn’t forbid the earning of a profit as 
long as these earnings are reinvested in airport infrastructure. 
In case of an investment to be made, the Authority must have considerable 
amount of money either to finance it or begin negotiation with lenders, 
otherwise the investment is to be delayed. 
These airports have objectives specified in their contracts with the 
government that largely mirror those of a publicly owned airport: 
maintenance of a revenue base, promoting the growth of air travel, regional 
development and sound financial and environmental management. 
(Tretheway, 2001; Zhang, 2010, Kong, 2010, AGPC, 2011) 
 
Strengths: 
- as not-for-profit entities, Canadian airports have not been subject to 
regulation (of aeronautical charges).  
 
Weaknesses: 
- it will take several years to build sufficient equity through retained 
earnings in order to establish the base needed to obtain partial debt 
financing for new investments. 
 
2. Private participation or involvement in airport ownership 
and operations 
 
A management contract, a lease as well as a minority participation in the 
equity share, is not to be intended as privatization but as private 
participation since the ownership and control rest within the government. 
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Again, a private entity managing retail outlets or duty free shops at an 
airport is not to be considered as private involvement but if a private 
company has acquired the right to manage the entire airport services or a 
single facility (a passenger terminal to make an example) versus the 
payment of a concession lease this is to be intended as private participation. 
This is one of the new tendencies in airport business that is spreading all 
around the world because of the airports’ urgent need of funding due to the 
diminishing public financial participation. Another reason for is the focus on 
marketing and commercial revenues: the non-aeronautical revenues share 
(parking, rental, shops …) has been growing since the last decades and now 
represents almost the 40-50% of the total revenue of an airport; it is possible 
to derive that information from the balance sheets of airport management 
companies.  
Airports are generally seen as attractive organizations to investors because 
the airport industry is supposed to have strong growth potential; moreover 
there are high entrance barriers due to the large capital needed and airports, 
especially the major ones, are perceived to face limited competition. 
(Graham, 2008) 
Private participation connotes either full ownership (the actual privatization) 
or majority/minority ownership by private investors.  
 
Although the majority of airports are still owned by the government (State, 
provincial government, municipalities or a combination of these) a growing 
number of airports are under some form of private participation: airport 
entities fully or partially privatized, private entities willing to buy, own and 
rule airport facilities leaving the rest in public ownership. Airport 
privatization can occur in different ways (Carney and Mew, 2003). The 
selection of the most appropriate type of privatization involves a complex 
decision-making process which will ultimately depend on the government’s 
objectives in seeking privatization. Factors such as the extent of control 
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which the government wishes to maintain; the quality and expertise of the 
current airport operators; further investment requirements and the financial 
robustness of the airports under consideration have to be taken into account. 
(Graham, 2008) 
 
2.1 - Public Private Partnerships – the concept of concession 
A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is broadly defined as “a cooperative 
venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of 
each partner that best meets clearly defined public needs through the 
appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards”. 
Unlike privatization, that requires the transfer of ownership, a PPP entails 
the private party taking substantial risk for financing a project’s capital and 
operating costs, e.g. designing and building a facility, and managing its 
operations to specified standards, normally over a significant period of time. 
In a PPP, the land typically belongs to the public institution, not to the 
private party, and the fixed assets developed in terms of the PPP are thus 
state property.  
Privatization entails the sale/disposal of state property and functions, 
including all the assets and liabilities associated with that property and 
functions. (Tretheway, 2001; Zhang, 2010, Kong, 2010, AGPC, 2011) 
 
So the key differences between public-private-partnership and 
‘privatization’ maybe summarized as follows: 
- Responsibility: under privatization the responsibility for delivery and 
funding a particular service rests with the private sector. PPP involves 
full retention of responsibility by the government for providing the 
service. 
- Ownership: while ownership rights under privatization are sold to the 
private sector along with associated benefits and costs, PPP may 
continue to retain the legal ownership of assets by the public sector. 
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- Nature of Service: while the nature and scope of services under 
privatization is determined by the private provider, under PPP the nature 
and scope of service is contractually determined between the two 
parties. 
- Risk and Reward: under privatization all the risks inherent in the 
business rest with the private sector. Under PPP, risks and rewards are 
shared between the public and the private sector. 
 
Various PPP models, especially when applied to specific airport facilities 
such as Passenger Terminals, Cargo Terminals, Runways, can be found. 
Whatever the model is, the major objectives are to improve economic 
performance and the level of service by involving a highly experienced 
airport operator, fund infrastructure needs by private investments, find 
financial resources in order to fund other government projects / priorities, 
transfer airport project development risks to a private party and improve 
airport profitability. The following are some statistics on PPP model 
adopted in the airport industry in the last ten years, from which we can see 
the practices of this model used in the world: 
 
Fig.1: Number of PPP initiatives at airports in the world between 1991 and 2011. (Source: 
World Bank Group PPI Database) 
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Fig. 2: Number of PPP at Airports by region, 1991-2011. (Source: World Bank Group PPI 
Database) 
 
 
Fig. 3: Amount of PPP investments at airports by region, 1991-2011. (Source: World Bank 
Group PPI Database) 
 
 
Fig. 4: PPP at airports by region and type, 1991-2011. (Source: World Bank Group PPI 
Database) 
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Fig. 5: PPP at airports by segment and region, 1991-2011. (Source: World Bank Group PPI 
Database) 
 
Here are some of the most important PPP models used in the industry: 
Project finance privatization: Project finance is the long term financing of 
infrastructure and industrial projects. It involves equity investors and a 
syndicate of banks or other lending institutions that provide loans to the 
operation. Recently, project financing principles have been applied to public 
infrastructure under public–private partnerships (PPP) or, Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) transactions (e.g., school facilities) as well as sports and 
entertainment venues. 
Several long-term contracts such as construction, supply, off-take and 
concession agreements, along with a variety of joint-ownership structures, 
are used to align incentives and deter opportunistic behaviour by any party 
involved in the project.  
Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract: an EPC contract 
provides for the obligation of the contractor to build and deliver the project 
facilities at a pre-determined fixed price, by a certain date, in accordance 
with certain specifications, and with certain performance warranties.  
Operation and Maintenance Agreement: the project company delegates the 
operation, maintenance and performance management of the project to an 
expert consultant operator. The operator could be one of the sponsors or 
third party operator. 
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Off-Take Agreement: the aim of this agreement is to provide the project 
company with stable and sufficient revenue to pay its debt obligation, 
covering the operating costs and provide the required return to the sponsors.  
Loan Agreement: it is an agreement between the project company 
(borrower) and the lenders involving the assumptions of loan drawing and 
repaying. It also contains the additional clauses to cover specific 
requirements of the project and project documents.  
Tripartite Deed: it sets out the circumstances in which the financiers may 
“step in” under the project contracts in order to remedy any default.  
Publicly-funded projects may also use additional financing methods such as 
tax increment financing or Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The PFI is a 
way of creating a PPP by funding public infrastructure projects with private 
capital. Beyond developing the infrastructure and providing finance, private 
sector companies operate the public facilities, in many cases using former 
public sector staff who have had their employment contracts transferred to 
the private sector through a process protecting their entrenched rights. 
(Hoffman, 2007; Sorge, 2004) 
Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) or build-operate-transfer (BOT) are 
forms of project financing, wherein a private entity receives a concession to 
finance, design, construct and operate a facility. Traditionally, the 
infrastructure is transferred to the government at the end of the concession 
period. Whenever the public administration delegates to a private entity to 
design and build infrastructure and to operate and maintain these facilities 
for a certain period, it is a BOT agreement. If the private entity also owns 
the works, we are talking about a BOOT. During this period the private 
party has the responsibly to raise the finance and is entitled to retain all 
revenues generated by the project and is the owner of the regarded facility. 
The facility will be transferred to the public administration without any 
remuneration. The private entity bears a substantial part of the risks: 
- 20 - 
 
political, technical and financing-related (riots, construction difficulties, rate 
fluctuation, over-estimation of cash flow forecast). BOT is new in airport 
financing and management but it is quickly spreading in the industry 
because it solves the problem of quickly raising large funds: for example, in 
India BOT concessions have been awarded for both New Delhi Indira 
Gandhi International Airport and Mumbai International Airport. 
(Smith&Charles, 1995; Sapte, 2006; Mishra, 2006) 
BLT (Build Lease Transfer): the private entity builds the project and leases 
it to the government. After the expiry of the leasing the ownership of the 
asset and the operational responsibility are transferred to the government at 
a previously agreed price. For foreign investors BLT provides good 
conditions because the project company maintains the property rights while 
avoiding operational risk. 
DBFO (Design Build Finance Operate): it is very similar to BOOT except 
that the government remains the owner of the facility, but it gets no direct 
payment from the users. The cash flows repay the investment and reward its 
shareholders. 
DCMF (Design Construct Manage Finance): a private entity is built to 
design, construct, manage, and finance a facility based on the specifications 
of the government. Project cash flows result from the government’s 
payment for the rent of the facility.  
(Tretheway, 2001; Zhang, 2010, Kong, 2010, AGPC, 2011) 
 
2.2 - Concession to operate: management contract 
Generally speaking, governments impose strict restrictions to both airlines 
and private entities wishing to operate airports; therefore the best solutions 
rather than acquire market shares are the concession and the management 
contract.  
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The management contract is seen to be the least radical privatization option 
because ownership remains with the government and the contractors take 
responsibility for the day-to-day operations. The airport operator is only 
constrained by the terms of the contract and it is allowed to seek a return to 
its shareholders. A management contract can involve a wide range of 
functions, such as technical operation of a production facility, management 
of personnel, accounting, marketing services and training. 
The government either pays an annual management fee to the contractor, 
usually related to the performance of the airport, or the contractor will pay 
the government a share of its revenues. In some cases, the right to operate 
the airport can be indefinite. In such instances, the right of the company to 
manage, rather than own, the airport is explicit.  
In Asia, this ownership structure is becoming increasingly popular and is 
often linked to the partial privatization of the airport operating company; to 
make some examples Malaysia Airports Berhad, who operates 20 airports 
including Kuala Lumpur, is approximately 75% state owned while the Thai 
government owns approximately 70% of the shares in the company Airports 
of Thailand which operates Thailand’s five main international airports 
 
Concession differs from lease contract and management contract in the 
rights of the operator and its remuneration. A lease gives a company the 
right to operate and maintain a public utility, while under a management 
contract the private entity is also responsible for the expansion and 
development of the airport. In both cases investments remain the 
responsibility of the owner, namely the public sector. To make an example, 
the participation of US airlines in the ownership of terminal buildings is a 
lease contract which moreover allows the airlines to control the entire 
terminals and to approve or veto capital spending plans. 
A concession involves also the commitment to carrying out the needed 
infrastructure investment at the concessionaire’s responsibility and 
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expenses. A contract has to be signed between the government and the 
concessionaire; in this contract the conditions, the payment terms (down 
payment, partly down payment and partly annual payment or annual 
payment) and the commitments are listed. 
After a public tendering process, the chosen private airport management 
operator will purchase the right to operate the ‘privatized’ airport for a 
defined period of time (commonly from 20 to 40-50 years depending on the 
country). This is a complex approach, which has high transactions costs and 
needs to be carefully designed and implemented to ensure that the private 
contracts achieve the government policy objectives. 
At present, most airports in Latin America and Africa are operated likewise; 
also most of the Italian airports plus Istanbul Ataturk, Cairo in Egypt and 
King Khalid International Airport in Saudi Arabia are run under a 
concession agreement. (Tretheway, 2001; Zhang, 2010, Kong, 2010, AGPC, 
2011) 
 
Strengths:  
- cost-effectiveness, since the developer/service provider is competitively 
selected, the operations are generally more cost effective than before; 
- higher productivity, because gains are linked to performance; 
- accelerated delivery, since the contracts generally have incentive and 
penalty clauses; 
- clear customer focus enhance satisfaction; 
- innovative decisions can be taken with greater flexibility thanks to the 
decentralization. Whereas user charges may exist, these are imposed in 
harmony with local conditions. 
 
Weaknesses:  
- fear that social, environmental or other aspects would not be given top 
priority; 
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- considerably negative financial impacts in the case the partnership has to 
be repudiated; 
- possible transfer of risks from the private sector to the public sector, e.g. 
risk of bankruptcy; 
- insufficient experience of the partners, particularly of the public sector 
while contracting out such projects; private companies use their 
endeavour and potential to negotiate better conditions for themselves; 
- as a consequence of the long-term of concessions, the mandatory 
expenses grow and the hidden debt arises. 
 
2.3 - Partial privatization 
Privatization can occur through the transfer of both ownership and 
management control from government to private groups, foreign founded 
enterprises or natural persons. The process start with the establishment of 
joint ventures through trading shares on the stock market (IPOs) or through 
a private bidding process.  
An initial public offering (IPO) is the first sale of stock by a company. An 
IPO allows a company to tap a wide pool of investors to provide it with 
capital for future growth, repayment of debt or working capital.  
“Shares outstanding” is the total number of shares that the target company 
has: it includes shares owned by insiders and large institutions, “restricted” 
shares and the float (the “freely” tradable shares). The smaller the float is, 
the more volatile a stock can become: in fact, if there are few shares in the 
float, this means that shares are harder to buy and the price will go up fast. 
The advantages within a flotation are the possibility to have access to new 
capitals, diversify the equity base, gain a higher public profile and a greater 
potential to acquire new business on the stock market and have multiple 
financing options; while the disadvantages are the vulnerability to market 
fluctuation, significant costs and regulatory requirements to comply with, 
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the necessity to disclose financial data and the relation with the equity 
shares’ holders. 
It’s important to note that different sets of investors bid in auctions versus 
the open market: more institutions bid, fewer private individuals bid. 
Historically, some of IPOs have been under-priced. The effect of “initial 
under-pricing” an IPO is to generate additional interest in the stock when it 
first becomes publicly traded. This can lead to gains for investors who have 
been allocating shares of the IPO at the offering price. However, under-
pricing an IPO results in lost capital. On the contrary, if a stock is offered to 
the public at a higher price, the underwriters may have trouble in selling 
shares.  
On the other hand, a trade sale is the disposal of a company’s shares or 
assets (and liabilities), in whole or in part. Usually, the buyer seeks to grow 
his business while the seller wants to generate a financial return on his 
invested capital. This method is used to open up the prospect of 
collaboration on larger projects. The term Trade Sale is mostly used in the 
context of Venture Capital and refers to the sale of a company in its early 
stages. Trade sales are largely used both in Europe both in the US. 
(Gregoriou, 2006; Killian, 2006) 
If a partial privatization is chosen, a decision making powers shall be 
carefully allocated, so as to balance and protect interests of both the public 
and the private sector. There are two different scenarios: airports in which 
the private investors’ share is the minority (Athens, Rome, Dusseldorf, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg and airports in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico 
to make some examples) and airports with the majority share held by a 
single private investor (Copenhagen, Moscow Domodedovo, Auckland and 
Wellington International Airports). In the latter situation, the majority share 
might represent a binding condition for the involvement; however there is 
de facto little difference between minority and majority ownership.  
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These forms of governance have been successful in bringing a more 
commercial orientated view to airport operations and strategies: the airport 
authorities decide upon air routes, retail development and commercial 
strategies. A significant increase in the number of carriers serving the 
airport (including low cost carriers) has also been noticed. The private 
ownership is widely seen as a mean to get to cost control and efficiency as 
long as the private investors are looking to earn a rate of return on their 
investment.  
 
2.4 - Full privatization 
The full handover of the assets and shares from public to private may be 
realized through IPOs or trade sale. Airports are sold to private investors 
among which airport management companies and/or infrastructure 
investment companies, along with pension funds. The ownership may be 
dispersed among a number of shareholders (e.g., BAA plc) or closely held 
(e.g., TradePort Corporation which leases and operates the Hamilton 
Ontario airport). The British Airport Authority (BAA) is the oldest example 
of an airport privatization implemented via an Initial Public Offering (IPO). 
In Australia airports were corporatized in the 1980s and then privatized 
from 1996 onwards (Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and then Sidney) on the 
base of a lease agreement of 50 years plus an automatic extension of 49 
years, after which the airports revert to the federal government.  
Airports entirely owned and operated by the private sector have the 
obligation to maximize returns to shareholders. As a result, management 
decisions are generally focused on ensuring that the airport generates a 
profit in the short term. 
In some cases, the private corporation may own the airport lands and 
facilities outright (BAA plc), or may simply lease the land on a long term 
basis (Hamilton Ontario). Leases may be pay-as-you-go (Hamilton Ontario) 
or prepaid (Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth in Australia).  
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The issue of lease versus ownership is important in determining whether the 
government has any residual liabilities, or whether it can step in and 
immediately operate should an airport file for or be brought into bankruptcy. 
As well, lease versus ownership has implications for land development, as 
tenants of the airport corporation will require assurances from the 
government landlord that leases will be honored should the government 
landlord re-assume control of the property.  
The recent trend towards privatization has slowed (ACI 2010). This can be 
attributed to the recent global economic downturn, which has adversely 
affected the cost and availability of finance for large projects and driven 
down the expected sale prices. To make some example, 30% stake in AENA 
was offered in 2008, but later postponed pending the improvement of 
market conditions; likewise the privatization process of Madrid, Barcelona, 
Amsterdam Schipol and Chicago’s O’Hare Airports are yet to be resolved. 
The economic worldwide crisis is one of the reasons why at present the 
majority of privatizations are partial: in most countries airports fully 
privatized are set for general aviation and aviation clubs.(Tretheway, 2001; 
Zhang, 2010, Kong, 2010, AGPC, 2011) 
 
Strengths: 
- the private shareholders have permanent members in the corporation's 
Board of Directors, thus enhancing the coherence in long term 
investment orientation; 
- private investors foster financial transparency; 
- most important, the private sector investor can provide all or part of the 
initial equity needed to kick-start the financing process in case of 
investments to be made without relying only on the government funds; 
thus the risk is shared between the stakeholders. In return, the private 
sector investor must be given an opportunity to make a reasonable return 
on their investment in the airport; 
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- at major airports, the revenues come from both aeronautical both 
commercial activities; the former are more regulated but the latter are 
not. Moreover, the shares of private management companies in the 
capital stock are often on the positive; 
- the concept of airport management industry is gaining importance 
throughout the world; 
- the airport management will become much more customer service 
oriented and will increase competition among airlines to provide choice 
and cost reduction for passengers. 
 
Weaknesses: 
- the degree and intrusiveness of government intervention through 
regulation and oversight might limit the development of commercial 
value; 
- the full private ownership may lead to a private monopoly at airports; 
- citizens believe that the government should play an active role in 
developing and supervising airports (as they are perceived as strategic 
catalysts for local economic growth) and also be involved in regulation, 
supervision and ensure safety and quality of service; 
- externalities and employment conditions are given low priority; 
- airlines fear lower level of service, higher landing fees and user charges. 
 
3. Remarkable examples of ownership structure in the world 
 
3.1 - Trade sale 
With this option, some parts of the airport or the entire airport will be sold 
to a trade partner or consortium of investors, usually through a public 
tender. If the trade sale involves strategic partners rather than mere investors 
it is usually a way to take into account also the technological managerial 
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expertise of the partners. That is to say that the facility of the airport is 
privatized and the private owner has the knowledge basis to run and manage 
the structure so that to achieve strategic development goals: AdP bought 
25% share of Liège airport in order to develop it as an alternate for freight 
activities.  
Therefore, strategic partners or consortia which lease airports on long-term 
basis are either established airport operators or at least have airport 
management experience; notable exempla may be Malta airport (a share has 
been acquired by Vienna airport) and Naples (BAA). When discussing 
about airport privatization via trade sale, it does not seem important that the 
acquirer is a fully privatized entity: both former Aer Rianta and Schiphol 
group were public-owned entities but showed private interest in the 
privatization processes of several other airports in the world. In her book, A. 
Graham (2008) provides a table with a list of some notable privatization via 
trade sale which took place up to 2007. 
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Table 1: Airport privatization through trade sale. (Source: Graham, 2008) 
 
3.2 - Concession 
The airport Management Company or consortium will purchase a 
concession or lease to operate the ‘privatized’ airport for a defined period of 
time through a tendering process. Normally an initial payment plus a 
percentage on the total income or an annual fee is requested to the 
concessionaire. 
It is a less strong but more complex approach if compared with the former, 
because the concessionaire bears the entire economic risk and is also 
responsible for operations and the fulfillment of the development plan. 
Moreover, a medium-to-long time span is fixed in order to both allow the 
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concessionaire to recover its costs and the government to keep a control 
over the airport.  
 
Table 2: Airport privatization through concession. (Source: Graham, 2008) 
 
As it is possible to derive from Table 2, this form of agreement was very 
common in the 1990s and in developing countries in particular (Andrew and 
Dochia, 2006). For example, 33 Argentinian airports were given in 
concession for 30 years to the consortium Aeroportuertos Argentinos 2000 a 
partner of whom is SEA, the Milan airport company; the consortium is due 
to pay 171 million US$ a year for the first 5 years of the agreement and a 2 
billion US$ investment has been forecasted. In 2007 the fee was changed to 
15% per cent of annual revenue due to the severe political and economic 
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crisis the country was experimenting. In more recent years concessions have 
increasingly been used in Eastern Europe and Asia with many involving a 
public–private partnership (Hooper, 2002). 
Other countries which have had concession agreements for their airports 
include the Dominican Republic, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Peru, 
Tanzania and India. 
 
3.3 - Privatization through project finance 
From a stricter point of view this form of agreement is a nuance of the 
previous one because a company owns the right to build and then operate an 
entire airport or a particular facility for a certain period of time and then the 
ownership reverts to the government. It is not important whether the 
company is fully privatized or not. Unlike the previous case, a huge capital 
is not requested by the owner since the project financer will have to carry on 
all the costs of building or re-developing the facility and this cost is often 
yet considerable. After the intervention, the financer holds the new or re-
developed structure in order to recover the costs and earn all or a part of the 
revenues until the facility returns to the government.  
As it has been said, the BOT (build-operate-transfer) form is the most 
common form of project finance which comprises many nuances like build–
transfer (BT), build–rent–transfer (BRT), design–construct–manage–finance 
(DCMF), build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) or rehabilitate–own–transfer 
(ROT) projects.  
One of the first major projects of this type was Terminal 3 at Toronto’s 
Lester B. Pearson International Airport which was developed as a BOT 
project by Huang and Danczkay and Lockheed Air Terminals (Ashford and 
Moore, 1999). The Eurohub at Birmingham airport was built under a BOT-
type arrangement by a company comprising, with different amount of 
shares, Birmingham airport, British Airways, local authorities, National Car 
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Parks, Forte and John Laing Holdings. This terminal is now a fully owned 
and managed facility of Birmingham International Airport plc.  
Likewise, in many cases it is possible to note that one of the shareholders is 
either a powerful airline brand or an affirmed international airport operator: 
a few examples may be: 
- the new Athens airport at Spata Eleftherios Venizelos (the BOOT 
contract was awarded to a private consortium led by German 
construction company Hochtief (36,125%) along with ABB Calor Emag 
Schaltanlagen AG (5%), H.Krantz-TKT GmBH (3.75%) and Flughafen 
Athen-Spata Projektgesellschaft mBH (0.125%)); 
- Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila (Fraport and PairCargo 
won the bid to build the international passenger Terminal 3) 
- Queen Alia International airport in Jordan, where The Edgo Group has 
been awarded the expansion project of the Airport. The Edgo Group is 
part of a consortium led by Aeroports de Paris Management, along with 
Edgo Group,  Joannou & Paraskevaides (Overseas) Ltd., J&P-Avax, 
Abu Dhabi Investment Company (ADIC) and Noor Financial 
Investment Company.  
 
Table 3: Airport privatization through project finance - PPP. (Source: Graham, 2008) 
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Fig. 6: Share of PPP initiative through project finance by region. (Source: Serebrisky, 2012) 
 
In this paragraph notable cases of privatization from all over the world have 
been analyzed thanks to the information provided by many authors in their 
books and in their papers or collected on the websites of airport companies 
and reports. In the next paragraph and even more specifically in the next 
chapters, some countries will be taken into account. Information collected 
about movements (one movement is the combination of one landing and one 
take-off), passengers traffic and ownership will be presented and indexes or 
performance indicators will be calculated and appointed in order to describe 
the air traffic market and the situation with special reference to competition 
and cooperation. 
 
The countries which have been taken into account have – obviously - some 
characteristics in common, like: 
- In the target country there is not a single international airport that 
gathers by far the majority of the total traffic output, both from the 
aircraft movements and the passenger output point of view 
- For each target country, data have been collected for quite a long time 
period, in most cases only data from 2005 to 2010 have been presented 
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(2011 data are still incomplete and therefore only the main trends have 
been reported in the next chapters) but also information for a longer time 
spam are available 
- For each country, the top ten airports regarding the total passenger 
output during the target year have been taken into account plus, where 
present, the following airports in the chart with at least 5 million 
passengers handled per year; this choice has been made in compliance 
with the definition of ACI Europe: “ACI Europe's Small & Medium Size 
Airports Action Group (SMAG) groups together airports with less than 
5 million Passengers”. It has been decided to focus on this distinction 
because airport classifications all around the world are very different 
and they reflect in most cases the specific situation of the country. To 
make some example, Table 4 and 5 are presented. 
 
 
Table 4: Canadian, American, British and Italian National Airport System Network 
classification. (Source: Web) 
 
International National Regional Local commercial Satellite
Primary airports Commercial service
Reliever airports Public
Gateway international Regional airports Local airports
Intercontinental International National Local General aviation
Italian national airport system
General aviation
Military airportsLocal interest airports
Canadian System
Us airport network classification
British national airport system
National integrated airport system
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Table 5: New classification of National airports by the Philippines’ Government. (Source: Web) 
 
The uncertainties are present also when trying to group together airports on 
the basis of the characteristics of infrastructures they have: in particular we 
have the classification provided by the FAA (Federal Aviation 
Naia Mactan Clark
Subic Laoag Pto. Principesa
Kalibo Zamboanga Davao
Tambler
Bacolod Butuan Cagayan de oro
Cotabato Dipolog Dumaguete
Iloilo Legazapi Naga
Pagadian Roxas San jose
Tacloban Tagbilaran Tuguegarao
Antique Baguio Basco
Busuanga Calbayog Catarman
Caticlan Camiguin Cuyo
Jolo Marinduque Masbate
Ormoc Romblon Sanga-sanga
Siargao Surigao Tandag
Virac
Alabat Allah valley Bagabag
Baler Bantayan Biliran
Bislig Borongan Bulan
Calapan Cagayan de sulu Catbalogan
Cauayan Daet Guiuan
Hilongos Iba Iligan
Itbayat Ipil Jomalig
Lingayen Liloy Lubang
Maasin Malabang Mamburao
Mati Ozamis Palanan
Pinamalayan Plaridel Rosales
San Fernando Siocon Siquijor
Sorsogon Ubay Vigan
Wasig
International
Principal class 1
Principal class 2
Community
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines - Classification of airports
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Administration - US) and the one provided by the ICAO (International Civil 
Aviation Organization), summarized in the two tables below 
 
Table 6: FAA Airport Design Group Classification. (Source: A.A. Trani – Virginia Tech) 
 
 
Table 7: ICAO Aerodrome Reference Code Classification. (Source: ICAO) 
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4. Airport ownership at some notable European countries 
 
Table 8: Ownership at some European Airports. (Author) 
 
4.1 - Italy 
The air traffic liberalization in Italy gave private investors the possibility to 
enter the market buying shares in airport management enterprises. As it will 
be shown in the next chapter, in Italy still survive medium-sized airport with 
100% shares held by public entities on different hierarchical level side by 
side with airports whose management capital is mixed between public and 
private. Privatization allowed a more commercial oriented evolution in 
those airports that have been somehow “privatized”. Italy has a very 
complex airport network with few big airports and a lot of airport with less 
than 2 million passengers/year, often very close to bigger airport and 
therefore with little possibility to develop further. Few of those little airports 
are though necessary to satisfy the inhabitants’ need to get to the continental 
part of the country and to give, vice-versa, those territory some form of 
Stockholm Arlanda Helsinki Vantaa Dublin
Barcelona Lisbon Portela Madrid Barajas
Geneva Coltrin Munich
Manchester Oslo
Istambul Ataturk
Amsterdam Schiphol Rome Fiumicino Paris Charles de Gaulle
Athens Frankfurt Milan Malpensa
Brussels Hamburg Compenhagen Kastrup
Rome Ciampino Paris Orly Vienna
Dusseldorf Zurich
London Gatwick London Stansted London Heathrow
Fully privatized
European Airports
Publically owned and operated
Corporatized
Concessioned
Partially privatized
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accessibility: this is the case of airports located in small islands like Elba, 
Lampedusa and Pantelleria but also of the airports located in the two biggest 
islands of the country: Sicily and Sardinia.  
Therefore, while somewhere in Italy there is still the necessity of airports 
whose only aim is to provide accessibility and satisfy the traffic demand, 
there are also airports whose management are developing growing interest 
in the managerial side.  
As a consequence of liberalization, the right to manage and develop the 
airport facilities switched from the central government to managerial 
entities. In Italy, Act n. 537/93 later revised by DM 12/11/97 n.521 and 
paragraphs 704-6 of “Codice della Navigazione” statue that an airport 
management entity must be a corporate enterprise (not necessarily Italian, 
provided that the foreign enterprise has a base in Italy and Italian enterprises 
are allowed to take part to public tenders in the enterprise’s country) and 
must win a public tender on the basis of development plan and economic 
capability.    
The Departments of Transport and Economy and, in particular cases, also 
the Department of Defense give the winner the concession to run the airport 
for a period up to 40 years during which the enterprise is expected to realize 
the investment plan, provide the level of service expected and keep the 
qualifications required under the periodic control by ENAC (the Italian 
agency for Air Traffic). 
Under this kind of governance, the airport services must still be provided 
because they are public service utilities but they are run on a commercial 
basis; the management company is responsible for the supply of those 
services and for their quality. Italian regulation allows three different levels 
of concession: 
- Full: the airport management enterprise is in charge of the whole airport 
services and collects money from air traffic royalties. 
- 39 - 
 
 
Table 9: Italian airports under full concession to operate. (Source: ENAC)  
 
- Partial: the deputed Airport Management is responsible for the provision 
of Airport Terminal Services. The loyalties collected are those regarding 
boarding and debark of passengers and duties/freight. The guideline n° 
141-T from the Department of transport considers mandatory the 
presence of at a least one private investors in the capital share to turn a 
partial concession to operate into a full one. Under a partial concession 
to operate, from the legal point of view, the airport management is not 
allowed to decide on repairing or extensions of airside structures, but 
often the central government (via ENAC) gave them the power to realize 
those repairing. Therefore, it has been decided to foster the transition 
from partial to full concession to operate. Nevertheless, the worsening 
economic situation in 2011, forced the Government to stop the pending 
transitions and to focus on the quick development of an Airports 
Development Plan at a National Level, a topic now seen as no more 
deferrable.  
 
Airport from Airport from
Rome FCO e CIA 1974 Bari, Brindisi, Foggia, Taranto 2003
Milan LIN e MXP 2001 Naples 2003
Venice 2001 Florence 2003
Torino - Bologna 2004
Genova 2009 Olbia 2004
Bergamo 2002 Trieste 2007
Pisa 2006 Alghero 2007
Cagliari 2007 Pescara 2008*
Catania 2007 Verona 2008
Palermo 2007 Lamezia Terme 2008
Italian airports under full concession to operate (2010)
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Table 10: Italian airports under partial concession to operate. (Source: ENAC) 
 
- Government run airports: only a few, small airports have are run this 
way 
 
The management enterprise is responsible for the organization of airport 
activities within its scope, the repairing, the extensions and the 
modernization of airport infrastructures.The D.L. 251/1995 stated that the 
control of the majority of the airport management enterprise’s shares by 
either the Central Government, the regional government, municipalities or 
public entities was no longer mandatory. Regions, provincial 
administrations, municipalities, chambers of commerce as well as private 
investors might hold the majority of the shares. 
Nevertheless, the procedure is due to be slow because of the public tender 
needed and private investors might perceive it as uncertain. 
This makes the Italian path towards airport privatization, as intended by the 
EU, behind schedule and, according to the “Corte dei Conti”, a “clear 
identification of the managerial aspects is still missing” (Corte dei Conti, 
19/5/2000, n. 45/rel in Riv. Corte Conti, 2000, fasc. 3, 48).  
The constraint seems to be the necessity by the public sector to dispose part 
of its shares because the mere change of legal personality is considered not 
sufficient (sent. n°466/1993, Corte costituzionale) (Masutti, 2009). 
Airport Airport Airport
Albenga Parma Grosseto
Ancona Perugia Lucca
Asiago Reggio Calabria Oristano
Bolzano Reggio Emilia Padova
Brescia Rimini Treviso
Crotone Salerno Venezia lido
Cuneo Siena Vicenza
Forlì Trapani
Italian airports under partial concession to operate (2010)
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4.2 - United Kingdom 
As it has already been previously said, the UK was the first country airport 
privatization took place in. Nowadays, the majority of British airports are 
partially or fully privatized. 
The British Airports Authority was established in 1965 (Airport Authority 
Act) to take responsibility for three former state-owned airports - London 
Heathrow Airport, London Gatwick Airport and London Stansted Airport. 
In the following few years, the authority acquired responsibility for 
Glasgow International Airport, Edinburgh Airport, Southampton Airport 
and Aberdeen Airport. As part of Margaret Thatcher's moves to privatize 
government owned assets, the Airports Act (1986) established that the 
British Airport Authority was to be dismantled. BAA took its place and was 
then floated on the stock market to raise capital funds: the initial 
capitalization of BAA plc was worth £1,225 million. In the early 1990s, the 
company sold Prestwick International Airport (now known as Glasgow 
Prestwick Airport). 
Baa operated airports were and currently are run on a commercial, for-
profit, basis. 
Three types of airport ownership are common in the UK: fully privatized 
airports (Liverpool airport and those owned by BAA are an example) which 
are owned and managed by a private stakeholder, partially privatized 
airports owned and operated by joint local entities and private investors 
(Birmingham and Newcastle airports for example) and total public 
ownership (Manchester). BAA-Ferrovial, Peel Airport, Macquarie and 
Manchester airport possess shares in most of the regional airports. 
 
4.3 - Germany 
In 1982, the Federal Government announced a program to privatize airports 
against the background of budget restrictions. Although for more than a 
- 42 - 
 
decade nothing had happened, five out of 18 international airports have so 
far been partially privatized (in the form of minority private participation), 
namely Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Hanover, and Saarbrücken. 
Several regional airports were also privatized to a varying extent and some 
were totally in private sector hands. Frankfurt-Hahn, Lübeck, 
Mönchengladbach, Oberpfaffenhofen and Schwerin-Parchim are a few 
examples of such regional airports.  
The traditional ownership structure in the Federal Republic of Germany was 
a shared ownership between Land (State), Kreis (county), and/or Stadt 
(city). The operation of airports was corporatized as limited liability 
companies (GmbH) or as joint stock companies (AG).  
Therefore, there are three kinds of ownership structure in Germany. 
The first option is an airport owned by a corporation of public entities 
namely local, regional and federal government. The municipality is often in 
charge of managing the airport. This is the ownership structure of Stuttgard 
and Munich airport. The same situation was present in Berlin too with West 
Berlin Tegel and Tempelhof airports. In the spring of 1991, Tegel, 
Tempelhof and East Berlin’s Schönefeld were pooled within a single 
holding company, the Berlin Brandenburg Flughafen Holding GmbH 
(BBF), which was owned by the Federal Government (26%) and the States 
of Berlin and Brandenburg (37% each). Then Berlin Tempelhof was closed 
and the same will happen to Tegel in June 2012 as Berlin Schonefeld will be 
expanded to become the only airport in berlin under the name of Berlin 
Brandenburg International.  
The second option is a public-private ownership, where the ownership is 
usually local government entities’ and the private entity manages the airport. 
This is the case of Dusseldorf and Hamburg airport. 
The third option is less common because it normally involves small and 
secondary airports, like Niederrhein, which are owned and managed by the 
private sector. 
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The privatization process in Germany started in the late 1990s and it is still 
taking place. Queerly, the reasons leading to a partial privatization of the 
airport were fortuitous: a wing of Dusseldorf airport was destroyed by a fire 
and the state of Nordrhein-Westphalia decided to sell the 50% of the airport 
because there were no funds to invest in the reconstruction of the airport. 
Another notable airport to be partially privatized was Hamburg in 2000: the 
city of Hamburg still controls the 51% of the shares while the private 
investors were Hochtief Airport GmbH and AerRianta International; 
AerRianta’s shares were subsequently bought by Hochtief in 2007.  
The main airport of the country is Frankfurt’s and it has been partially 
privatized too. In 2001 part of the shares were floated in the stock market 
via IPO and they were bought by different stakeholders, including Lufthansa 
(10%) and airport employees (29%). 
As to Hanover, its shares are split between State of Lower Saxony (70%) 
and Fraport (30%), this being another example of partial privatization. 
Although Federal legislative, policy and supervisory functions are vested in 
the Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing, administration and 
regulation are significantly devolved to the States. Under Section 43 of the 
Air Traffic Licensing Regulations, airport charges remain subject to 
traditional cost-based regulation with a single till approach. At a few 
airports involving private interests, however, incentive-based regulation 
such as price cap has been implemented.(Muller et al., 2009) 
 
4.4 - France 
Traditionally, the French Civil aviation sector has been heavily influenced 
by government. It is regulated by the DGAC (Direction Générale de 
l’Aviation Civile) under the authority of the French Transport Ministry, 
which is as well a service provider. The French state is the owner of the 
airports and they were operated as public institutions (ADP, Bâle-
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Mulhouse) or by the Chambers of commerce (long-term concession 
contracts). 
While the French population has a share of about 1% of the world 
population, its air traffic accounts for 7% of the world in 2003 (OECD, 
2004). The dominant airline in France is the Air France-KLM Group, which 
still belongs partly to the French state (17,9 % share, Air France, 2008 ) 
However, this frame came to a change in 2006 with the partial privatization 
of Aéroports de Paris (ADP). For the first time, a regulation contract 
between ADP and the State was signed. Moreover, the act Aéroports/2005 
decided the division of French airports in 3 groups:  
- The “Société Anonyme Aéroports de Paris”, whose majority of the 
shares is in the central government’s hands, owns and manages the 3 
major airports in the so-called Île-de-France (Paris-Charles de Gaulle, 
Paris-Orly et Paris-Le Bourget) plus 10 aerodromes and heliports. The 
same act ratifies the partial privatization of AdP, with the only 
restriction that the majority of the shares must rest with the central 
government. 
- Major regional airports, which are considered strategic in the national air 
transport network: Bordeaux-Mérignac, Lyon - Saint-Exupéry and 
Lyon-Bron, Marseille-Provence, Aix-Les Milles and Marignane-Berre, 
Montpellier-Méditerranée, Nice-Côte d'Azur and Cannes-Mandelieu, 
Strasbourg-Entzheim, Toulouse-Blagnac, AiméCésaire-Le Lamentin, 
PôleCaraïbes International-Le Raizet, Saint-Denis - Gillot, Cayenne-
Rochambeau. The ownership of those airports rests within the central 
government but the management is going to be transferred from 
Chamber of commerce to Airport management groups (sociétés 
aéroportuaires) to be established with the participation of central 
government, municipalities, Chamber of commerce and private investors 
willing to enter the market. 
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- Small regional airports (more or less 150 airports): the ownership will be 
transferred from the central government to the regional 
government/municipalities, according to the law Libertés et 
Responsabilités / 2004, in order to modernize the system and assure the 
fulfillment of traffic demand also at not strategic airports. In this group 
(which handled approximately 6% of total passenger traffic in 2006) 
there are both general aviation airport (formerly under the direct control 
of the central government) and commercial airports with more than 1 
million passengers/year (formerly under the competencies of national 
Chamber of Commerce or already conventionally transferred to 
collectivities). Also private sector investors are allowed to enter these 
societies. The established airport management societies (municipalities 
or consortia) will be in charge of ownership, daily operations, 
development and economic regulation, while the “Direction générale de 
l’aviation civile” is still responsible of the provision of air-navigation, 
security and border offices services and keeps the right of inspection. 
The handover is established through the signature of an agreement 
between the central government and the target collectivity or through a 
document presented by the Air transport ministry which establishes how 
the handover is taking place and how the airports will be exploited 
 
Airports named in the Order n° 2005-1070 are not part of any of these 
groups: in most cases they are military airports or part of the so-called 
Collectivités d’Outre-mer. 
The French airport network is not the result of a centralized organization; 
therefore the actual traffic demand composition has never been taken into 
consideration actually and this inefficient organization has led to waste of 
money by the central government. Because of the lack of coherence at a 
national level and of the lack of a strategic plan between closer airports, the 
majority of 3rd group airports are underused or too developed according to 
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the traffic they handle. The devolution poses the issue of airport network 
reorganization and rationalization in the hands of collectivities (“Court de 
Comptes”, 2008) 
 
Switching our attention to AdP’s partial privatization, an IPO between the 
31 May 2006 and the 14 June 2006 was called. It envisaged different 
conditions for each typology of investor: French private investors, French 
public investors, International investors and ADP-employees. The IPO 
brought to this new asset: the central government keeps 67.5% of the shares, 
AdP-employees the 3.2% and all other investors a combined 29.2% share. 
(DGAC, 2007 ; ICAO, 2008 ; AdP, 2011) 
 
4.5 - Spain 
Aena Aeropuertos has a network of 47 airports and two heliports in Spain 
and direct or indirect involvement in the management of 127 airports 
worldwide. These airports range from main hubs (Madrid and Barcelona, 
both above 30 million passengers/year) to small airports that are used by 
less than 20,000 passengers/year. 
The main functions of AENA, among others, are: 
- The disposition, management, coordination, operation, maintenance and 
administration of public civil airports, aerodromes and heliports. 
- The planning, execution, managing and monitoring of investments in 
airports’ infrastructure. 
The Government has recently announced that AENA will be restructured in 
two ways: 
- Participation of regional governments in the management of airports 
located in their territories. 
- Participation of private companies. 
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Spain has appointed an independent entity to estimate the value of Aena 
Airports and of the companies operating in Madrid-Barajas and Barcelona-
El Prat in order to privatize up to 49% of its capital. This privatization has 
been decided in response to the EU urge towards Spanish government to 
lower the public-debt load and reduce its financing needs.  
 
The bidding process for both Madrid and Barcelona airports was launched 
in July 2010 and should have been completed by the end of November 2011 
in order to permit the winning group to take over the airports in early 2012. 
Potential bidders for Madrid Barajas include a group led by Ferrovial SA, 
the leading shareholder of BAA, which owns London Heathrow and 
Stansted airports. Groups led by GMR Infrastructure Ltd., Aeroports de 
Paris, Germany’s Fraport AG, Spain’s Grupo San José and Changi Airports 
International also indicated they would bid.  
Spanish Abertis Infraestructuras SA is leading a bidding group for 
Barcelona El Prat, and the groups led by Ferrovial, GMR, AdP, Fraport and 
Changi Airports International are also seeking to bid.  
Both airports will be operated by private companies over a 20-year period, 
with an option for a five-year license extension. The government also 
launched the sale of 49% of Aena, but the Minister said that “the completion 
of the sale as well as the final percentage will depend on market conditions 
in order to find the maximum value for the company”. 
The privatization process slowed down and then was postponed at the end 
of 2011 because of the fear that the effects of economic downturn would 
harm the evaluation of AENA’s assets and of the 2 airports to be sold.  
 
Details about AENA reform are not publicly disclosed yet, but rumors 
report that AENA will keep the control of the remaining major airports but 
private companies will now be allowed to buy shares of AENA capital. 
Thus, the reform does not seem to be oriented towards full privatization. 
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Regarding the participation of regional governments, it is also still 
undefined how it will be implemented. The intention seems to be that 
regional officials might participate in airport key planning decisions 
(infrastructure enlargements, allocation of commercial space, etc) but daily 
management would remain in the hands of AENA. 
 
4.6 - Turkey 
Starting in 1993, the General Directorate of State Airports Authority (SAA) 
has partially privatized the major airport terminals in Turkey by using 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) methods. One of the main reasons for 
privatization was that the number of passengers served by Turkish airports 
doubled between 1988 and 1993. As a result, the existing capacity not only 
became inadequate, but also the service was granted at a low level of 
service. Therefore the large capital required for terminal enlargements or led 
the government to the first airport privatization in 1993, which was the 
tender of BOT for Antalya Airport Terminal 1, prepared and implemented 
by the SAA independent of the PA. (Özenen, 2003). Similar contracts 
followed over the next decade. The operating period granted for BOT 
contracts varied significantly, depending on the income that could be 
received from the operation and the cost of the terminal construction 
according to predetermined plans by the SAA. 
The largest amount spent for BOT investment was at Istanbul Atatürk 
airport with 306 million USD. It was followed by Ankara Airport by 188 
million USD and Antalya (Terminal 1 and 2) by 136.6 million USD. 
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Fig. 7: Privatization implementation in Turkey. (Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry 
Privatization Administration) 
 
As it has been presented before, with BOT agreements the investments are 
financed by the private sector but in the long term the government remains 
the owner. The airport privatization in Turkey can be summarized as a two 
stage process: in the first phase the winning operating company is required 
to build a terminal according to the contract and gets the operating rights for 
that period. At the end of this period, the operating company is obliged the 
give all the rights back to the SAA. Since significant efficiency gains had 
been observed in both the construction process and the daily operations, at 
the end of the contract period the SAA agreed to transfer the operating 
rights of the newly acquired terminals via long-term leasing back to the 
private sector. The interested companies were asked to submit their bids in 
price auctions. The one with the highest bid obtained the operating rights for 
a predetermined period.  
For Istanbul Atatürk airport, the lease period was set at 15.5 years. Four 
consortia originally considered taking place in the tender. However, ADP-
SNC Lavalin dropped out before the auction started. Alsim-Alarko & 
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Corporation America was not allowed to take part in the auction, as they did 
not fulfill the requirements set by the SAA. Only Malaysia Airports and 
TAV participated in the sealed bid auction and bid 1.59 billion USD and 2.1 
billion USD respectively. Following this, separate price negotiations 
between the parties and the SAA determined the winner TAV with a lease 
amount of 3 billion USD9. 
The situation for Antalya airport was slightly different, as the two 
international terminals were operated by two different private firms 
following the original BOT implementation. In 2007 the SAA prepared a 
tender for the two international and one domestic terminal. The tender 
followed the same two-stage process as in Istanbul Atatürk with sealed bid 
auction and subsequent price negotiations. Celebi Holding was not allowed 
to participate in the auction, as they did not fulfill the requirements set by 
the SAA. Newly established consortia Fraport-IC Ictas Holding overbid 
TAV with 3.2 billion USD and it was given the operating rights of those 
three terminals until 2024.11 (SAA, 2008) (Ülkü, 2010) 
 
4.7 - Other European countries 
Portugal, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Israel: in most cases airports 
in those countries are owned and operated by the central government. 
In other cases, semi-autonomous bodies or companies, but still under public 
ownership, operate the airports. It is not important at this stage whether 
these organizations managed more than one airport (as the AerRianta Irish 
Airports, now Dublin Airport Authority) or just one major airport 
(Amsterdam airport) but the topic will be discussed broadly later. 
Finally, there are countries in which only the major airports have been 
partially privatized. This is the case of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Hungary, Czech Republic and Republic of Slovakia, Malta, Romania and 
Switzerland. At Zürich airport, the Zürich Airport Authority, which was 
owned by the Canton of Zürich, was responsible for the planning and 
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overall operation of the airport and the airfield infrastructure, while a mixed 
public private company, FIG, managed and constructed the terminal 
infrastructure. The federal government of Austria for instance has not only 
sold its 50% stake in Vienna airport but also the 50% stake in regional 
international airports such as Graz, Innsbruck, Linz to regional and local 
administrations (Schneider, 2004, 150). Other countries like the Slovak 
Republic have done the same.  
With reference to Greece, only Athens airport has been partially privatized: 
in 2001 Hochtief bought 45% of the shares; due to the dramatic Greek 
crisis, it is said that the government would plan to sell its remaining 55% 
share. 
As to Russia, Fraport and its partners Copelouzos Group and Russian bank 
VTB will build a new terminal at St. Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport, Russia’s 
fourth-largest airport. Moscow’s Domodedovo airport is operated by the 
Eastline Group under a 75-year lease, and in October 2009 Russia’s 
Transport Ministry announced that it intends to privatize Moscow’s 
Sheremetyevo airport. And in July 2010, Prime Minister Putin announced 
that the government wants to “turn aviation infrastructure into a prospective 
and attractive platform for investment.” 
Czech politics appear to have killed for now the long-planned privatization 
of the Prague airport; the lower house of parliament approved a bill 
requiring the airport to be owned either by the state or by a company owned 
by the state. And recently independent Kosovo reached a 20-year, €100 
million concession deal with Lyon Airport (France) and Limak Investments 
(Turkey) for its main airport in Pristina. 
In June Ferrovial made public its intention of selling its stake in the Naples 
airport, and Reuters reported that the company had received offers in the 
range of €150-200 million. Crete has announced plans to privatize its 
Castelli airport, and it hopes to receive something close to €1 billion. On the 
lower end of the scale, Sweden’s LFV Group (spun off from the country’s 
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air navigation service provider) seeks to sell six smallish airports, and 
Northern Ireland’s Derry has sought expressions of interest from potential 
purchasers of its airport. Finally, Portugal’s plan for a new €5 billion airport 
for Lisbon to be developed as a public-private partnership has been put on 
hold due to the government’s financial difficulties. 
 
5. Regulation at some notable Asian & Australian countries 
 
Table 11: Ownership at some Asian Airports. (Source: Author ) 
 
5.1 - Australia 
Most of the medium-sized to large airports in Australia are privately owned 
and most of the smaller airports are owned by local governments. Most of 
the major airports have several main shareholders: foreign airport operators, 
banks, financial institutions, pension funds or infrastructure investment 
trusts. The central government always keeps a significant amount of shares. 
Federally-leased airports in Australia are generally only subject to 
Commonwealth laws. There are 138 regular public transport airfields that 
are under state, territory or local government control; these airports (the 
Jakarta Soekamo-Hatta Hong Kong Shanghai Pudong
Dubai Incheon Shanghai Hongqiao
Singapore Changi Christchurch
Phuket Kuala Lumpur
Auckland Guangzhou Balyun Osaka Kansai
Tokyo Narita Beijing Capital Wellington
Adelaide Brisbane Melbourne Tullamarine
Perth Sydney Kingsford
Asia - Pacific Airports
Publically owned and operated
Corporatized
Concessioned
Partially privatized
Fully privatized
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largest of which is Cairns) are subject to state and territory government 
legislation.  
The privatization process in Australia took place between 1994 and 2003:22 
out of the largest airports were privatized via 50 years lease agreements, 
among those Brisbane, Melbourne and Perth airports in 1997, Adelaide 
airport in 1998, and Sydney airport in 2002. The federal government kept 
however some involvement in operation and imposed restrictions as it is 
written in the Airport Act (1996).  
 
Table 12: Australian federal airports leased. (Source: Economic regulation of Airport Services 
– Draft Report) 
 
The Airports Act created an overarching system to govern airport activity. 
Among other things, the Act provides for: 
- airport leases, the sale of airports and tripartite deed agreements  
- Ownership restriction 1: a minimum of 51% of an airport must remain 
under Australian control (s40 of the Act). This occurs where a group of 
(or single) foreign person hold a total stake (including the interests of 
the person's associates) in the company of more than 49%. 
- Ownership restriction 2: Airlines are not permitted to own more than 5% 
of an airport (s44 of the Act). This occurs where an airline holds in total 
a stake (including the interests of the person's associates) in the company 
of more than 5%. 
- Ownership restriction 3: and there is a 15% limit on cross-ownership 
between Sydney/Melbourne, Sydney/Brisbane and Sydney/Perth 
Jurisdiction
NSW Sydney Bankstown Camden
VIC Melbourne Essendon Moorabbin
QLD Brisbane Gold Coast Townsville Archerfield Mount Isa
SA Adelaide Parafield
WA Perth Jandakot
TAS Hobart Launceston
NT Darwin Alice Springs Tennant creek
ACT Canberra
Airport
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airports. This occurs when a person holds a total stake (including the 
interests of the person's associates) in both of the paired airport operator 
companies of more than 15%. 
- Site usage obligations: an airport site must be used as an airport, and an 
airport operator is not to carry on ‘substantial non-airport trading or 
financial activities’ nor undertake ‘sensitive development’. An airport-
lessee company’s sole business will be to run the airport. 
Airport leases are subject to the following key rules: 
- the lessee must be a company; 
- the term of the lease must not be longer than 50 years (with or without 
an option to renew for up to 49 years); 
- the lease must provide for access by interstate and/or international air 
transport; 
- a company can only lease one airport; 
- the airport-lessee companies for Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport and 
Sydney West Airport must be wholly-owned subsidiaries of the same 
holding company; 
- airport leases can only be transferred with the Minister’s approval; 
- the beneficial and legal interests in an airport lease cannot be separated 
except in the case of the enforcement of a loan security; 
- If a lender acquires a lease, or enters into possession of an airport site, 
by way of the enforcement of a loan security, the lender must: 
(a) notify the Minister; and 
(b) transfer the lease to another company. 
- An airport-lessee company can contract out the management of the 
airport to another company. The other company is called an airport-
management company. An airport-management company must be 
approved by the Minister. 
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- The regulations may prohibit certain subleases and licenses relating to 
airport sites. 
- The regulations may deal with the terms of subleases and licenses 
relating to airport sites. 
- The regulations may provide that the beneficial and legal interests in 
subleases and licenses relating to airport sites cannot be separated except 
in the case of the enforcement of a loan security. 
- Master plans: the airport operator must establish a master plan that is 
subject to Ministerial approval. The master plan is a 20-year forward 
plan that identifies, among other things, development objectives, future 
aviation requirements, noise exposure forecasts, and intentions of land 
use and related development. The master plan needs to align with state, 
territory and local government planning laws, and additionally, the 
airport operator must provide a ground transport plan for the first five 
years of the master plan. Master plans are updated every five years 
- major development plans: the airport operator must furnish a major 
development plan, for Ministerial approval, for each major development, 
which, among other things, covers the construction or changes to a new 
or existing runway, passenger terminal, or other building, taxiway, road 
or railway which costs more than $20 million (Australian Government, 
1996; AGPC, 2011). 
 
5.2 - China 
China currently has 142 civilian airports but the market is dominated by the 
10 largest airports which gather almost 60% of the total passenger traffic. 
Beijing Capital International is the largest Chinese airport in terms of 
passenger volume and the majority of its shares is owned by Capital 
Airports Holding Company which is under the control of the Country Civil 
Aviation Authority. Capital Airports Holding Company possesses shares in 
more than 20 Chinese civil airports. At the moment, the most profitable 
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airports have been partially privatized and listed in the stock market 
(Shenzhen, Shanghai, Xiamen, Hainan, Beijing and Guangzhou), the 
majority of the shares is in most cases government owned and the central 
government imposes strong intervention even in daily operations and 
regulatory requirements. The government has been recently recognizing the 
need for private investors’ help and is phasing out subsidies for regional 
airports and decentralizing the administration to local CAAC offices in 
order to foster foreign investments. The first airport handed over to local 
government control was Xiamen airport in 1998 and by 2004 all major 
airports, with the exception of Beijing Capital and those in Tibet, were 
operated by local government airport corporations (Zhang and Yuen, 2008). 
There are still restrictions on the areas foreign investors may invest in but 
this step, together with the opening of air traffic market to foreign carriers 
also in secondary airports has been having a dramatic effect on the traffic 
growth. Qin (2010) in his paper describes the Chinese airport industry as a 
key player in the development if Chinese economy in the last decade not 
only because of the infrastructure provided but also for the significant 
multiplier effects on the economy in terms of employment and 
attractiveness. 
 
Fig. 8: Private ownership at some Chinese airports. (Source: Zhang, 2010) 
Xiamen Beijing Shenzhen Shanghai Guangzhou Meilan
Chinese Ownership 25,00% 25,00% 36,01% 36,28% 40,00% 27,95%
Foreign ownership 0,00% 10,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 20,00%
0,00%
10,00%
20,00%
30,00%
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
Private ownership at selected Chinese Airports
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Notable examples of foreign intervention in Chinese airports system may 
be: 
- Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK) in 2005 invested 1.99 billion 
Yuan for a stake of 35% in Hangzhou Xiao Shan International Airport, 
followed by the set-up of a joint venture between Hong Kong and 
Zhuhai airports, in which AAHK invested 198 million Yuan for a 55% 
of the joint venture. 
- Soon after that, airports in Ningbo, Nanjing, Chengdu and Kunming 
started negotiating with foreign investors on stake sales. German airport 
operator Fraport AG (which manages Frankfurt Airport) has signed an 
agreement to buy 25% of Ningbo Lishe International Airport. 
- The Chinese government is still reluctant to open aeronautical market to 
foreign investors while non-core aviation business such as retail in 
passenger terminal and ground handling services which are considered 
less essential, have been often contracted out to private companies via 
short-term sub-contracting or mid-term leasing. For example, at 
Shanghai International Airport, the retail spaces are leased out to private 
operators and their performance is reviewed regularly. Shanghai 
International Airport has also established a joint-venture company with 
Frankfurt Airport to provide training to airport employees. 
- The government has allowed mergers and acquisitions between airports 
in the last few years which have produced several big airport 
corporations in China to achieve the scale of economy and synergy to 
improve management and financial strength. Although the sizes of 
airport corporations in China are still relatively small, the creation of 
airport corporations managing more than one airport highlights the 
Chinese government’s effort in promoting operational autonomy and a 
strategy to achieve balanced developments between regions. The Capital 
Airport Holding (CAH) is an example of airport mergers and 
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acquisitions in the Chinese airport industry. At the end of 2008, it was 
holding stakes worth 67 billion CNY in more than 30 airports in China 
located in many parts of the country. (Yang & Yu, 2010) 
 
5.3 - India 
India is one of the fastest growing economies of the world, therefore also air 
traffic demand is rising at a high pace. In 1972 the International Airports 
Authority of India was established to manage the country’s four 
international airports, while in 1986 the domestic airports came under the 
control of the National Airports Authority. These two authorities merged in 
1995 under the name of AAI (Airport Authority of India) which nowadays 
manages more than 100 Indian airports out of which 11 are international. 
Private investment consortia which gather together airport operators from 
other countries are present too.  
Government owned airports come under the jurisdiction of the AAI which 
holds complete control over those airports and provides a centralized 
financing program.  
As the government recognized the need to bring airport infrastructure to 
world class levels and also its inability to bring in the required capital, PPP 
was identified as a preferred route to infrastructure provision. Greenfield 
airport at Bangalore was built according to this agreement between public 
and private sector: Siemens AG and Unique Zurich Airport invested a total 
amount of US $325.6 million. Similar projects have been realized also at 
Hyderabad airport. 
Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL) in Kerala has been a pioneer 
in India in the field of airport privatization because, at present, it is the only 
private sector airport in the country. A private company took the initiative to 
raise the necessary amount of money from a number of shareholders and 
private companies through a BOO agreement. AAI still manages Air Traffic 
Control. (M. Ohri, 2006; A. Bindra, 2006) 
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With specific regard to foreign investors’ opportunity, the Indian law 
allows: 
- In airports, FDI up to 100% is permitted however beyond 74% 
government approval is required. Foreign airport authorities can also 
participate in such investments. 
- In domestic airlines, FDI up to 49% is permitted. Also, 100% is 
permitted for Non-resident Indians through the automatic route. 
- No direct or indirect equity participation by foreign airlines is allowed. 
With new airports to be built and existing airports to be upgraded in order to 
face the problem of capacity shortage, opportunities exist for various 
organizations including those involved in airport management and 
infrastructures projects. This potential, together with the government's 
decision to allow private sector participation in the running of major airports 
makes India a very attractive market. 
 
5.4 - Indonesia 
There are two state-owned airport operators, namely PT Angkasa I (PT 1) 
and PT Angkasa II (PT II) which manage the commercial activities of 21 
out of 25 International Indonesian airports. PT I and II are in charge of the 
airports in the east and west of the country, respectively. They became 
public enterprises in 1987 and limited liability companies in 1993. 
The smaller airports are owned or operated separately either by the 
provincial governments or by Units under the control of Department of 
Transport, but it is important to underline that Jakarta’s airport is by far the 
largest in the country as it handled over 70% of passengers in 2004 (PT II 
Annual Report) 
 
5.5 - Japan 
The majority of Japanese airports is state-owned and public managed, 
although limited private investments are somewhere present. At present 
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there are issues concerning the possibility of major investment 
opportunities. Tokyo Narita and Haneda are the most important in the 
country, the former is considered the most important while the latter is 
mainly used for domestic flights but handles more passengers. 
There are also some forms of competition between airports as some of those 
are very close one-another and therefore are considered equally attractive by 
potential passengers (fig. 9) 
 
Fig. 9: Most important 15 airports in Japan. (Source: Web) 
 
It should be possible to distinguish between airports administered by the 
central government and those run by local governments. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is actually ambiguous because administrative responsibility has 
often been delegated. Airports located in major cities are kept under the 
control of the central government. Airport facilities are typically run and 
managed by multiple companies creating a difficult situation for a local 
government to plan future policies that capitalize on its airport. 
In terms of financial operations, major airports have their revenue and 
expenditures pooled in a single account managed by the central government; 
the Airport Improvement Special Account. This means that the management 
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of each airport lacks self-responsibility. Airports administered by local 
governments do not sufficiently disclose their financial data  
According to the classification of airports law, there are several categories 
of airports. Firstly there are international airports such as Narita 
International Airport, Central Japan International Airport and Kansai 
International Airport. These airports are privatized airports via long term 
Lease Agreement or PPI BOO (Build Own Operate) and have an influence 
on Japanese International competitiveness. Then there are 20 national 
airports which were constructed and administrated by Japanese government 
whose traffic is mainly international and domestic. Thirdly there are 54 
regional airports, most of those provide air transport services to isolated 
islands. Finally there are 21 airports for joint-use aerodromes with Japanese 
Ministry of Defense etc. (Shida) 
Below the list of 1st and 2nd class Japanese Airport is reported 
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Table 13: List of Japanese 1st and 2nd class airport. (Source: web) 
 
 
Table 14: Facilities provided at Japanese airports. (Source: Shida) 
 
5.6 - Malaysia 
Malaysia Airport Holding Berhad (MAHB), formerly known as Malaysia 
Airport SdnBhd (MASB) operates and manages 19 main airports plus 17 
secondary airports throughout Malaysia. The 72% of the shares of MAHB is 
Municipality Airport name ICAO IATA 
Izumisano / Tajiri / Sennan Kansai International Airport RJBB KIX 
Narita Narita International Airport RJAA NRT 
Tokoname Chu-bu International Airport (Centrair) RJGG NGO 
O-ta Tokyo International Airport (Haneda) RJTT HND 
Toyonaka / Ikeda / Itami Osaka International Airport (Itami) RJOO ITM 
Akita Akita Airport RJSK AXT 
Asahikawa Asahikawa Airport RJEC AKJ 
Chitose New Chitose Airport RJCC CTS 
Fukuoka Fukuoka Airport RJFF FUK 
Hakodate Hakodate Airport RJCH HKD 
Higashine Yamagata Airport RJSC GAJ 
Kirishima Kagoshima Airport RJFK KOJ 
Kitakyu-shu- Kitakyu-shu- Airport RJFR KKJ 
Kunisaki Oita Airport RJFO OIT 
Kushiro Kushiro Airport RJCK KUH 
Mashiki Kumamoto Airport RJFT KMJ 
Matsuyama Matsuyama Airport RJOM MYJ 
Mihara Hiroshima Airport RJOA HIJ 
Miyazaki Miyazaki Airport RJFM KMI 
Naha Naha Airport/Naha Air Base ROAH OKA 
Nankoku Ko-chi Airport RJOK KCZ 
Natori Sendai Airport RJSS SDJ 
Niigata Niigata Airport RJSN KIJ 
Obihiro Tokachi-Obihiro Airport (Obihiro) RJCB OBO 
O-mura Nagasaki Airport RJFU NGS 
Takamatsu Takamatsu Airport RJOT TAK 
Ube Yamaguchi Ube Airport RJDC UBJ 
Wakkanai Wakkanai Airport RJCW WKJ 
Yao Yao Airport RJOY 
FIRST CLASS AIRPORTS
SECOND CLASS AIRPORTS
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owned by the Government. The main airport is KLIA and it has been 
privatized by means of a 50 years lasting lease license to Malaysia Airports, 
a society wholly owned by MAHB.   
 
5.7 - Philippines 
This country’s airport sector is under public control: Air Transportation 
Office (ATO) manages the 85 airports under the Department of 
Transportation and Communication (DOTC). During the first decade of 
2000, a few private investments were made at Ninoy and Caticlan Airports; 
while the DOTC is supporting a plan of infrastructure development at both 
International and secondary airports. 
 
5.8 - South Korea 
South Korea has a peculiar airport governance organization if compared 
with the nearby countries: the Ministry of construction and Transport is 
responsible for the establishment and decision of air transport policies, 
while the daily operations of the airports are run by IIAC and KAC. The 
former Corporation runs the major international airport of Incheon and it is 
an independent public authority similar in relation to some aspects to USA 
and to others to European authorities because it is involved also in the 
management of seaports and both business and leisure facilities; the latter 
manages the remaining 7 international airports in the country and the whole 
group of domestic airports. (KPMG, 2008) 
 
5.9 - Taiwan 
There are 18 airports in this country; the whole lot is managed by the 
country’s Civil Aviation Authority. Currently 15 out of 18 airports are 
severely losing money, with the only exceptions of Taiwan and Kaohsiung. 
The inborn problem with Taiwan is the fact that the rail and road transport 
are strictly competitive with domestic air transport given the area of the 
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country, therefore the system relies only on the international traffic at the 2 
biggest aforementioned International Airports of the country: the route 
Taiwan – Hong Kong is currently one of the busiest in the world. 
 
5.10 - Thailand 
In Thailand there is a mixed approach towards the airport management 
topic: the 5 most important airports in terms of passengers carried are 
managed by the group Airport of Thailand; between those airport there is 
Bangkok airport that is the 4th airport in the whole Asia; the remaining 31 
airport in the country are run by the Department of Civil Aviation. 
 
5.11 - Vietnam 
There are 3 major international airports (which handle all together more 
than the 90% of the traffic) and 18 domestic airports in Vietnam. The entity 
which is responsible for their management is the Civil Aviation 
Administration of Vietnam (CAAV), while the subsidiary Civil Air Traffic 
Management is responsible for air traffic control. The government is 
planning to invest a consistent amount of money in airport infrastructure 
development but also welcomes foreign capitals investments. 
 
6. Regulation at some notable North – American countries 
 
Table 15: Ownership at some north-American Airports. (Source: Author) 
 
Atlanta Hartsfield Denver Dallas - Fort worth
Fort Lauderdale New York JFK Washington Dulles
Los Angeles Chicago O'Hare Miami
San Francisco
Montreal Vancouver Calgary
North American Airports
Publically owned and operated
Publically owned and operated by independent not for profit corporations
- 65 - 
 
6.1 - Canada 
From the 1960s up to the 1980s Canadian airports were under the 
responsibility of Canadian air transportation administration (CATA) which 
a division of Transport Canada. The whole national investment plan in 
airports was carried out on the basis of a capital fund; the revenues raised 
through the fees were left on deposit; the decisions regarding capacity and 
network served were made at the national level sometimes disregarding the 
dimension of the airport and its importance in the region. Moreover, 
Canadian airports were not required to be profitable. As a result of J. Dion’s 
policy “A future framework for airports in Canada” (1987) provincial, 
regional or local authorities were invested of management and financial 
responsibility of airports on the basis of long-term ground leases; Montreal, 
Calgary, Vancouver and Edmonton airports experimented this new 
governance. Then, in 1994, the National airport policy stated that small and 
regional airports were to be sold to their local communities while larger 
airports and airports serving provincial capitals were to be leased to 
Canadian Airport Authorities (CAAs); in doing this Transport Canada kept 
commitment on airport policies. Both Local airport authorities and Canadian 
airport authorities (LAAs and CAAs) are private, self-financing, not-for-
profit, non-share-capital corporate entities that don’t pay income tax. 
(Tretheway, 2001; Padova, 2007) 
The leases established are for 60+20 years and both LAAs and CAAs are 
subject to periodic performance review and public disclosure of documents; 
unlike other countries there is no formal economic regulation in Canada but 
this aspect will be discussed in the next chapters. 
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Table 16: Canada Airport divestiture program. (Source: TC) 
 
6.2 - USA 
As of January 2008, there were almost 20,000 airports in the United States. 
While the vast majority of these airports are privately owned and privately 
used (they are very small airports with, therefore, no commercial traffic), 
4,150 airports are publicly owned and publicly used and serve scheduled 
passenger operations, cargo operations, general aviation or a combination of 
these operations. The responsibility of these airports often lies within cities 
Airport Date of transfer Owner/Operator
Kelowna See remarks (a) TC/Municipality
Prince George Mar 31, 2003 TC/Prince George Airport Authority
Vancouver July 1st, 1992 (b) TC/Vancouver International Airport Authority
Victoria Apr 1st, 1997 TC/Victoria International Airport Authority
Calgary July 1st, 1992 (b) TC/Calgary Airport Authority
Edmonton Aug 1st, 1992 (b) TC/Edmonton Regional Airports Authority
Regina May 1st, 1999 TC/Regina Airport Authority
Saskatoon Jan 1st, 1999 TC/ Saskatoon Airport Authority
Winnipeg Jan 1st, 1997 TC/Winnipeg Airports Authority
London Aug 1st, 1998 TC/Greater London International Airport Authority
Ottawa Feb 1st, 1997 TC/Ottawa MacDonald Cartier International
Thunder Bay Sept 1st, 1997 TC/Thunder Bay International Airports Authority
Toronto Dec 2, 1996 TC/Greater Toronto Airports Authority
Montreal Dorval Aug 1st, 1992 (b) TC/Aéroports de Montréal
Montreal Mirabel Aug 1st, 1992 (b) TC/Aéroports de Montréal
Quebec Nov 1st, 2000 TC/Aéroport de Québec Inc.
Fredericton May 1st, 2001 TC/Greater Fredericton Airport Authority
Moncton Sept 1st, 1997 TC/Greater Moncton International Airport Authority
Saint John June 1st, 1999 TC/Saint John Airport Inc.
Halifax Feb 1st, 2000 TC/Halifax International Airport Authority
Charlottetown Mar 1st, 1999 TC/Charlottetown Airport Authority
Gander Mar 1st, 2001 TC/Gander International Airport Authority
St. John's  Dec 1st, 1998 St. John's International Airport Authority
Iqaluit July 1st, 1995 Government of Nunavut
Yellowknife July 1st, 1995 Government of Northwest Territories
Whitehorse Oct 1st,  1996 Government of Yukon Territory
 
(a) Airport leased to the City under a long term lease expiring 2034.
(b) Airport transferred to a Local Airport Authority (LAA) prior to NAP implementation.
TC = Transport Canada
CANADA - National Airports System (NAS)
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or counties governments; there also examples of airports owned by 
municipalities or counties but operated by authorities: New York’s, New 
Jersey’s, Seattle’s authorities are notable examples.  
 
Fig. 10: Airport ownership forms in the USA. (Source: ACI north America, 2003 & TRB, 2006) 
 
It was quite common during the 1920sand 1930s for local governments to 
purchase airports previously in private ownership and to acquire vacant 
properties to construct public airports. The U.S. Government constructed 
several airports during World War II and transferred the airfields to local 
governments after the war pursuant to the Surplus Property Act.3 During the 
1950s and 1960s, several airport authorities were established to assume 
control over public airports. Changes in airport governance continue to 
occur as a result of transfers of military airfields for commercial or joint 
(military and commercial) use, construction of new airports, and transfers 
and delegations of power over existing airports. 
In the USA is it possible to find: 
- airports owned by the federal government and operated by an airport 
authority; 
Municipalities
38%
Regional - Airport 
Authority
25%
County
17%
Multi-jurisdictional
9%
Central government
5%
Port authorities
3%
Private
3%
Airport ownership in the USA - 2006
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- airports operated by state governments (Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Rhode Island); 
- airports operated by an airport authority; this model rivals direct control 
by cities as the most common form of governance structure;  
- multi-airport systems operated by public entities, like the Metropolitan 
Washington Airports Authority (Virginia), the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey, the City of Los Angeles (California). Some public 
entities are responsible for modes of transportation in addition to 
airports; 
- airports operated jointly by the U.S. Department of Defense and the 
authority. 
There are no correlations between airport governance structure, airports 
characteristics and kind of service provided; therefore 2 comparable airports 
may have different governance structure. 
 
US airports’ funds stem from airport charges levied on passengers and 
airlines, commercial bonds and from the Federal Airport and Airways Trust 
Fund. 
Private sector’s investment in airport ownership is uncommon in the US, but  
public-private partnerships are traceable in the airport management: small 
airports like those in Albany, Burbank, Teterboro and Atlantic City have 
been privately managed on a contract basis and BAA – Ferrovial (the 
former British, now Spanish owned management group) has won 
concessionaire contract to provide retail services at Boston and Pittsburg 
airport and also private management contract to operate Indianapolis airport. 
Another form of PPI is privately financed terminals at public owned and 
operated airports; this is the case of JFK, Chicago O’Hare and Detroit 
airports. One reason to explain why US airport privatization has been 
somehow less strong and widespread if not different if compared with EU 
countries lies in the fact that the airport operator’s rule is limited to the 
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fulfillment of basic facilities (which led to lower user cost) and there was 
the fear to lose the possibility to have access to the Federal Fund and the 
tax-exemption on commercial bond sales; moreover the US regulation 
practice prohibits the revenue diversion to non-airport related activities. In 
fact, the federal Airport Improvement Program imposes economic 
regulation on U.S. airports in exchange for annual grant funding. Those 
regulations preclude airport privatization, because they require all “airport 
revenues” - including those stemming from a lease or sale - to be reinvested 
in the airport (or airport system) that generates them. That means a city, 
county or state that wishes to lease or sell its airport would receive zero 
financial benefits from so doing. The regulations also prohibit any airport 
operator (including an investor-owned airport company) from taking any 
profits off the airport, which means such a company would have no 
incentive to acquire a U.S. airport. 
In 1996 a step forward was done: the Airport privatization pilot program 
allowed five airports (including no more than 1 major hub and 1 general 
aviation airport) to be either leased or sold without any change to the 
previously established grants and the acquirer would have been allowed to 
seek profits. The privatization of the major hub would have taken place if 
65% of the airline that provide scheduled service and airlines accounting for 
the 65% of the landing weight had been favorable. It is a very strict 
condition and in fact Chicago Midway, the only airport that applied for the 
privatization, was unable to reach the goal. The slot for the general aviation 
airport to be privatized has been awarded to Briscoe field airport. From the 
introduction of Airport privatization pilot program on, an increasing number 
of municipalities, multipurpose port authorities and state government seem 
willing to become owner of their airport but the path towards privatization is 
very slow because there are many resiliencies to be overcome.  
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Meanwhile, independently of the recent specification in the reauthorization 
of the Airport Improvement Program, many individual airport authorities 
have embarked on privatization projects of various sorts, for example: 
- the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has entered into a 
contract with private investors to finance, build and operate the new 
International Arrivals Building at New York/Kennedy airport and a 
master concessionaire contract with a private company (Marketplace 
Development) to operate in the central passenger building at New 
York/LaGuardia airport; 
- the airport authorities of Pittsburgh, Boston and Washington DC have 
similarly entered into master concessionaire agreements, respectively to 
BAA plc for the whole facility at Pittsburgh, and to Westfield Holdings 
for specific passenger buildings at Boston and Washington; 
- the public authorities for Indianapolis and the Susquehanna Area 
Regional Airport Authority (Harrisburg) have entered into 10 year 
agreements with BAA plc to operate and upgrade facilities at their 
airports; 
- the City of Chicago has entered into a contract with Standard Parking to 
operate the parking garages at Chicago/O’Hare airport. 
The presence of a multipurpose authority managing an USA airport seems 
to be the one that assures the highest degree of independence from local 
politics in salaries and budget matters. In the US is also present a strong 
relation between airports and airlines, this topic will be discussed in the next 
chapters. 
A brand new privately developed airport opened in May 2009 in country 
music haven Branson, Missouri. A group of entrepreneurs created Branson 
Airport LLC, acquired a suitable parcel of land in Branson, received 
airspace approvals from the FAA, and raised $155 million. With that, they 
created a one-runway airport with a contractor-operated control tower and a 
modest terminal building. Because the airport used no federal grant funds, it 
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is not constrained by the usual FAA grant agreements. It is offering airlines 
two-year exclusive rights to link specific cities to Branson. As of mid-2010, 
Branson has signed up AirTran for exclusive service to and from Atlanta 
and Milwaukee, Frontier serving its hub in Denver, and Sun Country 
serving Minneapolis-St. Paul. In addition, the company has created its own 
airline, Branson Air Express, which as of mid-2010provides service to an 
additional eight cities. (de Neufville, 1999 ; Tretheway, 2001 ; Reimer et al., 
2007). 
To make an example, we provide the duties’ list of each entity for San 
Diego Airport, an airport situated in US California 
 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
- Operates air navigation facilities 
- Controls airways, air traffic and air safety 
- Establishes airport design standards 
- Provides airport development funding 
 
California Department of Transportation, Division of Aeronautics 
- Issues permits for, and inspects public-use airports 
- Conducts statewide aviation system planning 
- Administers noise regulation and land use planning laws 
- Provides grants and loans for safety, maintenance and capital improvement 
projects at airports 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Agency (TSA) 
- Approves airport security plans 
- Trains and deploys airport security screeners 
 
County of San Diego Airports 
- Operates and maintains all physical elements of airports including security 
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- Develops facilities and rents space to airlines, aviation-related and passenger 
service businesses 
- Leases property for development supporting airport enterprise funding 
 
National Transportation Safety Board 
- Investigates aircraft accidents and reports findings 
 
7. Regulation at some notable South - American countries 
Several Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries embarked upon a 
structural reform process in the 1990s. This process included, as a major 
component, the deregulation and privatization of several infrastructure 
services. In this context, the airport sector experienced a transformation that 
resulted in the introduction of private sector participation (PSP) inmost LAC 
countries. A wide variation of PSP schemes was adopted. Latin American 
and Caribbean countries are facing a strong passenger traffic growth in the 
last decade, as it is reported in the next figure. 
 
Fig. 11: Air-traffic growth rate forecast 2005-2025. (Source: Flores, 2007) 
 
Governments have been making huge changes in their airport ownership 
schemes: it is sufficient to say that from 1992 to 1997 around half of the 
LAC airports have established some form of private operation agreement.  
0,00% 2,00% 4,00% 6,00% 8,00% 10,00% 12,00%
Australia
Malaysia
France
Mexico
Brazil
Turkey
Thailand
Indonesia
China
India
Forecasted pax traffic growth at selected countries 2005-2025
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Unlike Europe, where the principal mode of airport privatization has been 
the sale of partial or 100% ownership stakes in airports, in Latin America 
the long-term concession model has prevailed. While Argentina opted to 
concession its airport network to a single operator, Chile adopted a case-by-
case strategy and Mexico concessioned its airports by groups. Peru used a 
mix of single and group concessions, while Colombia and Costa Rica opted 
for the single concession scheme. Other forms of partial privatization 
adopted in the LAC are Greenfield projects and Management and lease 
contracts, but concession is by far the most used. The most important 
economy in the region, Brazil, continues to operate the largest airports 
through a state-owned corporatized enterprise. However, in 2008 the federal 
government launched a consultation process to introduce private 
participation in the airport sector. 
 
Argentina: Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 acquired the concession to run 32 
airports under a 30 years agreement predicted to finish in 2028. The 
concession fee AA2000 pays to the government is the equal to the 15% of 
the annual gross income 
 
Bolivia: TBI acquired the management of 3 airports under a 25 years 
concession supposed to expire in 2025. The concession fee is the 20,8% of 
the annual gross income while the regulatory fee is the 0,8% of the same 
sum. 
 
Costarica: ALTERRA manages the country’s principal airport of Juan 
Santamaria under a 20 years concession agreement expiring in 2021. A two 
stage investment has been forecasted for a total amount of approximately 
300 million US$. The concession fee is the 32,5% of the split income and 
the 58% of the total revenue. 
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Chile: 9 to 16 years concession agreements have been signed between the 
government and the operator of each Chilean airport between 1995 and 
2000. These agreements are based on the principle of Build-Rehabilitate-
Operate-Transfer therefore we can assume that the concessionaire has the 
right to build new infrastructure and is in charge for maintaining the existing 
ones 
 
Perù: capital city airport in Lima is managed by Lima Airport Partners srl 
under a concession of 30 years due to expire in 2031 while the remaining 
Peruvian airports are managed by Aeropuertos del Perù under a 25 years 
concession agreement under a 5% of the annual gross revenue fee. 
 
Mexico: the country’s 58 airports were divided into four groups, namely the 
North-Central Group (GACN), the Pacific Group (GAP), the Southeast 
Group (ASUR), and the Mexico City Group (AICM). Each of these groups 
had at least one large airport which would make them desirable to private 
investors but they also had some smaller airports as well. The very small 
airports were not allocated to any of these groups as, although they were 
seen as essential for public need, they were not considered to be attractive.  
Concession contracts were awarded for 15% for three out of four groups for 
an initial 15-year period with an underlying 50-year agreement. There had 
to be at least one airport operator from another country within each 
successful consortium to bring international expertise but only 49% could 
be under foreign ownership and it was also planned that there would be a 
subsequent flotation of remaining government shares as well. An upfront fee 
for buying the concession and an annual percentage of revenue had to be 
paid to the government by the consortia. The concession for ASUR was the 
first to be awarded in 1998 to a consortium formed by Copenhagen airport 
and consequently the rest of the shares (except 0.01 per cent which was kept 
by the government) were sold through flotation in 2000 and 2005. In 1999, 
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15 per cent of the GAP Group of 12 airports was sold to a consortium with 
AENA, the Spanish airport group, as a key partner, and then in 2006 the rest 
of the shares were floated. In 2000, the 15 per cent share of the GACN 
group was sold to an AdP consortium again with a further flotation of 47 per 
cent of shares in 2006. The Mexico City group has yet to be privatized 
because of uncertainty related to a new airport for the capital. 
 
Brazil seems likely to be the new frontier for South American airport 
privatization, as the government gears up to modernize both Rio de 
Janiero’s Galeao International and Sao Paulo’s Viracopos. The country will 
host the World Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016. 
 
Jamaica several years ago privatized its major tourist airport—Sangster 
International, in Montego Bay—via a 30-year build/operate/transfer (BOT) 
concession. Based on the success of that privatization, the government 
wants to do the same thing for its other major airport, Norman Manley 
International in Kingston. In March 2010 it named a committee to develop 
the plans and timetable. (Flores, 2007) 
 
Increasingly, airport operators in one Latin American country are branching 
out into other countries. For example, Airports Argentina 2000 has 
developed the Carrasco airport in Montevideo, Uruguay. Brazil’s Andrade 
Gutierrez Concessoes is one of four partners (along with Aecon and ADC of 
Canada and HAS Development Corp. from the United States) in Quiport, 
the company developing the new Quito, Ecuador airport under a concession 
agreement. 
 
A source of controversy is the degree to which public and private entities 
control airport decision-making. International practices exemplify two main 
typologies of airport regulators: independent regulator versus some form of 
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control by the government. Frequently, government control has been seen as 
a way to ensure that the airport were serving the public entity’s goals; 
moreover the presence of elected officials promotes accountability (the 
electorate has the power to vote on the governing body’s airport-related 
decision-making). On the other hand, the presence of an independent 
regulator can lead to improved performance and greater efficiency. A third 
approach, a blend of the two mentioned above, exists in Australia. The 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has broad responsibility 
for administering competition policy as well as regulation in all sectors with 
essential facilities. 
Most countries that concessioned airport services decided to create a 
regulatory agency. Independent regulatory agencies were given the highest 
levels of administrative and legal independence and were subject to 
accountability before the congress. Their decision-making authority was 
placed within a board of directors, which would be composed of technical 
and nonpolitical members. The agencies were also given significant 
regulatory competencies to determine tariffs and minimum requirements for 
quality of service. 
When airport services remain within the state, the role of regulator is placed 
in the hands of government departments with limited independence from 
sector authorities. These institutions, sometimes having a separate status 
from the government, possess overall policy implementation 
responsibilities, although decisions are made by policy formulators such as 
the line ministry.  
IRAs present advantages versus government departments: transparency, 
accountability of stakeholders’ opinions into the decision-making process, 
technical expertise. Despite the overall advantage of IRAs for good 
regulatory governance, conclusions should not be interpreted in a “one 
model fits all” approach. (Serebrisky, 2012). 
 
- 77 - 
 
With the focus on the USA’s airport system, that has proven to be the more 
various so far, D.S. Reimer et al (2007) provide some examples: 
- airports in which primary decision-making responsibility is reserved by 
a general-purpose government, counties or states  Atlanta, Chicago, 
New Orleans; Sacramento (California); Alaska and Hawaii; 
- public entities have created boards and commissions to operate airports 
while retaining some degree of oversight and control  the City of Los 
Angeles retains decision-making authority over key aspects of four 
airports (Los Angeles International, Ontario, Van Nuys, and Palmdale 
Airports), but has delegated considerable decision-making responsibility 
to the Los Angeles World Airports, with its own Board of Airport 
Commissioners; 
- commercialization and privatization bring further relaxation of public 
control but private participation in airport governance or management is 
subject to detailed agreements, leases, or similar contracts that prescribe 
and constrain actions and decisions by the private entity. 
 
Airport authorities and port authorities may be subject to varying levels of 
oversight and control by a general-purpose government. A state or local 
government may retain ownership of the airport property, may appoint 
authority commissioners, may be authorized to veto authority decisions, and 
may exercise control in other direct and indirect ways. Conversely, some 
airport authorities have been structured and operate as separate and 
independent bodies from the public entities that created them, from the host 
jurisdictions in which the airports are located, and from the airport owners.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: 
 
Economic regulation at airports, 
services and duties to be provided 
and competition issues 
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The operational aspects have always been seen as the main topic of airport 
governance. In fact, the focus on non-aviation incomes is actually a recent 
topic in airport management. Nevertheless, as long as a managerial point of 
view has been arising at privatized airports, the innovation quickly gained 
importance in the balance sheet of airport management enterprises. 
Therefore, airport directors and senior management were, and somewhere 
still are, basically operational specialists but side by side with them, also 
economics and marketing specialists play an important role in airport 
management and as a result, the resources and staff numbers employed in 
these areas were expanded. Relatively underused practices, such as the 
benchmarking of financial performance and quality management 
techniques, also began to be accepted – albeit rather slowly at the start – by 
a growing number of airports as essential management tools.  
In some airports, the typical functional organization structure with different 
departments for finance, operations, administration, and so on was replaced 
with departments or business units more focused on customers’ needs, such 
as airline or passenger services. 
In this chapter, a quick review on economic regulation of airport is 
presented with an emphasis on the different techniques adopted all over the 
world and on the results they lead to. Then, the main activities taking place 
at an airport will be summarized, with the aim of pointing out which ones 
have to be provided by the airport management and which ones could be 
transferred to handling societies or other partners. In this field, some forms 
of competition between airports might occur. 
A few representative countries in each continent will be taken into account 
(African countries have been left aside because air transport is still in the 
embryonic stage in most of the countries and in most cases a single airport 
gathers by far the majority of that country’s traffic) and the topic of airport 
ownership will be further analyzed in detail, providing where possible 
information about the equity share composition of each airport management 
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enterprise and its evolution during the years. With particular attention to 
Italy, these data will be presented with reference to the period 2005-2010.  
State of the art’s information about competition issues will finally be 
provided. 
 
1. Economic Regulation at Airports  
An airport is a transport infrastructure characterized by a twofold business: 
the aviation market and the non-aviation market. Revenues come from both 
sides: charges levied to airlines and passengers for runway, apron and 
terminal use; retail and commercial activity or land leases. The shift to 
market oriented policies reflects the belief that airports were not natural 
monopolies anymore, despite the monopolistic power exercised on the 
revenue sources so far. (D. Gillen, H.M. Niemeier, 2006) 
As competition is currently not strong enough to limit the market power of 
airports in such a way that airports become cost and allocative efficient, the 
question arises if effective regulation can achieve this aim. The main issues 
are whether a form of regulation is necessary and, if positive, which one is 
to be preferred. Regulation should be confined to those activities in which 
the airport has persistent monopoly power. This is the case where the airport 
services are essential for downstream users and cannot be duplicated 
without substantial costs. In the debate on how to regulate airports, three 
features are important: the complementarity between aviation and non-
aviation activities, the degree of congestion (capacity) and the level of 
competition in the industry (or at the airport if it is a hub).  
It has often been claimed that regulation is a way to reduce costs at airports. 
This is only partially true. Regulation aims at being a strong input to get to a 
more efficient airport management, but the mere charges reduction would 
attract demand and it is not always a positive issue, especially for already 
congested airports. The structure of charges, the allocation mechanism and 
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the incentives for investment become a major issue for airport regulation in 
order to attain a reasonable demand and a sufficient income.  
Several authors have claimed that price regulation is not necessary if the 
airport market power is modest because uncongested airport operators are 
stimulated to lower charges to attract traffic (more passengers  higher 
revenues) (Starkie, 2001). However, congested airports have more 
opportunities to exert their market power and some kind of regulation is 
necessary (Basso, 2008). The number of passengers that an airport can 
attract is related with the airport's ability to set charges because it is related 
with its market power. In the case of larger airports, the number of flights 
that an airport can attract depends on both the airport's attractiveness and on 
its usefulness as a hub. (D. Gillen, 2008) 
Fu et al. (2006) are for a certain degree of regulation since airport charges 
can have a marked impact on the competition between airlines. Finally, 
Oum et al. (2004) provide a further argument in favor of regulation because 
they point that price-cap regulation provides incentives for setting prices, 
making investments and reducing costs.  
Were airports regulated or not and were their management firms public, 
partially or fully privatized, national regulators and competition policy 
authorities are in charge of carefully monitoring airports. 
 
The first milestone in airport economic regulation was the 1944 Chicago 
Convention which gives ICAO members the authority for the levying of 
airport charges. According to Art. 15, optimal regulation of airports should 
meet the following criteria (ICAO, 2004; Oum et al., 2004 e 2006, Gillen & 
Niemeier, 2008):  
− agencies, independent from political interests but accountable to 
democratic bodies, should be responsible for regulation; 
− a formal consultation process between airports and airlines is required; 
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− price regulation should establish the correct incentives for cost reduction 
and investment in additional capacity; 
− price regulation should be established on an individual basis because the 
market power of each airport depends on characteristics such as the 
volume and type of traffic or the potential competition from other 
airports (Starkie, 2002; Gillen, 2008, Bel & Fageda, 2010). 
It is generally believed that regulation should be implemented by an 
independent agency; however in most European countries regulation has 
been introduced by a central government agency. The recent directive on 
airport charges (2009) reassert the necessity of this independence as it is 
evident that the presence of  a non-independent regulator undermines the 
position of airports, in particular those under total or partial private control. 
Independent regulation has only been adopted in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Austria (Gillen & Niemeier, 2006). In Germany, 
regional governments are responsible for regulating their airports but in the 
meantime they are also airports’ minor/major shareholders; this is the case 
of Frankfurt, Hahn, Hamburg and Hannover (Niemeier, 2002). 
  
Fig. 12: Relationship between government and regulator (Source: D. Gillen, H.M. Niemeier, 
2006) 
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With reference to the formal consultation processes, the information 
provided should be transparent and complete. Nevertheless “the value of the 
regulated asset base and the percentage return on capital are not disclosed 
by ADP or the French government” (Morgan Stanley, 2006, p. 4) and the 
recent decision (Dec. 2010) of Lufthansa to acquire a 9,1 % share in 
Frankfurt airport highlights airlines’ will to take part to the board of 
directors in order to be better informed and – if necessary – exert veto-
power on management’s decisions.  
 
Airport authorities may decide to set airport charges according to the 
principle of cost relatedness, that is to say the charges should cover total 
costs and each charge should reflect its costs. In Europe many of the public 
airport systems like Greece, Poland and Finland set their charges in this 
way. Nevertheless, if the allowed rate of return on capital is above the cost 
of capital the airport has an incentive to expand the capital base to increase 
profits (well known as Averch Johnson effect, 1962). Furthermore, there are 
high incentives for cost-padding leading to productive inefficiency. This 
kind of regulation gives the airports no incentive to adopt peak pricing, but 
rather fosters them “to lower the price at peak times and charge a monopoly 
price at off-peak times to realize a profit” (Sherman, 1989). Moreover, 
charges are often levied on the basis of aircraft weight without taking into 
consideration aircraft movements that is a far more consistent marker of 
airport congestion. Finally, the fact that many airports are not slot 
constrained may allow an inefficient distribution of traffic demand during 
time and this, according to Niemeier, may lead to concern about expensive 
additional capacity expansion. (D. Gillen, H.M. Niemeier, 2006) 
At a national or individual airport level the degree of government control 
varies considerably as Fig. 13 reports with reference to a 2006 EU’s sample 
of airports (ICF SH&E, 2006).  
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Fig. 13: Regulation form at EU airports (Source: ICF SH&E, 2006) 
 
The Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
11 March 2009 on airport charges may lead to major changes in the 
regulation procedures of European countries. This directive should have 
been incorporated within corresponding national legislations by March 2011 
and is applicable to all airports in the European Union handling more than 
five million passengers each year, as well as to each country’s main airport 
should it handle fewer than five million passengers. The directive 
establishes that the entity should be independent and it confirmed the 
necessity that airports and airlines should exchange information concerning 
the cost structure, the traffic forecasts and the requirements about equipment 
and level of service before charges are finally approved. However, each 
country keeps considerable powers of discretion as regards the specific 
mechanism regulating the behavior of the airport operator. Level of service 
agreements should be revised every 2 years, while tailored services in 
dedicated parts of a terminal should be set versus additional fees and 
security charges, provided that security standards are met (European 
Commission, 2007). 
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Generally speaking, two kind of regulation are present: basic regulation 
versus detailed regulation.  
- Basic regulation  prices are set and adjusted according to costs. There 
is a strong dependence on regulations and administrative rules, but the 
costs determinants are not explicit. Generally, airports and airlines do 
not enter into a formal consultation process. Regulation is never under 
the responsibility of an independent agency. 
- Detailed regulation  a formal mechanism establishes the assets that are 
to be regulated. Prices are set and adjusted each year according to costs, 
revenues, evolution in traffic volume and depreciation rates. Regulation 
might be accompanied by a formal consultation process between airports 
and airlines. However, regulation is not usually under the responsibility 
of an independent agency. Prices are set directly by the firm (public or 
private) that manages the airport in case of non-regulation. 
 
It has been noted by Bel and Fageda (2010) that basic regulation becomes 
less common as the weight of private ownership in the airport management 
increases. In the case of public owned airports, basic regulation is clearly 
the dominant form, while a significant proportion of (fully or partially) 
private owned airports are subject to some form of detailed regulation. 
Moreover, the probability that the airport is subject to detailed regulation 
depends on the amount of traffic handled. Finally, concessions are subject to 
more detailed regulation than public management, which would explain the 
move from basic regulation to more detailed regulation with privatization. 
Whereas the EU Commission and airlines are demanding more regulation, 
others (Starkie, 2002, 2005) maintain that the governments should introduce 
a more light-handed approach because most of the current regulatory 
systems are time-consuming, bureaucratic, costly and sometimes unfitting 
with national competition law. Price cap formula with a single till approach 
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has been by far the most common regulation system in Europe (IATA, 
2006); nevertheless some shifts to other kinds of regulation are taking place.  
Among the mechanisms applied in detailed regulation, we should 
distinguish between: 
- Rate Of Return regulation 
- Price Cap regulation 
- Reserve Regulation 
- Airport – Airline Agreements 
 
In both ROR and Price cap regulation, airport management and the regulator 
have to shortlist which airport facilities and services are to be considered 
under the pricing regime in order to determine the Price cap. The so-called 
single till approach includes both aeronautical and non-aeronautical 
revenues in the determination of the price cap. Alternatively, the dual till 
system only considers aeronautical revenues. The single till principle was 
recommended by ICAO and has been widely used but this long tradition is 
slowly breaking down: Hamburg Airport was the first EU airport to shift to 
a dual till regulation in 2000, followed in 2001 by Malta airport and in 2006 
by Budapest airport.  
The major arguments for dual till regulation is that, with a single till 
approach, activities such as food, rental and parking concessions result in 
perverse incentives at capacity constrained airports or may create costs at 
un-congested airports. If we have a capacity constrained airport, the 
probability to have larger incomes from non-aviation related activities is 
higher than at un-constrained airports; if there is a single till approach, 
therefore, aeronautical charges must be lowered to remain under the price 
cap. Nevertheless, this is not an efficient decision: lower aeronautical 
charges mean higher traffic demand at already congested airports when the 
efficient solution would be raising charges to relieve traffic. On the other 
hand, un-congested airports are willing to attract traffic and therefore they 
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try to lower aeronautical charges; therefore, single till price-cap regulation 
at un-congested airports appears not necessary. 
When considering the need for infrastructure investments, a dual till 
regulated airports would not consider the non-aeronautical related incomes 
due to the extra capacity and so it would invest less money or delay the 
investment. On the other hand, a single till regulated airport would balance 
the investment for airside capacity with the incremental revenue from 
landside activities. 
Under a dual till regulation, airside charges would rise since they would no 
longer be cross subsidized by non-airside revenue and therefore the airport 
could experience a reduction in traffic. (D. Gillen, 2008) 
 
1.1 – Rate of return (ROR) regulation 
The Rate of Return approach is based on the principle that prices must be 
set high enough so as to generate revenues that cover total costs, including 
the depreciation of capital as well as a sufficient profit rate. Hence, rate-of-
return regulation limits the profits of the airport operator on the basis of its 
historical costs. Therefore, a price increase is allowed only after an increase 
in costs. This system is seen as:  
- incapable of providing incentives to reduce costs;  
- irrespective of efficiency (cost inefficiencies might be built into the cost 
structure and then passed on to the consumers through increased prices);  
- capable of encouraging over investment 
 
1.2 – Price Cap regulation 
Price caps leave the structure of charges unregulated, setting incentives to 
balance price structure in the direction of efficiently rationing peak and 
excess demand.  
Price cap regulation was introduced to lower the overall costs of regulation 
and to provide the incentives for firms to act in a way to improve economic 
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welfare. Unlike ROR, with price-cap regulation airport operators are 
allowed to increase prices. 
While ROR depends on the airport operator’s historical costs, price-cap 
mechanism is forward-looking and therefore this method provides better 
incentives for reducing costs and investing in capacity (Gillen and Niemeier, 
2008).  
Price cap regulation began to be used in the 1980s; the maximum price is 
established by a formula that takes into account inflation, efficiency factors 
and the external costs Y: 
 
	 = 
		 −  +      (1) 
 
where CPI is the Consumer Price Index, RPI the Retail Price Index, and X 
measures the expected productivity growth.  
The difference between CPI and RPI consists in which items are taken into 
consideration (RPI includes mortgage interest costs and council tax) and in 
the fact that RPI is an arithmetic mean while CPI is a geometric mean. The 
geometric mean is seen as more capable of reflecting changes in consumer 
spending patterns due to changes in the price of goods and, moreover, is 
never higher than the arithmetic mean. The value of X is determined by the 
regulator on the basis of a range of criteria including, for example 
productivity, the performance of the firm in the previous period and boost to 
reduce costs. 
A high positive X-factor (thus resulting in lower price cap) might be the 
result of cost savings in the past or disclose the will to further improve 
efficiency. On the other hand, a high negative X-factor (thus enabling an 
increase of the price cap) might hint a rise in the firm’s costs or the need of 
infrastructure investments. The little incentive to investments is the main 
negative aspect of price cap, this is due to the difference of life span 
between investments and regulation period.  
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In order to calculate the total revenue required a Regulated Asset Base 
(RAB) is defined and valued at the beginning of the price control period and 
then consequently enlarged to take account of the projected capital 
expenditure. The regulators have to pay attention to overestimation of RAB 
value by the airport management as well as to the level of quality of the 
services provided by the airport (lowering quality might be an unsound way 
to cut costs).  
 
D. Gillen and H.M. Niemeier (2006) distinguish between “pure” price cap, 
when there is no reference to benchmark costs and “hybrid” price cap, if 
benchmarking techniques are used. Hybrid price cap provides fewer 
incentives for cost reductions but it is more common in EU than the pure 
price cap method. Hybrid price caps have been used for UK airports, 
temporary for Australian airports and for some European airports.  
Another issue with Price cap is the way to calculate CPI or RPI: first of all, 
CPI or RPI is an average price; moreover the airport management may 
choose between a method relying on the predicted revenue/passenger 
(revenue yield) and a weighted average price (tariff basket) to define 
CPI/RPI. The latter is independent on traffic forecasts and is therefore 
simple and less prone to be manipulated; . In general the tariff basket 
approach is usually considered to give airports greater incentives to move to 
a more efficient pricing structure. ICF SH&E (2006) reports that the tariff 
basket approach is used in the majority of EU airports adopting Price cap 
regulation.  
 
1.3 – Reserve regulation (Light-handed regulation) 
Also known as “light-handed” approach, it consists in the intervention of the 
regulator whenever either the airport’s market power is abused or the airport 
management and the airlines cannot reach an agreement. It is the threat of 
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regulation rather than actual regulation which provides a safeguard against 
anti-competitive behavior (Toms, 2003).  
This kind of regulation is common in Asia-Pacific countries like Australia 
and New Zealand. The three main New Zealand airports, Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch, were corporatized in the late 1980s. 
Government shareholdings in Auckland and Wellington airports were 
partially sold to private investors in the late 1990s, while Christchurch is 
still owned by the local government. 
New Zealand did not formally regulate its airports after privatization, 
though it did provide for a review of airport pricing behavior with the threat 
of more explicit regulation should this behavior be unacceptable. 
In Australia airports under federal ownership were first corporatized in the 
1980s but beforehand they were expected to achieve cost recovery as a 
group, though there were cross subsidies from large to smaller airports. As 
stated in the previous chapter, in the 1980s the federal government 
transferred ownership of smaller airports to local governments while airport 
privatization began in 1996-97. Formal regulation under a dual till price cap 
was put in place by the government and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC). In 2001 The Australian Productivity 
Commission’s report recommended the end of price cap regulation and, in 
2002, the government decided to monitor only the seven major capital city 
airports instead, without regulating nor monitoring other airports. (D. Gillen, 
2008) 
Three aspects are worth to be taken into account to make light handed 
regulation a credible option. Firstly, monitoring needs a credible threat 
(Kunz, 1999), that is to say “Is there an independent regulator with 
sufficient information and democratic support?” This might be the case in 
Australia and in New Zealand (Australian Productivity Commission, 2001), 
but it is not in other parts of the world, as it has been stated above. 
Secondly, the guidelines have to be clearly and precisely stated. Thirdly, the 
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incentives towards efficiency depend on whether the guidelines demand 
cost-based pricing or are incentive-based.  
This system may work well in countries with uncongested airport and with 
absence of competition due to geographical reason (for example it might be 
the case of Canada, China and USA to some extent). It remains to be seen if 
monitoring can set incentives towards efficient pricing if capacity is scarce 
and airlines oppose such changes as they cannot pass higher charges to 
passengers as easily (H.M. Niemeier, 2009). 
 
1.4 – Airports – airline agreements 
Finally, what is not often considered in the debate on airport regulation is 
that airports can directly contribute to the degree of airline competition 
through pricing and capital investment decisions. Therefore policy makers 
should not only consider the welfare effects of airport regulation in relation 
to airports and their customers, but also the associated welfare effects on 
airline competition that result from airport pricing and investment decisions 
under the various regulatory regimes. (D. Gillen, 2008) 
 
Revenue sharing agreements in the European airport industry are often built 
in order to inversely bind the level of charges to the passenger growth over a 
certain period, configuring a sort of mutual agreement between the airlines 
and airports. These so-called sliding scales might also be combined with 
price cap regulation, as in the case of Hamburg, Vienna and regional 
Austrian airports. These agreements might be the result of Memorandums of 
Understanding between the airports and its users, in the form of a public 
contract.  
The average charge per passenger is determined according to the future 
passenger growth rate (for example, expected traffic growth +4%  charges 
+2%). In case of disagreement the charges are determined in a cost related 
way. If the actual growth rate were higher than it was expected, airlines 
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would give the airport management part of the additional revenues so as to 
balance revenue losses; on the contrary (lower growth rates), the airport 
would cover the whole or part of the airline’s revenue losses through higher 
charges. (D. Gillen, H.M. Niemeier, 2006) 
Also Low cost airlines, such as Ryanair and easyJet, have sought long-term 
deals at their base airport, but these agreements were sometimes rejected by 
the country’s Competition Board. (A. Graham, 2008) 
Within the contract period, these contracts offer both the airport and the 
airlines stability if demand fluctuates. However, the incentives for cost 
reduction and for traffic increase are rather. Very often these agreements 
highlight the airlines’ bargaining power (and this power could be high or 
extremely low depending on the kind of service the airports provide).  
Moreover, fast rising demand leads to lower charges and lower demand to 
higher charges and the mathematical form of the sliding scale might reduce 
the incentives to differentiate charges. 
 
Fig. 14: Regulation form at some EU countries (Source: D. Gillen, H.M. Niemeier, 2006) 
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Table 17: Regulation form at some extra-EU countries. (Source: Gillen, Graham) 
 
The initial regulatory framework for the privatized Australian airports was 
fairly similar to that adopted by the UK airports, but in this case 100% of 
the charges were allowed to be passed through to the airlines. There was 
also a dual till rather than a single till. The Australian airports used the 
basket tariff rather than the revenue yield approach. The price cap was 
supposed to last 5 years after its approval, but the Australian regulatory 
framework had more formal conditions relating to airport access and quality 
of service monitoring (Forsyth, 2004). Unfortunately, this regulation system 
entered a severe crisis after the 9/11 and the bankruptcy of former 
Australian’s second largest carrier (Ansett) and therefore in October 2001 
the Australian government suspended the price regulation at all but the four 
largest airports (Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Brisbane). APC’s final 
report recommended that price regulation should be replaced by a light-
handed price surveillance provided that airports would not abuse their 
freedom. (A. Graham, 2008) 
The US is the largest aviation market in the world and has what appears to 
be the least progressive airport governance and regulatory institutions. The 
US is essentially a cost-of-service form of regulation although airports that 
still adhere to the principles of residual financing are under a single till form 
of price-cap regulation. The US form of indirect regulation provides 
incentives for neither static nor dynamic efficiency. The use of revenue 
bonds by airports, which are owned by municipal or regional governments, 
Country Airport Form of regulation Single/dual till
South Africa Price cap single
Malta Malta Price cap dual
Hungary Budapest Price cap dual
Australia Reserve dual
Canada - -
New Zealand Reserve
USA - -
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for investments in capacity can have a deleterious impact on downstream 
airline competition. The reason is airlines provide the bond guarantees and 
this in turn gives the airline some power over capacity investment. 
Canada’s lack of formal airport regulation stems from the Canadian form of 
airport governance. As it was presented in the previous chapter, the 
Canadian federal government has been devolving airports since the mid-
1990s but it did not want airports to be privatized.  
The government chose a not-for-profit model: fees and charges are not 
regulated or subject to review; Airport Authorities are allowed to set charges 
but all the revenues must be reinvested; new airport infrastructure have to be 
financed only through the Airport Improvement Fee (AIF). This policy was 
experimented at Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary and Montreal airports and 
subsequently extended to the remaining Tier 1 airports. (D. Gillen, 2008) 
 
In the United Kingdom, only BAA owned airports in London (Heathrow, 
Gatwick, Stansted) are under some form of regulation at present. Regulation 
at Manchester airport was suspended in 2009 as the Department of 
Transport’s review established that Manchester airport’s market power was 
not so extensive. As for Manchester, airports which do not have enough 
market power are not regulated according to UK’s government decisions 
although the CAA is allowed to take measures against non-regulated 
airports would they engage in any anti-competitive practices such as 
unreasonable discrimination between users, artificially low prices in order to 
influence competition with neighboring airports or the use of their market 
power against airlines operating at their sites.  
The process of price-capping ensured that annual price increases would be 
limited to the CPI - X formula, where the value of the factor X comes under 
review every 5 years. During the 5 year regulation period, the airport 
operator is allowed to profit from efficiency improvements without having 
to reduce prices. The CAA establishes the value of X after consulting with 
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the Competition Authority and the airlines. When a new terminal or runway 
is planned, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) allows the airport to 
increase its prices above RPI-X to reflect the increased cost of the new 
facilities. Nevertheless, A. Graham in her book (2008) states that UK’s 
regulation is gradually drifting to an ROR form with revenue yield method.  
The value of the factor X is set to guarantee a minimum level of profitability 
consistent with the cost of capital. This profitability is calculated on the 
basis of predictions of the following elements (Starkie, 2004): air traffic at 
the airport; total revenues; operating expenses (taking into account potential 
efficiency improvements) and investment plans for the following years.  
The latter two elements are used to determine the regulated asset base. 
A major impact of this single till regulation at the London airports has been 
that the commercial aspects of the business have been considerably 
expanded which has simultaneously led to a substantial reduction in real 
charges to airline users. Since 2003, a specific price-cap formula has been 
established for each airport so as to avoid the distortions caused by cross-
subsidies between BAA airports. It was also decided that there should be 
rebates for users were certain service quality standards not achieved. 
 
Table 18: Evolution of UK price cap factor X at regulated airports (Source: Graham) 
 
The regulation process in the UK is complex because there are two 
regulators involved, both independent of the Ministry of Transport (Graham, 
2008). There is the sector regulator with detailed knowledge of the aviation 
industry, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), and the Competition 
Airport 1987-1991 1992-1993 1994 1995-1996 1997-2002 2003-2008
Heatrow -1 -8 -4 -1 -3 6,5
Gatwick -1 -8 -4 -1 -3 0
Stansted -1 -8 -4 -1 1 0
Airport 1986-1992 1993-1994 1995 1996-1997 1998-2002 2003-2009
Manchester -1 -3 3 -3 -5 -5
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Commission that is a very experienced more general trading regulator, 
appointed by the government to advise and monitor the CAA.  
It is the Competition Commission that undertakes the detailed review of the 
airports’ operations every 5 years and then offers advice to the CAA about 
the level of price control. The CAA takes the final decision after a 
consultation. Whilst the skills of these two regulators should be 
complementary, the two bodies have not always been in agreement: for 
example in 2001 the CAA asked for the shift from single till to dual till but 
the Competition Commission rejected the proposal. 
In general, the owners of the firms responsible for managing German 
airports have been either the federal, regional or local governments, in 
variable proportions. Since 1990, the main driver behind the change in the 
ownership structure of Germany’s airports has been the disinvestments 
(trough concessions) made by the federal government.  
No legal framework operates to condition the price regulation of airports in 
Germany (Müller, Konig and Müller, 2008): two federal laws establish that 
the prices charged by airports should be approved by the corresponding 
regulatory agency.  
Contrary to the rest of Europe, regional governments (rather than the federal 
government) are responsible for regulating airport prices. Thus, there is a 
potential conflict of interests with the regional governments acting as both 
regulator and airport manager.  
Some regional regulatory agencies have implemented rate-of-return 
regulation, while others have implemented price-cap regulation. In both 
cases, a formal consultation process between airlines and airports is 
conducted before charges are finally approved.  
Some partially privatized airports, including Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, 
Hamburg and Hanover, have entered into private contracts with their 
airlines. Anyway, these contracts require the approval of the regional 
regulatory agency; they are in force for relatively short periods (4-5 years) 
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and envisage an annual adjustment of prices according to a CPI – X 
formula. The factor X takes into account both parties’ past and future costs 
and revenues (Niemeier, 2002; Gillen and Niemeier, 2008; Müller, Konig 
and Müeller, 2008) through, usually, a sliding scale method. 
Fees must be levied according to the principles of cost-covering, public 
transport policy and appropriateness. This raises the problem that incentives 
for cost-cutting are limited. (Heymann, 2006) The majority of German 
airports follow a single till regulation policy, whereas Hamburg and 
Frankfurt have implemented dual-till regulation. (J. Müller, T. Ülkü and J. 
Živanović, 2009) 
Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea (AENA) is a public firm, 
dependent on the Ministry of Transport, which owns and manages on a 
centralized basis more than 40 commercial airports in Spain. AENA and the 
Ministry of Transport take all the relevant decisions regarding airports 
including investments, charges and slot allocations (thus disabling 
competition between airports). 
The prices charged by the Spanish airports to the airlines are, therefore, 
proposed by AENA and ratified by the Spanish Parliament.  
In theory airport charges are based on the total costs of all airports managed 
by AENA. However, in practice these charges are approved by Parliament, 
so they are annually adjusted in line with charges for other public services.  
The Spanish CAA sets the goals of national airport policy but it has no 
power in setting charges. Finally, there is no consultation process between 
airports and airlines for the fixing of airport charges. 
The evolution of airport charges is not associated to the evolution in costs 
and this is one of the reasons why AENA has recently experienced several 
economic downturn. A recent issue is the forecasted partial privatization of 
AENA or at least of some of the profitable assets (namely Madrid and 
Barcelona airports) to recover partially the debt, but due to the worldwide 
crisis nothing has been decided yet. (G. Bel, X. Fageda, 2010) 
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2. Services provided by airport management 
The functions and responsibilities at airports vary according to the airport’s 
size. Here we provide a short list of the main functions and offices present at 
a target mid to big-size airport; each function is under the responsibility of a 
duty manager who reports straightforward to the CEO of the airport. 
- Security, immigration, health & custom: they are general services 
usually provided by the State. They should be accorded the full 
cooperation of airport management. At some airports, an airport police 
or security force may exist to cooperate in providing or to provide itself 
certain functions. 
- Safety: airport management have to close cooperate with the flying 
squad, the rescue and fire-fighting team in case of accidents and 
emergencies. 
- Air traffic operation: the function deals with the movement of aircraft 
apporaching the airport, taxing on the runway and taxiways from/to the 
apron and after take off. In addition, meteorological services, pilot 
briefings and aeronautical documentation and information are provided. 
This services, as well as the previous ones, are often the responsibility of 
the State in which the airport is located. 
- Administration and finance: this function is usually responsible for 
overall management of personnel and general administrative matters 
including management of buildings and land and the supply and 
managements of stocks. It is also responsible for accounting, budgets, 
budgetary control, the assessment and collection of charges and other 
revenues as well as making payments and possibly the operation of 
airport data processing systems. 
- Corporate affairs: this function is appointed the administration of 
relations with governmental entities, rental and leases of airport land, 
concessions and other legal matters. 
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- Operations: the function is invested with either the duty of actually 
providing handling services or with a supervising role when one or more 
handling agencies are present at the airport. In both cases, information to 
passengers and airlines as well as other services are provided through 
the Operation office: scheduled and un-scheduled inspections of the 
airport’s infrastructures as well as decisions about operative restrictions 
or closures of the airport to commercial traffic in specific circumstances. 
- Infrastructures: this function assures maintenance services for airport 
installations, equipment and it also supervises civil engineering work at 
the airport. The maintenance area covers the internal equipment of the 
air terminal (baggage belts, stairways, heating and conditioning 
systems), the external equipment (lights, ILS, meteorological 
equipment) as well as airport vehicles and ground handling equipment. 
The engineering area is responsible for the definition of the master plan 
and for the planning of works and repairing at the airport.  
- Business, Strategy & performance: this function is responsible for the 
definition of airport’s long term objectives as well as of development 
and investment plans. Moreover, it deals with the assessment of airport’s 
performance, comparing results with forecasts, budget and trying to 
understand the rationales behind the improvements or deteriorations of 
the services. 
- Human resources: this function deals with the management of the 
working force at the airport. 
- Traffic & marketing: this function’s aim is to promote the airport to the 
airlines, to develop and manage commercial agreements and contracts 
with existing and new airlines wishing to start operation from/to the 
airport. 
- Public relations: this function’s aim is to promote the airport to general 
public, through the use of the web, media, advertising, brochures and 
guided tours of the airport. 
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Therefore, to summarize, three main activities take place at an airport: 
- essential operational services and facilities like air traffic control system, 
meteorological services, telecommunications, police and security, fire, 
ambulance and first aid services plus runways, aprons, taxiways, 
grounds and buildings maintenance; 
- handling services to aircrafts and to passengers; 
- commercial activities.  
While the first and the second activity fall into the aeronautical services 
group, the latter category is clearly not related with aeronautical operations.  
The activities included in the first group determine the degree of safety in 
airport operations and hence they are considered essential and “at the core” 
of the airport business. Most of these activities, even at partially privatized 
airports, are under the jurisdiction of the Central Government entities. With 
reference to the activities concerning airside infrastructures’ maintenance, 
there are differences among the countries: indeed, these activities may rest 
within the scope of the airport management or not, depending on the degree 
of control the Central Government has on the airport operations.  
Handling aircraft related activities include ramp handling, cleaning, the 
provision of power and fuel and the loading and unloading of luggage and 
freight; passengers related handling activities refer mainly to check-in and 
boarding operations (differences between countries are present as not 
everywhere check-in activities are run by handling agencies’ personnel) and 
the processing of passengers, baggage and freight through the terminal 
building.   
The definition of commercial activities involves a lot of services that might 
be located either at the terminal building or around the airport: duty free 
shops, retails, restaurants and bars, leisure services, hotel accommodation, 
banks, car rental, parking services, conference and communication facilities 
(O. Betancor, R. Rendeiro, 1999). 
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2.1 – Ground handling 
This function concerns the airport management only for those airports that 
provide all or part of the ground handling services at the airport. Otherwise, 
after liberalization (for EU countries, after 1996 and only at certain 
conditions), handling agencies (or airlines themselves) have been allowed to 
enter the market; thus the airport management’s responsibility is to monitor 
the provision of the services and the level of service provided. The function 
may be separated into terminal handling and ramp handling. If the airport 
management provides straightforwardly handling services to airlines and 
passengers, these activities might be considered part of the Operations 
function. In terms of staff employed, this is actually one of the most 
important activities at airports. As it has been anticipated above, several 
activities are ground handling related; some out of those might be partly or 
wholly subcontracted.  
The majority of handling agencies operating as a third part (n°1 and n°2 
being the airport and the airline) at airports is private owned, but they offer a 
public utility service. The Standard Ground Handling Agreement (SGHA) is 
a standard document which airlines, airport management and handling 
agencies refer to when establishing a ground handling service at an airport. 
The SGHA defines and shortlists the activities a target ground handling 
agency should provide; as it is possible to note from Table 19 below, 
additional security services and catering are not part of these activities.  
 
Table 19: Ground Handling services (Source: Masutti, 2009) 
 
LAND SIDE
baggage handlig refuelling check-in operations
cargo and mail handling cleanings of the aircraft boarding operations
transport of passengers from terminal to aircrafts ramp agent transfer of transit passengers
aircraft loading/unloading pushback cleanings of the terminal
in-flight pilot briefing balance of aircraft at take off customers care
AIR SIDE
GROUND HANDLING ACTIVITIES
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Fig. 15: Gantt diagram for handling activities (Source: Airport Research Center, 2009) 
 
The EU Justice Court, in 2002, established and confirmed that handling 
agencies have to comply with the CE Treaty in terms of competition 
(Sentence 24 Oct 2002, C-82/01 against Aéroport de Paris). Ground 
handling activities were liberalized in principle, in 1996 with the Directive 
96/67/CE that permitted self-handling and the presence of handling 
providers at airports. Up to 1996, handling services at airport were, as most 
of airport activities, monopolistically provided by airport management with 
self-handling usually permitted only to the national carrier: thus, there was 
only one handling agent and discriminatory practices and higher prices 
charged to airlines were frequent. This trend was particularly evident at 
southern countries’ airports in the EU (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Germany, 
France and Italy among others) if compared with Netherlands and UK, 
where a partial liberalization had already taken place. The directive had not 
been issued with the aim of allowing the presence of an indefinite number of 
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competing agencies: indeed, the number of handling agencies allowed to 
operate at a target airport was set according to safety issues and airside 
capacity; nevertheless at least 2 agencies should exist. 
 
Fig. 16: State of the art of GH liberalization in Europe (Source: Airport Research Center, 2009) 
 
 
Table 20: Market access to GH Services in the EU (Source: Airport Research Center, 2009) 
 
The guidelines established by the Directive 96/67 are: 
- at least 2 third part handling enterprises operating at airports handling 
more than 3.000.000 pax/year (or more than 75.000 tons of freight/year); 
- gradual application; 
EU COUNTRIES
Unlimited market access Denmark, Finland, France (*), Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal (*), 
Limited market access over 2 mil. Pax/year
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK
Limited market access over 1 mil. Pax/year Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta
Subcontracting always allowed Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy
Subcontracting limited / allowed with license
Austria, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
Subcontracting prohibited Greece
(*)
 at major airports limited access is in force
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- temporary dispensations are afforded in case of capacity shortage; 
- unbundling, that is to say the legal and accounting separation between 
handler and airport management in order to avoid cross-subsidies; 
- additionally, from 2001 onwards, at least one supplier must be 
independent from the airport’s management body and from any 
dominant airline (market share of more than 25% of total airport 
passengers during one year period) at the specific airport; 
- the provision of self-handling applies to every airport in the Community. 
Moreover, for airports with either more than 1 million passengers/year 
or 25.000 tons of freight/year, member states are allowed to limit the 
number of self-handling airlines to no fewer than at least 2 for the 
following categories: baggage handling, ramp handling, fuel and oil 
handling, freight and mail handling. 
 
Eurocontrol estimates that Ground handling activities have the following 
impact: revenues 50 billion€ worldwide, at least 60.000 employed in 
Europe, airlines expenditures for ground-handling services is from 5 to 
12%. The “Airport Package” presented at the end of 2011 provides different 
solutions to solve the problem of lack of efficiency at airports: 
- increased choice of ground-handling solutions at EU airports plus full 
opening of the self-handling market. At large airports and for restricted 
services, the minimum number of service providers will increase from 2 
to 3; 
- the airport managing body would be established as coordinator of 
ground services and so he would be in charge of setting minimum 
quality standards. Subcontracting rules would be further clarified;  
- provisions to strengthen the training and stable employment conditions 
of staff; 
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- mutual recognition of national approvals for ground-handlers issued by 
Member States to break down barriers to providing services across 
borders; 
- greater transparency in airports’ charging mechanism for airport 
centralized infrastructures and clarification of conditions on which 
airports can provide ground-handling services themselves.  
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Table 20: EU Airports falling under the Directive 96/67/CE (Source: Official Journal of the EU) 
 
2.2 – Non-aeronautical activities 
Airport revenues from non-aeronautical activities consist of fees for the 
rights to operate businesses at the airport, rental of leased land and premises 
and receipts from commercial activities operating off the airport but relying 
AUSTRIA Wien
BELGIUM Brussels, Charleroi, Liege, Oostend
BULGARIA Sofia
CYPRUS Larnaca
CZECH REP Praha
DENMARK Copenhagen, Billund, Aarhus, Aalborg, Esbjerg, Bornholm
ESTONIA
FINLAND Helsinki
FRANCE
Paris CDG, Paris Orly, Nice, Lyon, Marseille, Toulose, Bale-Mulhouse, 
Bordeaux, Nantes, Beauvais
GERMANY
Berlin tegel, Schonefeld, Bremen, Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Frankfyrt, Hahn, 
Hamburg, Hannover, Koln, Munchen, Stuttgard, Leipzig, Nurnberg
GREECE Athens, Iraklio, Thessaloniki, Rodos, Corfù, Kos, Chania
HUNGARY Budapest
IRELAND Dublin, Shannon, Cork
ITALY
Rome Fiumicino and Ciampino, Milan Malpensa and Linate, Venice, 
Bergamo, Catania, Naples, Palermo, Bologna, Pisa, Verona, Turin, Cagliari, 
Bari
LATVIA Riga
LITHUANIA Vilnius
LUXEMBOURG Luxembourg
MALTA Luqa
NETHERLANDS Amsterdam, Maastricht
POLAND Warszawa, Krakow, Katowice
PORTUGAL Lisboa, Faro, Porto, Madeira
ROMANIA Bucarest
SLOVAKIA Bratislava
SLOVENIA
SPAIN
Alicante, Barcelona, Bilbao, Fuerteventura, Girona, Gran Canaria, Ibiza, 
Lanzarote, Madrd, Malaga, Menorca, Palma de Mallorca, Sevilla, Tenerife 
norte, Tenerife sur, Valencia
SWEDEN Goteborg, Stockholm Arlanda and Skavsta
UNITED KINGDOM
London Heatrow-Gatwick-Standsted-Luton-City, Manchester, Birmingham, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Bristol, East Midlands, Liverpool, Belfast International 
and City, Newcastle, Aberdeen, Leeds, Prestwick
Country Airports whose annual traffic is more than 2 million 
passengers or 50.000 tons of freight in 2008
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on airport traffic for their customer base. The current financial reporting at 
airports makes it difficult the measurement of non-aviation revenues as 
there is no homogeneity in the definition of the activities to be taken into 
account among authors in scientific literature. Privatized or partially 
privatized airports have proved capable of providing more detailed 
information than small publicly owned airports, as they are legally required 
to disclose those information (M.J. Zenglein & J. Muller, 2007). Usually the 
definition of retail activities includes shops, food and beverage. In most 
world regions the most significant single revenue item is retail, except in 
North American where car parking (31%) and car rental (14%) are more 
important. (Airport Council International, 2007). Moreover at North 
American airports, food & beverage has a greater share than in Europe.  
Over the years, the development of commercial revenues at airports has 
been highly dependent on two key factors: commercialization/privatization 
and airlines’ pressure for the lowering of aeronautical charges. Therefore the 
need to cut cost and the possibility to better exploit the commercial potential 
of the terminals have led the way to innovative terminal design. 
According to the Airport Council International (ACI) annual World Airport 
Economic Surveys, commercial revenues accounted for 46% in 1995, 
peaked at 54% in 2000 and then fell at a slow pace but almost constantly to 
47% in 2008. 
However the importance of commercial revenues varies by global region: in 
2006, commercial revenues on average represented 53% of all revenues at 
North American, African and Middle Eastern airports, compared to 48% in 
Europe and 46% in the Asian/Pacific region. By contrast in the Caribbean 
and Latin America they only represented 29% of all revenues. Even then 
these regional figures hide very considerable differences between individual 
airports. (Graham, 2009). 
In Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 it is possible to analyze the commercial revenues’ 
structure from an ACI’s worldwide analysis in 2007 and a further analysis 
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restricted to EU airports in 2008 and 2009. From Table 21 we can derive the 
fact that, at EU airports, revenues have been slightly diminishing but the 
split between aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenue didn’t change. 
In 2009 aeronautical revenues worldwide declined by 2,5%, while non-
aeronautical revenue sources generated around -1,5% revenue when 
compared to 2008. Aeronautical revenue from passenger and airline user 
charges accounted for 53,5% of industry wide income, while non-
aeronautical revenues worldwide made up 46,5%. 
Revenues from the core commercial areas rose by 3% in 2009, driven by 
retail (+2%), real estate (+10%), car rental concessions (+9%) and Food & 
Beverage (+7%). Car parking (-3,5%) and advertising (-11%) revenues 
dropped (Annual Analysis of the EU Air Transport Market, 2010). 
Several authors agree in considering the use of the non-aviation revenues’ 
share misleading to express a performance index of an airports because, as it 
has been said before, airports experiment different operational and 
accounting structures according to the country they are located in. 
 
Fig. 17: Commercial revenue by source at world airports (Source: ACI, 2007) 
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Fig. 18: Commercial revenue by source at EU airports, 2008 versus 2009 (Source: ACI Europe 
Economic Reports) 
 
 
Table 21: EU Airports general sources of revenue in 2008 and 2009 (Source: ACI Europe 
Economic Reports) 
 
Within each global region and each country, commercial revenues will vary 
according to a multitude of factors including the volume and nature of 
traffic, dwell time and stress levels, contractual agreements with commercial 
concessionaires and space/location considerations. As it has been 
anticipated, the economic regulation of a target airport is a crucial aspect in 
the assessment of the commercial revenues: indeed, the single till approach 
considers all revenues while the dual till treats separately aeronautical and 
commercial activities. A study conducted by Vogel and Graham (2006) at 
31 EU airports found that the commercial revenues’ share is deeply related 
to the traffic output: below 4 million passengers the share was 35%, 
between 4 and 20 million passengers it was 45% and finally it was 56% for 
those airports over 20 million (Vogel and Graham, 2006). The Airport 
Retail Study of 2006–07, which covers airports from all major world 
billion € % billion € %
Total revenues 26,9 100% 26 100%
Aeronautical revenue 14,3 53% 13,9 53%
Non-aeronautical revenue 12,6 47% 12,1 47%
EU Airports 2008 vs 2009
2008 2009
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regions, found that commercial revenues/passenger were nearly twice as 
large for airports handling more than 20 million passengers/year if 
compared with airports of less than 10 million (The Moodie Report, 2007). 
In general, it has been experimented that commercial revenues (and, 
therefore, profits) at airports are deeply related – as happens for air 
passengers demand also – to security scares and to economic conditions.  
The last decade or so has been particularly challenging for airport 
commercial managers: in 1999 intra-EU duty and tax sales were abolished, 
the further expansion of the EU to eastern countries fostered this 
phenomenon, bureau de changes outlets at airport have been diminishing 
since the adoption of the Euro, terrorism’s menaces introduced periodic 
shocks in traffic demand and restrictions in the items (and in their 
quantities) passengers were allowed to carry onboard. Finally, cheaper on-
line sales and increasing restrictions on tobacco or alcohol had an impact on 
the kind of product sold. 
Passengers terminal are more crowded and dwell time have been increasing 
due to the strengthening of security controls, but space can be earned or 
saved thanks to new technologies like on-line check-in and kiosks (N. 
Gualandi, L. Mantecchini, F. Paganelli, 2009 and 2011). 
The pressure on cost reduction exerted by airlines due to both the “low cost 
threat” and the rising fuel costs has been encouraging airport to take 
additional steps to exploit their commercial potential: additional facilities 
are being provided or concessioned and, if economically sustainable, 
“aerotropolis” are gaining importance in the world scenario (Kasarda, 2001-
2006-2011). Business parks, enterprise zones, supermarkets, cinemas, 
restaurants as well as participations in other core activities in the 
surrounding areas are for sure a vital area to invest money in. Moreover, a 
growing interest is being paid nowadays also to the working force of the 
airport. This provision permits the airport management a more profitable use 
of the building and land spaces other than the terminal. 
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It is important to note that giving in concession or leasing terminal spaces to 
retail, shops, advertisement, offices and other premises occupied by airlines 
or governmental agencies and food & beverage is also a form of private 
participation at airport but those private investors don’t have any decision 
power nor representatives in the airport’s management board. At 100% 
public owned airports, though, these are the unique private stakeholders (as 
it largely happens at USA airports). Normally, as it may happen for example 
for hotels and other facilities, airports own the space where the facility is 
located or the facility itself but they contract out the expertise to operate it 
while retaining ownership and collecting the revenues generated. Airports 
may also be interested in making the concessioners or lessees responsible 
for finishing and furnishing the premises they occupy, obviously in 
conformity with airports’ plans not to alter harmony and architectural 
balance in layout appearance. 
Food & beverage facilities are likely to earn significant market shares in the 
future as a crescent number of airlines (not only LCCs but also NCs) is 
giving up with the provision of on board catering. The service they provide 
will have a crescent impact on passengers’ perception of the airport as a 
whole and therefore they have to be appropriately designed and located so 
as to attract passengers but also provide 0-km and high quality food in order 
to improve passengers’ opinion.  
“Walk-through” shops near the departure lounge and the boarding area have 
been developing at many airports and other are re-designing their terminals 
in order to canalize the passenger flow into those shops, avoiding retail offer 
duplication and providing greater choice for passengers. 
Attention is placed on advertising revenues: the increased ability to 
transport easily and quickly passengers within an airport giving them the 
possibility to peruse their surroundings. Jet bridges, floors, revolving doors, 
baggage claim areas are useful place for advertisement provided that they 
don’t compromise the signage.  
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Normally duty free are only for departing passengers, but recently some 
airports placed duty free also for arriving passengers or off airports, but they 
have to comply with customs laws and regulation. 
Airports’ websites are the last form of advertisement: from mere 
information providers on scheduled times they are now capable of giving 
information also on shops and retail sitting. 
 
Leasing contracts concerned with the occupation and use of airport property 
are usually less complex in terms of variety of terms, although in some 
cases certain clauses may need to be expressed in greater detail among those 
the provisions for periodic reviews of the rental charges and the reversal of 
ownership to the airport management when the contract expires. 
Repossession might also take place if the lessees defaults on payment, due 
to operational requirements or in public interest.  
The length of the contract period would normally be influenced by the type 
of business involved: longer terms contracts would usually be offered in 
cases where significant investments are involved.  
While the length of concession contracts vary from 1 to 5 years. Leases of 
airport premises are usually for somewhat shorter periods, while for the 
rental of airport land involving the construction of buildings by the lessee, 
the general range appears to be 10-40 years. Generally, contracts are 
renewable, to permit the lessees to amortize the usually large investments 
involved. (ICAO, 2006) 
 
2.3 – Operating expenses and source of revenues at airports 
Airport balances usually distinguish between aeronautical revenues and 
non-aeronautical revenues. Not everywhere it is possible to find cohesion 
between accounting reports of different countries due to differences in 
treating the single items. For example, handling revenues are usually treated 
as aeronautical revenues unless handling is undertaken by handling agents 
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or airlines’ personnel but its associated revenues (rent or fee based on 
turnover) are included under rents or concession. Same issue might concern 
the incomes received by the airport from fuel companies or from airlines as 
fuel refueling fees.  
Overall, landing and passenger fees are by far the most important 
aeronautical revenue sources. Most of the non- aeronautical revenue comes 
from concessions and rents. (Graham, 2008) 
From airports balance sheets, it is usually possible to identify the three 
separate cost items: labor, capital and other operating costs. In this field too, 
there is no consistency between the relative influence of each item on the 
total, nor certainty about which operations does each item fall in. For 
example, labor cost might include also handling staff at those airports that 
provide handling while this same voice is not considered at airports where 
handling activities are outsourced to third part handlers.  
If we establish a comparison between US and Europe in terms of aviation 
revenues sources, aircraft landing fees and fuel charges are common items; 
revenues stemming from the rents and the leases of land, terminal space or 
hangars used by airlines are more important at US airports, while incomes 
from passengers charges, handling services (generally speaking, only at 
smaller airports but the national law has to be taken into account) and ATC 
services are present only at EU airports. Table 22 below explains the 
situation at some notable airports in Europe, Americas and the rest of the 
world. 
For most US airports, the airport charges represents less than 30% of 
revenues and the staff costs are also less than 30% of total costs. Elsewhere 
in the world the situation is more mixed: the Australian and New Zealand 
airports tend to generate just less than half their revenues from aeronautical 
sources whereas the Mexican airports are very reliant on this source. The 
share of staff costs for most of the airports tends to be comparatively low 
relative to European airports which reflects both minimum involvement in 
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additional activities (as for Australia) and lower local labor costs (as for 
Mexico) (Graham, 2008) 
 
Table 22: Revenue and cost structure at some world airport, 2006-2007 (Source: Graham) 
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Many of the cost and revenues structures are somehow inversely dependent 
on the airports’ traffic throughput. Although, at small airports the impact of 
fixed costs will push up the unit costs because the traffic levels will be 
certainly lower.  
An ICAO survey found that, on average, airports with more than 25 million 
passengers generated 58% of their revenue from non-aeronautical sources 
compared with the sample average of 36%. (O. Betancor, R. Rendeiro, 
1999) 
Costs associated with international passengers tend to rise as this type of 
traffic requires more space in the terminal for customs and immigration, and 
in effect these passengers have to spend longer time in the terminal. Toms’ 
research (2000) showed that the cost associated with an international 
passenger is likely to be 1,62 times greater than the cost of domestic 
passengers and 1,36 times greater than that of a EU passenger; nevertheless 
international passengers tend to spend more money on commercial facilities 
thus pushing up unit revenues.  
Economic comparisons in any industry have to acknowledge the accounting 
policies adopted by individual operators as a different ownership form 
usually means a different accounting form: airport’s land might be 
considered as an airport asset or not as well as the depreciation rate of 
building might differ significantly. 
Landing charges  In most cases this fee is weight-related on the basis of 
maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) or maximum authorized weight 
(MAW). The simplest method is to charge a fixed amount unit rate (e.g. 
US$ per tons) regardless of the size of the aircraft. This approach favors 
smaller aircraft since tonnage tends to increase faster than aircraft capacity 
but also airlines which have high load factors or seating capacities.  
Some airports use the “ability to pay” principles, that is to say that airlines 
with larger aircraft will pay higher charges.  
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Very few airports, finally, have adopted a movement-related charge which 
tends to be very unpopular with airlines flying small aircraft types. Notable 
variations consist in a fixed charge for all aircrafts above a certain weight.  
Elsewhere other airports modulate landing charges by time of day to reflect 
the peaking of demand. 
The amount of landing charge normally includes also a contribution for 
lighting and ILS.  
ATC charges  typically this charge is related to the weight of the aircraft 
but this appears quite unusual as each aircraft movement, regardless of the 
size of the aircraft, imposes the same costs on the ATC infrastructure. 
Alternatively, the airline will directly pay the ATC agencies and the airport 
operator will not be involved in the financing of ATC services at all. 
At some airports, domestic or short-haul services have traditionally paid a 
reduced landing fee. This is not a cost-related charge but it tends to exist to 
figure a support to local and regional services and sometimes is comparable 
to a subsidy. The European Commission is against the setting of different 
landing charges for domestic and intra-EU traffic, because it would be 
contrary to the principles of the Single Market. 
Passenger charges  these charges are most commonly levied per 
departing passenger for the use of the terminal and passengers processing 
facilities. The French airports have four types of charges, namely domestic, 
Schengen-EU, non-Schengen-EU, and international.  
As with the landing charge in some cases, there may be political or social 
reasons for keeping down the cost of domestic travel as well. Historically, 
such policies are often maintained to subsidize the national carrier although 
domestic passengers usually generate less commercial revenues. A number 
of airports charge a smaller fee for transfer passengers while elsewhere this 
fee is waived hook (ACI-Europe, 2003a, b ).  
Ground handling and fuel charges  Airlines, in addition to landing and 
passenger fees, pay ground handling fees for the provision of specific 
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services (extra-cleanings, power supply … ) and a fuel charge levied by the 
fuel companies if they are independent of the airport operator (at certain 
Middle Eastern airports, the fuelling is provided by a government agency).  
These fees are usually negotiable and the prices depend on: the size of the 
airline, the scale of its operation at the airport and whether the same fuel 
company serves other airports used by the airline.  
If the airport management provides handling services, the incomes from the 
charges will be recorded as aeronautical activity while if handling activities 
are provided by a third part operator, the airline will pay the airport 
management only the rental of the structure; thus the revenues will be 
recorded as non-aeronautical. 
Security charges  the provision of security services may be performed – 
according to the country’s law - by a government agency, by the airport’s 
employees or by a private company or airlines.  
In some countries, security costs are financed directly by the airport 
operator who will have a special security charge or include it in the 
passenger charge.  
Other charges 
- Parking charge  it is a charge collected from aircraft operators for the 
parking of aircraft on the apron or for their housing in airport-owned 
hangars, including any revenue from the leasing of such hangars to 
aircraft operations. The amount usually depends on the weight of the 
aircraft or on its wingspan. There is normally an hourly or daily charge 
with, perhaps, a rebate for using remote stands or un-congested slots. 
Most airports charge airlines after the 4th hour to allow them to 
turnaround without incurring any fee.  
- Air-bridge fee  it is typically charged per movement or on the basis of 
the actual time of utilization. 
- Cargo charges  they are based on the weight of loaded or unloaded 
cargo 
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- Fire-fighting fee  it is levied on those airlines wishing to do refueling 
with the transit passengers on board at unsupplied airports. In those 
cases, fire-fighting brigade has to be in the proximity of the aircraft in 
event of mishandling that might lead to a fire. 
- Noise related charges: a growing number of airports have noise-related 
surcharges or discounts, associated with their landing charges, as a result 
of increasing concerns about the environment.  
Government taxes  finally, airlines or their passengers often have to pay 
an additional government tax, which is different from the airports’ 
passenger charge. This taxes might stand for some airport service or 
investment project; notable examples are the Government Airport 
Development Fund in Greece, the tourist tax on international 
arriving/departing passengers in Mexico, Hong Kong, Australia, UK, 
France, Denmark (the fee is usually differentiated for economy and business 
class passengers). (Graham, 2008 and ICAO Airport Economics Manual, 
2006) 
 
Table 23 shows that the different sources have a different % weight in the 
total amount of taxes depending on the continent. 
 
Table 23: Relative % importance of different aeronautical charges and taxes by world region 
(Source: Graham) 
 
Europe Americas Africa, Australia, Middle East
Landing 24 11 29
Air Traffic Control 7 3 3
Passenger 36 11 50
Security 10 5 4
Other (park, terminal use … ) 7 15 6
Taxes 16 55 8
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From the airports’ management point of view, the following are the main 
sources of revenue from non-aeronautical activities (ICAO Airport 
Economics Manual, 2006): 
- Aviation fuel and oil concession  for distributing aviation fuel and 
lubricants 
- Restaurants, bar, cafè and catering services concessions  for operating 
restaurants bars and catering services at airports  
- Duty free shops (in or outside the airport) concessions plus the revenues 
collected from duty free shops operated by the airport itself 
- Automobile parking paid by commercial enterprise for the right to 
operate parking facilities at the airport or any revenues derived from 
such facilities when operated by the airport itself 
- Rentals paid by enterprises for the use of airport owned building space, 
land and equipment (check in desks, offices, power plant supply) 
- car rentals, banking and exchange bureau as well as admission fees 
charged for entry to areas of special interest or guided tours 
- Other revenues from non-aeronautical activities 
 
Fig. 19: Airport revenues and incomes worldwide - 2010 (Source: ACI Europe Economic 
Report, 2010) 
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3. Remarks on competition  
In chapter one and two the key topics regarding air traffic and airport market 
competition have been analyzed.  
In this paragraph a quick summary is provided before shifting the attention 
on the case study and analyses made. 
The four topics investigated are: airport privatization, airport regulation, 
forms of state aid and ground handling. A fifth topic, slot allocation, exists 
as well but it has not been taken into consideration for the following 
reasons: 
- it is currently under review by regulators; 
- it is a topic related both to the airports’ and the airlines’ side;  
- it does not impact on the whole lot of airports worldwide but only on the 
congested ones. It is clear that, nevertheless, if the air traffic demand 
meets the IATA forecasts up to 2030 this topic will have a considerable 
impact on a growing number of airports. 
 
According to many authors, four forms of competition might be taken into 
account: 
- Hub competition: passengers can choose between different airlines to fly 
through different hubs to their long haul destination. Airports compete 
between each other trying to attract airlines to operate from/to the target 
airport. Although, hub competition is limited by an high switching cost 
for airlines because hubbing is an expensive investment. Moreover, 
while in the Americas and large Asian countries the hub switch is at 
least likely, in the EU this a remote possibility as European hub and 
spoke networks are still deeply related with former national carriers  
(Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005). 
- Hub and secondary hub: for example Heathrow versus Manchester or 
Frankfurt versus Koln. Traffic rights played an important role in the past 
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since, ante recent open skies agreements, only major airports were 
designated as landing points in air service agreements. Thus, hub 
airports gained a material competitive advantage on secondary airports.  
- Primary and secondary airport: it takes place when a relatively large 
airport competes against a mid-sized secondary airport, provided that the 
passengers target is the same and the airport management bodies are 
independent. A notable example is the competition between Vienna and 
Bratislava; Vienna attempted to buy Bratislava, but the Slovak 
Competition Authority rejected the opportunity. (Forsyth et al, 2009)  
- Potential competition: In competitive markets with strong growth and 
persistent excess demand, entry would occur and competition would be 
intense.  
 
The commercialization of airports led to concession, partial or full 
privatization of airport ownership. It has been proven positive and efficient 
in proposing a new form of designing, planning, financing and  managing 
airports. Although, commercialization is an attractive option only for 
profitable airports.  
The divestiture of airports’ share by local government may also be intended 
as a source of revenue to cover or reduce budgetary deficits due to the lack 
of funding from central government at several countries.  
Privatization is possible as well in non-aeronautical activities; the aim will 
be to offer the passengers improved and efficient services through, for 
example, a periodic assessment of retail operators’ performance. The 
passengers’ opinion would be a critic factor in deciding the renewal of 
contracts. Shorter duration of concessions and leases might be another 
driver for high quality of service and competition. 
The aim of profit maximization relies also on the improvement of airport 
infrastructures. The use of scientific methods and the analysis of passengers 
flows and dwell times are key issues airport managements have to take into 
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account. The presence at the airport of an open-minded and improvement-
oriented engineering board might be useful to cut cost and work efficiently. 
 
In general competition creates positive effects, but it does not imply good 
results. Airport competition can certainly increase welfare in many cases but 
it might result in tight oligopolistic markets. The divestiture of airports’ 
assets and the transfer of ownership from central government to local 
authorities has proven not to be the solution to the problem of operational 
and accounting efficiency of airport. Many authors claim that partial 
privatizations (with the government/local authority detaining the majority 
share) together with the regulation power still in the hand of a non-
independent authority might cause inefficiencies but also harm the interests 
of private partners. Strategic decision should be made on the basis of 
operational requirements rather than on political interests. Cross interests, 
lack of transparency, unclear development programs and legislative 
framework as well as asymmetric information are all together capable of 
distorting the market and the competition.  
Regulation plays an important role as it safeguards private investors from 
opportunistic behavior (Wolf, 2003) and reduces conflicts and litigations 
(Niemeier, 2004). This is certainly relevant for countries with a relatively 
high density of airports (for example the UK, Germany and Italy), but not 
for countries like Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and China. 
Countries with a high density of airports could experiment such a fierce 
competition that regulation would not be necessary anymore, were the 
system fair (Starkie 2008, Malina, 2009). Regulation ought to be 
complementary to a slow developing process of competition: regulation 
criteria should be periodically revised. Regulation must be designed to be 
compatible with airport competition. Therefore it is necessary to establish 
independent regulators in order to permit a balanced exchange of 
information on costs and demand forecasts. 
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Airports might influence regulation to receive subsidies, erect barriers to 
entry in order to keep their monopolistic power and their high revenues and 
profits; moreover, cost regulation, cost orientated monitoring and revenue 
sharing agreements does not encourage competition. Price caps set upper 
limits, but airports are allowed to react to shock and competition changing 
the price structure. Price cap form is also supposed to have strong incentives 
for cost savings and efficient pricing and investment. 
In some instances, airport entities have been established without being given 
the necessary financial autonomy: all the revenues are deposited directly to 
a common national treasury’s account resulting in the airport then having to 
apply for all funds required to cover airport expenses. This tend to 
significantly reduce the incentive of airport management to develop new 
revenue sources or increase income from existing sources. Financial 
independence, on the contrary, permits and encourages airport managements 
to exercise closer control over revenues and costs. It also offers the 
possibility of negotiating loans best suited to meeting the airport’s needs 
(provided the entity is empowered to negotiate its own loans).  
Competition in the long run needs enough capacity to accommodate traffic 
from other airports. Therefore the regulation of investment, environmental 
management and planning restrictions become important: over-development 
of infrastructures is not an efficient way to boost the local economy as 
developments must be consistent with the demand. Otherwise, airports go in 
the red because the traffic is far lower than the planned capacity. 
Uncontrolled competition is due to create lack of cooperation and 
exacerbated focus on local interest between municipal governments that 
would rather to cooperate. Therefore, privatization must be tempered with 
public interests. 
 
An airport charging policy has its greatest impact on airline operations when 
taking into consideration the existence of airport incentive schemes or 
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discounts offered to encourage demand growth especially at regional and 
secondary airports on determined routes. This incentive aims at attracting 
airlines that would have never chosen to use the airport otherwise. Such 
discounts are, in many cases, a critical factor in low-cost carriers’ choice of 
a suitable airport for their operations.  
State aids are not allowed if they distort competition. The aid provided 
might take the form of grants, interest relief, tax relief or preferential access 
to services but also restructuring aid and exclusive rights concessions. Aid is 
allowed to be provided under some conditions, such as a regional 
development program, but such aid must be available to all parties.  
In November, the EU Commission authorized, as rescue aid, a loan facility 
of 52 million € for Air Malta. By May 2011, the Maltese Authorities must 
present a restructuring plan, or a liquidation plan, or proof that the aid has 
been reimbursed.  
In the aviation market, subsidies can take a number of forms: cross-
subsidies from profitable airport to loss-making ones as decided in Spain by 
AENA; central government assistance (as for Schiphol, Charleroi and 
Strasbourg); capital subsidies; route support in the form of cheaper landing 
charges, guarantee of a target load factor (that is to say that the airlines 
decides to start operations from a target airport provided that the airport or 
the local authority guarantees a target load factor; if this target is not 
reached, the local authorities pays the airline a fee) 
Bel and Fageda (2010) show that the prices set by private, non-regulated 
airports were higher than those set by either public airports or regulated 
private airports. This phenomena might be explained with a certain degree 
of market power at private non-regulated airports or with the fact that prices 
at public airports (especially when basic regulation is in force) are kept 
artificially low. 
Ahmed Fadlaoui’s research on the impact of price regulation on airport 
charges demonstrates that airports with a high number of passengers are 
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likely to charge higher prices. This is in accordance with general views in 
literature provided by Bel and Fageda (2009) and Bilotkach et al. (2010): 
congested airports with heavy volumes of traffic are most likely to fix high 
prices and this is particularly truer at hub airports if compared with medium 
sized and regional airports; this happens thanks to the less competition hub 
airports face from other transport modes due to their high volume of 
passengers on long haul connections. Price cap regulated airports charge 
lower prices than airports regulated by the rate of return regulation scheme.  
Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2009 on airport charges is aimed at creating a common framework 
for the regulation of airport charges at EU airports. It shall apply to any 
airport located in a territory subject to the Treaty whose annual commercial 
traffic is over 5 million passenger and to the most congested airport in each 
country if its commercial traffic is under the above-mentioned threshold.  
This directive shall not apply to charges related to air navigation, ground 
handling and assistance to disabled passengers and passengers with reduced 
mobility. 
Airport charges must not discriminate between airport users, although they 
may be modulated for issues of general and public interest or    
environmental interest. 
The managing body of an airport network may decide to introduce a 
charging system to cover the entire network in a transparent manner. 
An airport managing body shall be authorized to apply a common and 
transparent charging system for airports serving the same urban community. 
Consultation shall take place at least once a year (unless agreed otherwise) 
with respect to airport charges, level of charges and quality of service 
Airport users shall be informed about the components serving as a basis for 
determining the level of charges (services and infrastructures, revenue, 
presence of any financing from public authorities) and whenever  plans for 
new infrastructure projects are finalized. On the other hand airlines have to 
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inform the airport management body about their traffic forecasts, fleet and 
development projects. 
EU countries shall be required to establish an independent supervisory 
authority which ensures the correct application of the measures. 
 
The Council Directive 96/67/EC of 15 October 1996 on access to the 
ground handling market at Community airports applies to all Community 
airports open to commercial traffic whose annual traffic is not less than two 
million passenger movements or 50.000 tons of cargo. 
The managing body of an airport, the airport user or the supplier of ground 
handling services must, under the supervision of the designated auditor, 
rigorously separate the accounts of their ground handling activities from the 
accounts of their other activities. 
The Member States may: 
- set up, for each of the airports concerned, a committee of representatives 
of airport users to represent users' interests; 
- require that suppliers of ground handling services be established within 
the Community; they may limit the number of suppliers authorized to 
provide categories of ground handling services such as baggage 
handling, ramp handling, fuel and oil handling, cargo and mail handling; 
- reduce to two the number of users able to provide self-handling for 
ground handling services such as: baggage handling, ramp handling, fuel 
and oil handling, cargo and mail handling; 
- benefit from exemptions (limited in time) where at an airport, specific 
constraints of available space or capacity make it impossible to open up 
the market and/or implement self-handling; 
- reserve for one body, under certain conditions, the management of the 
centralized infrastructures which cannot be divided up or the cost of 
which does not allow for duplication. In parallel, subject to certain 
conditions, Member States may grant exemptions to airports where 
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specific constraints make it impossible to open up the market and/or 
implement self-handling to the degree provided for in the Directive; 
- oblige the supplier chosen at an airport to also operate on islands 
forming part of the territory of the Member State; 
- subject the activity of suppliers of ground handling services to the 
requirement to obtain a license issued by a public authority independent 
of the airport, in order to guarantee safety, security, environmental 
protection and compliance with social legislation; 
- take the necessary measures to ensure that suppliers of ground handling 
services and airport users wishing to self-handle have access to airport 
installations. Where access to these installations is subject to a fee, the 
fee shall be determined according to relevant, objective, transparent and 
non-discriminatory criteria. 
- adopt, subject to the other provisions of Community law, the necessary 
measures to ensure the protection of workers' rights and respect for the 
environment. 
 
Historically, ground handling was a monopoly provided by either the airport 
(Germany, Italy…) or the airline (national carrier), as in Spain.  
The push for opening the market to competition came from carriers, while 
the airports had to “bite the bullet” as in many cases their profits were 
reduced.  
The outcomes differed across countries: in the UK the market became 
completely open, in Germany the airports lobbied and obtained that only 
one independent competitor would be granted access to the market; in Spain 
one independent provider was allowed to break the former monopoly of the 
national carrier. In France, Airport de Paris kept its monopoly while at other 
airports the market was opened to independent handlers.  
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The Study on the Impact of Directive 96/67/EC on Ground Handling 
Services 1996-2007 commissioned to Airport Research Center and released 
in February 2009 highlighted that: 
- the number of third party handling provider increased in each of the 
limitable categories (baggage, freight and mail, ramp handling, oil and 
fuel) whereas the growth between 1996 and 2002 was higher than in the 
period between 2002 and 2007. 
- The number of handling airlines increased as well, with a slight 
exception in the freight and mail handling category between 1996 and 
2002 (-1 handler) and in the fuel and oil handling category (-1 airline) in 
the second period. 
- In general, the ground handling prices at airports decreased following 
the introduction of the Directive and the subsequent increase in 
competition. 
- The trend of decrease in prices is maintained thanks to competition 
pressure at airports covered by the Directive; however the extent to 
which prices decreased was influenced by other factors such as 
improvements in ground handling technology or competition between 
airports to serve as hubs for airlines (GH are in competition even if they 
are not at the same airport). 
 
4. Definition of a sample of airport to analyze and 
understand air transport market worldwide  
In this thesis, a sample of countries has been taken into account to represent 
the situation of airport ownership and management at different parts of the 
world. Passengers traffic and aircraft movements are the most important 
indicators collected from available sources and for a significant time span. 
In most cases, the time span considered is 2005-2010 (2011 data are not 
available yet or are somehow partial); although, there are countries in which 
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the disclosure of traffic data is compulsory and therefore time series are 
available. On the other hand, the data collection for countries in which air 
transport is still little liberalized has been incomplete and therefore the 
results drawn are only partially significant.      
Only airports compliant with the two following criteria have been taken into 
account for each country: 
- being in the top 10 airport of the target country with reference to 
passengers traffic and aircraft movements; 
- beyond the top 10 airport, other airports are considered significant only 
provided that their traffic output is bigger than 5 million passengers/year 
In most of the cases, there were not 10 or more airports handling more than 
5 million passengers; so only the first criteria has been used in defining the 
sample. This is probably due to the huge number of secondary airports that 
makes the market fragmented, to the presence of a significant hub and to the 
scarce attitude to flight in certain countries. For China, USA, India and 
Brazil also the second criteria has been used to avoid omitting airports 
which processed a significant share of the country’s air traffic. It’s no 
coincidence that the threshold of 5 million passengers/year has been chosen: 
indeed, the Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2009 on airport charges apply to airport handling more 
than 5 million passengers. This threshold has been overdrawn to the whole 
sample of extra EU airports in order to make comparison between consistent 
data. Data processing has been done in order to collect some useful indexes 
and information; the results will be presented partly in the following 
paragraph and partly in chapter 4:  
- Research on airport / airport management body ownership on the basis 
of the distinction provided in chapter 1. With reference to Italy, the 
evolution of the sharing system is presented for the period 2005-2010 in 
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order to highlight trends. News and recent developments will be 
presented and thoroughly explained in chapter 3. Moreover, judgment 
verdicts passed by Competition Authorities and Regulators will be 
reported. The aim of this research is to determine the actual partition of 
airport governance methods at the airports taken into consideration. 
- With the help of the search engine www.flightstats.com scheduled 
flights on a typical working day (Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday) of a 
winter season’s mean month have been collected. Departing and arriving 
flights have been separated, a further distinction has been made 
according to airline. The search engine provides also information on 
aircraft, difference between Scheduled Times and Estimated Times or 
Scheduled Times and Actual times of arrival / departure (enabling thus 
to draw information on airport’s or airline’s delay). 
- Given that an aircraft movement is one departure and one arrival, a 
research on this data has been done to find the % incidence of each 
airline during a typical day; in particular top1, top2, top3, top5 and 
top10 airlines’ % incidence has been calculated. The greater the number 
of an airline’s movement, the greater is its operational impact on the 
airport. For each airport the Normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index 
has been calculated in order to draw information on the airline 
movements concentration. The grater the NHHI, the stronger is the 
presence of the dominant airline at the target airport.  
- The distance between the target airport and the target country’s principal 
airport has been measured to draw information about the passengers 
traffic concentration in the vicinity of the nation’s principal airport (a 
maximum distance of 500km for EU country and of 1000km for the 
others has been considered). 
- Thanks to the tool available on the website 
http://www.wessa.net/co.wasp, Gini index and Lorenz curve during time 
have been calculated for the whole countries analyzed with reference to 
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passengers and movements. This way, a numerical and graphical 
comparison of the results has been possible.  
- For each airport, the top-to-down airline movements rank has been taken 
into account. Starting from the top, only airlines contributing to reach 
the threshold of 80% of the total movement were considered. The more 
frequently a target airline is taken into consideration, the higher is its 
market share in that country. The kind of service provided by each 
airline has been reported too (National/network carrier, Low cost, 
Charter, Freight, Regional). 
- For each airport only the top5 airlines with reference to movements have 
been taken into account. The first gets 10 points, the second 8 points, 
down to the fifth that takes 2 points. The main parameters taken into 
consideration have been the total score and how many times the target 
airline got points. The total score by the relative frequency (that is the 
ratio between the target airline frequency and the number of airport 
taken into account for the target country) has been named Dominance 
Index. For each country, airlines are ranked with reference to the 
Dominance Index. 
- At EU airports and only for the year 2010, the potential attractiveness of 
the airports has been calculated as the ratio between the passengers 
carried and the population living up to 25km far from the airport. For 
those cities served by more than one airport (Paris, London, Milan, 
Frankfurt, Rome … ) the numerator will be the sum of the passenger 
handled by the airports. 
Below it is reported the list of the countries taken into consideration. The 
airports considered for each country will be mentioned in the next paragraph 
together with the information about airport / airport management body 
ownership: 
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- Africa: traffic is still too much gathered at the principal airport of the 
country to make the secondary airports interesting for our analysis; 
moreover very few airports – sometimes, not even the principal ones - 
were compliant with the second criteria. Finally air transport industry is 
at an embryonic stage, with a persistent dominance of national carriers. 
IATA is urging African countries to remove the barriers to 
liberalization. 
- Americas: Brazil, Canada, USA  
- Asia: China, India, Turkey 
- Australia 
- Europe: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom  
 
5. Airports’ ownership and management at the countries 
taken into account 
The distinction between public and private is not homogeneous among 
different countries (ACI Europe, 2010):  
- a Public Limited Company (Plc) may be quoted on the stock exchange 
and be owned by a large number of private individuals (alongside 
pension funds etc); 
- concession companies have their assets held by different organizations,  
generally at least one of those is within the Public Sector (central/federal 
or provincial/regional Government as well as local). Moreover, airport 
concessions are based on the rental of the land on which the airport 
stands but also they often bring with them an obligation to develop new 
facilities, ownership of which at the end of the concession passes to the 
grantor of the concession; 
- the airport operator may be a government department, an airport 
authority with a degree of independence from government but ultimately 
controlled by it, or may have been corporatized into a Joint Stock 
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Company (JSC) and comply with all/most laws applying to commercial 
companies. Those associated with a JSC often regard it as being private, 
even though part of its shares may be owned by government (perhaps 
through some wider state holding company or national pension or 
property fund).  
 
In this paragraph the aforementioned countries taken into consideration will 
be analyzed in terms of airport management ownership. From a general 
point of view, it is going to be made a distinction between: 
1. Airports totally publically owned 
2. Airports with mixed ownership, with the majority of the shares in public 
hands 
3. Airports with mixed ownership, with the majority of the shares in 
private hands 
4. Airport totally privatized 
 
No distinction will be made then at this stage between the different level of 
public ownership as it has been already presented in chapter 1. Likewise, no 
distinction has been made between the different path of privatization, that is 
to say for example concession versus privatization via IPO or some forms of 
PPP. Specifications will be added on a case by case basis. 
 
The three countries analyzed in the Americas show a vast majority of public 
ownership: the central government is directly involved only in Brazil but the 
process of privatization is still at its start. 
In both USA and Canada the management of the airports’ structures has 
usually been entrusted to local authorities (cities administrations or counties 
administrations) and multi-purpose authorities (port authorities). Private 
airports might, on the contrary, be privatized. The substantial difference 
between Canada and USA lies in the ownership of the land: in Canada it 
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usually is still in the hands of the government through TC (Transport 
Canada) while in the USA local entities and authorities own also the land 
the airports are situated on.  
In Tables 24,25,26 it is possible to find the airports taken into consideration 
at those countries. 
 
12 Brazilian airports handled more than 5 million passengers in 2010 and 
have been considered; in 2005 only 4 airports reached that traffic output 
thus highlighting that Brazil is one of the fastest growing countries in the 
world with reference to air traffic. As it has been previously said in chapter 
1, Brazil is starting considering the idea of airport privatization as well as 
other countries in South America. In the case of Brazil the main rationales 
are the forthcoming World Cup in 2014 and Olympic Games in 2016 which 
are expected to bring with them a huge increase of passenger and traffic 
demand that existing infrastructure are seen – at present – not capable to 
comply with. 
Brazil 
 
Table 24: Brazilian airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
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10 Canadian airports (only the top 5 airports handled more than 5 million 
passenger in 2010, the 10th Canadian airport is comparable to a small Italian 
secondary airport like Genova or Alghero - ranked 22nd in Italy).  
Canada 
 
Table 25: Canadian airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
 
55 airports in the USA, by far the country with the highest number of 
airports handling more than 5 million passengers/year due to the 
considerable surface of the country, to the distances between the principal 
cities and to the weight of USA in the world economy. Those reasons 
explain why airport traffic output has been constantly over the threshold of 
1,3 billion passengers/year for a long time, that is approximately equal to 
the total population of China (National Bureau of statistics of China, 2010).     
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USA  
 
Table 26: USA airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
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As for China and India, these two countries have been recently undergoing, 
and still are, a phase of modifications and of gradual opening to the market. 
Together with these phenomena, also the traffic is having a quick 
development: in 2002, there were only 10 airports handling more than 5 
million passengers/year while in 2010 that number was trebled. Likewise in 
India, the number of airport grew from two to six in the same period. In 
China there is still a strong control exerted by the central or the local 
government even if some forms of privatization is taking place. Where more 
than one airport is present at a target town, it is accepted the presence of a 
single management entity. 33 airports have been taken into account with 
regard to 2010 passengers traffic data, as it is possible to see from Table 27. 
China 
 
Table 27: Chinese airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
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The situation in India is quite similar to a certain extent: the central 
government keeps gold share at privatized airport through the presence of 
AAI. The presence of international expertise has been traced at principal 
airports (Fraport and MAHB at Dehli Airport) together with private national 
interest (for example GMR at Dehli and Hyderabad Airports). Five out of 
seven Indian biggest airports in terms of passengers carried have been 
partially privatized; the other airports are still under the ownership and 
management of AAI. Table 28 presents the Indian sample of airports.    
India 
 
Table 28: Indian airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
 
As for Australia, 10 airports have been taken into account; 6 of those 
handled more than 5 million passengers/year in 2010 (+1 with reference to 
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2005) while the 10th Australian airport’s traffic is  - again - comparable with 
the traffic of Genova airport in Italy (ranked 22nd). 
Airports were mostly privatized through long lasting lease agreements. The 
federal government kept some involvement in operation and imposed 
restrictions in particular on the accepted % of foreign ownership, cross 
ownership and airlines’ ownership of airports. The land is still Government 
owned and airport operator are not allowed to change the usage, to carry on 
substantial financial activities nor developments. Usually there are a lot of 
shareholders, the majority of the shares must stay with Australian ownership 
but foreigner investors might as well detain a substantial power. Table 29 
presents the ownership status at the Australian airports taken into account. 
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Australia 
 
Table 29: Australian airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
 
The un-readiness of States to finance airport infrastructure and the 
liberalization of EU aviation has exposed airports to increasing competitive 
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pressures. The combination of the current global economic crisis and strong 
long-term demand forecasts is throwing additional focus on airport 
financing. With public finances gradually diminishing, private sector 
involvement in airports is likely to increase either through the provision of 
privately financed facilities (such as passenger terminals) or through the 
partial or total sale of the airport company, be it just the operator of the 
airport concession or the owner of the assets. 
Over 20% of European airports are already privatized or are run as a Public-
Private Partnership. This applies in particular to the largest European 
airports. Equally significant, most publicly-owned European airports are run 
as corporatized entities abiding to commercial and fiscal discipline - just 
like any other competitive business. (ACI Europe, 2010) 
 
Partially/Fully privatized airports in EU may be listed on the stock exchange 
with or without a majority shareholder. Some of them might be sold to a 
strategic investor, other airport operators or financial institutions.  
Very often full privatization is restricted as the former public owners want 
to secure certain political interests to be guaranteed by a golden share or a 
wide ownership clause. Currently at most airports privatization consists in a 
PPP with the private owner detaining up to 49% of the shares or in a 
minority share of less that 25%. Only the airports of Bratislava, 
Copenhagen, Malta and Vienna are by majority private.  
With reference to 100% public airports, the form of airport corporation 
vertically separates the airport system from regulatory functions: the 
Department of Transport retains direct responsibility for the establishment 
and enforcement of regulations but operations are assigned to a private/state 
owned corporation. The corporation is state-owned, but it keeps a degree of 
independence due to its corporate structure: airport expenditures are not to 
be included in the annual government budget review process, thus avoiding 
conflicts of interest. An example is Aéroports de Paris (ADP). While some 
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airport corporations are wholly owned by the national government, others 
are jointly owned by federal and local governments (e.g., Germany, the 
Netherlands) and others have some forms of private participation (Italy and 
UK for example). 
 
In continental Europe (EU-27 + 18 Non-EU countries) there are 404 
airports, the majority of them is 100% public owned (at different level) 
while the 100% private owned airport are less than 9% of the total. In terms 
of passengers carried in the EU-27 countries, the partition between public 
owned airport and partially/fully privatized airport is almost equal thus 
highlighting the fact that airports with some forms of privatization usually 
are the most important ones (Frankfurt, London, Rome, Moscow … ). 
Among the 100% privatized airports in EU-27, 14 are in the UK. 
 
Table 30: Ownership of airport operators in continental EU (Source: ACI Europe, 2010) 
 
With reference to the public owned airports, a further distinction is to be 
made between those run by public administrations and those run by 
Corporatized administrations (that is to say, more public entities bearing the 
economic risks of managing the airports). No surprise in saying that the 
most popular kind of administration in continental EU is the second one 
(even taking into consideration the shortage of public fund, but also the 
notable interests an airport brings with at different governmental levels). 
N° airports
Public 
owned %
Mixed 
owned %
Private 
owned %
All 404 317 78,47% 52 12,87% 35 8,66%
EU-27 306 237 77,45% 43 14,05% 26 8,50%
% traffic
Non-EU 98 80 81,63% 9 9,18% 9 9,18%
52% 48%
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Table 31: Governance at Public owned airports in continental EU (Source: ACI Europe, 2010) 
 
With reference to the partially privatized airports, the topic is about who has 
the majority of the shares: public sector, private sector or whether there is a 
substantial equivalence. People would say that the public sector majority is 
by far the most common form, but surprisingly there is not so much 
difference between the number of airports with public majority and those 
with private majority. 
 
Table 32: Governance at Mixed-owned airports in continental EU (Source: ACI Europe, 2010) 
 
 
Table 33: Countries in the continental EU as for 2010 
100% 
Public N° airports
Public 
Administration % Corporatized %
All 317 81 25,55% 236 74,45%
EU-27 237 70 29,54% 167 70,46%
Non-EU 80 11 13,75% 69 86,25%
Mixed
N° 
airports
majority 
public %
majority 
private %
equidistribution 
of the shares %
All 52 24 46,15% 20 38,46% 8 15,38%
EU-27 43 23 53,49% 18 41,86% 2 4,65%
Non-EU 9 1 11,11% 2 22,22% 6 66,67%
Austria Sweden Albania Serbia
Belgium Uk Armenia Switzerland
Denmark Bulgaria Belarus Turkey
Finland Cyprus Bosnia-Herzegovina Ukraine
France Czech Rep. Croatia
Germany Estonia Georgia
Greece Hungary Iceland
Ireland Latvia Israel
Italy Lithuania Kosovo
Luxembourg Malta Macedonia
Netherlands Poland Moldavia
Portugal Romania Montenegro
Spain Slovakia Norway
Slovenia Russia
EU-27 Countries Non-EU Countries
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The analysis in this thesis focuses on 5 EU-27 countries and 1 non-EU 
country (at present). Fig. 19 below shows the scenario of airport ownership 
at those countries.  
 
Fig. 19: Type of ownership at EU sample airports (Source: ACI Europe, 2010) 
 
Privatization of the principal Turkish airports happened through usually 
short PPPs (BOT) limited to the Terminals. Except for a few exceptions, the 
General Directorate of State Airports Authority of Turkey (DHMI) is the 
owner of the land and the operator of all airside assets and facilities, while 
private entities operate the terminal on the basis of a temporary BOT 
concession. The PPPs have to be intended as mixed ownership.  
Likewise, labels 3 or 4 in table 34 below, have to be intended as limited to 
the private shares while it is to be taken for granted that those are 
concessions while the ownership rests in the hands of DHMI. 
The traffic is growing at a quite fast pace, but the number of airports 
processing more than 5 million of passenger has not changed from 2008 to 
2010.  
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Turkey 
 
Table 34: Turkish airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
 
Taking into consideration the 5 EU countries, it is possible to highlight 
some similarities: 
- France and Spain are the two country with the most centralized form of 
ownership; in Spain the government through AENA owns and operates 
all the airports while in France only the airports in the so-called Ile de 
France are managed by the Central Government through Aéroport de 
Paris. 
- In both France and Spain some form of devolution is taking place at 
present: in France, airports’ management has been given – partly or as a 
whole, depending on the dimensions of the airports - to local Chambers 
of Commerce and local authorities, while in Spain the process has been 
forecasted for the next future (especially with the aim of taking deeply 
into consideration the autonomy of the Speech Communities) but is still 
not in force. 
- Both French and Spanish innovative system of airport governance will 
become similar to those already adopted and in force in Germany and 
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Italy with each airport managed by one management entity (although 
some exceptions are present). As to Spain, this is true but only to a 
certain extent, as AENA will keep some powers that no other EU 
countries’ regulator has even after the partial devolution of the system. 
- The strongest difference between Germany and Italy lies in the form of 
governance: in Italy there is the Concession to operate, in Germany 
“Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung” (GmbH) have the right to 
operate the airport (the current translation in English is “Limited 
Liabilities Company”, but there are constitutional differences as well). 
- In UK, the majority of airport management entities are private. 
Moreover it is common that a single management entity is in charge of 
several airports at the same time. This has led to issues about 
competition, so the matter is to be carefully analysed. 
- 10 airports for each country have been taken into account; 6 to 9 
depending on the country analysed handled more than 5 million 
passengers in 2010. Each country has at least one airport processing 
more than 20 million passengers/year, so in this analysis both main hubs 
and bigger secondary airports have been taken into account. 
 
French airport system consists in local Chamber of Commerce managing the 
airport with the only exception being Paris, whose airports are managed by 
Aéroport de Paris, a government owned entity. The “White book on French 
regional airports” in 2002 highlighted the lack of autonomy, of central 
government investments and of efficiency of French airport with reference 
to other countries. In 2004, the government decided the devolution of small 
regional airports’ assets to local communities; then in 2005 autonomous 
corporatized entities were created to manage the most important airports, 
namely Paris, Lyon, Nice, Toulouse and Marseille. The central government 
kept a substantial share at those airports, with the remaining shares split 
between local authorities and Chambers of Commerce. For Aéroport de 
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Paris, also a private investors’ participation up to 47,6% is possible. As it is 
possible to derive from Table 35 below, French airports are either Public 
owned or have a mixed ownership with the majority of the shares in public 
entities’ hands. 
France 
 
Table 35: French airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
 
Each German airport is managed by a single management entity. The 
management entities’ shares are in the hands of municipalities, landers, 
federal government or private investors. Management entities are named  
GmbH. Private investors are usually present at principal airports and their 
share is not negligible. However, the majority of the share is always 
public. In September 2010, Germany’s competition authority fined the air 
carrier Condor €1.2 million for illegally fixing prices on routes to Turkey, 
having colluded with Lufthansa joint venture airline SunExpress. Table 
36 below shows the airports taken into consideration in this analysis. 
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Germany 
 
Table 36: German airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
 
Spain is the only big EU country with a 100% centralized system of airport 
governance. AENA is in charge of deciding on investments and air charges, 
of negotiating with the airlines and with the non-aeronautical activities’ 
providers plus handling activities and air traffic control. 
AENA has substantially the highest powers among European regulators: 
with its decisions it stops competition between airports and hands out 
funding on an arbitrary basis. A new structure was proposed for AENA: 
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AENA will keep the air traffic control while AENA Aeropuertos SA will 
be created in order to manage the Spanish airports. Moreover, the major 
airports will have established a management board whose majority will be 
held by the Central Government together with members appointed by 
municipalities, Chambers of Commerce and autonomous regions. As 
AENA has control on slot allocation too, the sample of airports chosen 
reflects the government strategy. It is possible to note from Table 37 that 
among those airports 6 out of 10 are situated in islands, thus highlighting 
a likely strong seasonality of the traffic. 
Spain 
 
Table 37: Spanish airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
 
While Spain is the country with the highest percentage of public owned and 
operated airports, UK is the country where this percentage is the lowest. 
Indeed all UK airports are - at least partially – privatized. BAA-Ferrovial 
had been managing 7 airports up to 2006: London Gatwick, London 
Heathrow, London Stansted, Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Southampton; that is to say 5 out 10 airports considered in the sample, as 
reported in Table 38. Owning and managing 5 out of 10 major airports in 
the country and 3 out of 5 airports in the surroundings of the capital city has 
been perceived as a threat to competition by the British Competition 
Commission “BAA’s seven airports together account for over 60% of all 
passengers using UK airports. More significantly, Heathrow, Gatwick, 
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Stansted and Southampton account for 90% of airport passengers in south-
east England, and Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen account for 84% of 
airport passengers in Scotland” that expressed “strong criticisms both of the 
regulatory regime and of the way it has been applied to the detriment of 
users. In particular, […] the recent regulatory review […] resulted in 
significant increases in airport charges especially at Heathrow”. Finally 
“At […] the BAA Scottish airports […] we found a much slower 
development of routes than at other regional airports […] and a lack of 
ambition in the development of Aberdeen. […] At the south-east airports 
BAA currently shows a lack of responsiveness to the interests of airlines and 
passengers […] which is also attributable to weaknesses in the regulatory 
system: […] weaknesses in consultation, lack of responsiveness to the 
differing needs of its customers […], asymmetry of information […] and 
apparent unwillingness to consider options of separate terminal 
development, co-investment or longer-term contracts; a failure to ensure 
operating excellence, including a failure to market test some key activities 
and the likelihood of consequent higher costs than would be expected in a 
more competitive environment; and deficiencies in the level and quality of 
service, as shown also by the continued public concern about the effects of 
shortage of capacity, particularly at Heathrow” 
Therefore, the Competition Commission (2009) decided “the divestiture of 
both Stansted Airport and Gatwick Airport to different purchasers; the 
divestiture of either Edinburgh Airport or Glasgow Airport; the 
strengthening of consultation procedures and provisions on quality of 
service at Heathrow, until a new regulatory system is introduced; 
undertakings in relation to Aberdeen, to require the reporting of relevant 
information and consultation with stakeholders on capital expenditure and 
recommendations to the Department for Transport in relation to economic 
regulation of airports.” 
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BAA-Ferrovial decided to sell Gatwick airport in 2008, even before being 
told to do so by the CC sentence, to GIP – Global Infrastructure Partners. 
which is also the owner of London City airport, and to other shareholders. 
BAA appealed to the Competition Appeal Tribunal and obtained a deferral 
of terms of the commitment to sell London Stansted. Currently BAA-
Ferrovial seems oriented to divest Edinburgh airport to either Global 
Infrastructure Partners, JP Morgan Asset Management or a Consortium led 
by The Carlyle Group LP and 3i Infrastructure Plc.   
United Kingdom  
 
Table 38: UK airports taken into consideration, IATA code, management and ownership 
(Source: Author) 
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The previous chapter ended with the characterization of the airports sample 
in several EU and extra-EU countries. Italy was left out on purpose in order 
to be presented in this chapter together with an analysis on its situation. 
Therefore, data collected from 2001 to 2010 on airports shareholders will be 
presented with reference to both the sample of the 10 airports taken into 
account and other secondary airports, outlining which is the most common 
management form in Italy and whether the system is moving or not. 
Then EU and other continents’ transport market will be analyzed in order to 
outline possible future trends and developments. 
Finally, three major recent trends will be described: vertical integration 
between airport and airline, merging and acquisitions in order to concentrate 
ownership (this is a recent trend for both airports and airlines) and, as a 
consequence, multi airport systems. It will be highlighted the fact that the 
countries which have been taken into consideration have not been 
developing at the same pace. Talking about concentration of ownership, a 
quick theoretical introduction will be inserted in this chapter.  
 
1. The case of Italy 
In Italian there are more or less 100 airports, 47 of those have commercial 
traffic; but the principal airports taken all together handle a significant share 
of the national passengers traffic. As for 2010, 11 airports had more than 5 
million passengers/year. Italy seems to have too much airports and 
moreover, not even the most important ones are comparable with other 
European major hubs.  
The airport network is fundamental for the national economic system but, 
even more important is how this network is connected to the rest of the 
country: Italian airports are in most cases isolated from the major highways 
and railway junctions and provide a level of service which is seen incapable 
of complying with the forecasted traffic volume for 2030. The EU 
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Commission in 2007 highlighted the likelihood of an airport capacity crisis 
in the majority of EU countries; Italy is among those countries as national 
airports have limited infrastructures. The conclusion that should be drawn is 
therefore that Italy doesn’t need an higher number of airports (this is seen as 
an expensive and economically harmful solution) but bigger and more 
efficient infrastructures. 
The fragmentation of Italian airport network has deep roots in the 
pronounced individualism of the past that, unfortunately, is still present at 
some regions. This background led frequently to the establishment of close 
airports, in exacerbated contrast between each other, in open contradiction 
with the principles of airport system cooperation cases. Forms of 
cooperation – also those fostered by the Government – have not been 
successful.  
The building of a new airport in an already served and uncongested area 
means a likely waste of money (which usually comes from the central 
government and the EU funds); moreover it would harm or stop the 
development of nearby airports. Airports have to be economically viable 
and therefore they need a sufficient catchment area of potential passengers. 
The Central Government seems to have realized the problem as it ordered 
KPMG a study on the Italian airports network in order to define a national 
roadmap for the development of airports. This document had never been 
realized before and it is perceived as a complex task due to the 
fragmentation of competencies at a legislative level. 
Airports with more than 5 million passengers/year should be regarded as 
principal airports (the threshold is consistent with that established by the 
EU) while airports whose traffic output is under a target threshold (for 
example 1 million passengers/year) should be barred from commercial 
traffic (with the only exception allowed would be being actually essential to 
serve remote regions like islands) and be converted to freight or general 
aviation oriented airports. Other airports should be economically regulated 
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in such a way that only profitable and efficient ones would be allowed to 
further develop. 
  
In addition to that, a growing number of airports are being managed with a 
commercial-oriented point of view; that is to say that airport management 
(in the majority of the cases a mixed public-private ownership or a 
corporation of local entities) grants airlines (especially LCCs) facilities and 
bonuses to operate from a target airport. These bonuses to airlines are 
allowed by EU as long as they are not tailored to a single operator in 
compliance with transparency and non-discrimination criteria, to avoid 
phenomena of unfair competition. Bonuses are, nevertheless, a two-sided 
option: airlines might accept them and grant the airport a strong traffic 
development but this development is not to be taken for granted during time 
as other airports might become competitive substitutes. 
It is Assaeroporti’s opinion (2011) that Italian air market needs 
simplification as well as firm and reliable rules and regulation. Air traffic 
demand at Italian airport is growing at a faster pace if compared with other 
major EU countries but the investments in capacity and efficiency are 
negligible. According to Mr. Palenzona (Assaerporti’s President), Italian air 
traffic market should have “an actually independent regulatory body, a fair 
regulation for secondary airports that would foster competition and 
efficiency and, finally, funds provided to be invested in infrastructure 
development at existing airports”.  
In the Tables below, the sample of Italian airport taken into account for our 
analysis is presented. Data collected refer also to shareholding % changes 
between 2008 and 2010 and the evolution of the different shareholders from 
2005 to 2010.  
Therefore, according to the dominant share, an airport will be classified as: 
1. Fully private. 
2. Mixed with majority public. 
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3. Mixed with majority private. 
4. Fully private. 
The same data have been collected for many other Italian airports in both 
2009 and 2010 and the result will be presented summarized by region. 
 
 
Table 39 a/b: Management firm, city, IATA code, shareholding, % change versus 2008 and 
ownership for Italian airports taken into consideration (Source: Author) 
 
A classification of airports considered according to passengers handled in 
2010 and type of ownership leads to fig. 21. The results confirm the fact that 
a significant private shareholding is most common at principal airports. 
 
Fig. 21: % of 2010 passengers carried at Italian principal airports ranked by ownership – 
governance form (Source: Author) 
% public % mixed % private 
AdR Rome FCO - CIA 40.901.987 3,00% 95,80%
Sea Milan MXP - LIN 27.244.258 99,90%
Sacbo Bergamo BGY 7.677.224   71,30% 28,70%
Save Venice VCE 6.868.968   29,80% 2,30% 67,90%
Sac Catania CTA 6.321.753   87,50% 12,50%
Gesac Naples NAP 5.584.114   30,00% 70,00%
SAB Bologna BLQ 5.511.669   86,10% 7,20%
Gesap Palermo PMO 4.367.342   97,80% 1,10%
City Airports pax 2010 2010 shareholding
1,20%
0,10%
6,70%
1,10%
% others
Management firm
% public % mixed % private % others
AdR Rome FCO - CIA 40.901.987 3
Sea Milan MXP - LIN 27.244.258 1
Sacbo Bergamo BGY 7.677.224   -12,30% 12,30% 2
Save Venice VCE 6.868.968   3,40% 0,10% -3,50% 3
Sac Catania CTA 6.321.753   2
Gesac Naples NAP 5.584.114   3
SAB Bologna BLQ 5.511.669   2
Gesap Palermo PMO 4.367.342   -0,70% -0,30% 0,90% 2
O / GManagement firm City Airports pax 2010 Change 2010-2008 shareholding
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ADR spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Leonardo holding spa 51,08 51,10 51,10 51,10 51,10 51,10
MAP - Macquarie spa 44,68 44,70 44,70 44,70 44,70 44,70
Regione lazio 1,33 1,33 1,33
City of Rome 1,33 1,33 1,33
Provincial Administration of Rome 0,26 0,26 0,26
City of Fiumicino 0,08 0,08 0,08
Others 1,20 1,20 1,20
SEA spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
City of Milan 84,56 84,56 84,56 84,56 84,56 84,56
Provincial Administration of Milan 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56 14,56
Provincial Administration of Varese 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64
City of Busto arsizio 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06
City of Gallarate 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04
Chamber of commerce Milan 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03
City of Varese 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03
Others 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08
SACBO spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SEA spa 49,98 50,00 49,98 30,98 30,98
City of Bergamo 13,84 13,80 13,84 13,84 13,84
Provincial Administration of Bergamo 13,20 13,20 13,20 13,20 13,20
Banca popolare Bergamo
Unione banche Italiane
Credito Bergamasco 3,46 6,96 6,96
Italcementi spa 2,46 3,27 3,27
Confindustria Bergamo 0,44 0,59 0,59
Aeroclub Taramelli 0,01 0,01 0,01
Chamber of commerce Bergamo 6,56 6,60 6,56 13,25 13,25
Others 6,37 6,40 - - -
4,204,24 4,20
17,90 17,9010,05 10,10
 Bergamo - Milan Orio al Serio
 Milan - Linate and Malpensa
 Rome - Fiumicino and Ciampino
10,05
GESAC spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BAA Italy 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00
City of Naples 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50
Provincial Administration of Naples 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50
SEA Spa 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00
Interporto campano Spa 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00
SAB spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chamber of commerce bologna 55,39 50,50 50,50 50,55 50,55 50,55
Comune bologna 16,75 16,80 16,75 16,75 16,75 16,75
Provincial Administration of Bologna 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00
Regione Emilia Romagna 8,80 8,80 8,80 8,80 8,80 8,80
Aeroporti holding srl - 5,00 7,21 7,21 7,21
Others 9,06 9,00 6,69 6,69 6,6913,90
Naples - Capodichino
 Bologna - G. Marconi
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Table 40 a/h: Shareholding at principal Italian airports 2005-2010 (Source: ENAC, Author) 
 
From the analysis of Table 39b, the only notable % change of shareholding 
took place at Bergamo Orio al Serio where SEA (the airport manager of 
Milan Malpensa and Linate) dismissed 20% of the Shares outstanding 
SAVE spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Nordest avio - - - -
Provincial Administration of Venice 12,29 12,29 12,29 12,29 12,29 12,29
City of Venice 14,10 14,10 14,10 14,10 14,10 14,10
Airport of Venice Marco Polo SPA - - - - 3,34 4,44
Veneto sviluppo - - - - -
Port Authority Venice - - - - -
fondazione di Venice - 2,17 2,17 2,17 2,17
marco polo holding srl / Finanziaria 
internazionale holding spa 36,98 38,98 38,98 38,98 38,98 41,89
City of treviso 0,73 2,09 2,09 2,09 2,09
Deutsche Bank London equities 2,31 - - - 2,33
CSFB prime brok - - - - 2,35
Kairos Fund Ltd - 2,27 2,02 2,93
Goldman Sachs - - - - 2,11
Chamber of commerce Venice 1,45 1,45 1,45 1,45
Provincial Administration of Treviso 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83
San Paolo IMI Bank 2,17 - - -
APV Holding 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10
URVAIT service - - - -
Others 34,63 27,05 25,74 25,97 17,26
SAC spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chamber of commerce Catania 37,50 37,50 37,50 37,50
Consorzio ASI catania 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50
Provincial Administration of Catania 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50
Provincial Administration of Siracusa 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50
Chamber of commerce Siracusa 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50
ASAC - - - -
Chamber of commerce Ragusa 12,50 12,50 12,50 12,50
20,69
 Catania - Fontanarossa
100,00
 Venice - M. Polo
100,00
GESAP spa
Shareholders 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Provincial Administration of Palermo 40,87 40,90 41,11 41,10 41,10 41,10
City of Palermo 31,33 31,30 31,38 31,30 31,30 31,30
Chamber of commerce Palermo 21,84 21,80 22,66 21,97 21,97 21,97
City of Cinisi 3,42 4,12 3,42
Ass. Ind. of Palermo 0,58 0,60
Regent srl 0,43 0,44
Ass. prov. breeders Palermo 0,12 0,06
Paolo Angius 0,13 0,02
Ass. Farmers Sicily 0,09 -
Others (10) 0,16 1,09
5,96 6,00 5,631,45
 Palermo - P.ta Raisi
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(100% public shares) which were bought partly (6,69%) by another public 
shareholder (Bergamo’s Chamber of Commerce) and partly by a few private 
investors (namely banks). The augmented share of a private investor is 
undoubtedly a positive factor, nevertheless the “negative” aspect is that the 
seller was another airport management entity. This highlights the Italian 
tendency to conform to the German situation: each entity manages one 
airport and participations in other airports are of a little significance. On the 
other hand, as it will be presented later in this chapter, in other countries the 
presence of multi-airport systems is significant. At principal airports, no 
other significant variations took place between 2008 and 2010. 
Extending the outlook from 2005 to 2010, no significant % change is 
traceable at airports located in Rome, Milan, Catania, Palermo and Naples; 
by the way variations are present at Bologna and Venice: in 2006 Aeroporti 
Holding srl (Torino airport’s management entity) bought 5% of the shares 
outstanding from the local Chamber of commerce and then in 2008 another 
2% was acquired from minority shareholders (SAB received and still 
detains 4,13% of Aeroporti Holding srl shares in exchange); at Venice 
airport a repartition of the shares took place in order to let Marco Polo 
Holding srl and its partners take the majority of the shares. 
From a broad point of view, it is possible to conclude that, up to 2010, there 
has not been a strong drift towards changes in airport management entities’ 
shareholdings yet. Although, the commercialization and the recent decision 
to stop the injection of money from governmental entities to loss making 
airports entities is due to bring some innovation and a more intense 
participation of private investors in managing boards.  
 
This is particularly true for secondary airports, that are more likely to be 
loss making due to their smaller traffic volumes.  
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SOGAER spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Cdc Cagliari 94,353 94,350
SFIRS Spa 3,430 3,430
Banco di Sardegna Spa 1,052 0,060
Regione autonoma Sardegna 0,720 0,720
Meridiana Spa 0,209 0,210
Cdc Oristano 0,096 0,100
Consorzio Sardegna costa sud 0,056 0,060
Ass.Ind. Cagliari, Carbonia, Iglesias ... 0,042 0,040
API sarda Cagliari 0,025 0,020
Aironjet srl 0,010 1,010
FIMA Spa 0,008 -
Geasar Spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Meridiana Spa 79,800 79,800
Cdc Sassari 10,000 10,000
Cdc Nuoro 8,000 8,000
Regione autonoma Sardegna 2,000 2,000
Consorzio Costa Smeralda 0,200 0,200
SOGEAAL spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione autonoma Sardegna 25,68 80,200
SFIRS Spa 41,70 19,800
Provincia di Sassari 4,07 -
Cdc Sassari 21,70 -
Comune di Alghero 2,71 -
Comune di Sassari 4,14 -
GE. AR. TO
Shareholders 2009 2010
Arbatax spa 100,000 -
Provincia ogliastra - 10,000
Cdc nuoro - 10,000
Comune tortolì - 10,000
SFIRS spa - 30,000
Regione autonoma Sardegna - 40,000
SO. GE. A. OR spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione autonoma Sardegna 3,290
SFIRS Spa 0,250
Provincia di Oristano 74,100
Camera commercio Oristano 8,160
Consorzio per l'industr oristanense 2,480
Comune di Oristano 11,720
2
3
1
1
1
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
SARDEGNA
no data
 Cagliari
 Olbia
 Alghero
 Tortolì - Arbatax
 Oristano
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Aeroporti di Puglia spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione puglia 99,414 99,410
Cdc taranto 0,400 0,400
Cdc bari 0,059 0,060
Provincia di bari 0,058 0,060
Comune di Bari 0,040 0,040
Comune di Brindisi 0,012 0,013
Provincia di Foggia 0,009 0,009
Cdc Brindisi 0,004 0,004
Cdc Lecce 0,002 0,002
Provincia di Brindisi 0,002 0,002
SACAL spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Comune lamezia 20,440 20,440
Provincia Catanzaro 18,930 18,930
Comune Catanzaro 10,000 10,000
Regione Calabria 10,000 10,000
Banca carime 10,220 10,220
Cdc catanzaro 3,070 3,070
Provincia cosenza 3,070 3,070
Adr spa 16,570 16,570
Comune di V. valentia 1,520 1,520
Confindustria Catanzaro 0,910 0,910
Others (>10) 5,270 5,270
SOGAS spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione calabria 6,750
Provincia di reggio calabria 68,400
Comune di reggio calabria 23,580
Cdc Reggio calabria 0,440
Provincia messina 0,410
Comune di messina 0,410
Others - Cdc messina 0,010
Società aeroporto di S.anna spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione calabria 14,110
F.lli Romano Spa 13,320
Banca popolare di Crotone spa 9,270
Cdc crotone 4,540
Ergom group 1,730
Romano autolinee regionali spa 3,300
Provincia di Crotone 51,000
Comune di Crotone 1,070
Casarossa Spa 0,640
Others 1,020
1
2
1
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
2
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
PUGLIA
CALABRIA
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
 Bari, Brindisi, Foggia e Taranto Grottaglie
 Lamezia Terme
 Crotone
 Reggio calabria
no data
no data
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Consorzio apt Asiago spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Comune asiago 26,00
Cdc Vicenza 22,00
Provincia Vicenza 36,00
Comune di roana 8,00
Comune di gallio 8,00
Aeroporto di padova spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
SAVE spa 62,900
Comune padova 0,800
Others (>4) 26,300
AER TRE spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
SAVE spa 80,000 80,00
Comune di Treviso 2,630 2,63
Veneto sviluppo spa 10,000 10,00
Cdc treviso 4,880 4,88
Provincia treviso 0,750 0,75
Fondazione cassamarca 1,740 1,74
Aeroporto G. Nicelli spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
SAVE spa 48,430
Others 51,570
Aeroporti sistema del Garda
Shareholders 2009 2010
Cdc brescia 5,000 4,19
Provincia brescia 5,000 4,19
Cdc verona 20,145 21,68
Provincia trento 18,356 15,39
Provincia verona 17,080 17,17
Comune verona 6,832 6,87
Provincia bolzano 6,631 6,66
Banca popolare di verona 4,019 4,04
Comune villafranca 4,010 3,86
Fondazione cr verona vicenza belluno ancona 4,000 4,02
Provincia vicenza 1,326
Cdc mantova 1,137
Provincia mantova 1,038
Others (>19) 5,426
3
3
2
2
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
1
no data
no data
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
no data
 Treviso
VENETO
 Verona - brescia
 Venezia Lido
 Asiago
 Padova
11,93
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Aeroporti sistema del Garda
Shareholders 2009 2010
Aeroporto Valerio Catullo - Verona 99,990 99,990
Provincia di Brescia 0,010 0,010
SEAF spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Comune forlì 48,096 48,096
Regione emilia romagna 25,026 25,026
Provincia di forlì - cesena 14,452 14,452
Cdc forlì - cesena 9,578 9,578
Confindustria fc 0,846 0,846
Comune cesena 2,000 2,000
Others 0,002 0,002
SOGEAP spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Unione parmense industriali 6,340 6,340
,ainl airport international 67,950 67,950
Cdc parma 7,730 7,730
Comune parma 7,730 7,730
Cassa risparmio parma 0,830 0,830
Provincia parma 5,550 5,550
Autocamionale della cisa / gruppo SIAS 1,990 1,990
Banca popolare Emilia romagna 1,000 1,000
Others (>13) 0,880 0,880
Aeradria spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Provincia rimini 33,920 33,92
Comune rimini 16,650 16,65
Cdc rimini 7,510 7,51
Comune di riccione 6,090 6,09
Ente autonomo fiera rimini 6,960 6,96
Società palazzo dei congressi spa 4,000 4,00
Confindustria rimini 2,790 2,79
Camera di rsm 2,790 2,79
Aia confly srl 2,770 2,77
Comune bellaria - igea marina 2,520 2,52
Provincia ravenna 2,210 2,21
Comune cervia 1,440 1,44
Comune misano 1,090 1,09
Regione emilia romagna 7,020 7,02
Comune di cattolica 0,030 0,03
Others (5) 2,210 2,21
3
2
2
1
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
LOMBARDIA
EMILIA ROMAGNA
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
 Rimini
 Parma
 Forlì
 Brescia
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Aeroporto di firenze spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Acquisizione prima srl / apt holding srl (part.ta 
gruppo benetton)
SAGAT spa
Gruppo monte paschi di siena 4,890 4,890
Cdc firenze 14,430 14,430
Comune di firenze 2,180 2,180
Comune di prato / Cdc prato 4,090 4,090
Fondiaria sai spa 2,050 2,050
Cassa risparmio firenze 17,500 17,500
So. G. im spa 12,120
Mercato
Others (5)
SEAM spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Cdc grosseto 5,430
Provincia grosseto 25,250
Comune grosseto 25,250
Adf aeroporto di firenze 0,386
Cassa di risparmio di firenze 10,000
Cassa di risparmio di prato 10,000
Ilca srl 9,940
Banche, associazioni e privati 6,358
Regione toscana 7,080
Aeroporto lucca tassignano spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
reginald trading 80,000
Comune di capannori 10,000
Provincia lucca
Others (5)
SAT spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione toscana 16,90 16,90
Provincia pisa 9,27 9,27
Comune pisa 8,45 8,45
Cdc pisa 7,87 7,87
Cassa di Risparmio pisa-livorno-lucca 6,05 6,31
Fondazione cassa di risparmio di Pisa 5,11 -
Finatan SPA - Ivo Gnudi 16,14 23,15
Others 16,63 18,30
Provincia livorno 2,37 2,37
Cdc Firenze 1,42 1,42
Banca monte dei paschi di siena 3,96 3,96
Aeroporto di firenze spa 2,00 2,00
Others 3,83 -
alatoscana spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
SAT spa - aeroporto di pisa 30,71
Others
Provincia di livorno
Regione toscana 66,00
3
2
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
2
 Firenze
 Pisa
TOSCANA
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
3
2
Isola d'Elba
no data
no data
no data
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
3,29
9,330 9,340
10,000
 Lucca
 Grosseto
33,400 33,400
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aeroporto di genova spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Autorità portuale di Genova 60,000 60,000
Cdc genova 25,000 25,000
ADR aeroporti di roma spa 15,000 15,000
AVA spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
SASE spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Cdc perugia 32,590
Sviluppo umbria spa 31,130
Comune perugia 10,960
Banca dell'umbria spa / Unicredit spa 11,380
Confindustria Peugia 4,800
ANCE perugia 1,790
Comune Bastia umbra 0,600
Banca popolare di Spoleto 1,880
Provincia Perugia 4,270
Others (>14) 0,600
SAGA spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione abruzzo 41,300
Caripe spa 10,730
Comune pescara 9,750
Cdc pescara 9,930
Cdc chieti 9,930
Banca Tercas 1,550
Cdc teramo 9,180
Cdc l'aquila 3,640
de cecco 1,000
provincia pescara 1,200
Cdc l'aquila
Others (12)
Aeroporto friuli venezia giulia spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Consorzio aeroporto friuli venezia giulia 51,000 -
Regione friuli venezia giulia 49,000 100,000
88,31
 Trieste
 Pescara
 Perugia
1,790
no data
no data
 Genova
11,69
no data
UMBRIA
ABRUZZO
1
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
2
2
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
LIGURIA
2
Soci privati vari
Soci pubblici vari
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
2
 Albenga
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ABD spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Provincia di Bolzano 100,000 100,000 1
ADVA spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Air Vallée holding spa 51,00
Regione val d'aosta 49,00
Aeroporto di Salerno spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Salerno interporto 9,000 -
Consorzio aeroporto 91,000 100,000
AIRGEST spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Provincia di Trapani 46,920 46,920
Gesap Spa 4,000 4,000
Cdc Trapani 2,090 2,090
Ditta durante 0,510 0,510
Quercioli Dessena Cesare 7,820 7,820
AA Valle dei templi spa 0,070 0,070
Società infrastrutture Sicilia spa 37,590 37,590
Others (>2) 1,000 1,000
GAP spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Shareholders 2009 2010
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
4
3
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
2
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
TRENTINO ALTO ADIGE
VAL D'AOSTA
CAMPANIA
no data
ENAC
ENAC
SICILIA
 Trapani
 Aosta
 Bolzano
 Salerno Pontecagnano
 Lampedusa
 Pantelleria
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Table 41 a/h: Shareholding and governance at Italian secondary airports 2009-2010 (Source: 
ENAC, Author) 
 
Olimpica
Shareholders 2009 2010
Provincia Cuneo 30,990 27,35
Regione piemonte 19,830 15,51
Fingranda spa 2,310 1,8
Cdc cuneo 19,830 19,87
Comune cuneo 7,230 6,32
Comune saluzzo 1,610 1,28
Comune alba 1,610 1,32
Comune mondovì 1,610 1,28
Comune fossano 1,610 1,29
Comune brà 1,610 1,31
Comune savigliano 2,260 1,8
Azioni proprie 7,22
Autostrada TO-MI spa 2,84
Satap spa 2,76
Cie spa 1,82
Fininc spa 1,69
Unicredit spa 1,52
Others (>23) 3,02
SAGAT spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Comune torino 38,000 38,00
Edizione holding spa 24,390 24,39
Regione piemonte 8,000 8,00
Sab spa - aeroporto di bologna 4,130 4,13
Italconsult spa / tecnoinvestimenti 4,700 4,70
Aviapartner spa 0,420 0,42
Equiter spa 12,400 12,40
Provincia torino 5,000 5,00
Others (?) 2,960 2,96
AERDORICA spa
Shareholders 2009 2010
Regione marche 50,180
Provincia Ancona 6,000
Comune Ancona 1,270
Cdc Ancona 4,510
Frapi spa 2,030
Provincia Macerata 1,010
Comune di Falconara marittima 0,610
Provincia di Ascoli Piceno 0,960
fiduciaria marche 33,180
Others (18 < 5%) 0,250
2
2
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP - 
GOVERNANCE
2
PIEMONTE
no data
MARCHE
 Torino
 Cuneo
 Ancona
9,500
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From the analysis of Table 41, it is possible to derive that all airports with 
label 1, that is 100% public ownership, handled in 2010 less than 1 million 
passengers with the only exception of Alghero, Bari and Brindisi that 
handled 1,3 - 3,3 and 1,6 million passengers respectively.  
Generally speaking the ACI, a few years ago, estimated that airports with 
less than 1 million passengers/year might experiment difficulties in covering 
their infrastructure costs and in being economically viable. The increased 
competition and the new degrees of complexity that have been introduced 
may have led to a rise of the thresholds of economic viability. The concept 
could be extended also to some airports with label 2 with a negligible 
participation of private investors, like Crotone, Brescia, Rimini, Grosseto, 
Albenga, Perugia, Pescara, Cuneo and Ancona.  
Finally, also at secondary airports few variation of shareholdings took place 
between 2009 and 2010: Alghero, Tortolì, Trieste, Salerno and Cuneo are 
the most notable. Were the Act on Federalism (2008) extended to regional 
non-strategic airports as well, some changes in Italian airport system would 
have been possible.  
 
The widespread majority of public ownership of airport operators along 
with the diminished financial capability of some public bodies due to the 
financial crisis may introduce deep changes in terms of ownership. 
During 2010 and 2011 some important indications have been provided by 
Italian Airports since public bodies have been seeking private partners and 
investors to either buy out shares through IPOs, private bids or increase 
capitals, or find strategic partners with a specific knowledge in the matter.  
This is the case of some small airports as Genova, Forlì, Reggio Calabria, 
Oristano, Lucca and Trieste. However, partial privatizations is foreseen also 
for medium-big sized airports’ operators such as SEA (the managing 
company of Milan’s airports) and Aeroporti di Puglia. 
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This recent wave of privatisation differs from the previous one since it 
allows private investors to invest in airports which are not economically 
sustainable any longer; the first wave demonstrates that the solution is 
feasible: the private investments made in Fiumicino and Ciampino, Naples, 
Venice and Bergamo have proven to be profitable during time. 
It is foreseeable for Italian airports as well the worldwide trend of 
aggregation of airports managing companies through: 
- the mutual purchasing of shares between the two companies; 
- a single company managing more than one airport; 
- a single investor which owns a significant amount of shares of different 
airport managing companies, 
- a partnership between airport management companies. 
Each of those options has different implications in terms of strategies and 
competitiveness.  
The purchasing of shares is an emerging phenomenon at Italian airports and 
the two biggest airport managing companies (AdR and SEA) have been the 
first exemples: AdR owns shares in Aeroporto di Genova and in SACAL 
(Aeroporto di Lamezia) while SEA owns a small amount of SACBO’s 
(Aeroporto di Bergamo) and GESAC’s (Aeroporto di Napoli) shares.  
A single airport management company owning and/or operating more than 
one airport might lead to the establishment of the concept of airport system. 
An example is BAA which owns and operates London Heathrow, London 
Stansted, Aberdeen, Glasgow and Southampton airports and owns market 
shares of other airports in the world. In Italy a similar situation is found in 
the airports of Verona and Brescia which are managed by the same 
management company. 
Investing in airport managing companies is becoming a widespread trend in 
the market, especially for big and medium sized airports. 
The investors could be basically banks, private equity funds or financial 
companies. In the Italian market, bank owning shares of airport 
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management companies is quite common: Bergamo, Firenze, Lamezia, 
Pescara, Verona just to name few cases; private funds owned shares are still 
limited. 
Finally, airports might find profitable to share their expertise and know-
how: few examples in Europe are Panteras between Schiphol and Frankfurt 
and the alliance between Schiphol and AdP; however these types of 
alliances are not formalized in the Italian market yet. 
 
An analysis of the Italian market through the comparison of traffic figures in 
the period January-November (Fig. 22) shows a growth of 1,29% in the 
number of movements in both 2010 and 2011, but 12 airports out of 37 
suffer a decrease in the overall number of movements. 
 
Fig. 22: Movements at Italian airports Jan-Nov 2011 (Source: Assaeroporti) 
 
However, in the same period, the number of passenger output on a national 
basis has grown of 6,67%, showing a general increase in aircraft load factor; 
nevertheless, in the 13,5% of the airport there has been a passenger traffic 
decrease. 
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Fig. 23: Passenger output at Italian airports, Jan-Nov 2010-2011 (Source: Assaeroporti) 
 
The analysis of monthly traffic data of the first quarter of 2011 showed a 
growth both in terms of passengers and movements. In the second quarter 
the growth of passengers was associated with stagnation in the number of 
flights, while the data of the third quarter highlighted a passengers’ growth 
versus a decrease in the number of flights. Finally, November and December 
2011 data showed a decrease in both passengers and movements. 
 
Fig. 24: Movements at Italian airports Jan-Nov 2010 versus 2011 (Source: Assaeroporti) 
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Fig. 25: Passengers at Italian airports Jan-Nov 2010 versus 2011 (Source: Assaeroporti) 
 
Fig. 26: Passengers at Italian airports in 2010 (Source: Assaeroporti) 
Fig. 26 explains the Italian market’s situation in 2010: the majority of traffic 
is concentrated at two airports, namely Rome Fiumicino and Milan 
Malpensa; then there are a few airports with traffic output between 5 and 10 
million passengers, namely Milan Linate, Bergamo, Venice, Catania, 
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Naples, Bologna and Rome Ciampino. The remaining part of the traffic is 
distributed among a great number of small regional airports, each one with 
less than 2 million passengers per year. In particular, the 38% of Italian 
airports handled less than 1 million passengers and the 19% handled 
between 1 and 2 million passengers/year. 
Domestic traffic at Italian airports accounts for 43% of the total in 2010 
(Fig. 27).  
 
Fig. 27:Distinction between domestic and international passengers at Italian airports – 2010 
(Source: ENAC) 
 
A review of traffic data in the period 2006-2010 shows that, with reference 
to 2006, an additional 9 million of passengers were carried (+12,85%,with a 
mean annual rate of +1,3%). With reference to the flight destination, 73,2% 
of the flights are domestic or heading to an EU-country, followed by Asia, 
Africa and European extra-EU destinations, with respectively 7,3%, 7% and 
6,8%. Between 2006 and 2010, the traffic between Italy and Asia grew of 
35,9%, the traffic between Italy and African countries of 26,5%, between 
Italy and other European countries of 11,1%. Comprehensive data are 
available in Table 42. 
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Table 42: Principal destinations of Italian passengers. Time series 2006-2010 (Source: ENAC) 
 
An aspect worth to be taken seriously into account is the repartition of 
passengers with respect to Airline. Italian market is characterized by the 
absence of a strong leading national carrier (even if it experiences scarce 
competition from other Italian legacy carriers) combined with a little 
network if compared with those of other EU countries. It is therefore quite 
surprising that 2010 traffic data show that 5 out of top 15 carriers and 2 out 
of the top 3 carriers (namely Ryanair and EasyJet ranked respectively 2nd 
and 3rd, Alitalia being at the top) are low cost carriers. Rumors about 2011 
data report that Ryanair overtook Alitalia as the biggest passengers carrier 
(Ryanair’s market share in Italy was 12% in 2007, thus highlighting the 
huge growth experimented by the Irish-based LC carrier.) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
North America 3.107.199 3.099.567 3.346.481 3.121.890 3.260.530
Centre America 675.572 638.083 642.178 478.730 426.260
South america 786.584 842.989 867.325 799.600 857.296
Europe - EU 52.981.758 57.140.177 57.310.030 57.032.456 58.053.605
Europe - non EU 4.082.139 4.489.282 4.975.277 4.545.244 5.371.183
Asia 4.274.813 4.618.515 4.760.073 4.800.149 5.809.435
Oceania 7.223 6.850 3.830 15 104
Africa 4.376.735 4.815.281 5.085.399 4.933.243 5.535.754
Total 70.292.023 75.650.744 76.990.593 75.711.327 79.314.167
% - 7,62% 1,77% -1,66% 4,76%
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Table 43: Top 15 airlines for passengers carried in 2010 (Source: ENAC)  
 
Were this rumors reliable or not, it is sure that competitors took advantage 
from the masked bankruptcy of Alitalia and the establishment of the new 
CAI – Alitalia in 2008. In 2006, the government tried to sell 49,9% of 
shares outstanding of Alitalia to partially cover the operating debts, but no 
reliable Italian acquirers were found. An agreement was found with Air 
France-KLM but flight assistants and pilots corporations together with 
conservative parties (the two actors had the same goal – the failure of the 
agreement – but actually different reasons to pursue it) brought the 
agreement to a failure. New elections won by the conservative parties 
played a role in the decision of not selling Alitalia to a competitor airline 
anymore; the assets which had been losing money were led to file for 
bankruptcy (the so-called “Bad company”) and the debts were partially paid 
by the government, while profitable assets were grouped together in new 
Alitalia – CAI, the partially privatized national carrier. Private investors 
have been forced to keep their shares for a period of 5 years ending the next 
year; in 2013 Italian shareholders would be free to sell their shares and 
1 Alitalia - CAI
2 Ryanair
3 Easyjet
4 Meridiana
5 Air One
6 Lufthansa
7 Wind Jet
8 Air France
9 Blue Panorama
10 British Airlines
11 Air Berlin
12 Wizz Air
13 Air Italy
14 Vueling
15 Iberia
Top 15 Airlines Italy 2010
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therefore Alitalia might even be sold to a partner airline (in coincidence 
with new elections). 25% of Alitalia – CAI shares are already owned by Air 
France-KLM.  
New Alitalia – CAI is the result of the merging with AirOne, a regional 
Italian carrier. The new company kept Alitalia’s key slots and got AirOne’s 
as well, but was then compelled to reduce its network. This re-organization 
led to the de-hubbing of Milan Malpensa airport and consequently to the 
losing of a significant market share.   
In 2011 some notable merging took place in Italy: Alitalia CAI merged with 
Wind Jet and Meridiana-Eurofly (which is the result of Meridiana’s merging 
with Eurofly in 2006) with Air Italy, thus strengthening their position as 
first and second Italian legacy carriers.  
 
Finally, a closer look to Low Cost market in Italy is worth to be given. 
LCCs provide passengers flights to both domestic and international 
destinations, with short to medium haul routes. Therefore 2005-2010 data 
have been analyzed. From Table 44, it is clear that the LCCs shares at both 
international and total has been increasing ceaselessly, even if the pace is a 
little slowing down. Nevertheless the number of passengers carried on non-
domestic routes by LCC doubled between 2005 and 2010, while the gran-
total data is 2,5 times bigger than in 2005. With reference to domestic 
routes, in 2010 for the first time LCCs’s share diminished with respect to 
the previous year (the number of passengers carried, nevertheless, grew of 
0,5 million). 
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Table 44: Low cost and Network carriers’ market share at Italian airports. Time series 2005-
2010 (Source: ENAC)  
 
2. Recent EU Traffic evolution 
Passengers traffic in EU counts for the 33% of the world market. 
(Passengers grew of +300% with respect to EU data of the 1990s).  
 
Table 45: Passengers carried in Europe – Time series 2001-2010 (Source: ICCSAI)  
 
 
Fig. 28: Passengers carried in Europe 2001-2010 (Source: ICCSAI) 
Passengers % Passengers % Passengers %
Low Cost Carriers 18.469.673   30,99% 32.333.515   40,77% 50.803.188   36,57%
Network Carriers 41.125.855   69,01% 46.980.652   59,23% 88.106.507   63,43%
Low Cost Carriers 17.924.182   33,10% 28.946.987   38,23% 46.871.169   36,09%
Network Carriers 36.224.030   66,90% 46.764.340   61,77% 82.988.370   63,91%
Low Cost Carriers 14.209.250   26,02% 29.184.733   37,25% 43.393.983   32,64%
Network Carriers 40.394.160   73,98% 49.164.259   62,75% 89.558.419   67,36%
Low Cost Carriers 8.911.076     15,77% 25.959.424   32,95% 34.870.500   25,77%
Network Carriers 47.610.428   84,23% 52.827.223   67,05% 100.437.651 74,23%
Low Cost Carriers 7.055.349     13,39% 21.349.971   30,37% 28.405.320   23,10%
Network Carriers 45.622.940   86,61% 48.942.052   69,63% 94.564.992   76,90%
Low Cost Carriers 3.854.288     7,89% 16.386.652   25,55% 20.240.940   17,92%
Network Carriers 44.989.307   92,11% 47.750.861   74,45% 92.740.168   82,08%
2010
Domestic traffic Non-domestic traffic Total
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Year Pax (x 1000) ∆% Year Pax (x 1000) ∆%
2001 944.507             - 2006 1.203.671          6,08%
2002 950.093             0,59% 2007 1.280.525          6,38%
2003 988.951             4,09% 2008 1.278.376          -0,17%
2004 1.064.227          7,61% 2009 1.202.333          -5,95%
2005 1.134.685          6,62% 2010 1.230.577          2,35%
Passengers carried in Europe 2001 - 2010
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Passenger traffic in Europe is expected by Boeing to grow at 4,4% annually 
to 2029, rising from 1,3 billion RPKs in 2009 to 3,2 billion. Europe is still 
an historic hub for the aviation market, even if the crescent importance of 
Asia and Middle East is shifting the strategic position eastwards. According 
to EU Commission and EU air market’s stakeholders, the two major 
challenges facing European airports in the next years will be capacity at 
airports and quality of service. With reference to the first topic, there is 
concern on airports capacity. However, the demand is not predicted to rise 
in an homogeneous way in the whole EU. Eurocontrol foresees 11,6 million 
IFR flights in 2017 (+22% with reference to 2009) and 16,9 million in 2030 
(+77% with reference to 2009). The average growth rate forecast for air 
traffic movements for 2009-2017 is 2,9% per annum. Eurocontrol reports 
that currently 5 major EU are operating at their full capacity: Düsseldorf, 
Frankfurt, London Gatwick, London Heathrow and Milan Linate. Provided 
that the growth tendency remains steady, by 2030, other airports will get to 
operate at their full capacity, among those Paris CDG, Warsaw, Athens, 
Vienna and Barcelona. Taking into consideration the fact that air traffic and 
airport congestion lead to delays, it is clear that the risk of a “capacity 
crunch” is to be taken seriously into consideration with both new 
infrastructures where needed and optimization of the existing ones. 
The problem of delays at airport is deeply related to the second topic: level 
of service, quality and efficiency. Eurocontrol estimates that 70% of all 
delays are caused by problems due to the turn-around depending on airlines, 
ground-handlers, airports or other parties. Quality is not improving together 
with airlines evolving needs and security challenges.  
To face these challenges, the European Commission in December 2011 
adopted a policy document and three legislative proposals (known as “Airport 
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Package”) on the following topics: slots, ground-handling and noise 
restrictions. 
Slots are a used to pose a cap on traffic at airports where demand for air travel 
exceeds the available runway and terminal capacity. Slot have been allocated 
to airlines under an administrative system (1993 EC Regulation) for winter 
and summer seasons. A minimum of 5 slots allocated at the same time on the 
same day of the week during a season forms a series of slots. If airlines use a 
series of slot 80% of the time they can retain it for the next season (the so-
called “grandfather clause”) otherwise it is returned to the pool for re-
distribution. The pool system is also used to allocate new capacity.  Slots 
from the pool are allocated by an independent co-ordinator: 50% of the pool 
slots go to new entrants, 50% go to other airlines on a first come first served 
basis. By the way, with the "grandfather clause" there is no market incentive 
for airlines to sell under used slots to other airlines. Thus the market is not 
dynamic as there is not competition nor incentives to efficiencies. In addition 
as air traffic has increased, at many congested airports carriers are not allowed 
to enter the market or indeed grow their operations. The revised slot 
regulation will introduce the possibility of trading slots between airlines 
across the EU (to tell the truth, 1993 Regulation did not provide for nor ban 
this practice; therefore EU countries’ legislators were allowed to decide in a 
fragmented way). The Regulation establishes a clear regime to ensure 
transparency in the trading of slots. Moreover, the threshold and the defining 
criteria of a slot series will be tougher and airlines will be required to 
demonstrate that they have used their slots (the so-called “use it or lose it” 
rule). This measure is estimate to be capable of creating a +24 million 
passengers’ capacity, of granting €5 billion to the European economy and 
create 62,000 jobs.  
Proposals on Ground handling have already been presented in the previous 
chapter. 
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The noise-abatement strategy has four principal elements: reduction at source 
(quieter aircraft); land-use planning and management; noise abatement 
operational procedures (overflights) and operating restrictions (e.g. bans on 
flights during the night). These measures may reduce the available capacity at 
airports and so the decision-making process follows international principles 
on noise management established by the ICAO (the so-called “balanced 
approach”, as operating restriction might harm capacity and distort 
competition) and by the Directive 2002/30 at EU level. 
The process of noise assessments and, following, the decisions on 
proportionality, cost-efficiency and transparency of operating restrictions is, 
nevertheless, incoherent among EU countries. 
The new proposals will ask the revision of the noise-compliant aircrafts’ list 
according to development in technology. Moreover, the commission will be 
entitled with a scrutiny role on new noise measures in order to ensure a 
consistency of approach across Europe; nevertheless Member State 
competencies would not change.  
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Table 46: Forecasted airport congestion at a sample of EU airport (Source: Steer Davies 
Gleave, 2011)  
Airport 2010 2017 2025 Capacity assumptions
Amsterdam 
Schiphol
Annual movement cap raised to 
510.000 but no further increase
Dublin Possibility to build a second 
runway
Düsseldorf A 10% increase in capacity in 2015 
would not be sufficient
Frankfurt
New runway (2011) and terminal 
(2015) allow increases from 83 to 
126 mov/hr
London 
Gatwick
Optimization of existing capacity 
may result in 2-3 extra mov/hr
London 
Heathrow
No 3rd runway, or mixed mode, or 
relaxation of annual movement cap.
Madrid 
Barajas
ATC improvements forecasted 
from 98 to 120 mov/hr by 2020
Milan Linate No amendment to Bersani Decree
Munich 3rd runway operational by 2017
Palma de 
Mallorca
Possibility to add capacity when 
needed
Paris CDG
Capacity increase from 114 to 120 
mov/hr by 2015, but no further 
infrastructures
Paris Orly No relaxation of annual slot cap
Rome 
Fiumicino
Improved ATC allowing 100 
mov/hr but no new infrastructures
Vienna
3rd runway operational in 2020, 
initially allowing 80 mov/hr 
increasing to 90 mov/hr by 2025
Partial demand exceeds capacity 
Sufficient capacity
Demand exceeds capacity 
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Hours per day demand exceeds capacity  
 
Table 47: Forecasted hours/day excess capacity at a sample of EU airport (Source: Steer Davies 
Gleave, 2011)  
 
According to ACI, European airport passenger throughput rose from 1,40 
billion in 2009 to 1,46 billion in 2010. Europe’s airports recorded 4,3% 
growth year-on-year, higher than that achieved by North American airports 
(+2,5%). However, this was some way below the worldwide average growth 
of 6,6% (see Fig. 29). 
 
Fig. 29: % change year on year 2010 versus 2009 (Source: IATA) 
Airport 2010 2012 2017 2025
Dublin 1 3 0 0
London Gatwick 14 14 14 17
London Heathrow 15* 15* 15* 15*
Madrid Barajas 6 12 6 12
Paris CDG 8 11 12 15
Palma de Mallorca 2 2 2 3
Rome Fiumicino 5 6 6 9
Vienna 5 5 9 5
0,00% 2,00% 4,00% 6,00% 8,00% 10,00% 12,00% 14,00% 16,00%
Latin America
Middle East
Asia / Pacific
Africa
Industry
Europe
North America
% change year 2010 on 2009
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European carriers saw a year-on-year passenger demand increase of +5,1% 
combined with a capacity increase of +2,6%. That is to say that also load 
factor increased with reference to 2009 (in 2010 was 79,4% , +1,9% with 
reference to 2009). These positive results were achieved despite the airspace 
closures on April and December. European airlines show a very small profit 
in 2010, thus not recovering the losses of 2009. Within Europe, there is 
considerable variety in the amount of air traffic on an individual country 
basis. Based on ACI airport passenger data, it is evident that Europe is 
dominated by certain core markets notably the UK, Spain, Germany, Italy 
and France, which combined accounted for approximately 75% of European 
Union airport passenger traffic in 2010 (see Fig. 30) 
 
Fig. 30: European Airport Passenger Traffic by country - 2010 (Source: IATA) 
 
Italy in 2010 registered the highest growth among the top 5 largest markets 
thanks to the strong growth at Rome Fiumicino (+7,5%), Milan Malpensa 
(+8,0%), Bergamo (+7,2) and Bologna (+14%). After the worldwide 
declines of 2009, the UK (largest market) was the only country in the top 
ten European markets to suffer a further drop in 2010 (-3,5%). The 
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European Union Member States recording the highest growth in 2010 
included Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Denmark, Poland and Austria. Outside of 
the European Union but within the European Common Aviation Area 
Serbia, Albania, Turkey and Russia achieved robust growth in 2010 driven 
in large part by tourism. The majority of others airports in Europe posted 
moderate growth figures with the negative exceptions of London Heathrow, 
London Gatwick and Palma de Mallorca. With reference to medium sized 
airports (over 2,5 million passengers) the largest traffic growth was 
registered at Brussels Charleroi (+32%) while the airports losing traffic 
were Belfast International and East Midlands Airport (-11%) due to 
increased competition and traffic reduction by their dominant carriers.  
Despite the passengers growth, apart from Rome Fiumicino and Frankfurt, 
Europe’s major airports handled fewer air transport movements than in 
2009. The principal reason are the unforeseen closures due to volcanic ash 
cloud and severe winter snowfalls. On the whole, airlines are responding 
cautiously to the upturn in traffic, preferring to increase load factors and/or 
using larger aircraft before adding further frequency or new routes to their 
networks. 
 
Table 48: Passengers and Freight flow from EU airports – 2010 (Source: IATA) 
 
 
Continent Pax 2010 Freight 2010
Other Europe 33,87% 5,63%
North Africa 12,88% 22,00%
Rest of Africa 4,73% 6,79%
Far East and Australasia 11,94% 36,48%
Middle East 9,94% 16,81%
South america 3,67% 4,93%
Central America 3,49% 2,01%
North America 19,48% 25,15%
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Table 49a: Airlines which entered EU market in 2010 (Source: IATA) 
 
 
Table 49b: Airlines which ceased operations in 2010 (Source: IATA) 
 
There were no major primary aviation regulatory or legislative actions 
implemented by the EU during 2010. The EU has continued to make 
significant progress through its comprehensive and horizontal agreements 
with non-EU states in widening the area in which the airline industry can 
compete freely.  
 
The EU is vigilant over possible illegal price fixing, co-operating with other 
bodies both within the Community and around the world: for example 
Airline Nation Service
Air Bucharest Romania Charter to Turkey
Belle Air Europe Italy Low-cost linking Italy 
and Albania
Eagles Airlines Italy Domestic based in Venice
Enter Air Poland
Charter from Poland to 
Turkey, Greece, Egypt 
and Tunisia
Airline Nation Service
Blue wings Germany Charter
Hola airlines Spain Charter
Myair Italy Lowcost
Air Slovakia Slovakia Network
Highland airways UK Domestic
Air Volga Russia Regional
MK Airlines UK Cargo
Cyprus Turkish Airlines Turkey Network
Athens airways Greece Regional
Star1 Airlines Lithuania Lowcost
Viking Airlines Sweden Charter
Blue Line France Charter
Eurocypria Airlines Cyprus Charter
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Germany’s competition authority fined the air carrier Condor €1,2 million 
for illegally fixing prices on routes to Turkey, having colluded with 
Lufthansa joint venture airline SunExpress. 
Actions were taken also against some governments for not being compliant 
with Ground Handling liberalization process. 
 
An area of concern is the increasing divergence of attitudes by Member 
States towards the taxation of aviation, for example with reference to Air 
Passenger Duty (APD). Italian government is planning to charge passengers 
with an additional 2€, while on the other hand Ireland is planning to reduce 
its APD from €10 to €3 and both the Netherlands and Belgium decided to 
drop this tax altogether.  
With the UK now surcharging passengers 14€ for an economy flight within 
Europe and 195€ for a long haul journey in premium class, there is scope for 
distortion of markets with passengers electing to fly (or travel by surface) 
from the UK or Germany to Amsterdam or Paris in order to take long-haul 
flights. The original purpose of APD would have been a tax on aviation to 
address its greenhouse gas emissions and now it is feared that, with the 
purpose of extending the ETS scheme to aviation, there will be a duplication 
of taxation. 
 
The EU allows up to 49% of non-EU participation in EU airlines. Existing 
law in the United States specifically limits non-U.S. ownership of U.S. 
certificated airlines to smaller shareholdings of 25%. These provisions are 
viewed by many as exclusionary, preventing all but limited foreign 
investment in the U.S. domestic airline industry and preventing any real 
non-U.S. control over an airline’s business decisions.  
Airline alliances are currently the only accepted option, subject to their 
compliance with respective anti-trust rules. 
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3. Recent worldwide traffic evolution 
The size of the European market was 97% of the North American market in 
2010 and it remains the second largest, ahead of Asia Pacific. Europe’s 
airports recorded over 4% growth year-on-year, higher than that achieved by 
North American (2,5%) but, however, below the worldwide average growth 
(6,6%).  
The volume of global air cargo recovered significantly during 2010 
(+15,3%) with the market still dominated by Asia Pacific (+18,5%), North 
America (+13,2%) and Europe (+15,5%). Significant increase took place 
also in Middle East and Latin America, although the volumes are still not 
comparable with those previously mentioned (see Table 50). 
This was the largest increase in three decades after a strong decline in 2009.  
 
Fig. 31: Annual airport passengers by world region – 2009 versus 2010 (Source: IATA) 
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Table 50: Worldwide Airport traffic summary, by region - 2010 (Source: IATA) 
 
By comparing the regional market share of total global airport passenger 
throughput in 2010 with 2005 and 2000, it is possible to notice that Europe’s 
share of the global total has remained fairly constant, the North American 
market share has decreased by 12% since 2000. Meanwhile, Asia Pacific has 
increased its portion of the market by 7% since 2000, while Latin America’s 
market share has risen 2,6% in the same period of time. In real terms, each 
regional market is growing, but North American and European rates are 
lower because they have a larger air traffic base. Fig. 32 and 33 below 
describe the evolution of passenger output per region in the last decade. 
 
Fig. 32: Evolution of Air Passenger segmentation by country 2000-2010 (Source: ACI) 
 
Region Million 
Pax 2010
% change 
vs 2009
Million 
Movements 
2010
% change 
vs 2009
Million 
Tons 
freight
% change 
vs 2009
Africa 152,7      9,90% 2,1 4,80% 1,7 1,90%
Asia - Pacific 1.265,6   11,40% 9,4 6,90% 31,9 18,50%
Europe 1.458,0   4,30% 15,5 0,60% 17,9 15,50%
Latin America 387,4      13,40% 4,9 7,80% 4,7 14,30%
Middle East 203,4      12,20% 1,7 8,30% 5,9 13,70%
North America 1.508,5   2,50% 19,8 -0,90% 28,7 13,20%
Total 4.975,5   6,60% 53,6 2,10% 90,7 15,30%
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Fig. 33: Airport passengers traffic segmentation by country 2010 (Source: IATA) 
 
Although the European air transport market remains second only to North 
America by volume, the year was characterized by a continuation of one 
particular trend – the development of emerging markets and the stagnation 
in mature markets. Asia Pacific air passenger demand increased by 11,4% in 
2010 over 2009, while the Middle East grew by 12,2%. Airports in Latin 
America showed even stronger growth at 13,4% while Africa grew by 9,9%. 
Each of these regions far exceeded the pace of growth experienced in the 
advanced mature markets of Europe and North America. 
 
According to ICAO, international airline traffic (RPKs performed on 
scheduled services) increased by 8,5% in 2010, led by a strong rebound in 
business and leisure long haul travel, particularly in emerging markets such 
as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) nations where outbound 
tourism flourished. The largest percentage growth was registered by the 
airlines of the Middle East with 20,5%, followed by those of Africa (18,3%) 
and the Asia Pacific region. International traffic in the mature markets of 
North America and Europe grew by 6,6% and 7,7% respectively. Europe is 
still benefiting from the so called “Low cost effect” as LCCs are still 
expanding their point to point networks after the geographical enlargement 
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of the European Union and the consequent liberalization of Easter Europe 
markets. Domestically, in 2010 markets grew overall by 7,1% over 2009 
levels. Lower growth rates of 2,4%, 7,7% and 7,6% in North America, the 
Middle East and Africa respectively were offset by rates of 12,8% in the 
Asia Pacific region, 18,6% in Latin America and 9,9% in Europe. Asia 
Pacific volumes benefited from an increase of around 17% in the Chinese 
domestic market. 
 
Table 51: ICAO members Airlines RPK growth, by region - 2010 (Source: ICAO) 
 
The global recovery saw world GDP grow by 5,1% in 2010. This was 
compared to a -0,6% in 2009. The strongest economic growth worldwide in 
2010 was experienced in Asia, in particular in China and India, recording 
growth at 9,5%; almost double the global average. This region is also 
forecast to experience the highest economic growth rates going forward to 
2016.  
The cost of jet fuel has been an increasing burden for airlines since the 
middle of the last decade. Today, fuel costs typically account for around 
30% of an airline’s operating cost. The volatile nature of kerosene price 
fluctuations means that commercial aircraft operators are continually 
struggling to keep these operating costs under control. There is a close 
correlation between changes in fuel price and the subsequent change in 
average air fares in the European and U.S. domestic markets. After a 
downturn in 2009, fuel prices rose again in 2010 and are set to rise further in 
2011. In 2010, the annual average price of jet fuel rose to USD 2.17 from 
USD 1,67 per U.S. Gallon, an increase of 30%. In 2010, the euro continued 
Region Domestic International
North America 2,4% 6,6%
Africa 7,6% 18,3%
Asia Pacific 12,8% 12,6%
Europe 9,9% 7,7%
Latin America and the Caribbean 18,6% 6,6%
Middle East 7,7% 20,5%
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to remain strong adversely impacting the competitiveness of Eurozone 
tourism destinations compared to other Mediterranean resorts in Turkey and 
North Africa. 
IATA reported that in 2010 its member airlines recorded demand for 
scheduled air traffic showing an 8,2% increase in passenger business, 
measured in terms of RPK. Demand growth outstripped a seat capacity 
increase of 4,4%. The average passenger load factor for the year was 78,4%, 
representing a 2,7% improvement on 2009. 
     
Fig. 34: Domestic and International Passenger segmentation by region - 2008 (Source: ICCSAI) 
 
IATA forecasts that global air travel is expected to increase to 3,3 billion 
passengers by 2014 (+33% on 2010). Both Boeing and Airbus forecast 
average annual growth of about 5% between 2010 and 2029. Growth will be 
driven by strong economic activity in Asia which will act as a key driver to 
the industry’s expansion, overtaking North American market. 
China will be the largest contributor of new passengers, accounting 27% of 
the 800 million increase in passengers between 2009 and 2014. 45% of the 
new passengers are forecast to travel on Asia Pacific routes, while the USA 
will remain the largest single-country market for domestic passengers (671 
million) and international passengers (215 million). 
Movements Growth in the Asia Pacific region is continuing at a 
considerable pace. The growth at China’s major airports has been rapid in 
recent years with Beijing Capital International Airport growing by 13% in 
2010 and reaching 73,9 million passengers. However, this vigorous Chinese 
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growth is causing airspace capacity problems in the Pearl River Delta area. 
South America is also experiencing rapid growth in its aviation industry 
which is forecast to continue throughout the decade. European hubs such as 
Madrid and Lisbon with close cultural links to South America can expect to 
see vigorous growth in the forthcoming years fuelled by further economic 
development in South America, particularly Brazil. 
 
In terms of passenger volume, North American airports dominate the top 30 
in the world with thirteen airports (43,3% of the sample – against 60% in 
2005) recording 637 million passengers; Asia Pacific has nine airports (30% 
of the sample – against 12% in 2005) with 429 million passengers; EU has 
seven (23,3% of the sample – against 22% in 2005) airports with 342 
million passengers; and the Middle East has one airport (3,4% of the sample 
– against 0% in 2005) with 46 million passengers (Dubai).  
In terms of growth, however, seven out of the top ten are Asia Pacific 
airports, with four of those Chinese (including Hong Kong). The bottom ten 
airports comprise seven North American and 3 EU. In 2010, the world’s 
busiest airport remained Atlanta with 89,2 million passengers (+1,5% on 
2009). 
Growth in the Middle East (albeit from a small base) and Asia Pacific 
regions is far outpacing EU and North America, reflecting the shift in focus 
of economic growth across the world. The Chinese airports (including Hong 
Kong) in the top 30 global list registered a passenger growth of 14% in 2010 
over 2009; the corresponding figure for USA and EU airports is 3.1% and 
3.0% respectively. Passenger throughput at North American airports has 
stagnated in the last five years, increasing at an average annual rate of 0,6%. 
EU airports have experienced similarly slow growth, recording 1,6% growth 
per year between 2005 and 2010. On the other hand, Asia Pacific and 
Middle Eastern airports achieved 6,4% and 14,1% average annual growth 
respectively. Regulation in both EU and North America is tighter in order to 
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deal with  topics like security, unfair competition and environmental 
concerns which are not being considered important at the moment 
elsewhere; EU and North America should continue to deliver this high 
quality services being focused on growth; on the other hand the rest of the 
world would have to find a way to match growth and sustainability.  
 
Table 52: ACI Worldwide traffic report at top 30 airport (Source: ACI) 
Figure 35 below illustrates the rapid growth at some East and Middle East 
airports from 2005 to 2010: Dubai has nearly doubled while Beijing, 
Rank Airport Pax % Change Rank %
1 Atlanta 89.238.059 1,5% 25
2 Beijing 73.948.113 13,1% 5
3 Chicago 66.735.180 4,1% 17
4 London 65.747.173 -0,2% 29
5 Tokyo 64.208.802 3,7% 20
6 Los Angeles 59.070.127 4,5% 15
7 Paris 58.075.239 0,5% 28
8 Dallas Forth Worth 56.906.610 1,6% 24
9 Frankfurt 52.710.228 4,1% 16
10 Denver 52.209.377 4,1% 18
11 Madrid 49.784.941 3,1% 22
12 Hong Kong 49.774.874 10,6% 7
13 New York 46.514.154 1,4% 26
14 Dubai 46.313.680 15,5% 3
15 Amsterdam 45.136.967 3,7% 19
16 Jakarta 42.043.642 18,9% 2
17 Bangkok 41.253.893 5,7% 12
18 Singapore 40.923.716 13,4% 4
19 Guangzhou 40.857.345 10,6% 8
20 Houston 40.479.569 1,2% 27
21 Shanghai 40.385.996 26,5% 1
22 Las Vegas 39.757.359 -1,8% 30
23 San Francisco 39.116.764 5,1% 14
24 Phoenix 38.554.215 1,9% 23
25 Charlotte 38.254.207 10,8% 6
26 Rome 35.954.489 7,6% 10
27 Miami 35.698.025 5,3% 13
28 Sydney 35.562.255 7,8% 9
29 Orlando 34.877.899 3,5% 21
30 Munich 34.598.634 6,0% 11
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Guangzhou, Shanghai and Jakarta totaled a growth of more than 60%. 
Airports in Singapore, Hong Kong and Sydney are also in the top ten. This 
highlights the dominance of Asia Pacific airports in terms of growth. 
Conversely, five out of the six airports that have recorded declining 
passenger traffic levels between 2005 and 2010, 5 are located in North 
America. 
 
Fig. 35: Top 30 global airport – 2010 vs 2005 (Source: IATA) 
 
The airports of Charlotte, Rome, Denver, Madrid, Munich are in the top 15 
with reference to % growth between 2005 and 2010 even if they are located 
in countries characterized by mature – and therefore slower-growing – 
economies; this means that these airports have been able to take advantage 
from circumstances, attracting new airlines (among those LCCs) with 
increased capacity and aggressive marketing and pricing policies.  
 
 
The IATA global traffic figures of November 2011 show a decline in 
passenger output while air cargo remains weak if compared to 2010 levels. 
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A comparison between passenger traffic demand in November and in 
October 2011 shows that the decline is about the 0,5% on a seasonally-
adjusted basis. 
Moreover, passenger load factor worldwide has fallen sharply from 78,5% 
in October to 76,3%, thus highlighting that the weakness in passenger 
demand is outpacing the airline’s ability to adjust capacity. Finally, freight 
market shows a 4% contraction with reference to January 2011. 
 
4. Airlines  
During 2010, average passenger load factors recovered as did average 
aircraft utilization and average yields per passenger kilometer. On the other 
hand, the cost of fuel continued to rise also in 2011 putting immense strain 
on airline profitability. 
Airlines based in Europe were the least improving: capacity up by 2,6% and 
traffic by 5,1%. In comparison, Middle Eastern airlines increased their 
capacity by 13,2% and traffic by 17,8%. 
According to IATA, the distinction between legacy carrier, regional carrier 
and low cost carrier is becoming thinner and thinner: there are a lot of 
examples worldwide of low cost carriers offering high quality services and, 
viceversa, legacy carriers offering a set of low fares seating. Also the last 
actual burden between legacy carriers and low cost carriers is predicted to 
be overcome in few years: AirAsia X is the first Low-cost carrier that 
successfully tried to introduce some long haul routes in its network. Experts 
from IATA and from other regulator say that the recent trend will bring 
airlines to move towards a common model that will be different from all the 
existing airline models: only the best aspects and best practices of each type 
of service will be kept. 
Worldwide, low cost airlines now account for 23% of all advertised seat-
kilometers, but the figure for Europe (35,3%) is now higher than any other 
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world region. Figures from the ELFAA (association of Low fare airlines in 
Europe) show an increase of 11,5% in passenger numbers over 2009, with 
its two leading members (Ryanair and easyJet) accounting for some 71% of 
the total ELFAA carriers’ passengers. 
 
Among the top 25 legacy carriers, Middle Eastern, Chinese and Turkish 
airlines increased capacity the most in percentage terms in 2010 compared 
to 2009. In terms of absolute growth (in ASKs) the most capacity was added 
by Emirates, followed by Qatar and China Southern Airlines. 
Consolidation in the legacy airline sector continued in 2010 with mergers 
between Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines; and between United 
Airlines and Continental Airlines. The merger of Delta Airlines and 
Northwest Airlines was completed at the start of 2010 and created the 
world’s largest legacy airline with the airline operating under one operating 
certificate, replacing American Airlines in pole position. The merger 
between United and Continental was approved and integration commenced 
in 2010, but they would  operate separately until they receive a single 
operating certificate from the FAA. The final preparations also took place in 
2010 for the merger of British Airways and Iberia with the two airlines 
joined together under a single parent company International Airlines Group 
(IAG), with the transaction completed on 24 January 2011. 
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Table 53: Top 25 legacy carriers worldwide - 2010 (Source: OAG) 
 
Emirates has moved from 6th to 4th position overtaking both Lufthansa and 
Air France, Air China moved from 15th to 13th position overtaking Japan 
Airlines and Qantas Airways; and Qatar Airways moved from 24th to 21st 
position overtaking TAM Linhas Aereas, All Nippon Airways and Iberia. 
Turkish Airlines, with its +14,70% on 2009 is due to rapidly acquire an 
higher position in the rank. Delta Air Lines and United Airlines data group 
together the result of both the airlines (Delta = Delta + Northwest; United = 
Rank Airline 2010 ASK (millions)
% change 
vs 2009
1 Delta Air Lines 323.740      2,50%
2 American Airlines 253.463      1,50%
3 United Airlines 192.357      -0,10%
4 Emirates Airlines 175.053      15,40%
5 Lufthansa 167.294      4,40%
6 Air France 158.289      3,10%
7 Continental Airlines 152.748      1,40%
8 British Airways 143.530      -1,60%
9 Us Airways 115.741      2,00%
10 Cathay Pacific Airways 112.253      5,40%
11 Singapore Airlines 106.599      1,30%
12 China Southern Airlines 106.269      14,70%
13 Air China 100.173      12,10%
14 Japan Airlines 96.543       -15,90%
15 Air Canada 93.764       7,50%
16 Qantas Airways 91.803       -0,50%
17 China Eastern Airlines 88.219       10,20%
18 KLM 86.539       3,00%
19 Thai Airways 78.337       6,80%
20 Korean Air 78.314       2,30%
21 Qatar Airways 70.811       25,00%
22 TAM Linhas Aereas 69.935       7,80%
23 All Nippon Airways 65.938       -1,80%
24 Iberia 61.868       3,90%
25 Turkish Airlines 59.167       14,70%
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United + Continental). Air France + KLM together would be ranked 3rd, 
British + Iberia together would be 4th, United 5th and so following). 
 
Table 54: Top 20 Airlines in the world. ASK (million) 2010 data (Source: ICCSAI) 
 
To have a more inside look at the market, a short summary of 2010 result by 
region is presented: 
 
Europe 
European-based airlines 2010 versus 2009 results (IATA): 
- RPK: +5,1% 
- ASK: +2,6% 
- average load factors increased by +1,9% to reach 79.4% 
Rank Airline N° airports N° routes ASK 2010
1 Delta air lines 381 2104 310.797     
2 American airlines 259 1126 271.964     
3 Air France - KLM 280 765 228.802     
4 United Airlines 216 885 212.116     
5 Emirates 100 216 179.718     
6 Continental Airlines 262 843 168.613     
7 Lufthansa 202 731 159.256     
8 Southwest Airlines 69 955 158.239     
9 British airways 169 401 147.984     
10 US Airways 202 884 136.189     
11 Singapore Airlines 80 166 109.236     
12 Cathay Pacific Airways 56 141 107.353     
13 China Southern airlines 178 1197 105.758     
14 Air China limited 143 599 100.419     
15 Air Canada 170 706 97.792       
16 Ryanair 160 2358 95.086       
17 Qantas Airways 75 292 94.976       
18 China Eastern airlines 163 990 88.650       
19 Korean Air lines 108 277 81.580       
20 JAL 80 306 80.479       
Top 20 Airlines in the world - ASK 2010
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The Association of European Airlines (AEA) legacy carriers recorded an 
annual RPK growth for its member airlines of 2,7%, almost half that 
reported by IATA, that is to say that much of the additional capacity and 
passenger growth on European routes came from low cost carriers (LCC). 
To be more specific Aegean Airlines, Air France, Finnair, British Airways, 
bmi, Iberia, Malev (it declared bankruptcy at the end of 2011), Czech 
Airlines, Croatia Airlines and Virgin Atlantic experienced overall passenger 
declines while significant growth was achieved by Air Baltic, Icelandair, 
Luxair, LOT Polish Airlines, Austrian, Ukraine International Airlines, 
Tarom Romanian Air Transport, Turkish Airlines and Aerosvit. 
The merger of British Airways and Iberia in early 2011 means that nearly 
75% of the available capacity offered annually by AEA member airlines 
comes from three airline groups: Air France/KLM/Alitalia 29%; 
Lufthansa/Austrian/Swiss/bmi/Brussels Airlines 24% and BA/Iberia 20%. 
Whilst the merger between BA and Iberia was completed by January 2011, 
in the same month the EU Commission blocked the proposed merger 
between Olympic and Aegean Airways announced by the two carriers in 
February 2010.  
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Table 55: Top 20 Airlines in Europe. ASK (million) 2010 data (Source: ICCSAI) 
Rank Airline N° airports N° routes ASK 2010
1 Ryanair 148 2224 91.168          
2 easyJet 106 879 53.349          
3 Lufthansa 90 411 33.835          
4 Air France 85 345 25.205          
5 Air berlin 108 997 36.830          
6 Iberia 80 410 22.991          
7 British Airways 68 183 23.748          
8 SAS 76 298 21.243          
9 TAP portugal 44 128 13.944          
10 KLM 39 76 8.961            
11 Alitalia 52 217 17.178          
12 Aer Lingus 66 222 12.762          
13 Hapag Lloyd express 31 322 7.636            
14 Norwegian air shuttle 78 400 16.901          
15 Finnair 66 139 10.337          
16 Air Europa lineas aereas 35 213 9.939            
17 Spanair 31 135 8.648            
18 SWISS 44 120 7.821            
19 Monarch airlines 18 98 9.927            
20 Condor Flugdienst 31 265 8.399            
Top 20 Airlines in the EU - ASK 2010
  
 
Table 56: Top 20 Airlines in Europe. ASK (million) per country 2010 data (Source: ICCSAI)
Rank Airline Spain UK Germany Italy France Portugal Norway Greece Sweden Switzerland
1 Ryanair 20.953 19.964 7.092     14.430  4.304    2.525     1.887     12        2.839    61              
2 easyJet 9.053  20.488 2.619     6.533    5.032    2.672     1.555   95         1.197         
3 Air berlin 10.342 268      19.514   1.651    185       644        67          1.198   141       1.165         
4 Lufthansa 2.006  1.567   20.061   2.715    1.203    1.084     500        680      778       347            
5 Air France 798     695      1.001     1.269    18.596  354        132        441      277       257            
6 British Airways 1.130  13.329 1.219     2.139    964       445        253        634      499       730            
7 Iberia 16.918 618      964        1.403    905       210        281      154       362            
8 SAS 595     1.565   930        495      696       7.099     119      4.236    435            
9 Alitalia 702     709      141        13.769  640       343      72              
10 Norwegian air shuttle 2.282  686      271        391      502       118        7.763     260      1.903    78              
11 TAP Portugal 341     854      649        867      1.038    7.957     156        169       609            
12 Aer Lingus 1.895  2.372   583        472      438       410        33        157            
13 Vueling 8.531  223      8           1.298    1.056    162        110      19              
14 Finnair 685     575      505        414      604       132        99          78        211       251            
15 Air Europa lineas aereas 8.733  113      230      791       62          10        1          
16 Monarch airlines 3.790  4.961   521        
17 KLM 749     760      200        630      131       222        403        238      362       201            
18 Spanair 7.563  44        269        52        7          305       
19 Wizzair 351     1.497   361        691      199       218        2          298       
20 Condor Flugdienst 3.335  4.217     97          550      
25,7 44,9 13,1 32,1 21,0 23,8 9,2 8,5 18,6 9,0
57,7 65,2 58,1 44,4 29,1 38,5 49,3 30,0 39,6 37,5
Top 20 Airlines in the EU - millions ASK 2010 per country
Quota Ryanair+EasyJet (%)
Quota LLC (%)
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Table 57: Major airlines and groups in EU per passengers and Load Factor - 2010 (Source: 
ICCSAI) 
 
Taking into consideration also the merging between Iberia and British, the 
new airline would have totaled 50 million passengers in 2010 ranking 4th. 
Moreover, if we consider also the likely merging between Air France-KLM 
and Alitalia, the group would total more than 90 million passenger 
(according to 2010 data), thus becoming a menace to Lufthansa group’s 
hegemony in Europe. 
Airline Pax 2010 (x1000) Load factor %
Lufthansa group * 90.174                 79,3
Ryanair 72.720                 82,0
Air France - KLM ** 69.770                 80,7
easyJet 48.800                 87,0
airberlin 34.100                 76,8
British Airways 30.484                 78,5
Alitalia 23.355                 70,5
SAS 21.532                 75,2
Iberia 19.622                 82,2
Norwegian 13.029                 77,0
Aeroflot 11.286                 77,2
Vueling 11.036                 73,2
Thomson Airways 10.996                 89,9
Aer Lingus 9.709                   76,1
wizz air 9.600                   84,0
Lufthansa 58.916                 79,3
Swiss 14.169                 82,3
British midlands - bmi 1.304                   n.a.
Austrian 10.895                 76,8
Brussels airlines 4.890                   n.a.
Air France 46.893                 80,6
KLM 22.787                 81,3
Major EU airlines per passengers traffic 2010
Lufthansa group *
Air France - KLM **
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North America 
North America-based airlines 2010 versus 2009 results (IATA): 
- RPK: +7,4% 
- ASK: +3,9% 
- average load factors increased by +2,6% to reach 82,2% 
Within the international traffic markets it was the transpacific routes which 
grew the most (+12.2%), followed by Latin American routes (+8.7%) and 
North Atlantic routes (+2.5%). 
For ATA carriers, domestic traffic (RPKs) accounted for 66,7% of the total 
in 2010, a reduction of 1% point compared to 2009. There has been also an 
improvement of passenger yields for the major U.S. carriers.  
 
Asia Pacific 
With reference to Asia/Pacific-based airlines, IATA reported the following 
results for 2010 on 2009: 
- RPK: +9% 
- ASK: +3,6% 
- average load factors increased by 3,9% to reach 77,6%.  
Chinese carriers have been at the heart of this recovery; moreover Chinese 
economy overtook Japanese becoming the second largest in the world: 
China Southern (+20%), Air China (+17%), Hainan Airlines (+14%). 
The region continues to see strong growth in its low cost sector with 
AirAsia, JetStar and Virgin Blue all recording double-digit traffic increases. 
Tiger Airways posted a +20% in passenger numbers, thanks to the growth in 
domestic markets.  
Japan Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection in January 2010 but continued 
to operate under a restructuring plan. In June, Japan Airlines and American 
Airlines applied to the Japanese Transport Ministry (MLITT) and were 
given approval for anti-trust immunity to operate as if they are a unique 
airline for commercial flights between North America and Asia. ANA and 
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United requested the same. The US Department of Transport gave final 
approval to both joint venture applications enabling implementation of the 
US - Japan ‘Open Skies’ agreement 
Air India received 20 billion INR (430 million USD) form the Government 
to restructure its business. 
 
Middle East 
With reference to Middle East-based airlines, IATA reported the following 
results for 2010 on 2009: 
- RPK: +17,8% 
- ASK: +13,2% 
- average load factors increased by 3,0% to reach 76%.  
The three largest carriers in the Middle East (Emirates, Qatar and Etihad) 
increased their ASK by 15%, 25% and 16% respectively; all above the 
region’s average of 13,2%. 
 
Latin America 
With reference to South America - based airlines, IATA reported the 
following results for 2010 on 2009: 
- RPK: +8,2% 
- ASK: +2,9% 
- average load factors increased by 3,8% to reach 76,7%.  
The highest growth in load factors were on intra-Latin American routes 
(+4,2%), followed by a +3,4% on other international routes and a +2,9% on 
domestic routes. Domestic routes saw the highest increase ASK (+9,6%) 
followed by intra-Latin American ASK (up by 7,1%) and other international 
routes (+1,4%). 
On 28 August Mexicana Airlines suspended operations after a brief period 
(since early August) of operating under creditor protection in both Mexico 
and the United States.  
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Africa 
With reference to African airlines, IATA reported the following results for 
2010 on 2009: 
- RPK demand increased by 12,9% 
- capacity growth (ASK) of 9,6% 
- average load factors by 2,4% to reach 69,1%.  
Whilst much of the capacity expansion in Africa in 2010 was by low cost 
carriers, Ethiopian Airlines has been expanding its long-haul network. It 
added 12% extra capacity in 2010 compared to 2009, more than double the 
growth of other legacy African carriers such as South African Airways 
(+4%) and Kenya Airlines (+5%). 
 
The process of liberalization enhanced the process of concentration within 
airline industry worldwide and alliances have become increasingly 
integrated and overbearing as foreseen by Doganis in 2001. 
At a global level, the process of integration has led to the creation of 
alliances of normal carriers operating hub and spoke network. Three major 
groups dominate the market: Oneworld, Skyteam and Star Alliance. 
Alliances between legacy carriers is a method by which most major airlines 
seek to reduce costs and increase their market share since it allows the 
adoption of commercial practices aiming at maximizing the number of 
routes served avoiding the brand duplication of routes and market losses. 
This is expected to be the trend until there will be no interest in who owns 
the world’s airlines. When that happens, there is likely to be a rapid 
contraction in the number of major airlines and the result would be a 
handful of large multinational airlines, often based in territories with low 
taxation levels and with a significant share of their labor costs contracted 
out to low-wage economies.  
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Star Alliance is the largest alliance in terms of aircraft, passengers and 
revenues (USD 151 billion in revenues in 2010, 47% of total alliance 
revenues); SkyTeam and oneworld tied at USD 86 billion and 26,5% each.  
The main trend in the last decade was that unaligned airlines would join one 
of the three alliances; nevertheless some major airlines like Emirates, 
Etihad, Qatar Airlines and Virgin Atlantic are still unattached. 
Taking into account both 2010 and 2011 data, it is possible to derive that the 
market shares of alliance airlines did not change significantly. The highest 
variation is a +0,5% in LCCs market shares combined with a -0,3% in un-
aligned legacy carriers’ market share. This is to say that the industry seems 
to have reached a stable situation after the period of rapid increase in both 
alliances and low cost operations.  
 
Table 58: Global airline alliances – ASK advertised 2010 (Source: OAG) 
 
Star Alliance  it is the largest alliance in terms of aircraft, passengers and 
revenues. It gained Brazilian airline TAM in May 2010; further 
strengthening the alliance’s presence in South America. At the end of June 
2010, Greece’s largest airline in terms of passengers carried also joined the 
alliance. In 2010 Ethiopian Airlines along with Air India were accepted into 
the alliance. The other three pending airlines to join Star Alliance are the 
Central and South American carriers Avianca, TACA and Copa Airlines. 
Sky Team  China Eastern will become the second Chinese carrier in the 
alliance after China Southern. In 2010, Vietnam Airlines and TAROM 
Growth
billion ASK % billion ASK % %
Star Alliance 129,4 25,6% 143 26,1% 10,50%
Sky Team 78,9 15,6% 86,9 15,8% 10,10%
One world 75,6 15,0% 77,8 14,2% 2,90%
Total 283,9 56,2% 307,7 56,1% 8,40%
Other legacy 142,5 28,2% 152,9 27,9% 7,30%
LLCs 78,8 15,6% 88,2 16,1% 11,90%
Gran total 505,2 100,0% 548,8 100,0% 8,60%
2010 2011Capacity
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Romanian Air Transport were welcomed into the alliance. China Airlines, 
the flag carrier of Taiwan, formally announced the intention to join the 
alliance. Shanghai Airlines exited Star Alliance to merge with China Eastern 
and then joined Sky Team. Further carriers which signed agreements to join 
Sky Team in the next future have been Aerolineas Argentina, Garuda 
Indonesia, Middle East Airlines and Saudi Arabian Airlines. 
Oneworld  Mexicana suspended its operations in August 2010 while in 
November S7 entered the alliance. Kingfisher Airlines of India and Air 
Berlin are due to enter the alliance in early 2012. Following antitrust 
immunity approval from both the U.S. Department of Transportation and 
the European Commission, the new JBA that groups together British 
Airways, Iberia and American Airlines to operate between the European 
Union (plus Switzerland and Norway) and USA, Canada and Mexico was 
launched in October 2010. 
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Table 59a: Global airline alliances - Composition (Source: Websites) 
 
Star Alliance Sky Team One World
Adria Airways Aeroflot American Airlines
Aegean Airlines Aeromexico British Airline
Air Canada Air Europa Cathay pacific
Air China Air France Finnair
Air New Zealand Alitalia Iberia
ANA China Airlines Japan Airlines
Asiana Airlines China Eastern airlines LAN
Austrian Airlines China Southern airlines Mexicana
Blue1 Czech airlines Qantas
bmi Kenya airlines Royal Jordanian
Brussels Airlines KLM S7 airlines
Croatia Airlines Korean air
EgyptAir TAROM
Ethiopian Airlines Vietnam airlines
LOT
Lufthansa
Scandinavian airlines
Singapore Airlines
South African Airways
Swiss international Air Lines
TAM airlines
TAP Portugal
Thai Airways international
Turkish Airlines
United Airlines
Us Airways
Already Members
Mega carriers - Global Carriers Alliances
Chapter 3: Present situation of air traffic market 
 
 
- 209 - 
 
 
Table 59b: Global airline alliances - Composition (Source: Websites) 
 
 
Table 60: Global airline dominance at EU major countries (Source: ICCSAI) 
Star Alliance Sky Team One World
Avianca Aerolinas argentinas Kingfisher airlines
Copa Airlines Garuda indonesia Air Berlin
TACA Airlines Middle east airlines Malaysia Airlines
Shenzen airlines Saudi arabian airlines
Xiamen airlines
Eva Air Air Algerie Air Lingus
Jet Airways Air India Air Astana
Air India Air Madagascar Etihad Airways
Air Malta Gol Transportes aereos Gulf air
Utair Aviaiton Jet Airways Jet star
Aer Lingus Uzbekistan airways Meridiana Fly
Air Algerie Virgin atlantic airways Tunisair
Air Astana Virgin Australia SriLankan airlines
Air Austral TAM airlines
Caribbean airlines TAP portugal
Etihad airlines Us airways
Gulf air
LAN airlines
Luxair
Pakistan international airlines
Pluna
Qatar airways
Srilankan airlines
Transaero airlines
Virgin atlantic
Virgin Australia
Future members
Mega carriers - Global Carriers Alliances
Possible members
Country Oneworld SkyTeam StarAlliance Other NC LLC Regional Other
Spain + Canarie 17,91 9,74 10,05 0,98 57,72 2,48 1,13
UK 19,06 2,67 7,82 3,77 65,15 1,26 0,27
Germany 4,86 2,02 31,23 1,62 58,10 2,10 0,08
Italy 6,95 24,64 7,45 11,38 44,45 3,22 1,91
France 6,91 45,72 8,56 4,48 29,06 3,38 1,90
Airline dominance in EU country (%)
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A concise summary of trends in the low cost carrier market has been 
provided in an article produced for the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation 
(CAPA) in February 2011: “The key development of 2011 will be the 
continuation of the rapid transformation of the business models of low cost 
airlines worldwide: expansion in intercontinental markets, interline 
agreements among themselves as well as with legacy network carriers, 
operations with multiple types of aircraft,  two-class service, multiple 
channels of distribution, more service to conventional airports, enhanced 
brands and superior communications with potential customers through 
social networks. These enhanced value propositions will divert more 
premium-fare passengers from the legacy carriers, both from the business-
class cabins and the top end of the economy-class buckets (individual 
travelers and corporate accounts).” 
Low fares airlines are the major product of the air transport liberalization 
and deregulation; after fifteen years since they first appeared, it is possible 
to draw some conclusions on how they have contributed to change the air 
transport market.  
 
Fig. 36: Concentration of EU LC market (Source: IATA) 
 
Three major players (Ryanair, EasyJet and Air Berlin) dominate the 
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European market of low fares airlines in terms of passengers carried, while 
other LC carriers focus their service on limited regions or on certain routes. 
The worldwide market of low fares airlines, like legacy carriers’ market, is 
strongly aggregated. It is possible to guess that LC market is even more 
aggregated in favour of the main players than the NCs’ market.  
In the first phase, low fares airlines could be considered as alternatives to 
full service carriers on point to point routes. However, the shift in the 
perception of LCCs among the passengers, the increased level of service 
provided and the increased use of major airports had transformed these 
airlines into actual competitors to legacy airlines on point to point routes. 
The evolution of low fares market is also marked by their increased 
presence in medium sized and large airports as highlighted by the KPMG 
study and by Fig. 37 below. 
 
 
Fig. 37: Percentage of LC traffic at different sized airports in EU countries (Source: KPMG, 
2011) 
 
The merger of full service airlines and the consequent rationalization of 
their routes by the increased use of code share, the decrease in the demand 
and the higher utilization of aircraft through the increase in load factor as 
shown by IATA, along with the crisis of charter flights, the decrease of 
cargo and the concentration of low fare market around few major player, 
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will undoubtedly change the relationship between airlines and airports. The 
airlines will end up having an increased market and bargaining power 
towards airports. 
According to IATA, the distinction between legacy carrier, regional carrier 
and low cost carrier is becoming thinner and thinner; as time goes by 
probably the market segments will remain the same (business, holiday and 
VFR; local, short-haul and long-haul; point to point and connecting; 
economy and premium; time-rich and time-poor) but individual airlines will 
continue to select strategies which maximize their profits, based on their 
financial capabilities and opportunities. Many airlines will choose strategies 
that cross over between what are now seen as different kinds of airlines. 
 
IATA industry outlook for 2011 state a weak profitability at 6,9 billion USD 
(net margin of 1,2%). IATA forecasts for 2012 are even worst: airline 
profitability of 3,5 billion USD and a net margin of 0.6%. The worst 
scenario would be the evolution of the Eurozone crisis into a full-blown 
banking crisis that would lead the global industry to suffer losses exceeding 
$8 billion USD. Moreover, regional differences have widened, reflecting the 
very different economic environments facing airlines in different parts of 
the world (S. Tyler, IATA CEO). Highlights of regional performance: 
- Europe  it is the most challenging situation as higher passenger taxes 
and weak home economies have limited profitability. The region’s 
carriers are forecasted to generate a collective profit of just 1 billion 
USD. Higher traffic growth rates are counterbalanced by high fuel prices 
and sovereign debt crisis escalation.  
- North America  the US economy is in better condition than the 
European one and this, together with airlines’ yields and tight capacity 
management, allowed an improved profitability (2 billion USD). 
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Nevertheless, American Airlines filed for bankruptcy in 2011 and this 
indicates that the region is going to face intense challenges.  
- Asia-Pacific  the situation is uneven: Japan market still has not fully 
recovered from the March earthquake and tsunami, and load factors 
remain under pressure. By contrast airlines have improved load factors 
and profitability on China’s expanding domestic market. Thus, the 
expected profitability for 2011 is the highest at 3,3 billion USD.  
- Middle East  as the importance of fuel costs at Middle East market is 
relevant, the profits for 2011 would be 0,4 billion USD.  
- Latin America  an unforeseeable loss in Brazilian load factor and 
intense competition brought to a small profit of 0,2 billion USD.  
- Africa  the market is still not profitable as load factors are still low.  
Recent estimations for passenger demand at global level for 2011 expect a 
growth of + 6,1%. Despite that positive result, cargo performance is under 
expectations (-0,5% in volumes and 0% in yields) and fuel prices are 
continuing to grow  
 
In 2012, Europe is expected to be in recession. Global GDP growth 
forecasts for 2012 have been revised downwards to 2.1%. Historically the 
airline industry has seen profit turn into loss whenever global GDP growth 
falls below 2%. Passenger demand is expected to grow by 4.0%, while 
cargo is expected to show flat growth. As a whole, yields will be negligible 
provided that the fuel price doesn’t grow too much (not over 100 USD x 
barrel), and the growth in revenues is expected to be overdrawn by that in 
costs (+3,7% vs +4,5%). All regions are expected to show profit 
deterioration from 2011. 
Two scenarios have been depicted for the regional performance of 2012. 
The best one foresees a net margin of +0,6%, with strong differences 
between the regions: 
Chapter 3: Present situation of air traffic market 
 
 
- 214 - 
 
- Europe  carriers are expected to lose 0,6 billion USD, hit by the 
weakness of their home market economies and further increases in 
passenger taxes.  
- North America  carriers are expected to generate profits of 1,7 billion 
USD  
- Asia-Pacific  carriers are expected to deliver the largest absolute 
profit at 2,1 billion USD. The deterioration with reference to 2011 is 
limited by high load factors forecasted on markets such as China that 
counterbalance the increases in costs due to the growing demand.   
- Middle East  carriers are expected to post a 0,3 billion USD profit, as 
long-haul market conditions are strictly linked to European countries’ 
economic condition.  
- Latin American  carriers are expected to lose 0,1 billion USD, as 
Brazilian market profitability will be weak.  
- Africa  carriers will lose another 0,1 billion USD as load factors 
won’t be sufficiently high despite the economies and air transport 
markets will continue to grow.  
The second scenario takes into account the possibility of the Eurozone crisis 
evolving into a renewed banking crisis. Based on the OECD’s view, this 
scenario would cut global GDP growth to 0.8% and cause the industry a 
global loss of 8,3 billion USD. Europe would resent from this crisis more 
than any else (-4,4 billion USD), followed by North America (-1,8 billion 
USD) and Asia-Pacific (-1,1 billion USD). The Middle East and Latin 
America would both be expected to post 0,4 billion USD losses, while 
Africa would be 0,2 billion USD in the red. 
IATA CEO’s opinion is that “Government policies need to recognize 
aviation’s vital contribution to the health of the economy and the airline 
industry has to be able to deliver connectivity and keep the heart of the 
global economy pumping to initiating a recovery.” 
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According with the worst scenario, there would be no increase in passenger 
demand and a contraction in both cargo market and yields. Overall expenses 
would be expected to grow by 1,9% on 2011, but revenues would fall by -
1,3% despite the likely fall of fuel price.  
AEA Secretary General said that, despite the fact that “most of the members 
would have posted good results over the first nine months of 2011, 
passenger numbers were at +8% on 2010 and the outlook for the full year 
were positive, 3rd and 4th quarter yields would be weak. Soaring external 
costs, such as fuel and taxation, continue to hamper industry profitability. 
For example, in 2012 fuel costs are expected to be 40% up on 2009 levels, 
accounting for a massive 29% of total operating expenses.” 
 
5. Mergers and acquisitions 
A merger is a combination of at least two businesses in one entity. The 
existing constituents remain shareholders of the combined entity. Mergers 
often occur in industries in which margins continuously stay under pressure. 
They make financial sense if sales or cost synergies can be exploited to 
reach a higher combined profitability. 
There are many ways of legally and technically structuring mergers. This 
may also include cash payments and the transfer of existing debt.  
In response to the impact of the recession, several trends in the airline 
industry were either strengthened or confirmed in 2010. Consolidation 
accelerated mainly for American and European airlines while the 
development of new airline business models expanded. LCCs market as 
well is experimenting market concentration, but the phenomenon is different 
if compared with the legacy carrier.  
Legacy carriers, in order to increase their market share, have enhanced the 
practice of airline alliances, because they are intent on increasing the 
number of passengers. Two definitive characteristics of strategic alliances 
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are exclusive memberships and a joint marketing entity. Airline alliances 
should be fostered by different factors, such as increased globalisation in air 
transport, increasing interaction, economic incentives for airline 
consolidation, liberalisation and anti-trust concerns. Airline alliances take 
many forms and not only generate various benefits and risks to the members 
but also to other stakeholders such as passengers, communities and travel 
agencies. The alliances could result in new route options, extension of 
frequent flyers program and common reservation systems and creation of 
new market shares. On the other hand, there could be a potential tendency 
for reduced both competition and level of services and higher fares. 
Historically alliances have been most evident in international aviation where 
the governments offered the airlines antitrust immunity for transoceanic 
alliances (for example the open skies agreements between US and European 
countries) that allow the partners to discuss schedules, fares and frequency 
of flights. 
Direct acquisition can be both in the form of a 100% ownership or in the 
form of a major shareholding (>50%). Direct acquisition is less viable 
nowadays both for the huge amount of money implied and for legal 
restriction to foreign ownership posed by some countries (USA, Australia 
and EU countries impose a maximum threshold to foreign investors in their 
carriers). However, after the acquisition, operating fleet and crews often 
continue to operate with the original brand. 
Many authors have studied the economic implication of airline 
consolidation; the findings show that total costs increase 20% slower than 
the total traffic generated by the merged airlines.  
Other viable forms of cooperation between airlines are characterised by a 
more operative connotation. These forms of cooperation are the code-
sharing agreements and the franchising. Code sharing is an aviation 
agreement between two or more airlines: on flight panels at airports the 
target flight reports all the callsigns of the airlines involved but only one 
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airline actually operates the flight, on board seats are split among the 
airlines involved. This permits the passengers greater accessibility through 
allied airlines' network (also the reservation system is shared and permits 
bookings on connection flights operated by different allied airlines) and the 
airlines not to be forced to offer extra-flights on routes with scarce demand. 
Criticism has been levelled against code sharing by consumer organization 
and national departments since it is said to be confusing and not transparent 
to passengers.  
There is franchising when a flight of airline A (franchiser) is flown by 
airline B (franchisee) with airline A’s level of service standards. Airlines A 
e B keep their independency. Franchisees may have access to logo, flight-
code, products and service standards of the franchiser. Franchiser’s 
advantage lays in the possibility to quickly expand its network without 
devoting too many resources. Franchising is especially used in smaller 
markets, for example the domestic market to provide feeder services to a 
scheduled carrier’s hub. For example, British Airways has franchising 
agreements with Gatwick based City Flyer Express and Scottish carrier 
Loganair. A particular form of franchising is technically called “wet lease” 
and consists in franchisee’s aircraft and crew with franchisers’ liveries and 
uniforms. Also low cost airlines have proven willing to consolidate their 
market power through acquisitions, but the acquired company’s brand (often 
on the edge of bankruptcy) simply exits the market. For example, Easyjet 
purchased his rival airline GO or Ryanair took over Buzz in February 2003 
and tried twice to do the same with Aer Lingus but in both the cases the 
acquisition has been thwarted because judged as potentially restrictive of the 
concurrence at Irish level. Similar episodes took place also in the US with, 
for example Southwest and AirTran Airways merging in 2010 (N. Gualandi, 
L. Mantecchini, F. Paganelli, 2010). 
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In order to co-operate in an alliance (e.g., to code-share or involve in closer 
forms of co-operation) an airline must receive immunity or an antitrust 
exemption, from Department of Transport.  
Airlines generally are positively oriented to alliances because they are able 
to offer to each member significant advantages: marketing costs savings, 
improved competitiveness and improved quality of service among others. 
These advantages are non-negligible also in light of these carriers' inability 
to merge. On the other hand, someone might judge alliances or joint 
ventures between airlines as anti-competitive. In their view, these joint 
ventures can act as a monopoly operator on certain routes and can use 
market power to preclude new competition, raise fares, and engage in other 
anti-competitive practices, particularly where there are slot constraints at 
one or both ends of a route. 
 
In the following lines, we provide some example of alliance in the different 
regions of the world: 
North America   
British Airways, Iberia and American Airlines reached a JBA to operate 
between the European Union (plus Switzerland and Norway) and USA, 
Canada and Mexico. Airlines were granted antitrust immunity approval 
from both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the European 
Commission. This agreement includes revenue sharing, combined selling, 
schedules coordination and other benefits such as frequent flyer consistency 
and integration, alignment of baggage policies and improved connection 
timings. 
United merged with Continental (2011) and the previous year Delta and 
Northwest did the same. Moreover, the new Delta Air Lines signed an 
expanded codeshare agreement on flights between the US and Australia 
with Virgin Australia Group (2011). Under the agreement, Delta will add its 
DL code to all flights between Los Angeles (LAX) and Sydney (SYD), 
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Melbourne and Brisbane, operated by V Australia (VA), Virgin Australia’s 
(DJ) long-haul international carrier. V Australia will add its DJ code to DL’s 
service between LAX and SYD. 
In 2011, US Airways Express concluded a franchising agreement with 
SkyWest Airlines: SkyWest will operate 6X-daily Express flights from US 
Airways’ hub in Phoenix. SkyWest is the result of the 2010 merging 
between Atlantic Southeast Airlines and ExpressJet Airlines. 
In October 2011 Delta Air Lines (DL) and US Airways (US) decided a slot 
swap between New York LaGuardia (LGA) and Washington National 
(DCA) airport. DOT approved the deal, clearly recognizing the slot 
transaction as a public interest option because of the service benefits and 
efficiencies that would result in both airports New York and Washington. 
Under the deal, DL will acquire 132 slot pairs at LGA from US and US will 
get 42 slot pairs from DL at DCA. 
 
Latin America  
Group TACA and Avianca finalized their merger agreement to create the 
joint holding company Avianca-TACA Ltd. The merged airline’s fleet 
totaled 129 aircraft and in total 13 carriers from 10 Latin American 
countries became part of one airline holding company. 
In April, Caribbean Airlines took over Air Jamaica after a number of 
months of negotiation between the two island carriers.  
Also in August 2011, Chile-based LAN and Brazil-based TAM announced 
they had forged a non-binding memorandum of understanding outlining 
their intentions to combine their holdings. The deal is subject to both 
companies completing a binding definitive merger agreement and securing 
approval from their shareholders and relevant regulatory authorities.  
In early 2011 LAN acquired 100% of the shares of Colombia’s second 
largest carrier Aires. Finally, GOL and Aerolineas Argentinas have signed 
an MOU to begin a codeshare agreement. 
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Europe 
In Europe there are three big groups that operate more than 70% of the 
flights. These group are the result of merging and alliances. Air France-
KLM’s shareholders are the French government (18%) and private 
investors. Lufhtansa group has been built through the acquisitions of Swiss 
Airlines, Austrian Airlines,  Germanwings, Brussels Airlines and British 
Midlands. British Airways is due to merge with Iberia in a new entity 
named International Airlines Group. In Italy some merging have taken place 
recently: Alitalia and Airone (2008), Alitalia and Windjet (2011) and 
Meridiana and Air Italy (2011). Moreover, 25% of shares of Alitalia have 
been sold to Air France – KLM  
Looking at EU LCC market, Air Berlin signed a codeshare agreement with 
S7 to operate flights between Germany and Russia (some of the airports 
involved are Tegel, Munich, Stuttgard, Dusseldorf, Moscow Domodedovo, 
Irkutsk, Samara, Kazan, Rostov and Yekaterinburg);  
 
Asia Pacific 
Shanghai Airlines merged with China Eastern Airlines in January 2010, 
though the two airlines’ capacity remains reported separately. Malaysia 
Airlines Group (MAS) has launched a network rationalization program with 
its subsidiary, Firefly, which will now serve only short-haul turboprop 
routes while returning 2 Boeing 737-400 and six 737-800s to MAS. 
The Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC) has issued 
draft approval for the Joint Business Agreement (JBA) between Qantas and 
American Airlines for Pacific routes between the US and Australia/New 
Zealand and the networks that support those routes (2010). ACCC approved 
also the proposed alliance between Singapore Airlines (SIA) and Virgin 
Australia (VA). Under the alliance, the airlines will cooperate on all aspects 
of their Australia-Singapore services and any international and domestic 
connecting routes, including joint pricing and scheduling, as well as joint 
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marketing and sales. Finally, All Nippon Airways (ANA) officially applied 
to Japan's Legal Affairs Bureau to establish its planned joint venture LCC 
with AirAsia to be called AirAsia Japan.  
 
Eric Amel, formerly the chief economist for both Delta Air Lines and 
Continental Airlines, provided a breakdown of US airlines’ domestic market 
share post-consolidation compared to 2007 (before the Delta/Northwest, 
United/Continental and Southwest/AirTran mergers). 
Pre-consolidation (2007):  Southwest (19,8%) + AirTran (4,2%), Delta 
(11,5%) + Northwest (7,3%), United (10,9%) + Continental (7,2%), US 
Airways (10,8%), American (13,2%), JetBlue (4,2%), Alaska (3,1%) and 
others (7,9%). The actual situation today is: Southwest (25,9%), Delta 
(18,9%), United (15,6%), American (11,5%), US Airways (10,6%), JetBlue 
(5,1%), Alaska (3.4%), Frontier (2,6%), Hawaiian (1.5%), Spirit (1,4%) and 
others (3,5%). 
Even after consolidation, no airline controls more than a quarter of the 
domestic market and only three carriers have a market share of 15% or 
more. In 2007, the top 10 carriers controlled 92,5% of the domestic market; 
now they control 96,5%. The top five US carriers went from controlling 
66,2% pre-consolidation to 82,5% post-consolidation. 
 
The same phenomena may take place between airports: the resulting 
companies are known as corporatization or corporate governance programs, 
they are created in order to attract investors and avoid cost duplication. A 
recent example is the 2011 MOU between Basic Element Group, (which 
owns several airports in South Russia), Changi Airports International (CAI) 
and LLC Sberbank Investments to form a joint venture (JV) to invest in and 
develop airports in Russia. Basic Element will hold 50% plus one share, 
CAI will hold 30% and Sberbank will hold 20%, minus one share. The 
creation of the JV is targeted to be completed in the second quarter of 2012. 
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It is subject to due diligence and final negotiations between the parties and 
approval by the regulatory authorities. Basic Element runs five airports in 
the South region: Krasnodar, Sochi, Gelendzhik, Anapa and Yeisk.  
  
6. Vertical integration between Airport and Airlines 
Airports are strongly depend on airlines’ decision to operate services; for 
example low-cost airlines have forced airport revenues down thanks to their 
bargaining position during the negotiation with airport managers. It has 
become clear that benefits may be achieved if airports and airlines work 
closely together as “...if customers don’t have a good perception of the 
situation, it will obviously impact on the image of both partners...” (J. 
Spinetta, CEO Air France, 2005).  
Large airports are in a better negotiating position than smaller airports, as a 
bigger size indicates a larger catchment area. The same happens for large 
airlines that can almost dictate the conditions towards regional airports. The 
majority of relationships involves hub airports and its hub carrier, but 
alternative combinations are also reliable (for example, hub carrier and 
regional airport). In the aviation context there are various forms of specific 
investments on both sides: airports may adapt their infrastructure to carriers’ 
needs and, on the other hand, airlines can consider their airport choice when 
making strategic decisions. The longer the duration of the relationship, the 
more likely it is that each party will show each other commitment through 
long-term contracts, shared performance measure indexes and trust. In fact, 
there are benefits for both airports and airlines from entering into long-term 
relationships: airports can obtain financial support and secure business 
volume, on the other and airlines can secure key airport facilities on 
favorable terms; this provides incentives for the airport and the dominant 
carrier to strike exclusive deals.  
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Vertical relationship between airport and airline may happen in these 
scenarios: privatization of hub airport (Lufthansa now holds 9% of shares in 
Frankfurt airport, thus being able to influence strategic and investment’s 
decisions and to have control on airport’s cost development policy), 
terminal expansion at hub airport (terminal 2 at Munich airport was built 
and operated by a joint company of Lufthansa and Munich airport; LH 
wanted a feasible terminal layout to support his double-hub and spoke 
operations and T2 was also intended to become a premium facility for Star 
alliance members’ passengers) or terminal expansion at a base airport (the 
low cost carrier commits itself to grant the airport a certain amount of 
passengers versus lease or rearrangement of airport’s structures).  
 
The weak point about vertical integration consists in the potential rise to 
anticompetitive practices aimed at displacing competing airlines such as 
diminution of quality of service, potential discrimination, increasing 
charges, cross-subsidies between airport and airline. This could happen if 
the airport operator is allowed to control somehow at least one airline. 
Therefore international experience suggests that airport concessions should 
impose vertical separation between the airport and the airline.  
Airport management should appreciate both the volatility of low-cost 
market and the rapid growth expectations before formulating airport-airline 
agreements: long term agreements and investments in infrastructure to 
accommodate low-cost airlines must be assessed regarding the degree of 
risk that services may be withdrawn, that is to say “market volatility” 
(Bingelli & Pompeo, 2002). Airport management should be also aware of 
the necessity of equity issues between traditional and low cost carriers as the 
social and economic status of a region may be harmed if scheduled services 
are withdrawn. 
Traffic is much more volatile both at secondary airports and in a deregulated 
environment than under strict regulation that prevents airlines from rapidly 
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changing their routes, fares or frequency of service. The phenomena known 
as vertical integration between airport and airline consists in deductions on 
airport fees, commercial alliances and financial aids to project and build 
new structures, in order to pursue the mutual will to attract passengers. Such 
relationship may also take place between state and airline, when the former 
pays the latter the operating costs, for example, to operate air connections to 
areas not easily attainable else-how or to operate from under-congested 
airports to reduce the congestion level at main hubs. (N. Gualandi, L. 
Mantecchini, F. Paganelli, 2010) 
IATA’s Director General and CEO, T. Tyler said in his speeches that:  
“Airports and airlines share a common interest in making aviation safer, 
more secure, user-friendly, operationally efficient and environmentally 
responsible.” He highlighted six areas where airports and airlines can 
enhance cooperation to innovate and deliver value: safety, security, 
improving the customer experience, infrastructure investments, environment 
and charges. 
- Safety: runway safety, ground safety and ground damage are the areas of 
concern. IATA and ACI will promote together the IATA Ground 
Operations Manual (IGOM) to globally harmonize ground operations  
- Security: risk-based approach with the aim of allowing passengers to 
move through security without stopping, unpacking or removing 
outerwear.  
- Improving the Customer Experience: to improve efficiency and 
passenger convenience through e-ticketing, common use self-service 
(CUSS) kiosks and bar coded boarding passes.  
- Environment: airports and airlines are united with air navigation service 
providers and manufacturers to tackle aviation’s carbon emissions.   
- Infrastructure Investments: building infrastructure to handle growth is a 
challenge best handled in close cooperation between airports and 
airlines. This includes working together in the airport master planning 
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drawing, to ensure that investments are being made that match the needs 
of airlines. This is the case of London Heathrow Airport, where an 
ongoing dialogue between the airport operator and the airlines is 
helping, among other things, to promote capacity expansion, to optimize 
existing capacity, to take advantage of developing technology, to 
mitigate noise and emissions, to enhance surface access and to improve 
operational resilience. 
Another example of strategic cooperation agreements between airport 
and airline is the one signed between China Southern Airlines (CZ) and 
Dalian Airport (DLC) in order to let the first enhance its position in the 
northeastern China and compete with Air China (CA) and the second to 
get more traffic (domestic routes as well as international). 
Airport and airline might, for example, find an agreement on a certain 
kind of service to be provided like a target turn-around time. The result 
could be obtained through a terminal or an airside renovation. A 25’ 
turn-around time and contact stand is for example part of what Ryanair 
often requests the airports before starting operations.  
- Cost-Efficiency: cost efficient, affordable airports with charges 
compliant with ICAO principles are of a big importance. Airlines and 
airports are under similar pressure.  
 
7. Multi airport systems 
Whatever the form of ownership and control that the state has selected, the 
management of airports can be done either on an individual airport basis, on 
an airport system basis, on an airport network basis or on a combination of 
these. An airport system is composed of two or more airports serving the 
same major metropolitan area and operated under a single ownership and 
control structure. An airport network is a group of airports within a state 
operated under a single ownership and control structure; it can include all 
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airports serving the territory of the state or only some of these airports. 
Cross ownership of airports in different states or managements contracts 
obtained in different states by an international airport management company 
can also lead to a form of cooperation sometimes referred to as airport 
network or as airport alliances, but these forms of international cooperation 
are of a different nature than a network at a national level.  
There are arguments in favor of operating and managing a group of airports 
within an airport network, a form of organization that has become more and 
more common at a national level. Smaller airports may derive some benefit 
within a common ownership which could include cross-subsidization. Other 
arguments point to the advantages for a state having a national air transport 
system in achieving its national development objectives; the advantages in 
terms of economies of scale and synergies; the easier access of all airports to 
capital markets and the better management of capacity and use of resources 
throughout the network. In summary, an airport network can be a valuable 
method of collectively managing airports which, taken individually, would 
not be viable.  
Argument against cross-subsidization are based on the fact that charges 
have to be cost-related, that users should not be charged for facilities they 
don’t use and that only those facilities used for international air services 
should be included in the cost basis for charges. In that sense, cross-
subsidization between international airport and domestic airports is 
questionable, although it is recognized that in some states it may be the only 
way to maintain airports that serve, for example, landlocked regions. 
Opponents to the network approach also point out that if subsidies are to be 
provided for national planning purposes, these should rather come from the 
state than from users of other airports.  
Another aspect is related to the operation and management of airports at an 
international or multinational level, including alliances between airports or 
airport groups. This is made possible by the operation and management of 
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airports in different states by globalized airport companies. The main 
advantage of such a form of organization lies in the potential economies of 
scale, while the drawbacks may be found in a possible diversion of revenue 
and cross-subsidies between airports in different states (a form of 
cooperation that may be acceptable to some developing states). 
One conclusion that may be drawn from this controversial issue is that an 
equilibrium should be sought between the interests of airports and users and 
that in case where cross-subsidization within a national network is applied, 
that full transparency is necessary. In the final analysis, it is for state to 
decide on what is in their best interest, taking the above advantages and 
disadvantages and their particular circumstances into account. In this respect 
consideration should be given to the possibility for states or charging 
authorities to recover less than their full costs is recognized as well as the 
possibility of cross-subsidization through revenues from commercial 
activities. With regard to international operation and management of 
airports, this form of organization should be exerted with caution and could 
be considered as acceptable as long as it bring lower charges through 
economies of scale (ICAO, 2006). 
A competition issue is worth attention when it comes of privatizing airports: 
should airports have to be taken as a group or separately? This is 
particularly true when the group is made of large, profitable airports and a 
number of smaller, loss making airports. This was the case with the 
Australian airports and also in a number of South American countries prior 
to privatization. If the airport group is sold as a single entity a higher sale 
price may be achieved because of the lack of perceived competition. 
However, if the group contains loss making airports this may make the 
airports group less attractive to investors. If only the profitable airports are 
privatized one option would be to use the concession fees to subsidize the 
smaller airports (Graham, 2008). 
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Airlines in general tend to be suspicious of airport groups, because they fear 
to be charged for un-requested services in order  to finance the development 
of another airport which they do not even use (IATA, 2000). In practice in 
Australia, the government decided on individual privatizations for the major 
international airports but with packages of some of the smaller ones. 
Restrictions were imposed to stop the same operator from having overall 
control at a number of airports. In South America, all 33 Argentinian 
airports were covered under the same concession agreements, while in 
Mexico the airports have been divided into four different groups with a 
mixture of small and large airports in each group. In the United Kingdom, 
BAA, which is an airport group of seven airports, was privatized in 1987 
after much debate as a single entity, but this has remained a controversial 
issue ever since. 
Nevertheless, in our opinion, airport alliances and multi airport system are a 
positive issue as they foster the elimination of cost duplication and permit to 
share expertise and know-how. Moreover and most important, airports need 
to have a contractual power towards airlines as well: as airlines are grouping 
together and at some airports only one dominant carrier exists, airlines are 
acquiring a strong contractual power to get lower charges and they might 
even influence the airports’ development. Airport alliances is seen as a good 
counterstrategy to negotiate with airlines on a fair field. Finally, this trend is 
also typical in liberalized countries by ground handling operators. (N. 
Gualandi, L. Mantecchini, F. Paganelli, 2011)  
 
BAA-Ferrovial owns 65% at Naples airport and is in charge of its 
management and was the airport manager of Chilean Cerro Moreno 
Antofagasta airport from 2000 to 2010. This is to highlight the fact that 
BAA-Ferrovial, after the merging, is starting considering the idea of 
selling its non-strategic assets to cover its debt. Therefore, assets in 
Bristol, Budapest, Sydney, Glasgow Prestwick (the secondary airport of 
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Glasgow), Indianapolis as well as in secondary Australian airports have 
been sold and also the divestiture of Naples airport is foreseen for the next 
future. Retail management at Baltimore-Washington International 
Airport, Boston Logan International Airport and Pittsburgh International 
Airport is held by BAA-Ferrovial. BAA-Ferrovial’s shares at Australian 
airports have been bought by Map Airport, partner of Macquarie Airport. 
MAp airports is shareholder of Bruxelles, Copenaghen e Tokyo Haneda 
(Macquaire, sito web). 
Another important player in British Airport scenario as well as worldwide is 
Manchester Airport Group (MAG). MAG is the biggest british-owned 
airport management group and its shares are 100% public. MAG manages 
Manchester, East Midlands, Bournemouth and Humberside airports. The 
100% public shareholding has not proven to be a drawback to expansion 
towards other market. 
 
Group Fraport’s shareholding is composed by the regional government of 
Hesse, the municipality of Frankfurt and other secondary investors both 
from public and private sector. In this case too, Fraport is an international 
managing group which expanded its interests in a panel of several airports 
worldwide: Hanover, Burgos, Varna, Delhi, Antalya, Il Cairo, Lima and 
Xian. Fraport group has recently declared its interest in buying Edinburgh 
airport from BAA-Ferrovial.  
Financial results for 2010 show that: Profits were +78% on 2009 and 
revenue +9%  
 
AENA too is 100% publically owned by the Spanish government, but 
through Aena Internacional, it takes part in the management of the 
infrastructure of 27 airports, distributed around the geography of Latin 
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America (Mexico, Colombia, Cuba and Bolivia), the European Union 
(United Kingdom and Sweden) and the United States:  
- Guadalajara, Tijuana, Puerto Vallarta, Los Cabos, La Paz, Manzanillo, 
Hermosillo, Bajío, Morelia, Aguascalientes, Mexicali and Los Mochis 
through its 17,4% shares in Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico (GAP); 
- Cartagena de Indias city Airport, through its 38% of the shares in 
Sociedad Aeroportuaria de la Costa S.A (SACSA) 
- Barranquilla Airport through its 40% of the shares in Aeropuertos del 
Caribe S.A (ACSA);  
- Cali airport through its 33,3% of the shares in Aerocali Society S.A  
- Finally AENA International takes part in operation and management of 
London Luton, Belfast and Cardiff airports in the UK; Orlando Sanford 
in USA; La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba in Bolivia and Skavsta 
airports in Sweden through its participation in TBI plc,. It also has 
different operation and management contracts in USA. 
AENA is the State airport group owner and operator of 47 Spanish airports, 
overseeing 2,1 million air transport movements and 193 million passengers 
in 2010. Consolidated revenue remained steady in 2010 over 2009, 
consolidated EBITDA increased 57% in 2010 over 2009. 
 
Aéroport de Paris Group owns equity stakes in airport operating companies 
outside France, some of which are held directly by Aéroports de Paris and 
the others by ADPM. These stakes are accompanied by management, 
consultancy or operating contracts held by Aéroports de Paris, ADPM or the 
company in which the stake is held. The Group’s international holdings are 
listed below: 
Mexico. Since 2000 Aéroports de Paris has held a 25.5% stake in the 
Mexican company Servicios de Tecnología Aeroportuaria, S.A. de C.V. 
(SETA), through which it has interests in Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro 
Norte, (GACN) which is the holding company for 13 airports in the north 
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and center of Mexico, including Monterrey International Airport. Aéroports 
de Paris enjoys joint decision-making power for major decisions regarding 
the management of SETA, and, via SETA’s role in GACN, exercises 
indirect management over GACN.  
China. In February 2000, ADPM took a 9.99% stake, for 119,9 million 
euros, in Beijing Capital International Airport (BCIA). The acquisition of 
this stake was accompanied in 2000 by the signature of a consultancy 
contract for the support of BCIA, particularly in areas relating to the 
transformation of the airports to a hub model and the development of non-
aviation revenues. 
Belgium. Since 1999, ADPM has owned a 25.6% stake in the Société de 
Développement et de Promotion de l’Aéroport de Liège-Bierset SA (SAB), 
which manages the Liège-Bierset airport in Belgium.  
Guinea. ADPM signed a technical assistance contract with SOGEAC 
(Société de Gestion et d’Exploitation de l’Aéroport de Conakry), which 
operates the international airport at Conakry - Gbessia. ADPM has owned a 
29% stake in SOGEAC since 1994.  
Japan. In February 2006, ADPM, alongside Mitsui and ADP Ingénierie 
(“ADPi”) formed a consortium to bid for the concession to manage the new 
international terminal at Tokyo Haneda airport in Japan. 
Inside France, AdP manages the following airports : Paris-Charles de 
Gaulle, Paris-Orly, Paris - Le Bourget, Marsa Alam International and Queen 
Alia International Airport (Amman) 
AdP has recently won the bid to build and lease for 30 years a new terminal 
building at Zagreb – Croatia. 
  
There are notable cases of 100% public management groups that 
own/manage their country’s airports as public infrastructures but, at the 
same time, are involved in the management of foreign countries airports 
with a commercial outlook: after AENA, AdP and Fraport in Europe, 
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Vancouver Airport Authority is worth to be mentioned: it owns/operates     
Cranbrook, Fort st John, Hamilton, Kamloops Moncton in Canada, Sangster 
airport in Jamaica, Lynedn Pindling airport at Nassau-Bahamas, Arturo 
Merino Benitez Airport in Santiago (Chile), Larnaka and Paphos in Cyprus 
and has 65% of the shares at both Liverpool and Sheffield Airport in the UK 
 
Italian management groups have no shares in foreign management group 
and this is in our opinion a strong drawback also for foreign investments at 
Italian airports. The only notable cases of a single management entity that 
owns the concession to operate more than one airports are AdR (Rome 
Fiumicino and Ciampino), SEA (Milan Linate and Malpensa), SAVE 
(Venice Tessera, Venice Lido plus majority shareholding at secondary 
regional airports of Padova and Treviso), Aeroporti del Garda Spa (which 
manages Verona and Brescia airports, but the two airports are too close and 
therefore Brescia is actually un-used) and Aeroporti di Puglia (Bari, 
Brindisi, Taranto and Foggia). 
 
Amsterdam Schiphol Group is the owner and operator of Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport and the airports at Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven and 
Lelystad. The group also has airport interests in the United States, Australia, 
Italy, Indonesia, Aruba and Sweden as well as an 8% stake in Aéroports de 
Paris. Passenger numbers at Amsterdam Schiphol grew by 3,8%. Results 
published for 2010 show: net revenue +2,3% and operating profit +58,6%  
 
Københavns Lufthavne owns Copenhagen Kastrup Airport and Roskilde 
Airport in Denmark. In addition the group has a 49% stake in Newcastle 
Airport (UK) and 10% of Aeropuertos del Sureste, a group of nine airports 
in Mexico. Total revenues +11% on 2009 and net profit +48%. 
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The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey is responsible for all airports 
and seaports and link tunnels in the New York City area including the five 
airports of John F Kennedy, Newark Liberty, La Guardia, Newburgh 
Stewart and Teterboro. Gross operating revenues +2,3% on 2009 and 
incomes -57,9% on 2009. 
 
The Airports of Thailand group comprises the major airports in Thailand 
including Bangkok Suvarnabhumi, Bangkok Don Muang, Chiang Mai, 
Phuket, Hat Yai and Chiang Rai. Revenue +12%, full year profits +97% on 
2009 
 
The MAp Airports Group owns 74% of Sydney Airport, 39% of Brussels 
Airport, 30,8% of Copenhagen Airport and 1% of Bristol Airport. Full year 
financial results for 2010 show +6,3% in total revenue. 
 
GMR is a major infrastructure group that manages and operates New Delhi 
International Airport and Sabiha Gökçen Airport in Istanbul. The group also 
has a significant interest in the expansion work at Malé Airport in the 
Maldives.  
 
TAV Airports Holding has significant airport interests in Turkey and 
surrounding countries, including the operation of Istanbul Atatürk, Ankara 
Esenboga, Monastir, Enfidha and both Skopje and Ohrid Airports in 
Macedonia. 
 
Both Hochtief and TAV appear to be looking for some other shareholders to 
inject private capital due to the financial crisis that hit Europe during last 
years. However, no investors showed.  
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In the context of serving passengers and cargo, a multi-airport system is 
successful to the extent that airlines and passengers use all the airports to a 
significant degree. Successful multi-airport systems must be more likely to 
exist in metropolitan areas with a high level of airline and passenger traffic 
because the greater the traffic, the more likely the multi-airport system is 
viable. A second airport has to be attractive: passengers and airlines will not 
use a second airport when they can get better service elsewhere. Originating 
passengers consider the time it takes both to get to the airport and to wait for 
a flight so airports with minimal air services are unattractive, while airlines 
try to optimize the use of their assets. The airlines allocate flights to routes 
by means of large-scale optimization programs which are able to account 
not only for the value of individual flights but for the multiplier effect of 
concentrating flights in a market. Airlines thus try to concentrate their 
flights to dominate markets, or at least prevent competitive airlines from 
doing so. An additional flight in a major market reinforces the value of the 
other flights in that market. When airlines consider the possibility of 
allocating flights to secondary airports, they thus have to consider not only 
whether they can achieve competitive load factors in the secondary market, 
but whether there is sufficient additional traffic that will compensate for the 
loss in the airline’s market share in the major market. This is a stable result 
of the competitive game between airlines.  
The second busiest airport in a multi-airport system now typically has far 
less of the traffic than the busiest airport. If the difference is not significant, 
it means that there are political or technical constraints that hinder the 
maximum exploitation of the first airport or that the traffic is so large that it 
saturates several major airports.  
An issue to be aware of at secondary airports is the market volatility, that is 
the airline possibility to go operate elsewhere. The natural uncertainties in 
traffic are amplified at secondary airports, because the traffic is small. The 
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volatility of traffic at secondary airports is further increased because these 
are often dominated by a single or two carriers.  
It is then requested that a strategic vision is implemented by airport 
management: to secure a site and to provide it with an access path for a 
second airport insures that future developments will be possible. Then 
building facilities incrementally, according to demonstrated need. The con is 
the loss of economies of scale and the resulting higher costs per unit of 
capacity, while the pro is the potential savings that result from not having to 
pay for capacity that turns out to be un-necessary. 
Finally, because the type of traffic is variable at second airports, the 
configuration and the nature of the facilities ought also to be flexible. These 
criteria were presented by R. de Neufville in 1995 but in our opinion they 
are still actual nowadays since a lot of reports and studies analyzed to draw 
useful information for the next chapter often comply and regret about the 
economic and transport-related un-necessity of some airport infrastructures 
in several countries taken into consideration.   
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This last chapter is based on the assessment of airports performances. The 
existing indexes and indicators will be presented from the point of view of 
both airlines and airport management entities. Then a quick review of the 
theoretical basis needed to define the indicators taken into consideration for 
assessing the competition scenario will be given. As anticipated in chapter 
two, three main methods will be used: Gini index, Normalized Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and games theory. 
The indicators derived are the passengers’ concentration in the vicinity of 
each country’s main airport, the Hub capability at European airport or 
airport system and the Dominance index. 
 
1. Means of measuring performance and productivity 
Performance and productivity measures are important financial management tools 
for airport managers, regulators and users. Airports typically use considerable 
resources in daily operations. Performance shortfalls can result in significant 
additional costs to users and society as a whole. The objective of measuring 
performance and productivity is therefore to improve efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. 
Performance measures can be applied to all aspects of an airport, not only it its 
operations but also to safety, security and commercial practices. Performance 
measures are helpful in establishing organizational goals, identifying areas needing 
attention, preparing operational and financial plans and improving accountability. 
The primary purpose obviously is the assessment and improvement of performance 
over time within an airport organization. 
Airports should choose areas of measurement that focus on improving what is 
important: for example, increasing aircraft movements, reducing congestion and 
delay.  
To analyze the data collected in a proper ways, there are two viable methods: if the 
period of time taken into consideration is too short to establish a time-series 
analysis, the comparison with other airports’ data could be useful; otherwise, time-
series analysis are a suitable method to assess the evolution of the performance of 
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the targeted item during time. Comparison of performance between airports is a 
difficult and likely misleading field: indeed, data might be not comparable as 
definition criteria, method of collection, size of the sample and accounting 
practices may differ. The most important requirements needed should be: 
uniqueness (of the analyst in order to use the same methodology) and a thoroughly 
deep knowledge of the industry in order to make the analysis consistent with the 
airports’ peculiarities (operational, structural and organizational structures). This 
way, comparison might reveal performance drivers and core indicators suitable to 
describe the system in a complete and realistic way.  It is useful to carefully 
establish a level field of comparison by means of performance indicators and to 
compare the single units rather than the airports as a whole. 
The first step would be the definition of measurable goals to rely on during the 
analysis and the assessment of what is to be considered as a success and what a 
failure. Then outcome objectives and the results to obtain in order to achieve the 
goal are to be decided. The measure method should permit the analysts to easily 
collect data at a reasonable cost. Data should be general and easy to be processed in 
order to enable analysis over periods of time. On the basis of benchmarks, 
expectations and trade-off a baseline for the individuation of the current level of 
performance has to be established; then, to achieve the goal, initiatives, efforts and 
resources are needed. To trade-off among goals and resource allocation in case of 
incompatibilities between goals is necessary in order not to waste pointlessly 
resources (staff, money and infrastructure). Finally if the result had been positive, 
the method should be analyzed in order to define its strength points and to assess 
its suitability in other areas. Failures as well have to be carefully analyzed in order 
to determine which the causes were and what to do to improve. 
 
A list of quantitative measures has been established to assess qualitative indicators 
of performance. These measures rely on the resources present at an airport 
(employee, runways, terminal, bridges…) and on the airport output (passengers, 
movements, revenues…). This way, indicators like pax/aircraft movements, 
pax/employees, aircraft movements/runway, pax/bridges and pax/terminal area are 
used to determine whether the airport operates at its full capacity. Moreover, from 
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the economic point of view, indicators like labor cost/operating cost, labor 
cost/pax, operating cost/pax or operating cost/aircraft movement, total revenue/pax, 
aeronautical revenues/aircraft movement and aeronautical revenue/total revenue 
might be derived. More and more Departments of Transport are requesting their 
airport or their airport operators as well as airlines to disclose financial data to 
foster transparency and efficiency.  
While the number of passengers handled, aircraft movements and tonnage of cargo 
handled are the principal quantitative measures of output, users and the airport 
managers are also concerned about other outcomes that reflect the quality and 
efficiency of services provided: 
Safety  runways accidents are a primary safety concern for airports. They are 
rare, therefore is usually provided a risk assessment for example runway incursions 
creating a collision or a hazard between a vehicle/person/object and a 
landing/taking off aircraft. Typical indicators are total number of incursion/period 
and rate of incursion/operation  
Delay all partners at an airport are interested in reducing delays. In order to do 
this, measures that identify the main causes are necessary; weather delays are 
beyond airport operator’s control therefore the analysis is focused on the activities 
within the competencies of the airport operator: taxi times, absolute number of 
delay, total delay/day, number delays/hour, length of delay/operation 
Productivity and cost efficiency  number of pax/employee, aircraft 
movements/employee, tons of cargo/employee. Cost efficiency measures are 
similar but indicate the amount of money necessary to obtain a target output 
(cost/pax, cost/aircraft movements, Cost/tons of cargo handled). They are 
calculated on the basis of informations on the total amount of pax and cargo 
handled and may be prepared in total or for its individual facilities. Comparing 
ratios between facilities may help identify best practises, while comparing results 
over time indicates whether performance is improving or deteriorating. 
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2. Airport - airline agreements 
As it has been previously analyzed, the agreement between airport and 
airline is seen by the airlines as an alternative to formal economic 
regulation.  
The basic form of an airport-airline agreement is the “Airport conditions of 
use”, which is a compulsory document that airport must provide the airlines 
and passengers which describes the services provided at the airport. 
Obviously, the services provided are the same which are going to be 
charged to users under the provision of aeronautical fees. Nevertheless this 
document is not sufficient as it does not identify the rights and obligations 
of both parties, contains no indications on level of service and no 
information regarding a process to follow in case of disputes between the 
user and the airports. The only major country which has the rights and 
obligations clearly defined and incorporated into a legally binding contract 
is the United States. These use and lease agreements concentrate on the fees 
and rentals to be paid, the method by which these are calculated and the 
conditions of use of these facilities. Service standards are not usually 
incorporated into these agreements.  
However, there have been some cases of a more formalized airline – airport 
relationship emerging. For example, the low cost airlines, such as Ryanair 
and EasyJet, have sought more long-term deals at airports which they have 
chosen as operative bases; in this documents both fees and service levels are 
considered (for example the airport or the ground handling provider 
commits itself to guarantee the airline a short turn-around time or the usage 
7/24 of a certain facility, for example dedicated common check-in desks). 
Elsewhere some airports have voluntarily agreed charge levels directly with 
their airline customers rather than asking for the intervention of a regulator.  
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For example at Copenhagen, the airport operator established a 3-year 
agreement with Danish airlines and IATA (which stood for foreign airlines) 
concerning airport charges. The document established that between 2003 
and 2005, an increase of 2,75% on charges would have been applied on an 
annual basis. The agreement was a success and was than renewed for 2006-
2008 but this time the annual surcharge was modulated: +3% in 2006 and 
+1% in both 2007 and 2008. On the other hand, airlines were granted 
incentives for passenger growth, for the use of large aircraft and a reduction 
of the security charge (Copenhagen Airport, 2005). It was finally 
established that government intervention (on the basis of a dual till price cap 
regulation) would have been deemed necessary in case the airport and 
airlines were not able to reach an agreement.  
 
Likewise in Australia, the switch from price regulation to price monitoring, 
has encouraged both airports and airlines to reach 5 year agreements to 
regulate charges and services. Even in the United Kingdom, where a more 
heavy-handed price cap regulation exists, during the price cap’s review 
period for years 2008–2013, airports and airlines were encouraged for the 
first time to enter into a much more direct dialogue (called “constructive 
agreement”) aiming at reaching an agreement on investment levels, service 
quality and data disclosure. 
 
The airport–airline agreement at Frankfurt airport in 2002 went further than 
all these others. It was a 5-year agreement with Lufthansa, the German 
Airline Association and BARIG (the board of airline representatives in 
Germany standing for airlines flying to Germany). It was a risk-sharing 
model which linked airport charges to traffic growth. As a reference, the 
2001 ratio of airports charges to the number of departing passengers was 
used as a reference. If the passenger forecast figures were reached, the 
reference ratio would be increased by about 2% annually. If the passenger 
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traffic grew faster than expected, then the airlines would receive 33% of the 
additional revenue while Fraport would get 66% as a compensation for extra 
congestion. Conversely, the airlines would bear 33% of the risk associated if 
the traffic fell below the levels.  
In case of disagreement, public law foresaw that the State of Hesse would 
have imposed a dual till ROR regulation.  
A Special Review Board with representatives from the airlines, Fraport and 
local government was established to have four meetings/year during which 
discussions on issues and swap information would take place.  
The deal also secured the financing of a 76 million € for noise protection 
program. Under the agreement, the airlines renounced to take legal action 
against the level of charges whilst Fraport made commitments not to cut 
costs by reducing service standards and to undertake investment projects 
which were planned (Fraport, 2002; Klenk, 2004). We can call this kind of 
agreement as a Revenue sharing agreement.  
 
There were finally several cases in which the request to the airport was 
made by LCCs: in order to face growing demand, LCCs asked to be 
provided with dedicated facilities as purpose built terminals (also known as 
Low-cost Terminal) or converted infrastructures (as it happened for 
Marseille and Budapest to address their LCCs requests). These terminals 
would be simple and functional, being designed for point-to-point rather 
than transfer passengers, with no frills such as airline lounges, air bridges in 
order to realize the lowest possible construction and operating costs. 
Commercial facilities would be provided but not in such an extensive way 
than in legacy carriers’ terminals as LCCs passengers’ only need would be 
food and beverages. (Graham, 2009) 
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3. Theoretical aspects of concentration indexes 
To derive a measure of concentration the two major indexes are the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Gini index. The former resents of 
variations at the sample extremities, while the latter is more sensitive to 
variations in the whole sample, with special reference to the 
intermediate values. Gini index is used to establish comparison between 
samples with a different number of elements.  
Given the variable X whose elements are ranked in a crescent order: 
 
nχχχ ≤≤≤ ...21         (2) 
 
or in mathematical form:  
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The Gini coefficient is derived as:
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Being Pi the measure on the X-axis and Qi the measure on the Y-axis:  
 
ni
n
iPi ,...,1=∀=
      
(7) 
ni
C
CQ
n
i
i ,...,1=∀=       (8) 
 
G values vary in [0;1] and the higher is G, the higher is the market 
concentration. If there is no concentration, then the numerator N = 0 and 
therefore G = 0; if there is maximum concentration, then Qi = 0 for each 
i  and then G = 1.  
A graphic explanation of the Gini coefficient might be given taking into 
consideration a right and isosceles triangle with both catheti measuring 
1 unit. Namely the Gini coefficient measures the distance between the 
Lorentz curve and the triangle’s hypotenuse, which represents the case 
of market equity: each item n has a market share equal to N/n. The 
Lorenz curve’s extremes are always (0;0) and (1;1). The Lorenz curve is 
a convex curve and lies always under the equity curve, as 
nipq ii ,...1=∀≤ .  
Given that: 
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It follows that: 
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That is the formulation of the Gini Index as it express the ratio between the 
area between the equity curve and the Lorenz curve and the triangle’s area 
and. If we have two Lorenz curves A,B and the Lorenz curve A is entirely 
comprised between the equity curve and Lorenz curve B then Concentration 
A < Concentration B. If the Lorenz curve at its beginning is very close to X-
axis it means that there are a lot of operators that share a little quota of the 
market and few operators that share the remaining relevant quota of the 
market; on the other hand if the Lorenz curve is very close to Y-axis it 
means that there are a lot of operators that share a relevant quota of the 
market and few operators that share the remaining quota.       
 
The Herfindahl index (also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, or HHI) 
is a measure of the size of firms in relation to the industry and an indicator 
of the amount of competition among them. It is defined as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of the 50 largest firms (or summed over all the 
firms if there are fewer than 50) within the industry, where the market 
shares are expressed as fractions. The result is proportional to the average 
market share, weighted by market share. As such, it can range from 0 to 1, 
moving from a huge number of very small firms to a single monopolistic 
producer. Increases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a decrease in 
competition and an increase of market power, whereas decreases indicate 
the opposite. The major benefit of the Herfindahl index in relationship to 
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such measures as the concentration ratio is that it gives more weight to 
larger firms. 
To make an example, we take into consideration two cases in which the six 
largest firms produce 90% of the goods in a market; in Case 1, all six firms 
produce 15% each, while in Case 2 there is one firm that produces 80% 
while the five others produce 2% each. We assume that the remaining 10% 
of output is divided among 10 equally sized producers. As HHI gives 
information about the market concentration, the result is expected to be 
different even if in both Case 1 and 2 the total production of the six firm 
considered is the same (90%). Indeed, in the first case there is open 
competition, while in the second case there is a substantial monopoly. Given 
the mathematic formulation of HHI, which squares each contribution before 
the sum, an additional weight is given to firm with larger market share. 
 = 	∑ 

         (11) 
 
where N is the number of the firms involved in the market  
 

	1:  = 6 × 0,15 + 10 × 0,01 = 0,136 = 13,6%  (12) 

	2:  = 0,80 + 5 × 0,02 + 10 × 0,01 = 0,643 = 64,3%  
         (13) 
 
Economists consider that a market has a high concentration if the HHI is 
above a target threshold. USA’s economists make use of a threshold of 
25%, while European economists are used to relying more on HHI variation 
with the entry/exit of a competitor in/from the market (for instance, concern 
is raised if there is a 2,5% change when the index already shows a 
concentration of 10%. Back to the Case 1 of the example, if a firm which 
already owns 15% market share buys a competitor firm whose share was 
15%, HHI goes up from 0,136 to 0,181) 
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	1':  = 0,3 + 4 × 0,15 + 10 × 0,01 = 0,181 = 18,1%   
         (14) 
 
This new scenario would be relevant for merger law in both the US (being 
HHI over 0,18) and in the EU (because there has been a change of 0,045, 
which is bigger than 0,025). HHI ranges from 1/N to 1, where N is the 
number of firms in the market. Equivalently, if % are used as whole 
numbers (15% counts as 15 and not as 0,15) the index can range up to 
1002=10000 
According to the DOJ-FTC 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the 
agencies will regard a market in which the post-merger HHI is below 1500 
(15%) as "un-concentrated," between 1500 and 2500 (15% - 25%) as 
"moderately concentrated," and above 2500 (25%) as "highly 
concentrated."  A merger potentially raises "significant competitive 
concerns" if it produces an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points 
(1%) in a moderately concentrated market or between 100 and 200 points 
(1% - 2%) in a highly concentrated market. A merger is presumed "likely to 
enhance market power" if it produces an increase in the HHI of more than 
200 points (2%) in a highly concentrated market. Therefore, a small index 
indicates a competitive industry with no dominant players. If all firms have 
an equal share the reciprocal of the index shows the number of firms in the 
industry. When firms have unequal shares, the reciprocal of the index 
indicates the "equivalent" number of firms in the industry. There is also a 
normalized Herfindahl index. Whereas the Herfindahl index ranges from 
1/N to 1, the normalized Herfindahl index ranges from 0 to 1. It is computed 
as: 
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where again, N is the number of firms in the market, and H is the usual 
Herfindahl Index, as above. 
In our case, the Normalized Herfindahl index H*will be used to describe the 
market and there will be no problems of market identification as HHI’s 
detractors usually claim: in fact, the market chosen will be an airport and the 
firms involved will be the airlines which operate to/from the target airport. 
 
4. Theoretical aspects of the Games Theory 
The Games Theory is a branch of math sciences applied to decision 
processes in case of competition. The aim is the finding of a 
competitive/cooperative solution. The outcome is dependent on the players’ 
choices. The competitors are supposed to be capable of a logical reasoning, 
to be rational and oriented to the maximization of their utility. A typical 
problem of games theory is called game. Each game is played by at least 2 
competitors or players. Each player has a strategy, that is to say an action 
plan with the moves for each possible evolution of the game. The outcome 
of the game depends on the players’ strategy and it is not sole.  
It is possible to distinguish between cooperative games (Von Neumann’s 
game) if players are allowed to come to an understanding which is 
profitable for both and competitive games (Nash) when the strategy and the 
game rely only on each player’s decision without consultation with the 
competitor. Players may have a complete knowledge of the rules and of 
each competitor's utility or not. A player’s knowledge might also be perfect 
or not, whether the target player knows the foregoing series of moves. 
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Finally, games are simultaneous if the players make their decisions 
simultaneously or consecutive (as it happens in the game of chess). 
The prisoner's dilemma is a canonical example of a game analyzed in game 
theory that shows why two individuals might not cooperate, even if it 
appears that it is in their best interest to do so. A classic example of the 
prisoner's dilemma (PD) is presented as follows: “Two men are arrested, but 
the police do not possess enough information for a conviction. Following 
the separation of the two men, the police offer both a similar deal: if one 
testifies against his partner (defects/betrays), and the other remains silent 
(cooperates/assists), the betrayer goes free and the cooperator receives the 
full ten-year sentence. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to 1 year in 
jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a 5 years 
sentence. Each prisoner must choose either to betray or remain silent; the 
decision of each is kept quiet. What should they do?” 
If each player is only interested in lessening his time in jail, the game 
becomes a non-zero sum game where the two players may either assist or 
betray the other. The logical decision leads each player to betray the other, 
even though their individual reward would be greater if they cooperated. In 
the regular version of this game, collaboration is dominated by betrayal, and 
as a result, the only possible outcome of the game is for both prisoners to 
betray the other. Regardless of what the other prisoner chooses, A will 
always gain a greater payoff by betraying B. In the extended form game, the 
game is played over and over, and consequently, both prisoners 
continuously have an opportunity to penalize the other for the previous 
decision. If the number of times the game will be played is known, the finite 
aspect of the game means that by backward induction, the two prisoners will 
betray each other repeatedly. 
The label "prisoner's dilemma" may be applied to situations not strictly 
matching the formal criteria of the classic game; for instance, a situation in 
which two entities could gain important benefits from cooperating or suffer 
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from the failure but find it difficult or expensive (not necessarily 
impossible) to coordinate their activities in order to achieve cooperation 
might well be represented with a Prisoner’s dilemma - like game 
The normal game is shown below: 
\ )	* )	'*+
,	* 1,1 10,0
,	'*+ 0,10 5,5
    (16) 
 
As it is possible to see from the matrix, both A and B, unaware of the mate’s 
decision, will get a higher pay-off by betraying the other. For example, 
Prisoner A will be freed if he betrays the mate and will stay 1 year in prison 
if he cooperates with the mate (that is to say, keeps silent) provided that B 
cooperates, while he will stay 10 years in prison if B betrays him or share 
with B a 5 years sentence. Therefore, given that A’s utility is to shorten his 
staying in prison, A will choose to betray B. Since the game is symmetric, B 
has the same pay-offs than A, therefore B will betray as well.  Since both A 
and B rationally decide to betray (to confess the crime), each receives a 
lower reward than if both were to stay quiet. This is an output that leads 
players to a worse result than that achievable with cooperation (indeed, the 
strategy is “A wants to stay in prison as less as possible” not “A wants B 
and him to stay in prison as less as possible”). 
If we generalize the (16), we obtain (17): 
 
\ )	* )	'*+
,	* ,  , '
,	'*+ ',  -, -
    (17) 
The game is a prisoner's dilemma if – in utility terms (that is to say, years of 
prison) - it is true that: 
 
' >  > - >         (18) 
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That is to say, for both A and B: 
 
0 > 1 > 5 > 10       (19) 
 
a>d implies that the "Cooperation” is socially preferred to the "Betrayal" 
outcome (as, in utility terms, 1+1>5+5), while b>a and d>c imply that the 
"Betrayal" outcome is the one which will actually result. It is not necessary 
for a Prisoner's Dilemma to be strictly symmetric, it is sufficient that the 
choices which are individually optimal (and strongly dominant) result in an 
equilibrium which is socially inferior. 
If two players play prisoners' dilemma more than once in succession and 
they remember previous actions of their opponent and change their strategy 
accordingly, the game is called “Iterated Prisoners' dilemma”. In addition to 
the general form above, the iterative version also requires that 2a > b+c, to 
prevent alternating cooperation and defection giving a greater reward than 
mutual cooperation. The iterated prisoners' dilemma game is fundamental to 
certain theories of human cooperation and trust. On the assumption that the 
game can model transactions between two people requiring trust, 
cooperative behavior in populations may be modeled by a multi-player, 
iterated, version of the game. It has, consequently, fascinated many 
researchers over the years. If the game is played exactly N times and both 
players know this, then the only possible Nash equilibrium is to always 
defect because if player A betrays on the last turn, player B will not have a 
chance to punish the player A on the next turn. Therefore, both A and B will 
defect on the last turn. Thus, the player might as well defect on the second-
to-last turn, since the opponent will defect on the last no matter what is 
done, and so on. The same applies if the game length is unknown but has a 
known upper limit. 
Unlike the standard prisoners' dilemma, in the iterated prisoners' dilemma 
the defection strategy is counter-intuitive and fails badly to predict the 
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behavior of human players but within standard economic theory it is the 
only correct answer. For cooperation to emerge between game theoretic 
rational players, the total number of rounds N must be random or at least 
unknown to the players. In this case “always betray” may no longer be a 
strictly dominant strategy. 
Interest in the iterated prisoners' dilemma (IPD) was kindled by Robert 
Axelrod in his book The Evolution of Cooperation (1984). In it he reports 
on a tournament he organized of the N step prisoners' dilemma (with N 
fixed) in which participants have to choose their mutual strategy again and 
again, and have memory of their previous encounters. Axelrod discovered 
that when these encounters were repeated over a long period of time with 
many players, each with different strategies, greedy strategies tended to do 
very poorly in the long run while more altruistic strategies did better, as 
judged purely by self-interest. He used this to show a possible mechanism 
for the evolution of altruistic behavior from mechanisms that are initially 
purely selfish, by natural selection (R. Axelrod, 1984). The best 
deterministic strategy was found to be “Tit for tat” by A. Rapoport. The 
strategy is simply to cooperate on the first iteration then A does what B did 
on the previous move. Depending on the situation, a slightly better strategy 
can be "Tit for tat with forgiveness" that is to say that if B betrays, on the 
next move A might sometimes choose to cooperate anyway. This allowed 
for occasional recovery from getting trapped in a cycle of defections (A. 
Rapoport, A.M. Chammah, 1965). Axelrod then stated several conditions 
necessary for a strategy to be successful: the strategy must be nice that is to 
say that it will not defect before its opponent does (an optimistic behavior) 
but not be a blind optimist; must then be forgiving to stop long runs of 
revenge and counter-revenge and “Non-envious” that is to say that a player 
must not strive for scoring more point than the opponent. The optimal 
(points-maximizing) strategy for the one-time PD game is simply defection. 
However, in the iterated-PD game the optimal strategy depends upon the 
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strategies of likely opponents and how they will react to defection and 
cooperation. If in a population there is only 1 player that applies the “Tit for 
that” strategy, the optimal strategy is to betray every time. If there is a 
certain % of betrayers while the rest apply “Tit for tat” strategy, then the 
optimal strategy for an individual depends on the percentage and on the 
length of the game. The Prisoner's dilemma is therefore of interest to the 
social sciences such as economics, politics and sociology, as well as to the 
biological sciences such as ethology and evolutionary biology. Many natural 
processes have been abstracted into models in which living beings are 
engaged in endless games of prisoner's dilemma. This wide applicability of 
the PD gives the game its substantial importance. 
 
5. Case study 
In this paragraph, country taken into consideration will be analyzed one by 
one on the basis of the theory used to derive concentration index. The 
information extracted from the data collected will be presented and briefly 
commented. Then, 2 applications of games theory and in particular of the 
Prisoner’s dilemma will be presented with reference to competition between 
airports and to possible agreements between airport and airlines. 
5.1 – Concentration Index analysis 
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Table 61: Australian traffic data 
Rank Movements IATA CODE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 Sydney SYD 258.923 264.401 275.226 271.029 278.262 290.501 29%
2 Melbourne MEL 175.435 176.112 186.431 189.011 192.641 206.798 50%
3 Brisbane BNE 141.785 144.359 150.895 157.675 156.928 168.342 67%
4 Perth PER 57.972 61.659 68.985 78.623 81.671 87.863 76%
5 Adelaide ADL 70.829 72.508 74.772 74.654 73.340 76.110 83%
6 Gold Coast OOL 27.471 27.279 31.691 32.083 35.297 37.737 87%
7 Cairns CNS 46.547 44.952 43.488 39.511 38.562 42.611 91%
8 Canberra CBR 38.182 38.257 41.177 45.191 44.201 43.280 96%
9 Hobart HBA 14.335 13.497 14.488 15.027 14.927 16.064 97%
10 Darwin DRW 16.416 17.981 19.270 22.733 25.962 27.238 100%
847.895 861.005 906.423 925.537 941.791 996.544
1.215.212 1.209.914 1.256.952 1.264.112 1.292.885 1.375.232
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank Passengers IATA CODE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 Sydney SYD 28.996.263 31.016.186 32.345.887 32.700.964 34.461.403 35.958.289 30%
2 Melbourne MEL 21.040.864 22.156.871 23.943.342 24.448.325 25.917.992 27.962.834 54%
3 Brisbane BNE 16.015.923 17.379.809 18.297.730 18.720.295 18.896.956 19.974.746 71%
4 Perth PER 7.005.254 7.977.091 8.952.069 9.359.248 9.992.588 10.889.528 80%
5 Adelaide ADL 5.766.504 6.181.390 6.619.267 6.784.166 7.015.509 7.278.766 86%
6 Gold Coast OOL 3.515.021 3.777.856 4.323.355 4.618.200 5.186.147 5.486.072 91%
7 Cairns CNS 3.731.178 3.782.183 3.777.154 3.653.544 3.550.240 3.859.339 94%
8 Canberra CBR 2.550.129 2.687.336 2.853.480 3.061.859 3.258.396 3.240.848 97%
9 Hobart HBA 1.605.978 1.629.417 1.758.241 1.869.262 1.855.871 1.903.165 99%
10 Darwin DRW 1.219.378 1.403.685 1.562.216 1.538.938 1.569.007 1.679.899 100%
91.446.492 97.991.824 104.432.741 106.754.801 111.704.109 118.233.486
103.997.499 103.997.499 120.120.667 122.014.912 127.204.110 135.040.270
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 38: Lorenz curve Australia Passengers 
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Fig. 39: Lorenz curve Australia Movements
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Table 62: Gini Index for Australia – time series  
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 10% on the X-asis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by ten airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while the 
information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On the 
graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of the 
time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately in 
the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,016 0,016 0,016 0,016 0,016 0,017 0,100 10%
0,043 0,043 0,041 0,037 0,037 0,036 0,200 20%
0,081 0,081 0,075 0,072 0,068 0,069 0,300 30%
0,124 0,122 0,118 0,118 0,113 0,114 0,400 40%
0,168 0,169 0,167 0,166 0,165 0,169 0,500 50%
0,244 0,247 0,248 0,242 0,236 0,237 0,600 60%
0,332 0,333 0,333 0,324 0,321 0,321 0,700 70%
0,501 0,500 0,503 0,491 0,488 0,488 0,800 80%
0,708 0,705 0,707 0,696 0,693 0,695 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,456 0,457 0,458 0,468 0,473 0,471 -3,14% GINI
equality
M
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
S
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,014 0,014 0,014 0,015 0,014 0,013 0,100 10%
0,030 0,031 0,032 0,032 0,031 0,031 0,200 20%
0,058 0,060 0,061 0,059 0,058 0,059 0,300 30%
0,090 0,092 0,095 0,095 0,097 0,097 0,400 40%
0,137 0,138 0,138 0,137 0,136 0,138 0,500 50%
0,198 0,201 0,202 0,200 0,199 0,201 0,600 60%
0,290 0,290 0,289 0,286 0,280 0,278 0,700 70%
0,459 0,459 0,465 0,461 0,457 0,453 0,800 80%
0,696 0,691 0,694 0,690 0,683 0,683 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,505 0,505 0,502 0,505 0,509 0,509 -0,81% GINI
equality
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 62 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2005. 
From Table 61, fig. 38 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 39 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Sydney 
airport accounts in both cases for approximately 30% of the total traffic 
taken into consideration by the sample. It is necessary to bear in mind that 
the sample takes into consideration approximately 87% of the Australian 
airports traffic output and 70% of the traffic movements. In terms of 
movements, the 50% of the sample is handled by Sydney and Melbourne 
and the same figure holds true also with reference to passengers output 
(54% handled by Sydney + Melbourne). In terms of movements, airports 
from Sydney to Cairns (rank 1 to 7) account for 90%; in term of passengers 
the same output is handled from airports ranked from1 to 6. That is to say 
that passengers are more concentrated than movements at major airports. 
The Gini index in terms of passengers is almost stable (0,509 in 2005 and 
0,505 in 2010), that is to say that the traffic repartition between airports has 
not changed; this is explicable with the high distances between airports and 
the scarce road connections typical of Australia. In terms of movements, the 
Gini index shows a variation of -3,14% of 2010 on 2005 that is to say that 
the smaller airports of the sample gained traffic shares from 2005 to 2010, 
thus diminishing the concentration. In fact from fig. 39, the blue line for 
2010 is clearly over the red and the green one for X-axis values between 0,2 
and 0,4. Geographically speaking, almost the 70% of the nation passengers’ 
traffic is concentrated in an area centered in Sydney with a mean radius of 
approximately 700 km (airports of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Gold 
coast and Canberra). Top five airports don’t show phenomena of airline 
concentration as there is a significant number of airlines and no one has a 
dominant market share (in the majority of the cases there are at least 2 
competing airlines with market share over 20%). Where there are few 
competitors, the HHI index grows highlighting substantial concentration 
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(Gold Coast, Canberra, and Hobarth): in these cases, the dominant airline 
detains more than 40% of the daily movements (at Gold Coast, the dominant 
airline detains 53,7% of the movements) and the top 5 airlines control more 
than 95% of the traffic.  
In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, Low Cost carriers Jetstar and 
Pacific Blue contribute to reach the 80% of the daily movements in 9 out of 
10 airports while legacy carrier Qantas in 8 out of 10 airports (Table 64). 
Moreover, taking into consideration the top 5 carriers of each airport, the 
same three carriers are present in 9 cases out of 10, together with the freight 
carrier Australian Air Express (Table 65). As the Dominance Index is given 
by: 
 
/ =
01023	41506	×789:;95<=
5°	17	2841806	5	0?9	62@439
     (20) 
 
the carriers which have a significant number of movements at the majority 
of airports take the highest score. That is the reason why legacy carrier 
Qantas, thanks to its feeder flights plus hub traffic gets the top DI, followed 
by point to point low cost carriers Pacific Blue (which detains a higher share 
of domestic low cost Australian market) and Jetstar. Given the importance 
of freight traffic in Australia, it is no surprise that also a freight carrier gets a 
high DI. Other relevant carriers are in the majority of the cases Regional 
carrier with a lower frequency service, therefore they have lower DI. 
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Table 63: Airlines’ concentration at Australian major airports 
 
un-concentrated moderate high concentrated
HHI norm 0,152 HHI norm 0,169 HHI norm 0,132 HHI norm 0,107 HHI norm 0,128
N° carriers 41 N° carriers 28 N° carriers 27 N° carriers 21 N° carriers 11
1/N 0,024 1/N 0,036 1/N 0,037 1/N 0,048 1/N 0,091
HHI 0,172 HHI 0,199 HHI 0,164 HHI 0,150 HHI 0,207
1st carrier 31,45% 1st carrier 29,83% 1st carrier 25,08% 1st carrier 28,38% 1st carrier 33,50%
1st-2nd carrier 51,78% 1st-2nd carrier 57,77% 1st-2nd carrier 45,60% 1st-2nd carrier 44,55% 1st-2nd carrier 56,16%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 63,73% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 72,37% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 63,36% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 59,08% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 72,91%
top5 81,66% top5 85,09% top5 84,85% top5 76,57% top5 88,67%
top10 89,62% top10 92,94% top10 92,67% top10 91,09% top10 99,01%
HHI norm 0,275 HHI norm 0,066 HHI norm 0,134 HHI norm 0,140 HHI norm 0,049
N° carriers 4 N° carriers 11 N° carriers 6 N° carriers 4 N° carriers 9
1/N 0,250 1/N 0,091 1/N 0,167 1/N 0,250 1/N 0,111
HHI 0,456 HHI 0,151 HHI 0,279 HHI 0,355 HHI 0,155
1st carrier 53,70% 1st carrier 24,03% 1st carrier 40,30% 1st carrier 40,91% 1st carrier 21,82%
1st-2nd carrier 94,44% 1st-2nd carrier 42,86% 1st-2nd carrier 64,18% 1st-2nd carrier 81,82% 1st-2nd carrier 40,91%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 98,15% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 56,49% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 86,57% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 95,45% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,27%
top5 100,00% top5 79,87% top5 98,51% top5 100,00% top5 81,82%
top10 100,00% top10 98,70% top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
HHI INDEX
MELBOURNE BRISBANE PERTH ADELAIDE
GOLD COAST CAIRNS CANBERRA HOBARTH DARWIN
SYDNEY
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Table 64: Australian traffic composition
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
PAX GROUP 118.233.486 111.704.109 106.754.801 104.432.741 97.991.824 91.446.492
% ON PAX COUNTRY 87,55% 87,81% 87,49% 86,94% 87,43% 87,93%
% 2010 on 2005 29,29%
PAX < 1000 KM 92.622.789    87.720.894    83.549.643    81.763.794    77.018.058 72.118.200
% ON PAX COUNTRY 68,59% 68,96% 68,47% 68,07% 68,72% 69,35%
% 2010 on 2005 28,43%
pax/kmq GROUP 13                    12                    11                    11                    10                  10                                
pax/kmq < 1000 km 62                    59                    56                    55                    51                  48                                
MEAN RADIUS 1726
MEAN RADIUS < 1000 KM 690
AIRLINE SYD MEL BNE PER ADL OOL CNS CBR HBA DRW N° SERVICE
Airnorth Regional X 1 RC
Australian Air Express X X X X X X X 7 FC
Jetstar Airways X X X X X X X X X 9 LC
Northern Air Cargo X X 2 FC
Pacific Blue Airlines / Virgin Blue X X X X X X X X X 9 LC
Qantas Airways X X X X X X X X 8 NC
Regional Express X X X 3 RC
Skytrans X 1 RC - CH
Skywest Airlines X 1 RC
Sunstate Airlines X X 2 RC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 65: Dominance Index at Australian airports 
 
AIRLINE TOTAL POINTS FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Qantas Airways 72 9 64,80
Pacific Blue Airlines 70 9 63,00
Jetstar Airways 52 9 46,80
Australian Air Express 50 9 45,00
Regional Express 26 6 15,60
Northern Air Cargo 6 2 1,20
Airnorth Regional 8 1 0,80
Tiger Airways Australia 6 1 0,60
Air New Zealand 4 1 0,40
Brindabella Airlines 2 1 0,20
Chapter 4: Methods of assessing airport competition at target countries 
 
 
- 263 - 
 
 
 
Table 66: Brazilian traffic data 
Rank Movements IATA CODE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 São Paulo-Guarulhos International  GRU 154.339 154.948 187.960 194.184 209.636 250.493 17%
2 Congonhas-São Paulo  CGH 228.110 230.995 205.564 186.694 193.308 204.943 31%
3 Brasília International  BSB 130.885 126.427 126.853 141.477 162.349 176.326 43%
4 Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International  GIG 97.332 100.895 119.892 130.597 119.287 122.945 51%
5 Santos Dumont  SDU 66.335 64.603 65.689 71.527 97.075 126.515 60%
6 Deputado Luís Eduardo Magalhães International  SSA 78.271 91.414 90.989 95.804 102.211 114.946 68%
7 Tancredo Neves International  CNF 36.842 45.437 55.491 59.544 70.122 84.851 73%
8 Salgado Filho International  POA 55.767 59.463 68.827 72.445 79.104 90.625 79%
9 Guararapes-Gilberto Freyre International  REC 54.843 57.812 59.871 64.625 66.415 77.322 85%
10 Afonso Pena International  CWB 58.050 56.934 62.563 69.076 80.017 88.217 91%
11 Viracopos International  VCP 25.716 25.107 29.226 32.399 55.261 74.472 96%
12 Pinto Martins International  FOR 42.537 46.567 47.226 47.703 49.962 62.570 100%
1.029.027 1.060.602 1.120.151 1.166.075 1.284.747 1.474.225
1.841.225 1.918.538 2.042.033 2.128.824 2.290.950 2.648.449
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank Passengers IATA CODE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 São Paulo-Guarulhos International  GRU 15.834.797 15.759.181 18.795.596 20.400.304 21.727.649 26.849.185 22%
2 Congonhas-São Paulo  CGH 17.147.628 18.459.191 15.265.433 13.672.301 13.699.657 15.499.462 35%
3 Brasília International  BSB 9.426.569 9.699.911 11.119.872 10.443.393 12.213.825 14.347.061 47%
4 Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International  GIG 8.657.139 8.856.527 10.352.616 10.717.120 11.828.656 12.337.944 57%
5 Santos Dumont  SDU 3.562.297 3.533.177 3.214.415 3.628.766 5.099.643 7.822.848 64%
6 Deputado Luís Eduardo Magalhães International  SSA 4.554.572 5.425.747 5.932.461 6.042.307 7.052.720 7.696.307 70%
7 Tancredo Neves International  CNF 2.893.299 3.727.501 4.340.129 5.189.528 5.617.171 7.261.064 76%
8 Salgado Filho International  POA 3.521.204 3.846.508 4.444.748 4.931.464 5.607.703 6.676.216 82%
9 Guararapes-Gilberto Freyre International  REC 3.604.652 3.953.845 4.188.081 4.679.457 5.250.565 5.958.982 87%
10 Afonso Pena International  CWB 3.393.079 3.532.879 3.907.275 4.281.354 4.853.733 5.774.615 91%
11 Viracopos International  VCP 816.599 826.246 1.006.059 1.083.878 3.364.404 5.430.066 96%
12 Pinto Martins International  FOR 2.774.240 3.282.979 3.614.439 3.465.791 4.211.651 5.072.721 100%
76.186.075 80.903.692 86.181.124 88.535.663 100.527.377 120.726.471
96.078.832 102.185.376 110.569.767 113.263.537 128.135.616 155.363.964
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 40: Lorenz curve Brazil Passengers 
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Fig. 41: Lorenz curve Brazil Movements
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Table 67: Gini Index for Brazil – time series  
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 8,33% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by twelve airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while 
the information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On 
the graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of 
the time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately 
in the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2.010 2.009 2.008 2.007 2.006 2.005
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,042 0,033 0,013 0,012 0,010 0,010 0,083 8%
0,088 0,075 0,052 0,049 0,050 0,047 0,167 17%
0,135 0,124 0,093 0,091 0,095 0,085 0,250 25%
0,184 0,175 0,142 0,136 0,139 0,129 0,333 33%
0,239 0,227 0,194 0,185 0,184 0,176 0,417 42%
0,300 0,283 0,250 0,235 0,232 0,222 0,500 50%
0,364 0,339 0,309 0,286 0,281 0,270 0,583 58%
0,429 0,409 0,377 0,355 0,348 0,330 0,667 67%
0,530 0,526 0,494 0,476 0,458 0,443 0,750 75%
0,649 0,647 0,616 0,605 0,578 0,567 0,833 83%
0,777 0,783 0,770 0,782 0,772 0,775 0,917 92%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,294 0,313 0,365 0,382 0,392 0,408 -27,97% GINI
P
A
S
S
E
N
G
E
R
S
equality
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,042 0,039 0,028 0,026 0,024 0,025 0,083 8%
0,093 0,082 0,069 0,068 0,067 0,061 0,167 17%
0,145 0,134 0,120 0,118 0,110 0,102 0,250 25%
0,203 0,188 0,175 0,171 0,164 0,155 0,333 33%
0,263 0,250 0,234 0,227 0,219 0,210 0,417 42%
0,324 0,312 0,296 0,286 0,275 0,266 0,500 50%
0,402 0,388 0,358 0,347 0,336 0,331 0,583 58%
0,486 0,467 0,440 0,428 0,422 0,407 0,667 67%
0,571 0,560 0,552 0,535 0,517 0,501 0,750 75%
0,691 0,686 0,673 0,649 0,636 0,628 0,833 83%
0,830 0,837 0,833 0,816 0,782 0,778 0,917 92%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,241 0,260 0,287 0,305 0,325 0,339 -28,86% GINI
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 67 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2005. 
From Table 66, fig. 40 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 41 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Sao Paolo 
Guarulhos airport accounts for approximately 17% of the total movements 
and for 22% of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the 
sample. It is necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into 
consideration approximately 78% of the Brazilian airports traffic output and 
55% of the traffic movements. That is to say that in Brazil there are a lot of 
secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million passengers/year) 
that, by the way, handle 45% of the aircraft movements. In terms of 
movements, the 50% of the sample is handled by Sao Paolo, Brasilia and the 
major airport of Rio de Janeiro (both Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro are 
served by two airports) and the same figure holds true also with reference to 
passengers output (57% handled by Sao Paolo + Brasilia + major Rio’s 
airports). In terms of both movements and passengers, airports from Sao 
Paolo to Curitiba - Afonso Pena (rank 1 to 10) account for 90% of the total 
traffic. At top 4 airports passengers are more concentrated than movements, 
while from the 5th to the 10th ranked airport aircraft movements are more 
concentrated than passengers, suggesting a lower load factor or the usage of 
smaller aircrafts by airlines. In this country there is a strong variation of the 
Gini index over time in terms of both passengers and aircraft movements. 
That is to say that the air traffic market in this country is not yet mature; 
moreover, as it is logical, the market is expanding as the Gini index shows a 
reduction of approximately 28% in both passengers and movements time 
series. The only approximately constant data is the number of passengers 
carried at the first airport of the country. Although, this is another Brazilian 
system’s peculiarity: by a government decision (through Infraero), the role 
of principal airport switched from Sao Paolo Congonhas to Sao Paolo 
Guarulhos in 2008 as the former airport had reached its full capacity and it 
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wouldn’t have been able to cope with the crescent demand (the fact that the 
major airport is not the one serving the capital city is another peculiarity that 
Brazil shares with Australia, Canada, Germany, USA and Turkey). The 
strong reduction of the Gini index in both cases shows that the smaller 
airports of the sample gained significant traffic shares, thus diminishing the 
concentration. In fact from fig. 40 and fig. 41, the blue line for 2010 is 
clearly over the others and closer to the equality line. Geographically 
speaking, almost the 52% of the nation passengers traffic is concentrated in 
an area centered in Sao Paolo with a mean radius of approximately 340 km 
(two airports of Sao Paolo, two airports of Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, 
Campinas and Fortaleza airports). Six out of the 12 airports considered 
show phenomena of airline concentration as there are few airlines 
competing for the market or at the airport there are two competing airlines 
that together handle by far the majority of the traffic (at least 70%). The 
airport of Campinas is actually dominated by a single airline which, alone, 
stands for the 84% of the daily movements. In the other 6 airports the level 
of airline concentration is moderate. However, in all airports taken into 
consideration, the top 5 airlines taken together handle more than the 85% of 
the daily traffic in terms of movements; therefore it is possible to guess that 
in Brazil there is scope for airline competition as well. 
In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the two major legacy carriers TAM 
Linhas Aereas and Gol Air Transport contribute to reach the 80% of the 
daily movements in 11 out of 12 airports while low cost carrier Azul 
Brazilian contributes in 8 out of 12 airports (Table 69). Moreover, with 
regard to the top5 airlines of each airports, the same three carriers are 
present in, respectively, 12 11 and 9 cases out of 12, together with the other 
LC carrier Webjet with a frequency of 10  out of 12 (Table 70). As the 
Dominance Index is given by formula (20), the carriers which have a 
significant number of movements at the majority of airports take the highest 
score. That is why legacy carrier TAM Linhas Aereas and Gol Air 
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Transport, thanks to their feeder flights plus hub traffic get the top DI with 
respectively 100 and 93,5 points (on 120 available). The two Low cost 
carriers Webjet and Azul Brazilian are ranked 3rd and 4th with respectively 
36,67 and 36,00 point. Other relevant carriers are Regional carrier with a 
lower frequency service, therefore they have lower DI. 
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Table 68: Airlines’ concentration at Brazilian major airports 
un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,173 HHI norm 0,186 HHI norm 0,253 HHI norm 0,228 HHI norm 0,084
N° carriers 37 N° carriers 3 N° carriers 11 N° carriers 25 N° carriers 7
1/N 0,027 1/N 0,333 1/N 0,091 1/N 0,040 1/N 0,143
HHI 0,195 HHI 0,457 HHI 0,321 HHI 0,259 HHI 0,214
1st carrier 33,22% 1st carrier 48,76% 1st carrier 39,49% 1st carrier 36,06% 1st carrier 32,29%
1st-2nd carrier 60,02% 1st-2nd carrier 95,41% 1st-2nd carrier 78,78% 1st-2nd carrier 70,35% 1st-2nd carrier 59,77%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 66,11% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 100,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 86,44% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 78,10% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 70,25%
top5 77,30% top5 100,00% top5 95,87% top5 86,50% top5 88,95%
top10 87,04% top10 100,00% top10 99,61% top10 91,81% top10 100,00%
HHI norm 0,128 HHI norm 0,119 HHI norm 0,141 HHI norm 0,144 HHI norm 0,129
N° carriers 10 N° carriers 10 N° carriers 11 N° carriers 8 N° carriers 10
1/N 0,100 1/N 0,100 1/N 0,091 1/N 0,125 1/N 0,100
HHI 0,216 HHI 0,207 HHI 0,219 HHI 0,251 HHI 0,217
1st carrier 35,46% 1st carrier 32,60% 1st carrier 33,61% 1st carrier 36,76% 1st carrier 32,28%
1st-2nd carrier 59,22% 1st-2nd carrier 49,59% 1st-2nd carrier 59,24% 1st-2nd carrier 67,03% 1st-2nd carrier 59,06%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 69,50% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 66,58% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 74,79% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 76,76% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 71,65%
top5 87,59% top5 95,07% top5 89,08% top5 90,81% top5 93,31%
top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 99,16% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
HHI norm 0,688 HHI norm 0,238
N° carriers 13 N° carriers 8
1/N 0,077 1/N 0,125
HHI 0,712 HHI 0,333
1st carrier 84,04% 1st carrier 40,13%
1st-2nd carrier 90,66% 1st-2nd carrier 79,62%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 93,07% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 91,72%
top5 96,08% top5 96,82%
top10 99,10% top10 100,00%
CAMPINAS FORTALEZA
HHI INDEX
SALVATOR DE BAHIA BELO HORIZONTE PORTO ALEGRE RECIFE CURITIBA
SAO PAULO GUARULHOS SAO PAULO CONGONHAS BRASILIA R. DE JAN. - GALEAO R. DE JAN. - SANTOS DUMONT
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Table 69: Brazilian traffic composition
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
PAX GROUP 120.726.471 100.527.377 88.535.663 86.181.124 80.903.692 76.186.075
% ON PAX COUNTRY 77,71% 78,45% 78,17% 77,94% 79,17% 79,30%
% 2010 ON 2005 58,46%
PAX < 1000 km 80.975.184 66.190.913 58.973.251 56.881.523 54.694.702 52.304.838
% ON PAX COUNTRY 52,12% 51,66% 52,07% 51,44% 53,52% 54,44%
% 2010 ON 2005 54,81%
pax/kmq GROUP 34 29 25 24 23 22
pax/kmq < 1000 km 221 181 161 156 150 143
MEAN RADIUS 1058
MEAN RADIUS < 1000 km 341
AIRLINE GRU CGH BSB GIG SDU SSA CNF POA REC CWB VCP FOR N° SERVICE
Azul Brazilian X X X X X X X X 8 LC
Gol Air Transport X X X X X X X X X X X 11 NC
OceanAir X X X 3 RC
Passaredo Linhas Aereas X 1 RC
TAM Linhas Aereas X X X X X X X X X X X 11 NC
Trip Linhas Aereas X X X X X 5 RC
WebJet X X X X X X 6 LC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 70: Dominance Index at Brazilian airports 
 
AIRLINE TOTAL POINTS FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
TAM Linhas Aereas 100 12 100,00
Gol Air Transport 102 11 93,50
WebJet 44 10 36,67
Azul Brazilian 48 9 36,00
Trip Linhas Aereas 30 7 17,50
OceanAir 20 5 8,33
PLUNA 4 1 0,33
Aerotransportes Mas de Carga 2 1 0,17
American Airlines 2 1 0,17
Passaredo Linhas Aereas 2 1 0,17
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Table 71: Canadian traffic data 
Rank Movements IATA CODE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 Toronto Pearson International  YYZ 362.750 367.753 376.731 366.999 378.453 29%
2 Vancouver International  YVR 223.481 236.997 246.897 225.480 221.903 46%
3 Calgary International  YYC 150.790 160.720 163.127 162.280 161.833 59%
4 Montréal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International  YUL 158.275 169.138 169.818 167.396 173.552 72%
5 Victoria International  YEG 30.738 31.975 32.853 32.291 31.713 75%
6 Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International  YOW 65.040 72.632 79.227 81.028 86.106 81%
7 Winnipeg James Armstrong Richardson International  YHZ 70.966 72.251 71.200 71.010 71.018 87%
8 Edmonton International  YWG 82.590 91.238 94.615 93.688 91.693 94%
9 Halifax Stanfield International  YYJ 53.027 56.932 57.376 58.640 61.720 98%
10 Kelowna International  YLW 20.296 20.671 20.224 20.285 20.485 100%
1.217.953 1.280.307 1.312.068 1.279.097 1.298.476
2.117.009 2.224.598 2.289.311 2.237.336 2.267.970
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank Passengers IATA CODE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 Toronto Pearson International  YYZ 29.688.029 29.759.849 30.531.483 29.325.663 30.910.795 34%
2 Vancouver International  YVR 1.625.477 17.024.850 17.108.871 15.660.003 16.254.016 51%
3 Calgary International  YYC 11.186.340 11.935.499 12.210.006 11.639.069 11.774.776 64%
4 Montréal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International  YUL 11.476.528 12.320.568 12.163.987 11.874.886 12.700.175 78%
5 Edmonton International  YEG 5.302.239 5.835.075 6.230.818 5.972.018 5.981.206 85%
6 Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International  YOW 3.688.499 3.964.240 4.156.884 4.112.216 4.390.951 89%
7 Halifax Stanfield International  YHZ 3.330.941 3.346.616 3.463.249 3.363.324 3.509.473 93%
8 Winnipeg James Armstrong Richardson International  YWG 3.574.679 3.555.070 3.452.307 3.372.817 3.385.250 97%
9 Victoria International  YYJ 1.343.819 1.438.738 1.501.189 1.490.559 1.464.420 99%
10 Kelowna International  YLW 1.267.518 1.327.258 1.359.619 1.338.946 1.365.113 100%
72.484.069 90.507.763 92.178.413 88.149.501 91.736.175
101.677.328 106.433.442 109.025.968 104.765.822 109.324.591
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 42: Lorenz curve Canada Passengers 
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Fig. 43: Lorenz curve Canada Movements
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Table 72: Gini Index for Canada – time series  
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 10% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by ten airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while the 
information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On the 
graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of the 
time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately in 
the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2.010 2.009 2.008 2.007 2.006
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,100 10%
0,031 0,032 0,031 0,031 0,030 0,200 20%
0,068 0,070 0,068 0,068 0,068 0,300 30%
0,106 0,108 0,106 0,107 0,109 0,400 40%
0,154 0,155 0,151 0,151 0,152 0,500 50%
0,219 0,223 0,219 0,215 0,212 0,600 60%
0,347 0,355 0,351 0,347 0,341 0,700 70%
0,486 0,490 0,483 0,483 0,473 0,800 80%
0,663 0,667 0,669 0,671 0,659 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,482 0,477 0,481 0,483 0,488 -1,23%
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E
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S
equality
GINI
2.010 2.009 2.008 2.007 2.006
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,016 0,016 0,015 0,016 0,017 0,100 10%
0,040 0,041 0,040 0,041 0,042 0,200 20%
0,088 0,087 0,084 0,086 0,085 0,300 30%
0,142 0,142 0,138 0,142 0,139 0,400 40%
0,209 0,206 0,199 0,199 0,197 0,500 50%
0,279 0,279 0,271 0,270 0,265 0,600 60%
0,404 0,406 0,395 0,396 0,389 0,700 70%
0,538 0,537 0,525 0,528 0,519 0,800 80%
0,709 0,713 0,713 0,713 0,702 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,415 0,415 0,424 0,422 0,429 -3,26% GINI
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 72 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2006. 
From Table 71, fig. 42 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 43 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Toronto 
airport accounts for approximately 29% of the total movements and for 34% 
of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the sample. It is 
necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into consideration 
approximately 84% of the Canadian airports traffic output and 57% of the 
traffic movements. That is to say that in Brazil there are a lot of secondary 
airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million passengers/year) that 
handle 43% of the aircraft movements but only 16% of the passengers. In 
terms of movements, the 59% of the sample is handled by Toronto, 
Vancouver and Calgary airports, while Toronto and Vancouver handle 51% 
of the passengers. In terms of movements, airports from Toronto to 
Edmonton (rank 1 to 8) account for 94% of the total traffic, while as for 
passengers airports from Toronto to Halifax (rank 1 to 7) account for 93% 
of the total traffic. At top 6 airports, passengers are by far more concentrated 
than movements suggesting a higher load factor or the usage of bigger 
aircrafts by airlines. In this country there is a significant variation of the 
Gini index over time in terms of movements (-3,26% of 2010 on 2006) 
while the loss in terms of passengers is less relevant (-1,23% of 2010 on 
2006). The variation in terms of passengers took place between 2006 and 
2008 at big-sized airports (see fig. 42 for X-axis value ranging from 0,6 to 
0,9 – that is to say 2nd,3rd and 4th ranked airport - where the red Lorenz curve 
for 2008 is clearly above the green one for 2006, while the 2010 Lorenz 
curve is partially overlapped), while the variation in terms of movements 
took place in particular between 2008 and 2010 at medium to big-sized 
airports (see fig. 43 for X-axis value ranging from 0,4 to 0,9 – that is to say 
airports ranked from 2nd to 6th - where the blue Lorenz curve for 2010 is 
clearly above the red one for 2008). Thus, the market is expanding and the 
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concentration diminishes. The number of passengers carried and the 
movements handled at the first airport of the country is, on the other hand, 
almost steady. The reduction of the Gini index in both cases shows that the 
airports other than the first have been gaining significant traffic shares, thus 
diminishing the concentration. Geographically speaking, almost the 43% of 
the nation passengers’ traffic is concentrated in an area centered in Toronto 
with a mean radius of approximately 480 km (Toronto, Montreal and 
Ottawa airports). Five out of the 10 airports considered don’t show 
phenomena of airline concentration as, among the airlines competing for the 
market, no one has a dominant market share (in the majority of the cases 
there are at least 2 competing airlines with market share over 20%). Where 
the first airline with reference to daily movements gathers approximately 
30% of the traffic, the HHI index grows highlighting moderate airline 
concentration (Toronto, Calgary, Halifax, Victoria). In addition to this, if the 
number of competing airlines is less than ten, then there is high 
concentration of airline: as the only example, at Kelowna airport there are 8 
competing airlines and the dominant airline detains the 40% of the traffic. 
At un-concentrated airport, the top 3 airlines gather less than 60% of the 
movements, at moderately concentrated airports they gather from 60% to 
70% of the traffic and at concentrated airport the traffic share handled is 
higher than 80% (and top5’s share over 90%).  
In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the low cost carrier Westjet and 
Jazz Aviation (which provides regional feeder service to the legacy carrier 
Air Canada) contribute to reach the 80% of the daily movements in 10 out 
of 10 airports while legacy carrier Air Canada contributes in 8 out of 10 
airports (Table 74b). Moreover, with reference to the top 5 carriers of each 
airport, the same three carriers are present in, respectively, 10 10 and 9 
cases out of 10 (Table 75). As the Dominance Index is given by formula 
(20), the carriers which have a significant number of movements at the 
majority of airports take the highest score. That is why regional carrier Jazz 
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Aviation, with its feeder traffic on behalf of legacy carrier Air Canada, gets 
the top DI with 82 point on 100 available. The second highest DI is 
appointed to low cost carrier Westjet with 66 points (the difference lies in 
the fact that a regional feeder service needs an higher frequency to link the 
spokes with the hub and transport passengers at a convenient time) and the 
third to Air Canada with 55,80 points. The rest of notable carriers taken in 
consideration provide a short haul – low frequency service as regional or 
charter carrier and therefore get far lower DI values. 
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Table 73: Airlines’ concentration at Canadian major airports 
 
 
un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,179 HHI norm 0,105 HHI norm 0,139 HHI norm 0,102 HHI norm 0,110
N° carriers 42 N° carriers 39 N° carriers 27 N° carriers 36 N° carriers 24
1/N 0,024 1/N 0,026 1/N 0,037 1/N 0,028 1/N 0,042
HHI 0,199 HHI 0,128 HHI 0,170 HHI 0,127 HHI 0,147
1st carrier 36,56% 1st carrier 22,66% 1st carrier 29,70% 1st carrier 24,87% 1st carrier 25,88%
1st-2nd carrier 56,89% 1st-2nd carrier 42,45% 1st-2nd carrier 52,58% 1st-2nd carrier 46,58% 1st-2nd carrier 47,06%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 70,28% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,70% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 66,61% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 53,59% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 60,00%
top5 77,59% top5 70,09% top5 77,12% top5 64,45% top5 75,88%
top10 87,84% top10 83,69% top10 89,85% top10 78,28% top10 89,71%
HHI norm 0,091 HHI norm 0,111 HHI norm 0,072 HHI norm 0,138 HHI norm 0,163
N° carriers 20 N° carriers 17 N° carriers 20 N° carriers 9 N° carriers 8
1/N 0,050 1/N 0,059 1/N 0,050 1/N 0,111 1/N 0,125
HHI 0,136 HHI 0,163 HHI 0,118 HHI 0,234 HHI 0,268
1st carrier 22,30% 1st carrier 27,43% 1st carrier 22,34% 1st carrier 41,58% 1st carrier 39,39%
1st-2nd carrier 39,37% 1st-2nd carrier 46,86% 1st-2nd carrier 36,63% 1st-2nd carrier 56,44% 1st-2nd carrier 69,70%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 54,36% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 64,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 50,18% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 69,31% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 80,30%
top5 77,70% top5 82,29% top5 68,50% top5 87,13% top5 92,42%
top10 93,73% top10 93,71% top10 92,67% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
HHI INDEX
OTTAWA HALIFAX WINNIPEG VICTORIA KELOWNA
TORONTO VANCOUVER CALGARY MONTREAL EDMONTON
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Table 74a: Canadian traffic composition
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
PAX GROUP 91.736.175 88.149.501 92.178.413 90.507.763 87.112.069
% ON PAX GROUP 83,91% 84,14% 84,55% 85,04% 84,14%
% 2010 on 2005 5,31%
PAX < 1000 km 48.001.091    45.312.765    46.852.354    46.044.657    44.853.056    
% ON PAX GROUP 43,91% 43,25% 42,97% 43,26% 44,11%
% 2010 on 2005 7,02%
pax/kmq GROUP 4,32                 4,15                 4,34                 4,26                 4,10                 
pax/kmq < 1000 km 66,73               63,00               65,14               64,01               62,36               
raggio medio 2600
raggio medio < 1000 479
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Table 74b: Canadian traffic composition
AIRLINE YYZ YVR YYC YUL YEG YOW YHZ YWG YYJ YLW N° SERVICE
Air BC/Air Canada express X X 2 RC
Air Canada X X X X X X X X 8 NC
Air Georgian X 1 RC - CH
American Eagle Airlines X X 2 RC
Bearskin Airlines X X X 3 RC
Calm Air International X 1 RC
Central Mountain Air X X 2 RC
ExpressJet Airlines X X X 3 RC
Harbour Air X 1 RC - CH
Horizon Air/Alaska Airlines Commuter X X X 3 RC
Jazz Aviation X X X X X X X X X X 10 RC
Kelowna Flightcraft Air Charter X 1 CH
Morningstar Air X 1 FC
North Caribou Flying Service Ltd. X X 2 CH
Northwest Airlink/Express Airlines X X 2 RC
Pacific Coastal Airlines X X 2 RC - CH
Perimeter Airlines X 1 RC - CH
Porter Airlines X X X 3 RC
Provincial Airlines X 1 RC
Sky Regional Airlines X 1 RC
Skywest Airlines X 1 RC
Sunwest Home Aviation X X 2 CH
Sunwing Airlines X 1 CH
West Coast Air X 1 RC - CH
Westjet X X X X X X X X X X 10 LC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 75: Dominance Index at Canadian airports 
 
AIRLINE TOTAL POINTS FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Jazz Aviation 82 10 82,00
Westjet 66 10 66,00
Air Canada 62 9 55,80
Porter Airlines 18 3 5,40
North Caribou Flying Service Ltd. 10 3 3,00
Horizon Air 10 2 2,00
Pacific Coastal Airlines 10 2 2,00
Perimeter Airlines 10 1 1,00
Air Georgian 6 1 0,60
Air BC/Air Canada express 4 1 0,40
Bearskin Airlines 4 1 0,40
Calm Air International 4 1 0,40
Sunwest Home Aviation 4 1 0,40
American Eagle Airlines 2 1 0,20
Central Mountain Air 2 1 0,20
Morningstar Air 2 1 0,20
Sky Regional Airlines 2 1 0,20
West Coast Air 2 1 0,20
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Table 76a: Chinese traffic data 
 
Rank Airport COD IATA Passengers % on 2010 Movements % on 2010
1 Beijing Capital International  PEK 73.948.114 13% 517.585         11%
2 Hong Kong 49.774.874 22% 306.534         18%
3 Guangzhou Baiyun International  CAN 40.975.673 29% 329.214         25%
4 Shanghai Pudong International  PVG 40.578.621 37% 332.126         33%
5 Shanghai Hongqiao International  SHA 31.298.812 42% 218.985         37%
6 Shenzhen Bao'an International  SZX 26.713.610 47% 216.897         42%
7 Chengdu Shuangliu International  CTU 25.805.815 51% 205.537         47%
8 Taiwan 25.114.413 56% 156.036         50%
9 Kunming Wujiaba International  KMG 20.192.243 60% 181.466         54%
10 Xi'an Xianyang International  XIY 18.010.405 63% 164.430         58%
11 Hangzhou Xiaoshan International  HGH 17.068.585 66% 146.289         61%
12 Chongqing Jiangbei International  CKG 15.802.334 69% 145.705         64%
13 Xiamen Gaoqi International  XMN 13.206.217 71% 116.659         67%
14 Changsha Huanghua International  CSX 12.621.333 73% 115.635         69%
15 Nanjing Lukou International  NKG 12.530.515 75% 116.087         72%
16 Wuhan Tianhe International  WUH 11.646.789 78% 112.521         74%
17 Qingdao Liuting International  TAO 11.101.176 80% 103.975         77%
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Table 76b: Chinese traffic data 
 
 
 
Rank Airport COD IATA Passengers % on 2010 Movements % on 2010
18 Dalian Zhoushuizi International  DLC 10.703.640 81% 91.628          79%
19 Sanya Phoenix International  SYX 9.293.959 83% 70.575          80%
20 Ürümqi Diwopu International  URC 9.148.329 85% 86.491          82%
21 Haikou Meilan International  HAK 8.773.771 86% 73.824          84%
22 Zhengzhou Xinzheng International  CGO 8.707.873 88% 84.180          86%
23 Shenyang Taoxian International  SHE 8.619.897 89% 70.786          87%
24 Tianjin Binhai International  TSN 7.277.106 91% 85.034          89%
25 Harbin Taiping International  HRB 7.259.498 92% 61.002          90%
26 Jinan Yaoqiang International  TNA 6.898.936 93% 69.145          92%
27 Fuzhou Changle International  FOC 6.476.773 94% 62.108          93%
28 Guiyang Longdongbao International  KWE 6.271.701 95% 61.231          95%
29 Nanning Wuxu International  NNG 5.632.933 96% 52.396          96%
30 Wenzhou Yongqiang International  WNZ 5.326.802 97% 49.854          97%
31 Guilin Liangjiang International  KWL 5.259.260 98% 48.103          98%
32 Taiyuan Wusu International  TYN 5.252.783 99% 57.525          99%
33 Macau international 4.078.836 100% 37.148          100%
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Fig. 44: Lorenz curve China Passengers 
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Fig. 45: Lorenz curve China Movements
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Table 77a: Gini Index for China – time series  
 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,007 0,009 0,008 0,007 0,006 0,030 3%
0,017 0,018 0,017 0,016 0,014 0,061 6%
0,026 0,027 0,027 0,024 0,022 0,091 9%
0,035 0,037 0,037 0,034 0,030 0,121 12%
0,046 0,048 0,047 0,044 0,040 0,152 15%
0,057 0,059 0,058 0,054 0,050 0,182 18%
0,068 0,071 0,069 0,065 0,060 0,212 21%
0,081 0,082 0,080 0,076 0,071 0,242 24%
0,093 0,094 0,091 0,087 0,082 0,273 27%
0,106 0,108 0,103 0,099 0,092 0,303 30%
0,122 0,121 0,117 0,112 0,103 0,333 33%
0,137 0,136 0,131 0,125 0,117 0,364 36%
0,153 0,151 0,145 0,140 0,131 0,394 39%
0,169 0,167 0,160 0,155 0,146 0,424 42%
0,186 0,185 0,180 0,172 0,163 0,455 45%
0,205 0,204 0,199 0,190 0,180 0,485 48%
0,225 0,224 0,218 0,209 0,198 0,515 52%
0,245 0,246 0,238 0,228 0,216 0,545 55%
0,268 0,269 0,258 0,248 0,234 0,576 58%
0,290 0,292 0,280 0,268 0,253 0,606 61%
0,314 0,315 0,301 0,289 0,274 0,636 64%
0,342 0,343 0,327 0,314 0,296 0,667 67%
0,372 0,374 0,355 0,342 0,322 0,697 70%
0,404 0,405 0,385 0,370 0,349 0,727 73%
0,440 0,444 0,422 0,408 0,389 0,758 76%
0,485 0,488 0,462 0,453 0,434 0,788 79%
0,531 0,534 0,512 0,503 0,484 0,818 82%
0,579 0,584 0,563 0,557 0,537 0,848 85%
0,634 0,635 0,616 0,614 0,600 0,879 88%
0,707 0,700 0,682 0,684 0,673 0,909 91%
0,780 0,775 0,760 0,759 0,746 0,939 94%
0,868 0,867 0,870 0,870 0,866 0,970 97%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,425 0,424 0,441 0,454 0,474 -10,41%
equality
GINI
P
A
S
S
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N
G
E
R
S
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Table 77b: Gini Index for China – time series  
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,008 0,010 0,009 0,009 0,008 0,030 3%
0,019 0,020 0,020 0,019 0,018 0,061 6%
0,030 0,031 0,031 0,030 0,028 0,091 9%
0,041 0,043 0,043 0,041 0,039 0,121 12%
0,054 0,056 0,056 0,053 0,050 0,152 15%
0,067 0,068 0,068 0,065 0,062 0,182 18%
0,081 0,082 0,080 0,078 0,075 0,212 21%
0,094 0,096 0,093 0,091 0,088 0,242 24%
0,110 0,110 0,106 0,104 0,101 0,273 27%
0,125 0,125 0,120 0,119 0,115 0,303 30%
0,141 0,141 0,136 0,134 0,130 0,333 33%
0,157 0,157 0,153 0,149 0,145 0,364 36%
0,175 0,174 0,169 0,166 0,161 0,394 39%
0,194 0,192 0,187 0,183 0,178 0,424 42%
0,213 0,210 0,206 0,200 0,195 0,455 45%
0,233 0,230 0,225 0,219 0,214 0,485 48%
0,256 0,254 0,248 0,241 0,234 0,515 52%
0,281 0,279 0,271 0,264 0,255 0,545 55%
0,306 0,305 0,296 0,287 0,276 0,576 58%
0,332 0,331 0,320 0,311 0,299 0,606 61%
0,358 0,359 0,346 0,337 0,322 0,636 64%
0,390 0,390 0,376 0,366 0,350 0,667 67%
0,422 0,423 0,408 0,398 0,380 0,697 70%
0,456 0,456 0,440 0,431 0,411 0,727 73%
0,492 0,491 0,479 0,472 0,453 0,758 76%
0,532 0,533 0,519 0,516 0,500 0,788 79%
0,577 0,578 0,561 0,562 0,549 0,818 82%
0,625 0,624 0,610 0,613 0,601 0,848 85%
0,673 0,672 0,660 0,665 0,655 0,879 88%
0,741 0,739 0,731 0,735 0,726 0,909 91%
0,813 0,809 0,806 0,807 0,798 0,939 94%
0,886 0,883 0,886 0,889 0,884 0,970 97%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,371 0,371 0,384 0,391 0,406 -8,73% GINI
equality
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M
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is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 3% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by thirty-three airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis 
while the information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports 
involved. On the graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the 
last year of the time series are taken into consideration plus a further year 
approximately in the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the 
area between the equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the 
Lorenz curve. The numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 
77a-b and the % variation refers to 2010 on 2006. 
From Table 76a-b, fig. 44 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 45 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Beijing 
airport accounts for approximately 11% of the total movements and for 13% 
of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the sample. It is 
necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into consideration 
approximately 90% of the Chinese passenger traffic output and 89% of the 
traffic movements. That is to say that in China there are other small 
secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million passengers/year) 
that handle 11% of the aircraft movements but only 10% of the passengers. 
In terms of movements, the 50% of the sample is handled by airport ranked 
from 1st to 8th position, while airport ranking from 1st to 7th position handle 
51% of the passengers. In terms of movements, airports ranking from 1st to 
25th account for 90% of the total traffic, while as for passengers airport 
ranked from 1st to 24th position account for 91% of the total traffic. At 
airports ranking from 2nd to 14th in terms of 2010 passengers, passengers are 
far more concentrated than movements suggesting a higher load factor or 
the usage of bigger aircrafts by airlines. In this country there is a strong 
variation of the Gini index over time in terms of both passengers and aircraft 
movements. That is to say that the air traffic market in this country is not yet 
mature; moreover, as it is logical, the market is expanding as the Gini index 
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shows a reduction of approximately 10,4% in terms of passengers and of 
8,7% in movements time series. Both variations take place between 2006 
and 2010 (even if the changes are already relevant in 2008) especially in the 
middle of the sample: from the 2nd to the 26th airports in terms of passengers 
and from the 4th to the 20th airports in terms of movements (see fig. 44 and 
45). Thus, the market is expanding at medium to big-sized airports and the 
concentration diminishes. On the other hand, the fact that the figures of the 
1st airport (Beijing) doesn’t change over time, means that this airport has 
been growing at a faster pace than the immediate followers. The growth of 
passengers’ traffic from 2006 to 2010 has been dramatically evident: 
+96,8%. Geographically speaking, almost the 21,5% of the nation 
passengers traffic is concentrated in an area centered in Beijing with a mean 
radius of approximately 590 km (7 medium sized airports + Beijing). 
Chinese airports don’t show phenomena of high airline concentration as, 
among the airlines competing for the market at each airport, no one has a 
dominant market share. 19 airports out of 33 have moderate concentration 
and the remaining low-concentration. At un-concentrated airport, the top 3 
airlines gather less than 55% of the movements, at moderately concentrated 
airports they gather from 60% to 70% of the traffic.  
In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the six airlines that contribute to 
reach the 80% of the daily movements in the majority of airports are legacy 
carriers (Air China International, China Eastern Airlines, China Southern 
Airlines, Hainan Airlines, Shenzhen Airlines and Xiamen Airlines). Given 
the vastness of the country, each of these legacy carriers is based in a target 
part of the country and its base airports acts like a proper hub. Moreover, 
with reference to the top 5 carriers of each airports, Air China International, 
China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines have the best connected 
network and therefore are the leading airlines of the country. As the 
Dominance Index is given by formula (20), the carriers which have a 
significant number of movements at the majority of airports take the highest 
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score. China Southern totals 218,18 points on 330 available, followed by 
China Eastern with 151 points and Air China International with 112 points. 
The difference in DI and the scarce concentration at airports suggest that 
there is scope for a greater competition; on the other hand, the presence of a 
vast majority of legacy carriers suggests that the government is still heavily 
involved in the airline ownership so some form of protectionism may be 
present.  
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Table 78: Chinese traffic composition
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
PAX GROUP 561.371.626 490.974.886 429.241.060 413.894.871 362.911.649 285.759.129
% ON PAX GROUP 91,28% 91,72% 92,49% 92,45% 92,72% 83,87%
% 2010 on 2005 96,45%
PAX < 1000 km 132.509.525 115.698.175 98.817.745 91.790.942 80.420.433 67.318.643
% ON PAX GROUP 21,55% 21,61% 21,29% 20,50% 20,55% 19,76%
% 2010 on 2005 96,84%
pax/kmq GROUP 66 57 50 48 42 33
pax/kmq < 1000 km 122 107 91 85 74 62
MEAN RADIUS 1651
MEAN RADIUS < 1000 KM 587
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un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,187 HHI norm 0,099 HHI norm 0,186 HHI norm 0,110 HHI norm 0,138
N° carriers 50 N° carriers 50 N° carriers 50 N° carriers 50 N° carriers 20
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,020 1/N 0,020 1/N 0,020 1/N 0,050
HHI 0,204 HHI 0,117 HHI 0,202 HHI 0,128 HHI 0,181
1st carrier 38,03% 1st carrier 25,94% 1st carrier 39,52% 1st carrier 29,94% 1st carrier 30,94%
1st-2nd carrier 54,75% 1st-2nd carrier 40,04% 1st-2nd carrier 54,07% 1st-2nd carrier 39,54% 1st-2nd carrier 54,68%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 65,87% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 46,39% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 64,67% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 48,44% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 64,03%
top5 79,20% top5 53,39% top5 77,81% top5 62,43% top5 78,71%
top10 86,84% top10 64,05% top10 88,78% top10 77,23% top10 95,40%
HHI norm 0,126 HHI norm 0,132 HHI norm 0,140 HHI norm 0,077 HHI norm 0,114
N° carriers 30 N° carriers 31 N° carriers 38 N° carriers 33 N° carriers 19
1/N 0,033 1/N 0,032 1/N 0,026 1/N 0,030 1/N 0,053
HHI 0,155 HHI 0,160 HHI 0,162 HHI 0,105 HHI 0,160
1st carrier 25,40% 1st carrier 27,92% 1st carrier 32,42% 1st carrier 19,25% 1st carrier 30,75%
1st-2nd carrier 48,87% 1st-2nd carrier 50,73% 1st-2nd carrier 52,85% 1st-2nd carrier 37,17% 1st-2nd carrier 46,95%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 63,02% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 61,50% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 61,89% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 47,12% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 62,68%
top5 78,62% top5 76,64% top5 68,96% top5 63,94% top5 74,65%
top10 89,55% top10 89,78% top10 79,57% top10 83,63% top10 91,55%
HHI INDEX
Xi'an Xianyang   
BEIJING HONG KONG GUANGZHOU BAIYUN SHANGHAI PUDONG SHANGHAI HONGQIAO
Shenzhen Bao'an   Chengdu Shuangliu   taiwan Kunming Wujiaba   
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un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,091 HHI norm 0,064 HHI norm 0,160 HHI norm 0,090 HHI norm 0,108
N° carriers 31 N° carriers 43 N° carriers 27 N° carriers 22 N° carriers 31
1/N 0,032 1/N 0,023 1/N 0,037 1/N 0,045 1/N 0,032
HHI 0,120 HHI 0,086 HHI 0,191 HHI 0,131 HHI 0,137
1st carrier 18,78% 1st carrier 18,05% 1st carrier 39,04% 1st carrier 27,65% 1st carrier 27,83%
1st-2nd carrier 35,68% 1st-2nd carrier 30,96% 1st-2nd carrier 49,64% 1st-2nd carrier 42,18% 1st-2nd carrier 46,06%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 51,17% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 41,39% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 60,24% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 53,35% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,88%
top5 72,77% top5 57,78% top5 73,98% top5 68,44% top5 68,23%
top10 86,85% top10 79,80% top10 89,88% top10 87,15% top10 83,74%
HHI norm 0,080 HHI norm 0,121 HHI norm 0,086 HHI norm 0,069 HHI norm 0,197
N° carriers 19 N° carriers 18 N° carriers 30 N° carriers 20 N° carriers 18
1/N 0,053 1/N 0,056 1/N 0,033 1/N 0,050 1/N 0,056
HHI 0,128 HHI 0,170 HHI 0,117 HHI 0,116 HHI 0,241
1st carrier 25,58% 1st carrier 31,34% 1st carrier 24,11% 1st carrier 24,39% 1st carrier 45,30%
1st-2nd carrier 41,86% 1st-2nd carrier 49,25% 1st-2nd carrier 41,67% 1st-2nd carrier 39,37% 1st-2nd carrier 58,12%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 52,91% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 64,93% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 52,08% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 50,52% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 67,95%
top5 68,90% top5 78,36% top5 64,88% top5 65,16% top5 77,35%
top10 88,37% top10 93,28% top10 82,74% top10 83,97% top10 91,88%
HHI INDEX
Ürümqi Diwopu   
Hangzhou Xiaoshan   Chongqing Jiangbei   Xiamen Gaoqi   Changsha Huanghua   Nanjing Lukou   
Wuhan Tianhe   Qingdao Liuting   Dalian Zhoushuizi   Sanya Phoenix   
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un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,092 HHI norm 0,180 HHI norm 0,139 HHI norm 0,065 HHI norm 0,079
N° carriers 23 N° carriers 16 N° carriers 21 N° carriers 30 N° carriers 19
1/N 0,043 1/N 0,063 1/N 0,048 1/N 0,033 1/N 0,053
HHI 0,131 HHI 0,232 HHI 0,180 HHI 0,096 HHI 0,127
1st carrier 23,58% 1st carrier 44,79% 1st carrier 36,99% 1st carrier 19,03% 1st carrier 29,52%
1st-2nd carrier 44,34% 1st-2nd carrier 54,05% 1st-2nd carrier 51,60% 1st-2nd carrier 34,60% 1st-2nd carrier 38,10%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 53,77% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 61,78% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 58,90% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 44,29% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 45,71%
top5 71,38% top5 74,90% top5 72,15% top5 62,28% top5 60,00%
top10 89,31% top10 92,66% top10 89,50% top10 81,66% top10 84,76%
HHI norm 0,162 HHI norm 0,126 HHI norm 0,107 HHI norm 0,103 HHI norm 0,067
N° carriers 15 N° carriers 26 N° carriers 15 N° carriers 16 N° carriers 18
1/N 0,067 1/N 0,038 1/N 0,067 1/N 0,063 1/N 0,056
HHI 0,218 HHI 0,159 HHI 0,166 HHI 0,159 HHI 0,119
1st carrier 41,51% 1st carrier 34,24% 1st carrier 33,33% 1st carrier 31,34% 1st carrier 22,11%
1st-2nd carrier 54,72% 1st-2nd carrier 49,03% 1st-2nd carrier 46,20% 1st-2nd carrier 46,27% 1st-2nd carrier 40,20%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 64,78% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 56,81% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,89% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 61,19% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 53,27%
top5 80,50% top5 70,04% top5 75,44% top5 74,63% top5 66,33%
top10 96,23% top10 81,71% top10 91,81% top10 91,04% top10 86,43%
HHI INDEX
Jinan Yaoqiang   Fuzhou Changle   Guiyang Longdongbao   Nanning Wuxu   Wenzhou Yongqiang   
Haikou Meilan   Zhengzhou Xinzheng   Shenyang Taoxian   Tianjin Binhai   Harbin Taiping   
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Table 79 a-d: Airlines’ concentration at Chinese major airports
un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,106 HHI norm 0,105 HHI norm 0,130
N° carriers 16 N° carriers 12 N° carriers 20
1/N 0,063 1/N 0,083 1/N 0,050
HHI 0,162 HHI 0,179 HHI 0,173
1st carrier 33,33% 1st carrier 35,09% 1st carrier 34,59%
1st-2nd carrier 48,72% 1st-2nd carrier 50,88% 1st-2nd carrier 53,46%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,26% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 59,65% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 61,01%
top5 72,65% top5 75,44% top5 72,33%
top10 89,74% top10 96,49% top10 86,16%
HHI INDEX
Guilin Liangjiang   Taiyuan Wusu   Macau  
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Table 80: Dominance Index at Chinese airports 
AIRLINE TOTAL POINTS FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
China Southern 240 30 218,18
China Eastern Airlines 172 29 151,15
Air China International 148 25 112,12
Shenzhen Airlines 86 16 41,70
Xiamen Airlines 72 13 28,36
Hainan Airlines 66 14 28,00
Shandong Airlines 34 6 6,18
Sichuan Airlines 20 5 3,03
Tianjin Airlines 26 3 2,36
Cathay Pacific Airways 16 2 0,97
China Airlines 14 2 0,85
EVA Air 14 2 0,85
Shanghai Airlines 12 2 0,73
Spring Airways 10 2 0,61
Beijing Capital Airlines 8 2 0,48
Juneyao 6 2 0,36
Air Macau 10 1 0,30
Dragonair 8 1 0,24
Hong Kong Airlines 6 1 0,18
China Postal Airlines 4 1 0,12
Lucky Air 4 1 0,12
Okay Airways 4 1 0,12
TransAsia Airways 4 1 0,12
ANA - All Nippon Airways 2 1 0,06
Chengdu Airlines 2 1 0,06
Thai AirAsia 2 1 0,06
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Table 81: French traffic data 
Rank MOVEMENTS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Paris Roissy CDG 513.674 530.871 543.810 551.174 517.824 491.933 38%
2 Paris Orly ORY 222.878 228.968 232.991 230.166 220.496 215.645 55%
3 Nice NCE 122.751 124.666 130.008 128.187 148.918 146.671 67%
4 Lyon LYS 123.437 124.189 126.578 126.980 120.127 116.121 76%
5 Marseille MRS 87.831 90.640 96.779 95.869 96.338 97.317 83%
6 Toulouse TLS 78.612 66.996 80.767 73.849 78.700 79.848 90%
7 Bordeaux BOD 49.452 50.557 51.451 51.500 45.686 46.607 93%
8 Nantes NTE 33.511 37.154 37.055 38.200 37.109 39.833 96%
9 Beauvais BVA 13.228 13.196 15.286 17.862 18.618 20.528 98%
10 Strasbourg SXB 37.164 39.385 36.472 32.851 27.841 25.283 100%
1.282.538 1.306.622 1.351.197 1.346.638 1.311.657 1.279.786
1.652.135 1.729.182 1.744.643 1.750.873 1.630.977 1.603.180
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank PASSENGERS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Paris Roissy CDG 53.798.308 58.849.567 59.922.177 60.874.681 57.906.866 58.167.062 46%
2 Paris Orly ORY 24.860.532 25.622.152 26.440.736 26.209.703 25.107.693 25.203.969 66%
3 Nice NCE 9.754.772 9.948.035 10.399.513 10.382.566 9.830.987 9.603.014 74%
4 Lyon LYS 6.561.365 6.752.333 7.320.952 7.924.063 7.717.609 7.979.228 80%
5 Marseille MRS 5.859.480 6.115.943 6.962.773 6.965.933 7.290.119 7.522.167 86%
6 Toulouse TLS 5.799.536 5.956.552 6.162.288 6.349.805 6.282.076 6.405.906 91%
7 Bordeaux BOD 3.096.827 3.255.960 3.463.205 3.556.916 3.318.059 3.660.042 94%
8 Nantes NTE 2.161.177 2.423.778 2.589.890 2.731.563 2.650.611 3.031.510 97%
9 Beauvais BVA 1.848.484 1.887.971 2.155.633 2.484.635 2.591.864 2.931.796 99%
10 Strasbourg SXB 1.954.746 2.032.957 1.733.050 1.329.626 1.109.397 1.060.705 100%
115.695.227 122.845.248 127.150.217 128.809.491 123.805.281 125.565.399
128.715.026 134.655.620 141.407.824 143.555.889 137.821.315 139.254.486
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 46: Lorenz curve France Passengers 
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Fig. 47: Lorenz curve France Movements
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Table 82: Gini Index for France – time series  
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 10% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by ten airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while the 
information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On the 
graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of the 
time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately in 
the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,010 0,011 0,012 0,013 0,014 0,016 0,100 10%
0,036 0,038 0,039 0,038 0,035 0,036 0,200 20%
0,064 0,069 0,066 0,066 0,064 0,068 0,300 30%
0,103 0,107 0,103 0,104 0,098 0,104 0,400 40%
0,165 0,159 0,163 0,159 0,158 0,166 0,500 50%
0,233 0,228 0,234 0,230 0,232 0,243 0,600 60%
0,329 0,323 0,328 0,325 0,324 0,333 0,700 70%
0,425 0,419 0,425 0,420 0,437 0,447 0,800 80%
0,599 0,593 0,597 0,590 0,605 0,616 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,507 0,511 0,507 0,511 0,507 0,494 -2,51%
equality
GINI
M
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
S
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,016 0,015 0,013 0,010 0,009 0,009 0,100 10%
0,032 0,032 0,030 0,029 0,030 0,032 0,200 20%
0,051 0,052 0,050 0,050 0,051 0,057 0,300 30%
0,078 0,078 0,077 0,078 0,078 0,085 0,400 40%
0,128 0,126 0,126 0,127 0,129 0,136 0,500 50%
0,179 0,176 0,180 0,182 0,188 0,196 0,600 60%
0,236 0,231 0,238 0,243 0,251 0,259 0,700 70%
0,320 0,312 0,320 0,323 0,330 0,336 0,800 80%
0,535 0,520 0,528 0,527 0,532 0,537 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,585 0,592 0,587 0,586 0,580 0,571 -2,47% GINI
equality
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 82 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2005. 
From Table 81, fig. 46 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 47 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Paris 
Roissy airport accounts for approximately 38% of the total movements and 
for 46% of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the 
sample. It is necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into 
consideration approximately 90% of the French passenger traffic output and 
77% of the traffic movements. That is to say that in France there are other 
small secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million 
passengers/year) that handle 23% of the aircraft movements but only 10% of 
the passengers. In terms of movements, the 55% of the sample is handled by 
Paris Roissy and Orly airports, while the same airports handle 66% of the 
total passengers output of the group. In terms of both movements and 
passengers, airports ranking from 1st to 6th account for 90% of the total 
traffic. At Paris Roissy, passengers are far more concentrated than 
movements suggesting a higher load factor, the usage of bigger aircrafts by 
airlines or a decision by the government to attract the majority of the traffic 
at the principal airport (Paris is served by four airports: Roissy/Charles de 
Gaulle, Orly, Beauvais-Tille and Le Bourget). In this country there has been 
a reduction over time of approximately 2,5% of the Gini index in terms of 
both passengers and aircraft movements. That is to say that the market is 
still expanding at medium airports. Both variations took place in 2010: in 
both fig. 46 and 47 it is possible to see the blue Lorenz curve for 2010 
getting closer to the equity, while both the red and the green Lorenz curve 
remain below. In terms of movements, the most notable variation took place 
at Paris Orly and Lyon airports: with regard to Paris Orly, it is possible to 
notice that in 2008 it handled 29% of the total output of Paris Roissy + Paris 
Orly; in 2010 the traffic diminished of about 75.000 movements but the 
highest loss was at Paris Roissy; therefore in 2010 Paris Orly handled a 
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bigger share than in 2008 and that’s why the concentration index 
diminishes. Taking into consideration Table 82, it is clear that the French 
market at present is un-stable as there have been fluctuations on market 
concentration: years 2006 on 2005 and 2008 on 2007 show an increase of 
the Gini index, while year 2007 on 2006, 2009 on 2008 and 2010 on 2009 
present a sharp loss of the index. This may be explained with the devolution 
of airport ownership from the central to the local governments and with the 
urge for traffic growth at medium sized airport. Therefore, secondary 
airports are growing their traffic at a faster pace than Paris Roissy or, as data 
show, they are losing traffic at a slower pace. Thus, the market is expanding 
and the concentration diminishes. From 2005 to 2010 there has been a 
traffic growth in terms of both passengers and movements, but from 2008 to 
2010 there has been a market contraction. Geographically speaking, almost 
the 65% of the nation passengers’ traffic is concentrated in an area centered 
in Paris Roissy with a mean radius of approximately 260 km (Paris Roissy, 
Paris Orly, Nantes, Paris Beauvais and Strasbourg airports). The phenomena 
of airline concentration is uneven at French airports: there are three airports 
with low-concentration (Nice, Lyon and Toulouse) where the 1st and 2nd 
carriers handle approximately 42% of the traffic and the top 3 carriers 
handle approximately 52% of the total movements. Then there are three 
airports with moderate concentration (Orly, Marseille and Nantes) where the 
top 2 airlines handle over 51% and the top 3 almost 62% (mean values), 
while Roissy, Bordeaux, Strasbourg and Beauvais are highly-concentrated 
as the dominant carrier has a market share above 40% (Beauvais is 
dominated by Ryanair with a 84,6% share) and the top 5 above 80% (Roissy 
is an exception because it is the hub airport, therefore the majority of the 
market is in the hands of Air France while other airlines operate far less 
movements).  In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the airline which 
contribute to reach the 80% of the daily movements in the majority of 
airports is Air France (in 9 out of 10 airports) followed by the regional 
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carrier “Regional Compagnie Aerienne Europeene”. Hence, with reference 
to the top 5 carriers of each airport, Air France is the leading carrier 
followed by the aforementioned regional carrier and by the Low-cost 
EasyJet with 6 out of 10 airports.  As the Dominance Index is given by 
formula (20), the carriers which have a significant number of movements at 
the majority of airports take the highest score. Air France totals 74 points on 
100 available, followed by Regional Compagnie Aerienne Europeene and 
EasyJet with less than 30 points. It is possible to conclude then that Air 
France  is by far the dominant carrier (as part of its shares are administered 
by the Government) and that at French airport there is sufficient scope for a 
higher competition. This is the country with the highest Gini index. 
Moreover, taking into consideration Table 86, it is possible to note that the 
Paris system is capable of attracting 27,7 departing passengers for each 
inhabitants, denoting a good hub-capability. A good performance is 
achieved by Nice as well (12,4 passengers/inhabitants), thanks to its 
tourism-related demand. 
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Table 83: Airlines’ concentration at French major airports 
 
un-concentrated moderate high-concentrate
HHI norm 0,282 HHI norm 0,184 HHI norm 0,100 HHI norm 0,081 HHI norm 0,159
N° carrier 50 N° carrier 33 N° carrier 23 N° carrier 26 N° carrier 19
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,030 1/N 0,043 1/N 0,038 1/N 0,053
HHI 0,296 HHI 0,209 HHI 0,139 HHI 0,116 HHI 0,203
1st carrier 50,59% 1st carrier 43,47% 1st carrier 31,43% 1st carrier 19,94% 1st carrier 41,28%
1st-2nd carrier 57,22% 1st-2nd carrier 50,80% 1st-2nd carrier 42,86% 1st-2nd carrier 38,01% 1st-2nd carrier 51,38%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 63,50% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,17% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 53,33% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 52,34% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 60,55%
top5 69,44% top5 66,08% top5 64,76% top5 71,03% top5 72,48%
top10 76,15% top10 79,94% top10 82,86% top10 84,11% top10 87,16%
HHI norm 0,099 HHI norm 0,209 HHI norm 0,118 HHI norm 0,479 HHI norm 0,151
N° carrier 21 N° carrier 12 N° carrier 11 N° carrier 2 N° carrier 6
1/N 0,048 1/N 0,083 1/N 0,091 1/N 0,500 1/N 0,167
HHI 0,142 HHI 0,274 HHI 0,198 HHI 0,740 HHI 0,293
1st carrier 31,34% 1st carrier 48,00% 1st carrier 32,14% 1st carrier 84,62% 1st carrier 40,54%
1st-2nd carrier 45,16% 1st-2nd carrier 65,60% 1st-2nd carrier 53,57% 1st-2nd carrier 100,00% 1st-2nd carrier 70,27%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 52,53% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 70,40% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 73,21% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 100,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 89,19%
top5 65,90% top5 80,00% top5 83,93% top5 100,00% top5 97,30%
top10 84,33% top10 96,00% top10 98,21% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
HHI INDEX
TOULOUSE BORDEAUX NANTES PARIS BVA STRASBOURG
PARIS CDG PARIS ORLY NICE LYON MARSEILLE
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Table 84a: French traffic composition
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
PAX GROUP 125.565.399 123.805.281 128.809.491 127.150.217 122.845.248 115.695.227
% ON PAX GROUP 90,17% 89,83% 89,73% 89,92% 91,23% 89,88%
% 2010 vs 2005 8,53%
PAX < 500 km 90.395.042 89.366.431 93.630.208 92.841.486 90.816.425 84.623.247
% ON PAX GROUP 64,91% 64,84% 65,22% 65,66% 67,44% 65,74%
% 2010 vs 2005 6,82%
pax/kmq GROUP 157 155 162 159 154 145
pax/kmq < 500 km 432 427 448 444 434 405
raggio medio 504
raggio medio entro i 500 258
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Table 84b: French traffic composition
AIRLINE CDG ORY NCE LYS MRS TLS BOD NTE BVA SXB N° SERVICE
Aigle Azur X 1 NC
Air Algerie X X 2 NC
Air Europa X 1 NC - CH
Air France X X X X X X X X X 9 NC
Air Nostrum X X X X X 5 RC
Airlinair X X X 3 RC
Alitalia X 1 NC
Brit Air X X X X X 5 RC
British Airways X X 2 NC
Brussels Airlines X 1 NC
CCM - Air Corsica X X X 3 RC
Cityjet X X 2 RC
Continental Airlines X 1 NC
Delta Air Lines X 1 NC
Easyjet X X X X X X 6 LC
Finnair X 1 NC
FlyBE X 1 LC
Iberia X 1 NC
KLM X X 2 NC
KLM Cityhopper X X 2 RC
Lufthansa X X 2 NC
Lufthansa Cityline X X X X 4 RC
Regional Compagnie Aerienne Europeene X X X X X X X 7 RC
Royal Air Maroc X 1 NC
Ryanair X X X 3 LC
SAS - Scandinavian Airlines X 1 NC
SWISS X X 2 NC
TAP-Air Portugal X 1 NC
Transavia France X 1 LC
Twin Jet X X 2 RC
Vueling X 1 LC
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Table 85: Dominance Index at French airports 
 
 
 
Table 86: Hub capability at French airports 
AIRLINE POINTS TOT FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Air France 82 9 73,80
Regional Compagnie Aerienne Europeene 46 6 27,60
Easyjet 38 6 22,80
Brit Air 28 4 11,20
Ryanair 22 3 6,60
Airlinair 14 3 4,20
CCM 14 2 2,80
Air Nostrum 6 3 1,80
Lufthansa Cityline 6 2 1,20
Wizzair 8 1 0,80
Brussels Airlines 4 1 0,40
Lufthansa 4 1 0,40
SWISS 4 1 0,40
Twin Jet 4 1 0,40
British Airways 2 1 0,20
Cityjet 2 1 0,20
Czech Airlines 2 1 0,20
Vueling 2 1 0,20
AIRPORT INHABITANTS PASSENGERS PAX/INHAB
CDG+ORY+BVA 3.112.100       86.302.827   27,73           
NCE 775.300           9.603.014      12,39           
LYS 915.900           7.979.228      8,71             
MRS 1.417.800       7.522.167      5,31             
TLS 671.000           6.405.906      9,55             
BOD 392.000           3.660.042      9,34             
NTE 435.000           3.031.510      6,97             
SXB 500.000           1.060.705      2,12             
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Table 87: German traffic data 
Rank MOVEMENTS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Frankfurt FRA 475.591 474.926 479.508 473.839 452.367 453.232 26%
2 Munich MUC 374.626 386.128 406.594 408.292 376.770 367.760 48%
3 Düsseldorf DUS 185.988 200.586 213.222 214.757 202.879 203.383 59%
4 Berlin Tegel TXL 136.481 133.549 144.626 154.010 148.256 150.987 68%
5 Hamburg HAM 132.735 144.611 150.452 149.589 136.836 137.290 76%
6 Cologne/Bonn CGN 137.590 136.542 136.603 127.011 118.922 119.286 83%
7 Stuttgart STR 140.353 130.825 132.152 127.941 111.536 106.177 89%
8 Berlin Schoenefeld SXF 46.093 52.766 54.799 57.046 60.298 76.595 94%
9 Hanover HAJ 70.310 70.444 69.774 69.413 60.484 57.931 97%
10 Nuremberg NUE 5.705 56.174 57.291 53.505 50.303 49.820 100%
1.705.472 1.786.551 1.845.021 1.835.403 1.718.651 1.722.461
1.925.615 1.985.349 2.049.114 2.102.965 1.964.766 1.957.983
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank PASSENGERS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Frankfurt FRA 52.219.412 52.810.683 54.161.856 53.467.450 50.932.840 53.009.221 31%
2 Munich MUC 28.619.427 30.757.978 33.959.422 34.530.593 32.681.067 34.721.605 52%
3 Düsseldorf DUS 15.910.990 16.590.055 17.831.248 18.151.252 17.793.493 18.988.149 63%
4 Berlin Tegel TXL 11.532.302 11.812.625 13.357.741 14.486.610 14.180.237 15.025.600 72%
5 Hamburg HAM 10.676.016 11.954.117 12.780.631 12.838.350 12.229.319 12.962.429 79%
6 Cologne/Bonn CGN 9.452.185 9.904.236 10.471.657 10.342.931 9.739.581 9.849.779 85%
7 Stuttgart STR 9.405.887 10.104.958 10.321.438 9.924.697 8.934.493 9.218.095 90%
8 Berlin Schoenefeld SXF 5.075.172 6.059.343 6.331.191 6.638.162 6.797.158 7.297.911 95%
9 Hanover HAJ 5.637.385 5.699.299 5.644.582 5.637.517 4.969.799 5.059.800 98%
10 Nuremberg NUE 3.843.610 3.961.458 4.238.275 4.269.606 3.965.743 4.068.799 100%
152.372.386 159.654.752 169.098.041 170.287.168 162.223.730 170.201.388
165.448.549 174.215.286 184.691.434 191.018.401 182.175.295 190.687.112
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 48: Lorenz curve Germany Passengers 
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Fig. 49: Lorenz curve Germany Movements
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Table 88: Gini Index for Germany – time series  
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 10% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by ten airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while the 
information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On the 
graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of the 
time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately in 
the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,025 0,025 0,025 0,025 0,025 0,024 0,100 10%
0,059 0,061 0,059 0,058 0,055 0,054 0,200 20%
0,095 0,099 0,096 0,098 0,097 0,096 0,300 30%
0,157 0,161 0,157 0,156 0,152 0,150 0,400 40%
0,219 0,224 0,219 0,216 0,211 0,208 0,500 50%
0,290 0,298 0,295 0,291 0,287 0,284 0,600 60%
0,366 0,374 0,373 0,377 0,374 0,373 0,700 70%
0,470 0,477 0,479 0,483 0,484 0,485 0,800 80%
0,657 0,670 0,680 0,686 0,685 0,689 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,433 0,422 0,423 0,422 0,426 0,427 -1,18%
equity
GINI
P
A
S
S
E
N
G
E
R
S
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,003 0,030 0,030 0,029 0,030 0,028 0,100 10%
0,030 0,061 0,061 0,060 0,065 0,063 0,200 20%
0,072 0,100 0,099 0,098 0,100 0,107 0,300 30%
0,150 0,174 0,170 0,166 0,166 0,168 0,400 40%
0,230 0,248 0,244 0,237 0,235 0,238 0,500 50%
0,310 0,325 0,323 0,318 0,315 0,317 0,600 60%
0,392 0,406 0,404 0,402 0,401 0,405 0,700 70%
0,502 0,518 0,520 0,519 0,518 0,523 0,800 80%
0,722 0,734 0,740 0,742 0,737 0,737 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,418 0,381 0,382 0,386 0,387 0,383 -8,40% GINI
equity
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M
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 88 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2005. 
From Table 87, fig. 48 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 49 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Frankfurt 
airport accounts for approximately 26% of the total movements and for 31% 
of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the sample. It is 
necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into consideration 
approximately 90% of the German passenger traffic output and 88% of the 
traffic movements. That is to say that in Germany there are other small 
secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million passengers/year) 
that handle 12% of the aircraft movements but only 10% of the passengers. 
In terms of movements, the 48% of the sample is handled by Frankfurt and 
Munich, while the same airports handle 52% of the total passengers output 
of the group. In terms of both movements and passengers, airports ranking 
from 1st to 7th account for approximately 90% of the total traffic. In general 
passengers are more concentrated than movements at the major airports 
suggesting a higher load factor or the usage of bigger aircrafts by airlines. In 
this country there has been a reduction over time of approximately 1,2% of 
the Gini index in terms of passengers and a relevant reduction of 8,4% in 
terms of aircraft movements. From Table 88 it is evident that the sharp loss 
of traffic took place between 2005 and 2006; the Gini index had been 
approximately constant from 2006 to 2010. From fig. 48 it is possible to 
derive a two-sided trend of the Lorenz curve for 2010: at x=0,5 it is below 
Lorenz curve for 2005 and 2008 highlighting the passenger share handled 
by the 50% of the sample is higher, but for x ranging between 0,7 and 1 the 
Lorenz curve for 2010 is above the others highlighting the fact that at bigger 
airport the passengers’ share processed is lower. As the variation is 
negative, the loss at bigger airports is higher than the gain at medium 
airport. From fig. 49 we notice that 2010 Lorenz curve (which overlaps 
2008 Lorenz curve) is always above 2005 Lorenz curve and the difference is 
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substantial at the smaller airports of the sample (for x<0,5). That is to say 
that the market is still expanding at medium airports. Therefore, secondary 
airports are growing their traffic at a faster pace than Frankfurt or, as data 
show, they are losing traffic at a slower pace: data show a traffic growth 
from 2005 to 2008, followed by a loss in terms of movements (with the only 
exception of Berlin Schoenefeld); the passenger output diminished in 2009 
but the losses were recovered in 2010; again Berlin Schoenefeld data show a 
remarkable growth. Geographically speaking, almost the 75% of the nation 
passengers’ traffic is concentrated in an area centered in Frankfurt with a 
mean radius of approximately 270 km (which gathers Frankfurt, 
Nuremberg, Hanover, Stuttgard, Cologne/Bonn, Dusseldorf and Munich). 
The phenomena of airline concentration is uneven at French airports: there 
are four airports with low-concentration (Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Stuttgart 
and Hanover) where the 1st and 2nd airlines taken together handle from 33% 
to 49% of the traffic and the top 3 carriers gather from 45% to 60% of the 
total movements. Then there are five airports with moderate concentration 
(Munich, the 2 airports of Berlin, Cologne-Bonn and Nuremberg) where the 
top 2 airlines handle from 49% to 64% of the traffic and the top 3 airlines 
gather from 58% to 78% of the traffic; the only high-concentrated airport is 
Frankfurt where the dominant carrier has a market share above 51%.  In 
terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the airlines which contribute to reach 
the 80% of the daily movements in the majority of airports are the legacy 
carriers: Lufthansa and Air Berlin with 9 out of 10 airports (many authors 
still consider Air Berlin an hybrid low-cost carrier, we consider it as a 
legacy carrier as it recently joined an alliance as only legacy carriers do at 
present) followed by other countries’ legacy carriers as Air France and 
British Airways. Hence, with reference to the top 5 carriers of each airport, 
Lufthansa is the leading carrier followed by Air Berlin and other regional 
and low-cost carriers belonging to the Lufthansa group. As the Dominance 
Index is given by formula (20), the carriers which have a significant number 
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of movements at the majority of airports take the highest score. Lufthansa 
totals 70 points on 100 available, followed by Air Berlin with 48 points; the 
remaining carriers don’t reach the threshold of 10 points. It is possible to 
conclude that the Lufthansa group plays a leading role at German airports 
with an extended network of feeder flights + a double hub structure in 
Frankfurt and Munich (it is peculiar the fact that neither of the two hub is 
located in the capital city). Nevertheless both Frankfurt and Munich have a 
high hub-capability (respectively 47,7 and 25,1 passengers/inhabitants); 
Frankfurt is indeed the EU airport with the highest connectivity (N. 
Gualandi, L. Mantecchini, F. Paganelli, 2010). Even Dusseldorf has a 
highest hub-capability than Berlin; things might change with the opening of 
the new airport in Berlin Brandenburg. 
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Table 89: Airlines’ concentration at German major airports 
 
 
un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,312 HHI norm 0,142 HHI norm 0,110 HHI norm 0,193 HHI norm 0,127
N° carriers 50 N° carriers 50 N° carriers 45 N° carriers 35 N° carriers 39
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,020 1/N 0,022 1/N 0,029 1/N 0,026
HHI 0,326 HHI 0,159 HHI 0,129 HHI 0,216 HHI 0,149
1st carrier 51,35% 1st carrier 31,10% 1st carrier 22,67% 1st carrier 36,88% 1st carrier 32,43%
1st-2nd carrier 61,47% 1st-2nd carrier 48,97% 1st-2nd carrier 43,67% 1st-2nd carrier 64,07% 1st-2nd carrier 49,19%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 63,51% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,73% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 60,33% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 67,38% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 58,38%
top5 67,06% top5 72,21% top5 66,00% top5 73,29% top5 65,41%
top10 72,32% top10 79,07% top10 76,83% top10 82,51% top10 77,03%
HHI norm 0,181 HHI norm 0,057 HHI norm 0,124 HHI norm 0,069 HHI norm 0,107
N° carriers 16 N° carriers 29 N° carriers 15 N° carriers 18 N° carriers 9
1/N 0,063 1/N 0,034 1/N 0,067 1/N 0,056 1/N 0,111
HHI 0,232 HHI 0,090 HHI 0,182 HHI 0,121 HHI 0,207
1st carrier 38,71% 1st carrier 17,72% 1st carrier 31,58% 1st carrier 20,69% 1st carrier 39,42%
1st-2nd carrier 60,37% 1st-2nd carrier 33,07% 1st-2nd carrier 56,14% 1st-2nd carrier 38,79% 1st-2nd carrier 49,04%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 77,88% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 45,67% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 64,91% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 54,31% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 58,65%
top5 84,33% top5 58,66% top5 77,19% top5 69,83% top5 77,88%
top10 94,47% top10 77,17% top10 92,98% top10 87,93% top10 100,00%
HHI INDEX
COLOGNE - BONN STUTTGARD BERLIN SCHOENEFELD HANOVER NUREMBERG
FRANKFURT MUNICH DUSSELDORF BERLIN TEGEL HAMBURG
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Table 90a: French traffic composition
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PAX GROUP 152.372.386 159.654.752 169.098.041 170.287.168 162.223.730 170.201.388
% ON PAX GROUP 92,10% 91,64% 91,56% 89,15% 89,05% 89,26%
% 2010 ON 2005 11,70%
PAX < 500 km 125.088.896 129.828.667 136.628.478 136.324.046 129.017.016 134.915.448
% ON PAX GROUP 75,61% 74,52% 73,98% 71,37% 70,82% 70,75%
% 2010 ON 2005 7,86%
PAX/kmq GROUP 361 378 400 403 384 403
PAX/kmq < 500 km 537 557 586 585 553 579
MEAN RADIUS 367
MEAN RADIUS < 500 km 272
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Table 90b: French traffic composition
FRA MUC DUS TXL HAM CGN STR SXF HAJ NUE N° SERVICE
Adria Airways X 1 NC
Aeroflot Russian International Airlines X X 2 NC
Air Berlin X X X X X X X X X 9 NC
Air Canada X 1 NC
Air China International X 1 NC
Air Dolomiti X X 2 RC
Air France X X X X X X X 7 NC
Augsburg Airways X X X 3 RC
Austrian X 1 NC
bmi X 1 NC
bmi Regional X 1 RC
British Airways X X X X X X 6 NC
Brussels Airlines X X 2 NC
Cirrus Airlines X 1 RC
Condor X X X 3 CH
Contact Air X X 2 RC
easyJet X X X 3 LC
Easyjet Switzerland X 1 LC
Eurowings X X X 3 RC
FlyBE X 1 LC
Germanwings X X X X X 5 LC
KLM X 1 NC
KLM Cityhopper X X X X X 5 RC
LOT - Polish Airlines X X 2 NC
Lufthansa X X X X X X X X X 9 NC
Lufthansa Cityline X X X X 4 RC
Luxair X 1 NC
Norwegian air shuttle X 1 LC
Regional Compagnie Aerienne Europeene X X 2 RC
Ryanair X 1 LC
SAS - Scandinavian Airlines X X X X 4 NC
SWISS X X X X X X X X 8 NC
Turkish Airlines X X X X 4 NC
Tyrolean Airways X X 2 NC
United Airlines X 1 NC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 91: Dominance Index at German airports 
 
 
Table 92: Hub capability at German airports 
AIRLINE POINTS TOT FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Lufthansa 78 9 70,20
Air Berlin 60 8 48,00
Germanwings 28 3 8,40
Lufthansa Cityline 20 4 8,00
Eurowings 16 3 4,80
SAS - Scandinavian Airlines 10 3 3,00
SWISS 10 3 3,00
Regional Compagnie Aerienne Europeene 12 2 2,40
Augsburg Airways 8 2 1,60
EasyJet Airlines 10 1 1,00
Germanwings 8 1 0,80
British Airways 6 1 0,60
Norwegian air shuttle 6 1 0,60
Aeroflot Russian International Airlines 4 1 0,40
Air France 4 1 0,40
Condor 4 1 0,40
Contact Air 4 1 0,40
KLM Cityhopper 4 1 0,40
Air Dolomiti 2 1 0,20
Brussels Airlines 2 1 0,20
Ryanair 2 1 0,20
Tyrolean Airways 2 1 0,20
AIRPORT INHABITANTS PASSENGERS PAX/INHAB
FRA 1.109.996       53.009.221   47,76           
MUC 1.380.000       34.721.605   25,16           
DUS 1.162.000       18.988.149   16,34           
TXL+SXF 3.627.000       22.323.511   6,15             
HAM 1.800.000       12.962.429   7,20             
CGN 1.423.000       9.849.779      6,92             
STR 903.000           9.218.095      10,21           
HAJ 622.000           5.059.800      8,13             
NUE 735.000           4.068.799      5,54             
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Table 93: Indian traffic data 
Rank MOVEMENTS IATA CODE 2003 2004 % on 2004
1 Mumbai DEL 137.212 153.166 28%
2 Dehli BOM 105.540 122.123 51%
3 Chennai MAA 51.251 61.233 62%
4 Bangalore BLR 46.923 55.547 72%
5 Kolkata CCU 38.820 42.374 80%
6 Hyderabad HYD 28.077 35.473 87%
7 Cochin COK 16.590 18.075 90%
8 Ahmedabad AMD 13.126 14.893 93%
8 Goa LKO 11.074 13.029 95%
10 Trivandrum CJB 10.476 10.422 97%
11 Lucknow TRV 8.119 8.551 99%
12 Coimbatore GOI 5.393 7.104 100%
472.601 541.990
641.389 717.597
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank PASSENGERS IATA CODE 2003 2004 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 Mumbai DEL 13.284.445 15.665.777 24.804.766 28.137.797 25%
2 Dehli BOM 10.394.164 12.782.979 25.251.379 28.531.607 50%
3 Chennai MAA 4.555.821 5.633.926 10.148.499 11.699.894 60%
4 Bangalore BLR 3.181.248 4.113.383 9.434.131 11.237.468 70%
5 Kolkata CCU 3.090.853 3.494.564 7.636.935 9.181.182 78%
6 Hyderabad HYD 2.211.766 2.845.029 6.356.673 7.298.064 85%
7 Cochin COK 1.332.601 1.596.126 3.707.662 4.232.453 88%
8 Ahmedabad AMD 976.687 1.289.747 3.381.828 3.784.818 92%
8 Goa LKO 987.681 1.265.410 1.081.653 1.184.518 93%
10 Trivandrum CJB 1.073.582 1.160.151 2.166.458 2.513.856 95%
11 Lucknow TRV 384.393 453.345 1.474.899 2.975.878 97%
12 Coimbatore GOI 279.324 391.175 2.916.570 2.916.570 100%
41.752.565 50.691.612 98.361.453 113.694.105
48.779.611 59.283.800 123.755.433 143.430.273
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 50: Lorenz curve India Passengers 
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Fig. 51: Lorenz curve India Movements
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Table 94: Gini Index for India – time series  
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 8,3% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by twelve airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while 
the information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On 
the graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of 
the time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately 
in the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2010 2009 2004 2003
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,010 0,011 0,008 0,007 0,083 8%
0,033 0,026 0,018 0,016 0,167 17%
0,058 0,049 0,041 0,040 0,250 25%
0,084 0,079 0,065 0,063 0,333 33%
0,117 0,113 0,091 0,089 0,417 42%
0,155 0,151 0,123 0,121 0,500 50%
0,219 0,215 0,179 0,173 0,583 58%
0,300 0,293 0,248 0,247 0,667 67%
0,398 0,389 0,328 0,323 0,750 75%
0,502 0,492 0,439 0,432 0,833 83%
0,749 0,743 0,692 0,681 0,917 92%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,479 0,490 0,545 0,551 -13,11%
equality
GINI
P
A
S
S
E
N
G
E
R
2008-9 2007-8 2006-7 2004 2003
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,012 0,011 0,010 0,013 0,011 0,083 8%
0,028 0,028 0,027 0,029 0,028 0,167 17%
0,051 0,052 0,049 0,049 0,050 0,250 25%
0,074 0,075 0,073 0,073 0,073 0,333 33%
0,106 0,110 0,104 0,101 0,100 0,417 42%
0,148 0,150 0,140 0,134 0,136 0,500 50%
0,231 0,232 0,219 0,199 0,195 0,583 58%
0,316 0,315 0,301 0,277 0,278 0,667 67%
0,423 0,430 0,415 0,379 0,377 0,750 75%
0,543 0,548 0,535 0,492 0,486 0,833 83%
0,766 0,764 0,758 0,718 0,710 0,917 92%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,467 0,464 0,478 0,506 0,509 -8,31% GINI
equality
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M
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 94 and the % 
variation refers to the more recent year on the less recent year. 
From Table 93, fig. 50 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 51 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Mumbai 
airport accounts for approximately 25% of the total movements and for 25% 
of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the sample. It is 
necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into consideration 
approximately 80% of the Indian passenger traffic output and 75% of the 
traffic movements. That is to say that in India there are other small 
secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million passengers/year) 
that handle 25% of the aircraft movements but only 20% of the passengers. 
In terms of movements, the 57,7% of the sample is handled by airport 
ranked from 1st to 3rd position, while Mumbai and Delhi airports are 
sufficient to handle the 50% of the passengers. In terms of both movements 
and passengers, airports ranking from 1st to 8th account for approximately 
the 92% of the total. At top 3 airports passengers and movements are 
equally concentrated, suggesting a low load factor (if compared with the 
aforementioned countries) or the usage of medium sized aircrafts by 
airlines. In this country there is a strong variation of the Gini index over 
time in terms of both passengers and aircraft movements. That is to say that 
the air traffic market in this country is not yet mature; moreover, as it is 
logical, the market is expanding as the Gini index time series shows a 
reduction of approximately 13% in terms of passengers and of 8,3% in 
movements. Passengers data in 2003 was 41,7 million; in 2010 was 113,7 
million (+170%) so it is possible to say that the traffic is increasing at a fast 
pace but fig. 50 suggests that the growth at 2nd, 3rd and 4th airport is faster 
than that at airport ranked 1st. In conclusion, all the airports taken into 
consideration had been growing from 2003 to 2010. As for movements, the 
total number doubled from 2003 to 2010; no relevant variation took place as 
for the six smaller airports’ (although, they registered a sensible growth in 
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absolute terms as well) while taking into consideration the market share of 
the top 6 airports it is possible to notice a deeper loss of share in % terms 
(but there was a traffic growth in absolute terms) for top 3 airports (whose 
majority took place between 2003 and 2006-7 as negligible variations are 
present from 2006-7 to 2008-9) with respect to the others. Thus, the market 
share of the bottom 6 airports is the same, while a re-allocation of the 
market shares took place among the top 6 airports. Thus, the market is 
expanding and the concentration diminishes. Geographically speaking, 
almost the 25% of the Indian passengers' traffic is concentrated in an area 
centered in Delhi with a mean radius of approximately 590 km (which 
gathers Delhi, Lucknow and Ahmedabad). Only Kolkata, Hyderabad and 
Coimbatore show a mild airline concentration: the leading carrier doesn’t 
achieve the 25% of market share and the top 5 carriers handle from 80% to 
87% of the total traffic. As the Indian market is one of the fastest growing at 
present, there is no concern about airline monopoly at its airport at present 
while airport infrastructures are quite congested. In terms of airlines’ 
presence at airports, five airlines dominate the Indian market: three are 
legacy carriers (Kingfishers, Air India and Jet Airways) and two are low 
cost carriers (Spice Jet and Indigo). Indigo and Jet Airways contribute to 
reach the 80% of the daily movements at all airports, Air India and Spice Jet 
at 11 out of 12 airports and Kingfishers at 10 out of 12. Moreover, with 
reference to the top 5 carriers of each airport, Jet Airways and Air India 
have the best connected network and therefore are the leading airlines of the 
country. Low cost carrier Indigo is present at 11 out of 12 airports while 
Spice Jet at 10 out of 12. As the Dominance Index is given by formula (20), 
the carriers which have a significant number of movements at the majority 
of airports take the highest score. Jet Airways totals 88 points (on 120 
available, thus it is not possible to define properly as a dominant airline), 
followed by Air India with 66 points and Indigo with 55. The difference in 
DI and the scarce concentration at airports suggest that there is scope for a 
Chapter 4: Methods of assessing airport competition at target countries 
 
 
- 327 - 
 
greater competition; on the other hand, the presence of more than one legacy 
carriers suggests that the government might still be heavily involved in the 
airline ownership so some form of protectionism may be present as well. 
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un-concentrated moderate high-concentrate
HHI norm 0,105 HHI norm 0,119 HHI norm 0,112 HHI norm 0,090 HHI norm 0,113
N° carriers 50 N° carriers 41 N° carriers 26 N° carriers 25 N° carriers 21
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,024 1/N 0,038 1/N 0,040 1/N 0,048
HHI 0,123 HHI 0,141 HHI 0,146 HHI 0,127 HHI 0,155
1st carrier 22,01% 1st carrier 26,69% 1st carrier 25,57% 1st carrier 20,40% 1st carrier 23,57%
1st-2nd carrier 36,80% 1st-2nd carrier 44,95% 1st-2nd carrier 42,05% 1st-2nd carrier 39,66% 1st-2nd carrier 45,71%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 50,77% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 56,85% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 58,52% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 53,26% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 61,43%
top5 72,31% top5 74,00% top5 80,11% top5 73,09% top5 81,43%
top10 88,76% top10 88,11% top10 88,64% top10 90,37% top10 92,14%
HHI norm 0,117 HHI norm 0,056 HHI norm 0,070 HHI norm 0,036 HHI norm 0,034
N° carriers 16 N° carriers 20 N° carriers 12 N° carriers 9 N° carriers 8
1/N 0,063 1/N 0,050 1/N 0,083 1/N 0,111 1/N 0,125
HHI 0,172 HHI 0,103 HHI 0,148 HHI 0,143 HHI 0,154
1st carrier 23,97% 1st carrier 19,17% 1st carrier 23,53% 1st carrier 18,87% 1st carrier 21,28%
1st-2nd carrier 47,95% 1st-2nd carrier 35,83% 1st-2nd carrier 45,38% 1st-2nd carrier 37,74% 1st-2nd carrier 42,55%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 64,38% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 47,50% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,14% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 52,83% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 55,32%
top5 87,67% top5 64,17% top5 77,31% top5 79,25% top5 80,85%
top10 95,89% top10 83,33% top10 96,64% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
HHI INDEX
HYDERABAD COCHIN AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW COIMBATORE
DEHLI MUMBAI CHENNAI BANGALORE KOLKATA
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Table 95a-b: Airlines’ concentration at Indian major airports
un-concentrated moderate high-concentrate
HHI norm 0,064 HHI norm 0,052
N° carriers 17 N° carriers 12
1/N 0,059 1/N 0,083
HHI 0,119 HHI 0,131
1st carrier 22,62% 1st carrier 17,39%
1st-2nd carrier 41,67% 1st-2nd carrier 32,61%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 51,19% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 47,83%
top5 65,48% top5 77,17%
top10 84,52% top10 95,65%
TRIVANDRUM GOA
HHI INDEX
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Table 96: Indian traffic composition
2010 2009 2004 2003
PAX GROUP 113.694.105 98.361.453 50.691.612 41.752.565
% ON PAX GROUP 79,27% 79,48% 85,51% 85,59%
% 2010 ON 2005 172,30%
PAX < 1000 km 34.898.493 29.661.493 17.408.869 14.645.525
% ON PAX GROUP 24,33% 23,97% 29,37% 30,02%
% 2010 ON 2005 138,29%
pax/kmq GROUP 17 14 7 6
pax/kmq < 1000 km 32 27 16 13
MEAN RADIUS 1470
MEAN RADIUS < 1000 km 591
AIRLINE DEL BOM MAA BLR CCU HYD COK AMD LKO CJB TRV GOI N° SERVICE
Air Arabia X X 2 LC
Air India X X X X X X X X X X X 11 NC
Air India Express X X 2 LC
Emirates X X 2 NC
GoAir X X X X X 5 LC
IndiGo X X X X X X X X X X X X 12 LC
Jet Airways (India) X X X X X X X X X X X X 12 NC
JetLite X X X X X X 6 RC
Kingfisher X X X X X X X X X X 10 NC
Maldivian X 1 NC
SpiceJet X X X X X X X X X X X 11 LC
Sri Lankan Airlines X 1 NC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 97: Dominance Index at Indian airports
AIRLINE TOTAL POINTS FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Jet Airways (India) 88 12 88,00
Air India 72 11 66,00
IndiGo 60 11 55,00
SpiceJet 62 10 51,67
Kingfisher 42 8 28,00
JetLite 22 4 7,33
Air India Express 10 2 1,67
GoAir 4 2 0,67
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Table 98: UK traffic data 
Rank MOVEMENTS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 London Heathrow LHR 469.786 472.041 470.891 475.789 473.207 460.178 31%
2 London Gatwick LGW 241.174 251.953 254.414 258.921 256.352 245.377 48%
3 London Stansted STN 176.769 178.012 189.995 191.522 177.285 155.985 59%
4 Manchester MAN 208.493 217.987 213.026 206.503 191.228 162.126 70%
5 London Luton LTN 64.243 75.424 78.840 83.319 85.661 75.094 75%
6 Birmingham BHX 109.202 112.963 108.658 104.481 102.856 93.936 81%
7 Edinburgh EDI 111.768 115.959 115.846 115.190 113.535 106.477 88%
8 Glasgow GLA 92.146 96.555 96.754 93.668 86.647 74.051 93%
9 Bristol BRS 54.793 61.311 65.825 58.741 60.068 53.796 97%
10 Liverpool LPL 39.736 49.341 47.792 45.772 43.708 42.143 100%
1.568.110 1.631.546 1.642.041 1.633.906 1.590.547 1.469.163
2.292.794 2.414.995 2.458.236 2.497.190 2.447.096 2.234.673
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank PASSENGERS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 London Heathrow LHR 67.109.174 67.683.317 67.339.227 67.852.387 66.906.954 65.906.641 36%
2 London Gatwick LGW 31.391.546 32.693.005 34.080.345 35.165.404 34.162.014 32.360.773 54%
3 London Stansted STN 20.907.023 21.991.733 23.680.352 23.759.250 22.340.375 19.949.689 65%
4 Manchester MAN 20.969.163 22.083.008 22.123.762 21.891.723 21.062.749 18.630.394 75%
5 London Luton LTN 7.520.467 9.134.748 9.414.829 9.919.361 10.173.902 9.115.327 80%
6 Birmingham BHX 8.796.712 9.311.403 9.056.004 9.134.055 9.576.700 9.093.201 85%
7 Edinburgh EDI 7.992.453 8.448.604 8.606.651 9.037.200 8.992.178 9.043.452 90%
8 Glasgow GLA 8.557.047 8.775.355 8.820.462 8.726.013 8.135.260 7.213.397 94%
9 Bristol BRS 4.603.106 5.199.220 5.710.222 5.883.856 6.228.656 5.615.200 97%
10 Liverpool LPL 3.351.922 4.409.018 4.962.460 5.463.234 5.329.826 4.879.468 100%
181.198.613 189.729.411 193.794.314 196.832.483 192.908.614 181.807.542
218.143.637 230.624.448 237.619.696 243.234.729 238.698.078 221.271.666
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 52: Lorenz curve UK Passengers 
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Fig. 53: Lorenz curve UK Movements
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Table 99: Gini Index for UK – time series 
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 10% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by ten airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while the 
information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On the 
graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of the 
time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately in 
the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,018 0,023 0,026 0,027 0,027 0,027 0,100 10%
0,043 0,051 0,055 0,057 0,059 0,057 0,200 20%
0,084 0,096 0,099 0,101 0,101 0,097 0,300 30%
0,129 0,142 0,145 0,147 0,149 0,147 0,400 40%
0,176 0,191 0,191 0,194 0,198 0,197 0,500 50%
0,224 0,239 0,240 0,244 0,251 0,247 0,600 60%
0,340 0,355 0,355 0,356 0,360 0,350 0,700 70%
0,455 0,471 0,477 0,477 0,476 0,459 0,800 80%
0,629 0,644 0,653 0,656 0,653 0,637 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,480 0,457 0,452 0,448 0,445 0,456 -5,02% GINI
equality
P
A
S
S
E
N
G
E
R
S
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,025 0,030 0,028 0,027 0,028 0,029 0,100 10%
0,060 0,067 0,069 0,064 0,066 0,065 0,200 20%
0,101 0,113 0,117 0,114 0,120 0,115 0,300 30%
0,159 0,172 0,175 0,172 0,174 0,167 0,400 40%
0,230 0,242 0,241 0,236 0,239 0,231 0,500 50%
0,301 0,313 0,312 0,306 0,310 0,303 0,600 60%
0,414 0,423 0,427 0,424 0,421 0,410 0,700 70%
0,547 0,556 0,558 0,550 0,541 0,520 0,800 80%
0,700 0,711 0,712 0,709 0,703 0,687 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,393 0,375 0,372 0,379 0,380 0,394 0,43% GINI
equality
M
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
S
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 99 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2005. 
From Table 98, fig. 52 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 53 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that London 
Heathrow airport accounts for approximately 31% of the total movements 
and for 36% of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the 
sample. It is necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into 
consideration approximately 82% of the UK passenger traffic output and 
65% of the traffic movements. That is to say that in UK there are other 
small secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million 
passengers/year) that handle 35% of the aircraft movements but only 18% of 
the passengers. In terms of movements, the 48% of the sample is handled by 
London Heathrow and Gatwick, the same airports handle the 54% of the 
total passengers output of the group. In terms of movements, airports 
ranking from 1st to 8th account for 93% of the total traffic, while in terms of 
passengers the top 7 airports gather the 90% of the total traffic. In general 
passengers are more concentrated than movements at the major airports 
suggesting a higher load factor or the usage of bigger aircrafts by airlines. In 
this country there has been a reduction over time of approximately 5% of 
the Gini index in terms of passengers and a mild growth of 0,4% in terms of 
aircraft movements. From Table 99 it is evident that the sharp loss of traffic 
took place between 2005 and 2006 and then from 2006 to 2009; the 2010 
brought the data back to 2006 level; from 2005 to 2010 the number of 
passengers carried grew faster than the 10 airports considered. From fig. 52 
it is possible to derive that the Lorenz curves for 2007 and 2010 overlap up 
to x=0,7 and are above the Lorenz curve of 2005; then Lorenz curve for 
2005 and 2010 overlap and stay below the Lorenz curve for 2007. Thus, 
there has been a re-allocation of the market share at the bottom 7 airport 
(which gained market share) with these airports growing faster than the top 
3 airports. As for movements, from fig. 53 we notice that 2010 Lorenz curve 
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is always below Lorenz curves for 2007 and 2005 for x=0,8; that is to say 
that from 2005 to 2010 London Gatwick gained market shares towards both 
London Heathrow and Stansted (which lost almost 2 million movements in 
the meantime) and this led to a growth in market concentration. Negligible 
variations are present at bottom airports. Geographically speaking, almost 
the 75% of the nation passengers’ traffic is concentrated in an area centered 
in London with a mean radius of approximately 170 km (which gathers 
London Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton, Liverpool, Bristol and 
Birmingham). To better explain this, we took into consideration the airport 
up to 500 km far from London Heathrow and we calculated the mean radius. 
The airports reported in brackets are less than 500km away from London 
Heathrow and the mean radius is 170km. 
There are four un-concentrated airports: Manchester (which is losing 
traffic), Birmingham, Edinburgh (which experiment competition from 
London airports) and Glasgow; there are three moderated concentrated 
airports (Heathrow, Gatwick and Bristol) where the leading airline has from 
35% to 43% market share and the top 3 airlines gather from 545 to 65% of 
the traffic and 3 airports highly-concentrated (Stansted, Luton and 
Liverpool). At those airports, the leading carrier has a movements share 
ranging from 50% to 60% and the top5 airlines detain more than 90% of the 
traffic. In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the airlines which 
contribute to reach the 80% of the daily movements in 8 out of 10 airports 
are low cost carriers (Ryanair and EasyJet) while British Airways is present 
at 5 out of 10 airports. Hence, with reference to the top 5 carriers of each 
airport, three low-cost carriers have the highest DI: EasyJet, Ryanair and 
Flybe which total 48, 40 and 39 points on 100 available. It is then possible 
to conclude that at UK airports there is scope for competition between 
airlines as the legacy carrier is ranked 4th in terms of dominance because it 
is more focused on its international network. London is capable of attracting 
a lot of passengers, London Stansted is the airport with the highest 
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connectivity among those with a majority share of traffic held by low cost 
carriers (N. Gualandi, L. Mantecchini, F. Paganelli , 2010) and hence it has 
a hub-capability of 14,64 passengers/inhabitants.  Better results in terms of 
hub capability are reached by Edinburgh and Manchester (16,4 and 15,4 
respectively).
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Table 100: Airlines’ concentration at UK major airports 
 
 
un-concentrated moderate high-concentrate
HHI norm 0,211 HHI norm 0,157 HHI norm 0,387 HHI norm 0,052 HHI norm 0,267
N° carriers 50 N° carriers 31 N° carriers 16 N° carriers 42 N° carriers 10
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,032 1/N 0,063 1/N 0,024 1/N 0,100
HHI 0,227 HHI 0,184 HHI 0,425 HHI 0,074 HHI 0,341
1st carrier 43,82% 1st carrier 35,84% 1st carrier 60,27% 1st carrier 22,11% 1st carrier 50,00%
1st-2nd carrier 50,30% 1st-2nd carrier 54,55% 1st-2nd carrier 84,59% 1st-2nd carrier 29,40% 1st-2nd carrier 77,70%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 54,74% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 65,38% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 88,70% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 35,68% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 88,51%
top5 61,39% top5 75,35% top5 92,12% top5 44,97% top5 93,24%
top10 71,70% top10 86,89% top10 96,92% top10 61,81% top10 100,00%
HHI norm 0,115 HHI norm 0,055 HHI norm 0,085 HHI norm 0,104 HHI norm 0,193
N° carriers 27 N° carriers 18 N° carriers 16 N° carriers 11 N° carriers 4
1/N 0,037 1/N 0,056 1/N 0,063 1/N 0,091 1/N 0,250
HHI 0,148 HHI 0,108 HHI 0,142 HHI 0,185 HHI 0,395
1st carrier 35,58% 1st carrier 19,14% 1st carrier 21,76% 1st carrier 36,84% 1st carrier 50,00%
1st-2nd carrier 43,27% 1st-2nd carrier 36,72% 1st-2nd carrier 42,49% 1st-2nd carrier 48,25% 1st-2nd carrier 86,84%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 47,12% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 47,66% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 56,99% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 58,77% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 94,74%
top5 54,81% top5 64,06% top5 77,20% top5 75,44% top5 100,00%
top10 69,23% top10 89,06% top10 93,78% top10 98,25% top10 100,00%
HHI INDEX
BIRMINGHAM EDIMBURGH GLASGOW BRISTOL LIVERPOOL
L. HEATHROW L. GATWICK L. STANSTED MANCHESTER L. LUTON
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Table 101a: UK traffic composition
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PAX GROUP 181.198.613 189.729.411 193.794.314 196.832.483 192.908.614 181.807.542
% ON PAX GROUP 83,06% 82,27% 81,56% 80,92% 80,82% 82,16%
% 2010 on 2005 0,34%
PAX < 500 km 164.649.113 172.505.452 176.367.201 179.069.270 175.781.176 165.550.693
% ON PAX GROUP 75,48% 74,80% 74,22% 73,62% 73,64% 74,82%
% 2010 on 2005 0,55%
PAX/kmq GROUP 752 787 804 817 801 755
PAX/kmq < 500 km 1.770 1.855 1.896 1.925 1.890 1.780
MEAN RADIUS 277
MEAN RADIUS < 500 km 172
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Table 101b: UK traffic composition
AIRLINE LHR LGW STN MAN LTN BHX EDI GLA BRS LPL N° SERVICE
Aer Arann X X X X 4 RC
Aer Lingus X X X 3 NC
Air Canada X 1 NC
Air France X X X 3 NC
Alitalia X 1 NC
American Airlines X 1 NC
BA CityFlyer X X 2 RC
Blue Islands X 1 RC
bmi X X X X 4 NC
bmi Regional X X X 3 RC
bmibaby X 1 LC
British Airways X X X X X 5 NC
Brussels Airlines X X 2 NC
Delta Air Lines X 1 NC
Eastern Airways X 1 RC - CH
easyJet X X X X X X X X 8 LC
Eurowings X X 2 RC
FlyBE X X X X X X 6 LC
Helvetic Airways X 1 CH
Iberia X 1 NC
Jet2.com X 1 LC
KLM X X X 3 NC
KLM Cityhopper X 1 RC
Loganair X X 2 RC
Lufthansa X X 2 NC
Lufthansa Cityline X 1 RC
Monarch Airlines X X 2 CH
Norwegian Air Shuttle X 1 LC
Ryanair X X X X X X X X 8 LC
SAS - Scandinavian Airlines X 1 NC
Sun Air X 1 RC
SWISS X X 2 NC
TAP-Air Portugal X 1 NC
Thomas Cook Airlines UK X 1 CH
Thomson X X X 3 NC - CH
United Airlines X 1 NC
Virgin Atlantic Airways X 1 NC
Wizzair X 1 LC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 102: Dominance Index at UK airports 
 
Table 103: Hub capability at UK airports 
 
 
AIRLINE POINTS TOT FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
easyJet 68 7 47,6
Ryanair 50 8 40
FlyBE 56 7 39,2
British Airways 36 5 18
Aer Lingus 6 2 1,2
BMI Regional 6 2 1,2
BMI Baby 6 2 1,2
Wizzair 8 1 0,8
BMI 8 1 0,8
Brussels Airlines 6 1 0,6
German Wings 6 1 0,6
Loganair 6 1 0,6
Lufthansa 6 1 0,6
Air Berlin 4 1 0,4
Blue Air 4 1 0,4
Blue Islands 4 1 0,4
KLM Cityhopper 4 1 0,4
Norwegian Air Shuttle 4 1 0,4
Aer Arann 2 1 0,2
BA CityFlyer 2 1 0,2
Monarch Airlines 2 1 0,2
Thomson 2 1 0,2
Virgin Atlantic Airways 2 1 0,2
AIRPORT INHABITANTS PASSENGERS PAX/INHAB
EDI 550.400           9.043.452      16,43           
MAN 1.205.500       18.630.394   15,45           
LHR+LGW+STN+LTN 8.700.000       127.332.430 14,64           
GLA 847.300           7.213.397      8,51             
BRS 661.500           5.615.200      8,49             
BHX 1.985.000       9.093.201      4,58             
LPL 1.100.700       4.879.468      4,43             
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Table 104: Italy traffic data 
Rank MOVEMENTS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Rome-Fiumicino FCO 302.890 310.100 328.282 340.971 318.849 329.252 32%
2 Milan-Malpensa MXP 227.718 247.456 263.584 212.841 183.182 189.580 51%
3 Milan Linate LIN 93.942 100.113 100.467 96.823 93.764 91.907 60%
4 Milan/Orio al Serio BGY 47.820 53.741 58.613 61.980 63.188 67.167 66%
5 Venice VCE 75.196 77.386 80.896 73.744 73.066 72.763 73%
6 Catania CTA 53.397 52.217 59.301 56.704 55.331 57.249 79%
7 Naples NAP 49.096 52.569 62.774 60.448 57.055 55.914 84%
8 Bologna BLQ 54.780 58.206 61.618 56.993 59.027 64.193 91%
9 Rome-Ciampino CIA 49.915 57.195 58.375 51.275 34.283 47.749 95%
10 Palermo PMO 42.751 45.892 49.106 47.120 49.389 46.569 100%
997.505 1.054.875 1.123.016 1.058.899 987.134 1.022.343
1.348.715 1.419.875 1.532.987 1.468.880 1.382.289 1.433.221
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank PASSENGERS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Rome-Fiumicino FCO 28.208.161 29.726.051 32.479.653 34.815.230 33.415.945 35.956.295 35%
2 Milan-Malpensa MXP 19.499.158 21.621.236 23.717.177 19.014.186 17.349.602 18.714.187 53%
3 Milan Linate LIN 9.085.999 9.623.156 9.924.558 9.264.561 8.293.839 8.295.436 61%
4 Milan/Orio al Serio BGY 4.291.239 5.226.340 5.720.481 6.462.591 7.144.203 7.661.061 68%
5 Venice VCE 5.780.783 6.296.345 7.032.499 6.848.244 6.655.612 6.801.941 75%
6 Catania CTA 5.169.927 5.370.411 6.046.263 6.020.606 5.905.074 6.301.832 81%
7 Naples NAP 4.573.158 5.056.643 5.720.260 5.594.043 5.310.965 5.535.984 86%
8 Bologna BLQ 3.624.072 3.928.887 4.253.198 4.124.298 4.765.232 5.432.248 91%
9 Rome-Ciampino CIA 4.222.263 4.933.487 5.388.749 4.778.059 4.757.136 4.563.852 96%
10 Palermo PMO 3.809.637 4.246.555 4.486.364 4.424.867 4.352.778 4.341.696 100%
88.264.397 96.029.111 104.769.202 101.346.685 97.950.386 103.604.532
112.931.916 122.889.091 135.308.151 132.952.402 129.891.116 138.909.695
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 54: Lorenz curve Italy Passengers 
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Fig. 55: Lorenz curve Italy Movements
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Table 105: Gini Index for Italy – time series 
 
The Lorenz curve might be read both from left to right (that is from the 
smaller to the biggest airport among the sample), both from right to left (that 
is from the biggest to the smallest airport among the sample). Each airport 
accounts for a 10% on the X-axis regardless of its output as the sample is 
composed by ten airports, so the relevant data are on the Y-axis while the 
information on the X-axis will be given in terms of airports involved. On the 
graphical representations of Lorenz curve, the first and the last year of the 
time series are taken into consideration plus a further year approximately in 
the middle of the time series itself. The Gini index is the area between the 
equity curve (the hypotenuse of the triangle) and the Lorenz curve. The 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,041 0,041 0,041 0,041 0,044 0,042 0,100 10%
0,084 0,085 0,083 0,084 0,093 0,086 0,200 20%
0,132 0,136 0,135 0,131 0,142 0,138 0,300 30%
0,181 0,189 0,189 0,187 0,196 0,192 0,400 40%
0,232 0,244 0,244 0,246 0,256 0,253 0,500 50%
0,291 0,299 0,302 0,310 0,324 0,318 0,600 60%
0,357 0,365 0,369 0,377 0,397 0,392 0,700 70%
0,459 0,465 0,464 0,469 0,482 0,472 0,800 80%
0,680 0,690 0,690 0,656 0,659 0,653 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,408 0,397 0,397 0,400 0,381 0,391 GINI-4,33%
equality
P
A
S
S
E
N
G
E
R
S
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,043 0,044 0,044 0,044 0,035 0,046 0,100 10%
0,091 0,093 0,096 0,093 0,085 0,092 0,200 20%
0,140 0,143 0,148 0,146 0,141 0,147 0,300 30%
0,190 0,194 0,201 0,200 0,199 0,203 0,400 40%
0,244 0,248 0,256 0,257 0,258 0,266 0,500 50%
0,299 0,303 0,311 0,316 0,322 0,331 0,600 60%
0,374 0,377 0,384 0,386 0,396 0,403 0,700 70%
0,468 0,471 0,473 0,477 0,491 0,493 0,800 80%
0,696 0,706 0,708 0,678 0,677 0,678 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,391 0,384 0,376 0,380 0,379 0,368 GINI-5,82%
equality
M
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
S
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numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 105 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2005. 
From Table 104, fig. 54 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 55 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Rome 
Fiumicino airport accounts for approximately 32% of the total movements 
and for 35% of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the 
sample. It is necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into 
consideration approximately 77% of the Italian passenger traffic output and 
72% of the traffic movements. That is to say that in Italy there are other 
small secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million 
passengers/year) that handle 28% of the aircraft movements but only 23% of 
the passengers. In terms of movements, the 51% of the sample is handled by 
Rome Fiumicino and Milan Malpensa; the same airports handle the 53% of 
the total passengers output of the group. In terms of both movements and 
passengers, airports ranking from 1st to 8th account for 91% of the total 
traffic. In general passengers are more concentrated than movements at the 
major airports suggesting a higher load factor or the usage of bigger 
aircrafts by airlines. In this country there has been a reduction over time of 
approximately 4,83% of the Gini index in terms of passengers and of a 
5,82% in terms of aircraft movements. From Table 105 it is evident that the 
sharp loss of traffic took place between 2005 and 2006 and then from 2008 
to 2009; the 2010 registered a +1% on 2009; from 2005 to 2010 the number 
of passengers carried grew at all airports with the only exceptions being 
Linate and Malpensa as a consequence of the de-hubbing of Alitalia. Rome 
Fiumicino and Milan Orio al serio were the fastest growing airports in the 
period. From fig. 54 it is possible to derive the growth of Fiumicino’s 
market share in 2010 at x=0,9 (blue Lorenz curve) and the loss at Milan 
Linate (x=0,7). As for movements, from fig. 55 we notice that 2010 Lorenz 
curve is below Lorenz curves for 2007 and 2005 for x=0,9; that is to say that 
from 2005 to 2010 Rome Fiumicino gained market shares towards both 
Chapter 4: Methods of assessing airport competition at target countries 
 
 
- 348 - 
 
Milan Malpensa and Linate and this led to a growth in market concentration. 
Relevant variations are present also for x=0,6 (Milan Orio al Serio). 
Geographically speaking, almost the 36% of the nation passengers’ traffic is 
concentrated in an area centered in Rome with a mean radius of 
approximately 230 km (which gathers Rome Fiumicino and Ciampino, 
Bologna and Naples).  
Five out of 10 Italian airport present airline concentration (Fiumicino, 
Ciampino, Linate, Orio al Serio and Catania): the leading carrier has market 
share ranging from 44% to 93% (Milan Orio al Serio and Ciampino are 
dominated by Ryanair) and the top 3 airlines gathering together from 70% 
to 100% (Rome Fiumicino has not been taken into consideration as it is the 
main hub, so other airlines have negligible shares). There are four un-
concentrated airport (Malpensa, Venice, Naples, Bologna) and one airport 
where the concentration is moderate. The top 3 airlines’ share ranges from 
30% to 70%. In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the airlines which 
contribute to reach the 80% of the daily movements in 8 out of 10 airports 
are legacy carriers (Alitalia with 8 out of 10 airports and Lufthansa with 6 
out of 10 airports) followed by EasyJet with 6 airports as well. Hence, with 
reference to the top 5 carriers of each airports, airlines part of the Alitalia 
group rank 1st and 2th (Airone city-liner) with 6 and 5 airport respectively, 
then there are two low cost carriers (EasyJet and Ryanair) with 5 and 4 
airports respectively. The highest DI is obtained by Alitalia (33,6 points on 
100 available), followed by EasyJet with 20 points and Ryanair with 14,4. It 
is then possible to conclude that at Italian airports there is scope for 
competition between airlines as the legacy carrier is still recovering from its 
bankruptcy and market loss. Nevertheless, the high percentage of dominated 
airports highlights the easiness to obtain monopoly from management 
entities. Moreover, the traffic is very dispersed among the territory due to 
the geography of the country. Milan is the city which has higher hub 
capability (16,32 passenger/inhabitants) followed by Venice (thanks to its 
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touristic sightseeing) and Rome which is in a peripheral position with 
reference to the other EU hubs.  
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Table 106: Airlines’ concentration at Italian major airports 
 
 
un-concentrated moderate high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,263 HHI norm 0,049 HHI norm 0,291022 HHI norm 0,609567 HHI norm 0,03004
N° carriers 50 N° carriers 50 N° carriers 17 N° carriers 10 N° carriers 25
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,020 1/N 0,059 1/N 0,100 1/N 0,040
HHI 0,278 HHI 0,068 HHI 0,333 HHI 0,649 HHI 0,069
1st carrier 48,22% 1st carrier 19,85% 1st carrier 55,97% 1st carrier 79,86% 1st carrier 14,06%
1st-2nd carrier 53,14% 1st-2nd carrier 25,88% 1st-2nd carrier 63,43% 1st-2nd carrier 89,58% 1st-2nd carrier 28,13%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 57,51% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 30,90% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 70,52% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 90,97% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 35,94%
top5 62,43% top5 35,93% top5 79,48% top5 93,75% top5 46,88%
top10 71,45% top10 46,73% top10 92,91% top10 100,00% top10 68,75%
HHI norm 0,162829 HHI norm 0,08864 HHI norm 0,059145 HHI norm 0,756204 HHI norm 0,078578
N° carriers 9 N° carriers 16 N° carriers 21 N° carriers 2 N° carriers 8
1/N 0,111 1/N 0,063 1/N 0,048 1/N 0,500 1/N 0,125
HHI 0,256 HHI 0,146 HHI 0,104 HHI 0,878 HHI 0,194
1st carrier 44,04% 1st carrier 24,00% 1st carrier 26,28% 1st carrier 93,48% 1st carrier 30,30%
1st-2nd carrier 66,06% 1st-2nd carrier 44,00% 1st-2nd carrier 33,58% 1st-2nd carrier 100,00% 1st-2nd carrier 51,52%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 73,39% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 62,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 40,88% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 100,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 69,70%
top5 84,40% top5 76,00% top5 54,01% top5 100,00% top5 87,88%
top10 100,00% top10 88,00% top10 75,18% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
PALERMO
ROME FIUMICINO MILAN MALPENSA MILAN LINATE MILAN ORIO AL SERIO VENICE
HHI INDEX
CATANIA NAPLES BOLOGNA ROME CIAMPINO
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Table 107a: Italian traffic composition
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PAX GROUP 88.264.397 96.029.111 104.769.202 101.346.685 97.950.386 103.604.532
% ON PAX GROUP 78,16% 78,14% 77,43% 76,23% 75,41% 74,58%
% 2010 ON 2005 17,38%
PAX < 500 km 40.627.654 43.645.068 47.841.860 49.311.630 48.249.278 51.488.379
% ON PAX GROUP 35,98% 35,52% 35,36% 37,09% 37,15% 37,07%
% 2010 ON 2005 26,73%
PAX/kmq GROUP 109 118 129 125 121 127
PAX/kmq < 500 km 241 259 284 293 286 305
MEAN RADIUS 509
MEAN RADIUS < 500 km 232
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Table 107b: Italian traffic composition 
 
 
 
 
 
AIRLINE FCO MXP LIN BGY VCE CTA NAP BLQ CIA PMO N° SERVICE
Air alps aviation X 1 RC
Air berlin X 1 NC
Air Dolomiti X X X 3 RC
Air France X X X X 4 NC
Air Nostrum X 1 RC
Air One X X X X 4 NC
Air One CityLiner X X X X 4 RC
Alitalia X X X X X X X X 8 NC
Austrian X 1 NC
Belle air X 1 LC
Blue Panorama X X 2 CH
British Airways X X X X 4 NC
Brussels Airlines X X 2 NC
CAI first X 1 RC
Cargolux italia X 1 FC
Cathay pacific airways X 1 NC
Contact Air X X 2 RC
Czech airlines X 1 NC
Darwin Airlines X 1 RC
Easyjet X X X X X X 6 LC
El Al X 1 NC
Emirates X 1 NC
Ethiopian Airlines X 1 NC
Eurowings X 1 RC
Finnair X 1 NC
Germanwings X X 2 LC
Helvetic Airlines X 1 CH
Iberia X X X 3 NC
KLM X X 2 NC
KLM Cityhopper X X 2 RC
Korean Air X 1 NC
Lot - Polish Airlines X 1 NC
Lufthansa X X X X X X 6 NC
Luxair X 1 NC
Malev X 1 NC
Meridiana X X X X X 5 NC
Niki X 1 LC
Qatar airways X 1 NC
Regional compagnie aerienne europeene X X 2 RC
Ryanair X X X X 4 LC
SAS - Scandinavian airlines X 1 NC
Singapore airlines X 1 NC
Sky Work airlines X 1 RC - CH
Swiss X X 2 NC
Tap- air portugal X X 2 NC
Turkish Airlines X X 2 NC
Tyrolean Airways X X 2 NC
Vueling X X 2 LC
Wind Jet X X X X X 5 LC
Wizzair X X 2 LC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 108: Dominance Index at Italian airports 
 
 
Table 109: Hub capability at Italian airports
AIRLINE POINTS TOT FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Alitalia 56 6 33,6
easyJet 40 5 20
Ryanair 36 4 14,4
Air One CityLiner 26 5 13
Wind Jet 24 4 9,6
Blue panorama 12 3 3,6
lufthansa 12 3 3,6
Meridiana 12 3 3,6
Wizzair 18 2 3,6
Air one 10 2 2
Air france 8 2 1,6
Air Nostrum 8 1 0,8
Air France 6 1 0,6
Air Dolomiti 4 1 0,4
CAI first 4 1 0,4
Carpatair 4 1 0,4
Turkish airlines 4 1 0,4
British airways 2 1 0,2
Brussels airlines 2 1 0,2
AIRPORT INHABITANTS PASSENGERS PAX/INHAB
MXP+LIN+BGY 2.124.400       34.670.684   16,32           
VCE+TSF 705.250           8.946.279      12,69           
FCO+CIA 3.209.400       40.520.147   12,63           
CTA 617.550           6.301.832      10,20           
BLQ 639.000           5.432.248      8,50             
PMO 858.800           4.341.696      5,06             
NAP 1.863.650       5.535.984      2,97             
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Table 110: Spain traffic data 
Rank MOVEMENTS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Madrid MAD 415.704 434.959 483.292 469.746 435.187 433.706 31%
2 Barcelona BCN 307.811 327.650 352.501 321.693 278.981 277.832 51%
3 Palma de Mallorca PMI 182.028 190.304 197.384 193.379 177.502 174.635 63%
4 Malaga AGP 123.959 127.776 129.698 119.821 103.539 105.634 71%
5 Gran Canaria LPA 110.748 114.949 114.355 116.252 101.557 103.093 78%
6 Alicante ALC 76.109 76.813 79.756 81.097 74.281 74.476 83%
7 Tenerife Sur TFS 63.649 65.774 65.036 60.779 49.779 51.858 87%
8 Ibiza IBZ 49.603 54.146 57.855 57.233 53.552 56.988 91%
9 Lanzarote ACE 47.158 50.172 52.968 53.375 42.915 46.669 94%
10 Valencia VLC 87.045 87.920 96.616 96.795 81.126 77.806 100%
1.463.814 1.530.463 1.629.461 1.570.170 1.398.419 1.402.697
2.210.449 2.318.525 2.501.537 2.420.072 2.168.580 2.119.665TOT COUNTRY
TOT GROUP
Rank PASSENGERS IATA CODE 2.005 2.006 2.007 2.008 2.009 2.010 % on 2010
1 Madrid MAD 42.146.784 45.799.983 52.110.787 50.846.494 48.437.147 49.866.113 33%
2 Barcelona BCN 27.152.745 30.008.302 32.898.249 30.272.084 27.421.682 29.209.536 52%
3 Palma de Mallorca PMI 21.240.736 22.408.427 23.228.879 22.832.857 21.203.041 21.117.417 65%
4 Malaga AGP 12.669.019 13.076.252 13.590.803 12.813.472 11.622.429 12.064.521 73%
5 Gran Canaria LPA 9.827.157 10.286.726 10.354.903 10.212.123 9.155.665 9.486.035 79%
6 Alicante ALC 8.795.705 8.893.720 9.120.631 9.578.304 9.139.479 9.382.931 85%
7 Tenerife Sur TFS 8.631.923 8.845.668 8.639.341 8.251.989 7.108.055 7.358.986 90%
8 Ibiza IBZ 4.164.703 4.460.143 4.765.625 4.647.360 4.572.819 5.040.800 94%
9 Lanzarote ACE 5.467.499 5.626.087 5.625.580 5.438.178 4.701.669 4.938.343 97%
10 Valencia VLC 4.639.314 4.969.120 5.933.424 5.779.343 4.748.997 4.934.268 100%
144.735.585 154.374.428 166.268.222 160.672.204 148.110.983 153.398.950
181.277.741 193.553.178 210.498.760 203.862.028 187.631.102 192.792.606
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 56: Lorenz curve Spain Passengers 
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Fig. 57: Lorenz curve Spain Movements
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Table 111: Gini Index for Spain – time series 
 
The numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 111 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2005. 
From Table 110, fig. 56 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 57 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Madrid 
airport accounts for approximately 31% of the total movements and for 33% 
of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the sample. It is 
necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into consideration 
approximately 79% of the Spanish passenger traffic output and 65% of the 
traffic movements. That is to say that in Spain there are other small 
secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million passengers/year) 
that handle 35% of the aircraft movements but only 21% of the passengers. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,029 0,029 0,029 0,029 0,031 0,032 0,100 10%
0,061 0,061 0,062 0,063 0,063 0,064 0,200 20%
0,099 0,098 0,098 0,099 0,095 0,097 0,300 30%
0,158 0,155 0,150 0,150 0,143 0,145 0,400 40%
0,219 0,212 0,205 0,210 0,204 0,206 0,500 50%
0,287 0,279 0,267 0,273 0,266 0,268 0,600 60%
0,374 0,364 0,349 0,353 0,345 0,347 0,700 70%
0,521 0,509 0,489 0,495 0,488 0,485 0,800 80%
0,709 0,703 0,687 0,684 0,673 0,675 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,409 0,418 0,433 0,429 0,439 0,436 GINI
P
A
S
S
E
N
G
E
R
S
equality
6,71%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,032 0,033 0,033 0,034 0,031 0,033 0,100 10%
0,066 0,068 0,068 0,070 0,066 0,070 0,200 20%
0,110 0,111 0,108 0,109 0,105 0,111 0,300 30%
0,162 0,161 0,157 0,161 0,158 0,164 0,400 40%
0,221 0,219 0,216 0,222 0,216 0,219 0,500 50%
0,297 0,294 0,286 0,296 0,288 0,293 0,600 60%
0,381 0,377 0,366 0,373 0,362 0,368 0,700 70%
0,506 0,502 0,487 0,496 0,489 0,493 0,800 80%
0,716 0,716 0,703 0,701 0,689 0,691 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,402 0,404 0,415 0,407 0,419 0,412 GINI
M
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
S
2,38%
equality
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In terms of movements, the 51% of the sample is handled by Madrid and 
Barcelona; the same airports handle the 52% of the total passengers output 
of the group. In terms of movements, airports ranking from 1st to 8th account 
for 91% of the total traffic, while the 90% of the passenger output is handled 
by airport ranked from1st to 7th. In general passengers are more 
concentrated than movements at the major airports suggesting a higher load 
factor or the usage of bigger aircrafts by airlines. This is the only country up 
to now in which there has been a growth of concentration in both passengers 
(+6,71%) and movements (+2,4%) from 2005 to 2010. From Table 111 it is 
evident that the growth has been slightly constant with mild losses in 2008 
and 2010 and peak values achieved in 2009. From 2005 to 2010 the number 
of movements fell at all airports with the only exceptions being Madrid and 
Ibiza. As a consequence in fig. 57, the Lorenz curve for 2010 is below the 
Lorenz curves for 2005 and 2007. The relevant growth of the Gini index in 
terms of passengers is explained by Table 110: from 2005 to 2010 Madrid 
and Barcelona registered a growth in terms of passengers carried while the 
others showed no changes or registered mild losses; therefore, Lorenz curve 
for 2010 is below Lorenz curve for 2005. It is worth noticing that Lorenz 
curve for 2007 overlaps the curve for 2010 even if the absolute values were 
higher. That is to say that the traffic loss between 2007 and 2010 was even 
Spanish at all airports. Geographically speaking, almost the 66% of the 
Spanish passengers' traffic is concentrated in an area centered in Madrid 
with a mean radius of approximately 540 km.  
Only Ibiza and Valencia register high-concentration with the dominant 
carrier accounting for, respectively, 52% and 43% and the top 3 carriers 
accounting for 84% and 75%. The dominant carrier is Air nostrum, 
Regional carrier which operates in behalf of Iberia on regional routes. 
Madrid, Palma de Maiorca and Lanzarote register a significant 
concentration with top 3 airlines accounting for more than 60% of the daily 
movements. The other 5 airports are un-concentrated with the highest top 5 
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reaching 71%. Spain is a peculiar country as there is a lot of tourism: 
indeed, 7 out of 10 airports serve islands and coastal towns. In terms of 
airlines’ presence at airports, the airline which contribute to reach the 80% 
of the daily movements in 10 out of 10 airports is the low cost carrier 
Ryanair, followed by Air nostrum 7 and Air Europa with 6 (a regional and a 
charter carrier). The 4th airline is Spanair which has recently filed for 
bankruptcy, so the Spanish scenario is likely to evolve on the account of the 
carrier which will be able to take over its place. Due to tourism and to the 
fact that the legacy carrier Iberia is focused on the international network 
towards Latin America, the Spanish market is dominated – in terms of DI – 
by low cost and regional carriers: Ryanair scores 63 points, Air Nostrum 
27,6 , Air Europa and Vueling 12 points. It is then possible to conclude that 
at Spanish airports there is scope for competition between airlines as the 
legacy carrier is oriented towards the international routes; moreover the 
merging with British Airways is likely to lead to a rationalization of the 
slots. Madrid and Barcelona are ranked 7th and 8th among those airports in 
term of hub capability as they have a significant number of inhabitants. On 
the other hand, touristic destinations like Lanzarote, Palma de Maiorca and 
Ibiza have high values of hub capability.  
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Table 112: Airlines’ concentration at Spanish major airports 
 
 
 
un-concentrated moderated high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,153 HHI norm 0,073 HHI norm 0,135 HHI norm 0,068 HHI norm 0,063
N° carriers 50 N° carriers 50 N° carriers 11 N° carriers 24 N° carriers 25
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,020 1/N 0,091 1/N 0,042 1/N 0,040
HHI 0,170 HHI 0,091 HHI 0,214 HHI 0,107 HHI 0,100
1st carrier 30,98% 1st carrier 20,63% 1st carrier 34,34% 1st carrier 21,80% 1st carrier 23,61%
1st-2nd carrier 52,34% 1st-2nd carrier 33,58% 1st-2nd carrier 58,59% 1st-2nd carrier 41,35% 1st-2nd carrier 34,43%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 60,59% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 45,41% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 72,73% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 48,87% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 42,95%
top5 73,42% top5 58,74% top5 89,90% top5 59,40% top5 58,36%
top10 84,60% top10 76,10% top10 98,99% top10 75,94% top10 80,00%
HHI norm 0,053 HHI norm 0,062 HHI norm 0,201 HHI norm 0,131 HHI norm 0,197
N° carriers 11 N° carriers 19 N° carriers 6 N° carriers 8 N° carriers 11
1/N 0,091 1/N 0,053 1/N 0,167 1/N 0,125 1/N 0,091
HHI 0,139 HHI 0,112 HHI 0,334 HHI 0,240 HHI 0,270
1st carrier 26,51% 1st carrier 19,39% 1st carrier 52,00% 1st carrier 38,67% 1st carrier 43,52%
1st-2nd carrier 42,17% 1st-2nd carrier 37,76% 1st-2nd carrier 72,00% 1st-2nd carrier 60,00% 1st-2nd carrier 69,44%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 54,22% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 52,04% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 84,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 78,67% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 75,93%
top5 71,08% top5 66,33% top5 96,00% top5 89,33% top5 86,11%
top10 97,59% top10 83,67% top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 98,15%
VALENCIA
MADRID BARCELONA PALMA MAIORCA MALAGA LAS PALMAS
HHI INDEX
ALICANTE TENERIFE IBIZA LANZAROTE
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Table 113a: Spanish traffic composition
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
PAX GROUP 144.735.585 154.374.428 166.268.222 160.672.204 148.110.983 153.398.950
% ON PAX GROUP 79,84% 79,76% 78,99% 78,81% 78,94% 79,57%
% 2010 on 2005 5,99%
PAX < 1000 120.809.006 129.615.947 141.648.398 136.769.914 127.145.594 131.615.586
% ON PAX GROUP 66,64% 66,97% 67,29% 67,09% 67,76% 68,27%
% 2010 on 2005 8,95%
PAX/kmq GROUP 45 48 52 50 46 48
PAX/kmq < 1000 km 133 143 156 151 140 145
MEAN RADIUS 1007
MEAN RADIUS < 1000 km 537
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Table 113b: Spanish traffic composition 
 
 
 
 
 
AIRLINE MAD BCN PMI AGP LPA ALC TFS IBZ ACE VLC N° SERVICE
Ryanair X X X X X X X X X X 10 LC
Air Nostrum X X X X X X X 7 RC
Air Europa X X X X X X 6 NC - CH
Spanair (bankrupcy 28-01-12) X X X X X X 6 NC
easyjet X X X X X 5 LC
Vueling X X X X X 5 LC
Air Berlin X X X X 4 NC
Iberia X X X X 4 NC
Transavia X X X 3 LC
Binter Canarias X X 2 RC
Condor X X 2 CH
Hapagfly X X 2 CH
Islas Airways X X 2 RC
NAYSA X X 2 RC
Air France X 1 NC
British Airways X 1 NC
FlexFlight ApS X 1 CH
Jetairfly X 1 LC
KLM X 1 NC
Lufthansa X 1 NC
Niki X 1 LC
Norwegian Air Shuttle X 1 LC
Portugalia Airlines X 1 RC
SWISS X 1 NC
TAP-Air Portugal X 1 NC
Tatarstan X 1 NC
TUIfly Nordic X 1 CH
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 114: Dominance Index at Spanish airports 
 
 
Table 115: Hub capability at Spanish airports
AIRLINE POINTS TOT FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Ryanair 70 9 63
Air Nostrum 46 6 27,6
Air Europa 24 5 12
Vueling 24 5 12
Spanair 22 5 11
Air Berlin 24 4 9,6
Iberia 18 3 5,4
NAYSA 20 2 4
easyJet 12 3 3,6
Islas Airways 14 2 2,8
Hapagfly 10 2 2
Binter Canarias 8 2 1,6
Condor 6 1 0,6
Portugalia Airlines 2 1 0,2
AIRPORT INHABITANTS PASSENGERS PAX/INHAB
ACE 96.700             4.938.343      51,07           
PMI 700.000           21.117.417   30,17           
IBZ 205.700           5.040.800      24,51           
LPA 617.500           9.486.035      15,36           
TFS 583.200           7.358.986      12,62           
AGP 1.086.900       12.064.521   11,10           
MAD 4.822.000       49.866.113   10,34           
BCN 2.850.000       29.209.536   10,25           
ALC 1.208.700       9.382.931      7,76             
VLC 1.344.300       4.934.268      3,67             
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Table 116: Turkey traffic data 
Rank Movements City IATA CODE mov 2009 mov 2010 % on 2010
1 Atatürk International Airport Istanbul IST 283.926 288.249 36%
2 Antalya Airport Antalya AYT 127.278 148.825 55%
3 Sabiha Gökçen International Airport Istanbul / Pendik SAW 63.812 104.175 68%
4 Esenboga International Airport Ankara ESB 62.625 73.936 78%
5 Adnan Menderes Airport Izmir ADB 54.167 63.162 86%
6 Dalaman Airport Dalaman DLM 24.008 27.070 89%
7 Milas-Bodrum Airport Bodrum BJV 23.475 25.822 92%
8 Adana Sakirpasa Airport Adana ADA 26.326 30.343 96%
9 Trabzon Airport Trabzon TZX 14.893 17.797 99%
10 Diyarbakir Airport Diyarbakir DIY 8.883 11.335 100%
689.393 790.714
1.066.083 1.213.125
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
Rank Passengers City IATA CODE pax 2008 pax 2009 pax 2010 % on 2010
1 Atatürk International Airport Istanbul IST 28.553.132 29.812.888 32.145.619 34%
2 Antalya Airport Antalya AYT 18.789.257 18.345.693 21.996.601 58%
3 Sabiha Gökçen International Airport Istanbul / Pendik SAW 4.281.193 6.517.486 11.129.472 70%
4 Esenboga International Airport Ankara ESB 5.692.133 6.084.404 7.759.479 78%
5 Adnan Menderes Airport Izmir ADB 5.455.298 6.201.794 7.485.067 86%
6 Dalaman Airport Dalaman DLM 3.208.668 3.347.996 3.784.440 90%
7 Milas-Bodrum Airport Bodrum BJV 2.749.788 2.780.944 3.071.418 93%
8 Adana Sakirpasa Airport Adana ADA 2.290.427 2.482.402 2.841.220 96%
9 Trabzon Airport Trabzon TZX 1.469.713 1.596.905 1.963.168 98%
10 Diyarbakir Airport Diyarbakir DIY 967.088 1.060.381 1.404.639 100%
73.456.697 78.230.893 93.581.123
79.438.289 85.208.880 102.705.805
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 58: Lorenz curve Turkey Passengers 
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Fig. 59: Lorenz curve Turkey Movements
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Table 117: Gini Index for Turkey – time series 
 
The numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 117 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2008 (for passengers) and on 2009 (for 
movements). 
From Table 116, fig. 58 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 59 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Istanbul 
Ataturk airport accounts for approximately 34% of the total movements and 
for 36% of the total passengers traffic taken into consideration by the 
sample. It is necessary to bear in mind that the sample takes into 
consideration approximately 91% of the Turkish passenger traffic output 
and 65% of the traffic movements. That is to say that in Turkey there are 
2010 2009
0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,014 0,013 0,100 10%
0,037 0,034 0,200 20%
0,069 0,069 0,300 30%
0,104 0,103 0,400 40%
0,142 0,142 0,500 50%
0,222 0,220 0,600 60%
0,315 0,311 0,700 70%
0,447 0,404 0,800 80%
0,635 0,588 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,503 0,523 -3,94%
equality
GINI
M
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
S
2010 2009 2008
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0%
0,015 0,013 0,013 0,100 10%
0,036 0,034 0,033 0,200 20%
0,067 0,065 0,065 0,300 30%
0,100 0,101 0,103 0,400 40%
0,140 0,144 0,146 0,500 50%
0,220 0,221 0,204 0,600 60%
0,304 0,301 0,279 0,700 70%
0,422 0,384 0,356 0,800 80%
0,657 0,618 0,612 0,900 90%
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 100%
0,508 0,524 0,538 -5,60%
P
A
S
S
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N
G
E
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S
GINI
equality
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other small secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million 
passengers/year) that handle 35% of the aircraft movements but only 9% of 
the passengers. In terms of movements, the 55% of the sample is handled by 
Istanbul Ataturk and Antalya; the same airports handle the 58% of the total 
passengers output of the group. In terms of movements, airports ranking 
from 1st to 7th account for 92% of the total traffic, while the 90% of the 
passenger output is handled by airport ranked from1st to 6th. At Istanbul 
Ataturk passengers are less concentrated than movements; the opposite 
happens at Antalya and Istanbul Sabiha. In general there is a substantial 
equilibrium between passengers and movements from the 3rd airport on. 
From 2009 to 2010 there has been a decrease of 3,94% of the Gini index 
with regard to movements; from 2008 to 2010 a -5,6% loss in terms of 
passengers’ Gini index has been registered. From Table 117 it is evident the 
decreasing trend as Turkey is another country whose air traffic market is 
growing at a fast pace. Thus, a diminution of the concentration index is 
foreseeable. From 2008 to 2010 passengers traffic rose of 28% and a growth 
has been registered at all airports, in particular at the 2nd airport of Istanbul. 
In fig. 58 no relevant change is visible in % shares for bottom 5 airports, 
from x=0,6 onwards Lorenz curves for 2009 and 2010 are above Lorenz 
curve for 2008 as the top 4 airports’ share has decreased in % terms. With 
reference to movements, we take into consideration fig. 59: in % terms 
nothing changes for X-axis values ranging from 0 to 0,7, then the +40.000 
movements/year at 2nd Istanbul airport lead to a sharp decrease of the to 2 
airports’ share and so Lorenz curve for 2010 stand above Lorenz curve for 
2009. Geographically speaking, almost the 50% of the Turkish passengers' 
traffic is concentrated in an area centered in Istanbul and gathering 3 
airports; the mean radius is of approximately 280 km.  
9 out of 10 airports considered register high-concentration. The principal 
reason is the scarce number of airlines operating, so there is scope for the 
entry of new competitors in Turkish market provided that the government 
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would not impose some forms of protectionism. The top 3 carriers at each 
airport gather more than 75% of the daily movements. The only airport with 
a moderate concentration is Antalya. In terms of airlines’ presence at 
airports, the airlines which contribute to reach the 80% of the daily 
movements in 9 out of 10 airports are the legacy carrier Turkish Airlines 
and the low cost carrier Pegasus Airlines. Another low cost carrier, 
Anadolujet follows with 7 airports. In terms of DI, Pegasus Airlines and 
Turkish Airlines dominate the market with 78 points each. Other carriers 
which operate low cost and charter services have lower values of 
Dominance Index.  
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Table 118: Airlines’ concentration at Turkish major airports 
 
 
un-concentrated moderate high-concentrated
HHI norm 0,521 HHI norm 0,079 HHI norm 0,551 HHI norm 0,239 HHI norm 0,125
N° carriers 50 N° carriers 8 N° carriers 8 N° carriers 8 N° carriers 7
1/N 0,020 1/N 0,125 1/N 0,125 1/N 0,125 1/N 0,143
HHI 0,530 HHI 0,194 HHI 0,607 HHI 0,334 HHI 0,250
1st carrier 72,45% 1st carrier 28,95% 1st carrier 76,53% 1st carrier 48,42% 1st carrier 39,67%
1st-2nd carrier 77,32% 1st-2nd carrier 47,37% 1st-2nd carrier 90,31% 1st-2nd carrier 74,74% 1st-2nd carrier 64,46%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 81,59% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 65,79% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 94,90% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 91,58% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 76,03%
top5 84,09% top5 92,11% top5 97,96% top5 96,84% top5 93,39%
top10 88,12% top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
HHI norm 0,063 HHI norm 0,016 HHI norm 0,104 HHI norm 0,066 HHI norm 0,040
N° carriers 3 N° carriers 3 N° carriers 5 N° carriers 5 N° carriers 4
1/N 0,333 1/N 0,333 1/N 0,200 1/N 0,200 1/N 0,250
HHI 0,375 HHI 0,344 HHI 0,283 HHI 0,253 HHI 0,280
1st carrier 50,00% 1st carrier 37,50% 1st carrier 39,34% 1st carrier 33,33% 1st carrier 40,00%
1st-2nd carrier 75,00% 1st-2nd carrier 75,00% 1st-2nd carrier 68,85% 1st-2nd carrier 61,11% 1st-2nd carrier 60,00%
1st-2nd-3rd carrier 100,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 100,00% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 86,89% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 83,33% 1st-2nd-3rd carrier 80,00%
top5 100,00% top5 100,00% top5 100,00% top5 100,00% top5 100,00%
top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 100,00% top10 100,00%
HHI INDEX
DALAMAN BODRUM ADANA SAKIRPASA TRABZON DIYARKABIR
ISTAMBUL ATATURK ANTALYA ISTAMBUL SABIHA ANKARA IZMIR
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Table 119: Turkish traffic composition
2010 2009 2008
PAX GROUP 93.581.123 78.230.893 73.456.697
% ON PAX GROUP 91,12% 91,81% 92,47%
% 2010 on 2008 27,40%
PAX < 500 km 51.034.570 42.414.778 38.526.458
% ON PAX GROUP 49,69% 49,78% 48,50%
% 2010 on 2008 32,47%
pax/kmq GROUP 49 41 39
pax/kmq < 500 km 208 173 157
MEAN RADIUS 778
MEAN RADIUS < 500 km 280
AIRLINE IST AYT SAW ESB ADB DLM BJV ADA TZX DIY N° SERVICE
AnadoluJet X X X X X X X 7 LC
Atlasjet X X X X 4 CH
Onur Air X 1 RC - CH
Pegasus Airlines X X X X X X X X X 9 LC
SunExpress X 1 NC - CH
Turkish Airlines X X X X X X X X X 9 NC
NC = National carrier/Network carrier , LC = Low cost carrier , RC = Regional carrier , CH = Charter , FC = Freight carrier
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Table 120: Dominance Index at Turkish airports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIRLINE TOTAL POINTS FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Pegasus Airlines 78 10 78,00
Turkish Airlines 78 10 78,00
AnadoluJet 54 7 37,80
Atlasjet 32 6 19,20
Onur Air 20 5 10,00
SunExpress 16 4 6,40
Lufthansa 6 2 1,20
Transavia 2 1 0,20
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Rank Movements IATA CODE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International ATL 976.447       994.346       978.824       970.235       950.119       6%
2 O'Hare International ORD 958.643       926.973       881.568       827.899       882.617       11%
3 Los Angeles International LAX 656.842       680.954       622.504       634.383       666.938       15%
4 Dallas/Fort Worth International DFW 699.773       685.491       656.310       638.782       652.261       19%
5 Denver International DEN 598.489       614.065       616.272       607.019       630.063       23%
6 John F. Kennedy International JFK 378.389       446.348       435.450       416.945       399.626       25%
7 George Bush Intercontinental IAH 602.672       603.656       576.062       538.168       531.347       28%
8 McCarran International LAS 619.486       609.472       578.949       511.064       505.591       31%
9 San Francisco International SFO 359.201       379.500       387.710       379.751       387.248       34%
10 Phoenix Sky Harbor International PHX 546.510       539.211       502.499       457.207       449.351       36%
11 Charlotte/Douglas International CLT 509.559       522.541       536.253       509.448       529.101       39%
12 Miami International MIA 384.477       386.058       372.891       351.417       376.208       42%
13 Orlando International MCO 350.119       360.075       334.774       300.401       307.784       43%
14 Newark Liberty International EWR 444.374       435.691       433.251       411.607       403.880       46%
15 Minneapolis−Saint Paul International MSP 475.668       452.972       449.972       432.395       436.625       49%
16 Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County DTW 481.740       467.230       462.284       432.589       452.616       51%
17 Seattle–Tacoma International SEA 340.058       347.046       342.889       317.873       313.954       53%
18 Philadelphia International PHL 515.869       499.653       492.018       472.668       460.779       56%
19 Boston Logan International BOS 406.119       399.537       371.604       345.306       352.643       58%
20 LaGuardia LGA 399.827       391.872       378.521       354.594       362.137       60%
21 Washington Dulles International IAD 379.571       382.939       360.154       340.367       336.531       62%
22 Fort Lauderdale – Hollywood International FLL 297.088       307.975       295.496       266.979       272.293       64%
23 Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall BWI 305.630       296.872       277.662       268.005       276.457       65%
24 Salt Lake City International SLC 421.436       422.010       387.671       372.300       362.654       68%
25 Ronald Reagan Washington National DCA 276.419       275.433       277.296       272.146       271.097       69%
26 Chicago Midway International MDW 298.548       304.657       265.572       244.810       245.533       71%
27 San Diego International SAN 220.839       227.329       223.089       199.209       190.137       72%
28 Tampa International TPA 257.071       258.349       237.885       199.960       195.359       73%
Chapter 4: Methods of assessing airport competition at target countries 
 
 
- 374 - 
 
 
Rank Movements IATA CODE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
29 Portland International PDX 260.510       264.518       252.572       226.548       223.068       74%
30 Lambert-St. Louis International STL 272.585       254.302       247.617       209.057       185.720       75%
31 Memphis International MEM 384.823       374.989       363.139       338.973       336.016       77%
32 Kansas City International MCI 178.466       194.969       176.608       150.323       146.588       78%
33 Oakland International OAK 330.418       342.024       269.631       233.183       219.652       80%
34 General Mitchell International MKE 202.505       200.205       183.247       169.693       191.553       81%
35 Cleveland Hopkins International CLE 249.967       244.719       235.975       200.268       192.863       82%
36 Raleigh-Durham International RDU 245.099       252.708       228.694       202.401       198.295       83%
37 William P. Hobby HOU 234.709       232.976       221.929       209.459       209.614       84%
38 Nashville International BNA 216.617       213.185       190.978       175.618       175.450       85%
39 Sacramento International SMF 172.522       174.946       152.675       136.834       126.110       86%
40 Austin-Bergstrom International AUS 209.150       214.440       208.563       174.514       176.914       87%
41 John Wayne SNA 347.194       331.452       267.751       218.157       200.278       88%
42 San Jose International SJC 188.458       187.267       172.674       145.838       123.490       89%
43 Louis Armstrong New Orleans International MSY 103.356       114.318       116.197       106.617       109.107       90%
44 Pittsburgh International PIT 235.264       209.303       167.729       147.720       144.563       91%
45 San Antonio International SAT 218.934       219.437       216.634       194.657       177.415       92%
46 Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International CVG 345.754       328.059       278.894       222.677       177.597       93%
47 Dallas Love Field DAL 248.805       244.609       218.640       172.962       168.544       94%
48 Indianapolis International IND 213.740       203.136       197.202       171.318       166.358       95%
49 Southwest Florida International RSW 86.170         92.008         89.303         83.120         83.742         95%
50 Port Columbus International CMH 196.082       173.984       155.914       146.437       136.081       96%
51 Palm Beach International PBI 192.850       186.583       168.549       138.092       141.387       97%
52 Albuquerque International Sunport ABQ 192.520       191.050       180.439       158.353       156.505       98%
53 Jacksonville International JAX 118.854       118.493       106.714       95.927         96.440         99%
54 Bradley International BDL 156.620       147.720       128.344       108.868       105.985       99%
55 Buffalo Niagara International BUF 137.518       127.307       136.979       131.325       136.574       100%
19.102.360 19.058.969 18.071.029 16.744.475 16.708.868
30.458.061 30.904.331 27.974.274 27.991.401 27.279.644
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Rank Passengers IATA CODE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
1 Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International ATL 84.846.639   89.379.287   90.039.280 88.032.086 89.331.622 7%
2 O'Hare International ORD 77.028.134   76.177.855   69.353.480 64.158.343 66.774.738 13%
3 Los Angeles International LAX 61.041.066   61.896.075   59.716.459 56.520.843 59.070.127 17%
4 Dallas/Fort Worth International DFW 60.226.138   59.786.476   57.080.333 56.030.457 56.906.610 22%
5 Denver International DEN 47.325.016   49.863.352   51.245.334 50.167.485 52.209.377 26%
6 John F. Kennedy International JFK 43.762.282   47.716.941   47.799.090 45.915.069 46.514.154 30%
7 George Bush Intercontinental IAH 42.550.432   42.998.040   41.701.953 40.007.354 40.479.569 33%
8 McCarran International LAS 46.193.329   46.961.011   44.074.707 40.469.012 39.757.359 37%
9 San Francisco International SFO 33.574.807   35.792.707   37.255.490 37.338.942 39.253.999 40%
10 Phoenix Sky Harbor International PHX 41.436.737   42.184.515   39.891.193 37.824.982 38.554.215 43%
11 Charlotte/Douglas International CLT 29.693.949   33.165.688   34.786.389 34.536.666 38.254.207 46%
12 Miami International MIA 32.533.974   33.740.416   34.063.531 33.886.025 35.698.025 49%
13 Orlando International MCO 34.640.451   36.480.416   35.659.551 33.693.649 34.877.899 52%
14 Newark Liberty International EWR 36.724.167   36.367.240   35.336.733 33.399.207 33.107.041 54%
15 Minneapolis−Saint Paul International MSP 35.612.133   35.157.322   34.051.280 32.378.599 32.839.441 57%
16 Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County DTW 35.972.673   35.983.478   35.144.841 31.357.388 32.377.064 60%
17 Seattle–Tacoma International SEA 29.979.097   31.296.628   32.187.941 31.227.512 31.553.166 62%
18 Philadelphia International PHL 31.768.272   32.211.439   31.832.392 30.669.564 30.775.961 65%
19 Boston Logan International BOS 27.725.443   28.102.455   26.102.391 25.512.086 27.428.962 67%
20 LaGuardia LGA 26.571.146   25.026.267   23.078.228 22.142.336 23.983.082 69%
21 Washington Dulles International IAD 22.813.067   24.525.487   23.698.105 23.073.665 23.591.554 71%
22 Fort Lauderdale – Hollywood International FLL 21.369.787   22.681.903   22.621.500 21.060.144 22.412.627 73%
23 Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall BWI 21.184.208   21.498.091   20.889.413 20.963.048 21.949.902 74%
24 Salt Lake City International SLC 21.557.656   22.045.333   20.824.098 20.442.178 21.016.686 76%
25 Ronald Reagan Washington National DCA 18.545.557   18.670.924   18.019.495 17.568.095 18.105.802 78%
26 Chicago Midway International MDW 18.680.663   19.378.855   17.345.535 17.028.761 17.566.281 79%
27 San Diego International SAN 17.481.942   18.336.761   18.125.701 16.974.172 16.889.622 80%
28 Tampa International TPA 18.867.541   19.154.957   18.262.863 16.965.545 16.645.765 82%
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Table 121a-d: USA traffic data 
Rank Passengers IATA CODE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % on 2010
29 Portland International PDX 14.043.489   14.654.222   14.299.075 12.929.675 13.184.843 83%
30 Lambert-St. Louis International STL 15.205.944   15.384.557   14.405.111 12.796.302 12.331.436 84%
31 Memphis International MEM 11.176.460   11.290.477   10.532.141 10.264.327 10.368.048 85%
32 Kansas City International MCI 11.237.480   12.000.997   11.166.835 10.041.165 10.168.035 85%
33 Oakland International OAK 14.692.875   14.846.832   11.474.260 9.652.782 9.857.845 86%
34 General Mitchell International MKE 7.299.294    7.713.144    7.956.968 7.946.562 9.848.377 87%
35 Cleveland Hopkins International CLE 11.321.050   11.459.390   11.104.469 9.715.604 9.492.455 88%
36 Raleigh-Durham International RDU 9.422.112    10.219.138   9.715.926 8.973.209 9.101.870 88%
37 William P. Hobby HOU 8.549.289    8.819.521    8.774.686 8.498.441 9.054.001 89%
38 Nashville International BNA 9.663.386    9.876.524    9.388.253 8.936.860 9.037.456 90%
39 Sacramento International SMF 10.362.800   10.748.982   9.971.312 8.914.510 8.849.711 91%
40 Austin-Bergstrom International AUS 8.261.310    8.885.391    9.039.075 8.220.898 8.702.365 91%
41 John Wayne SNA 9.613.540    9.979.699    8.989.603 8.705.199 8.663.452 92%
42 San Jose International SJC 10.708.065   10.658.389   9.720.186 8.321.750 8.246.064 93%
43 Louis Armstrong New Orleans International MSY 6.231.044    7.525.533    7.942.705 7.787.373 8.203.305 93%
44 Pittsburgh International PIT 9.987.310    9.822.588    8.710.291 8.031.175 8.195.359 94%
45 San Antonio International SAT 8.031.405    8.033.314    8.339.907 7.831.267 8.034.720 95%
46 Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International CVG 16.244.962   15.736.220   13.630.443 10.622.185 7.977.588 95%
47 Dallas Love Field DAL 6.874.717    7.953.385    8.060.792 7.744.522 7.960.809 96%
48 Indianapolis International IND 8.085.394    8.271.632    8.123.650 7.465.719 7.526.414 97%
49 Southwest Florida International RSW 7.643.217    8.029.204    7.603.507 7.415.958 7.514.316 97%
50 Port Columbus International CMH 6.738.348    7.726.421    6.910.045 6.243.717 6.366.191 98%
51 Palm Beach International PBI 6.824.789    6.967.277    6.476.303 5.994.606 5.887.723 98%
52 Albuquerque International Sunport ABQ 6.493.339    6.727.384    6.489.128 5.895.211 5.801.641 99%
53 Jacksonville International JAX 5.946.188    6.319.016    6.002.698 5.605.934 5.601.500 99%
54 Bradley International BDL 6.907.042    6.519.181    6.088.872 5.334.322 5.380.987 100%
55 Buffalo Niagara International BUF 5.044.616    5.308.723    5.521.982 5.327.093 5.203.104 100%
1.272.317.777 1.308.059.067 1.266.627.537 1.204.561.588 1.234.486.482
1.438.096.606 1.454.251.442 1.397.277.261 1.371.900.801 1.372.371.624
TOT GROUP
TOT COUNTRY
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Fig. 60: Lorenz curve USA Passengers 
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Fig. 61: Lorenz curve USA Movements
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Table 122: Gini Index for USA – time series 
 
The numerical value of the Gini index is reported in Table 122 and the % 
variation refers to 2010 on 2006. 
From Table 121, fig. 60 (with reference to passengers) and fig. 61 (with 
reference to aircraft movements) it is possible to understand that Atlanta 
airport (the biggest of the world) accounts for approximately 6% of the total 
movements and for 7% of the total passengers traffic taken into 
consideration by the sample. It is necessary to bear in mind that the sample 
takes into consideration approximately 90% of the USA passenger traffic 
output and 89% of the traffic movements. That is to say that in USA there 
are other small secondary airports (with traffic output lower than 5 million 
passengers/year) that handle 11% of the aircraft movements but only 10% of 
the passengers. In terms of movements, the 51% of the sample is handled by 
the airport from 1st to 16th; airports ranked from 1st to 13th handle the 52% of 
the total passengers output of the group. In terms of movements, airports 
ranking from 1st to 43rd account for 90% of the total traffic, while the 90% 
of the passenger output is handled by airport ranked from 1st to 38th. In 
general passengers are more concentrated than movements suggesting 
higher load factors or the usage of bigger aircrafts by airlines. USA is the 
other country in which Gini index for both passengers and movements 
registered an increase from 2006 to 2010. The substantial change in 
passenger’s figures is evident from fig. 60 for X-axis values ranging from 
0,4 to 0,7. In general passengers decreased, therefore the increase in 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 PAX
0,420 0,417 0,411 0,405 0,405 3,68%
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 MOV
0,324 0,319 0,297 0,284 0,286 13,39% GINI
equality
GINI
equality
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concentration means that the secondary airports lost a higher share of traffic 
if compared with bigger airports. Likewise, in terms of movement, the 
changing is evident for X-axis values ranging from 0,3 to 0,95 in fig. 61.  
Again, from 2006 and 2010 USA airports registered a substantial loss in 
aircraft movements; that is to say that the same phenomena that led to a 
higher concentration in terms of passengers are valid and more evident also 
for aircraft movements. Geographically speaking, almost the 21% of the 
USA passengers' traffic is concentrated in an area centered in Atlanta and 
gathering 16 airports; the mean radius is of approximately 740 km.  
There are 9 airports out of the 55 taken into consideration at which the top 3 
carriers taken together gather more than 70% of the daily traffic.  
In terms of airlines’ presence at airports, the top5 airlines which contribute 
to reach the 80% of the daily movements are the low cost carriers Southwest 
Airlines and American Airlines, the freight carriers Delta Air Lines and Sky 
West Airlines and the legacy carrier US Airways. In terms of DI, Southwest 
Airlines is by far the dominant airline with more than 240 points, followed 
by Delta Air Lines with 98 points (freight is a relevant component of US air 
traffic), SkyWest and Us Airways with less than 40 points. 
Chapter 4: Methods of assessing airport competition at target countries 
 
 
- 381 - 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 123: USA traffic composition
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
PAX GROUP 1.234.484.472 1.204.559.579 1.266.625.529 1.308.057.060 1.272.315.771
% ON PAX GROUP 89,95% 87,80% 90,65% 89,95% 88,47%
% 2010 on 2006 -2,97%
PAX < 1000 km 292.616.894 288.407.801 303.176.970 310.051.834 294.043.491
% ON PAX GROUP 21,32% 21,02% 21,70% 21,32% 20,45%
% 2010 on 2006 -0,49%
PAX/kmq GROUP 135 132 139 143 139
PAX/kmq < 1000 km 169 167 176 179 170
MEAN RADIUS 1704
MEAN RADIUS < 1000 km 742
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Table 124: Dominance Index at USA airports
AIRLINE TOTAL POINTS FREQUENCY DOMINANCE
Southwest Airlines 342 39 242,51
Delta Air Lines 174 31 98,07
SkyWest Airlines 114 18 37,31
US Airways 100 20 36,36
American Airlines 98 20 35,64
American Eagle 64 11 12,80
ExpressJet Airlines 64 10 11,64
Pinnacle Airlines 58 11 11,60
JetBlue Airways 62 8 9,02
AirTran Airways 56 8 8,15
United Airlines 44 8 6,40
Republic Airlines 38 8 5,53
Continental Airlines 38 6 4,15
Alaska Airlines 30 6 3,27
Air Wisconsin Airlines 26 5 2,36
Horizon Air 28 4 2,04
Chautauqua Airlines 22 4 1,60
Colgan Air 20 4 1,45
FedEx - Federall Express 26 3 1,42
Ameriflight 18 4 1,31
Mesa Airlines 18 4 1,31
Shuttle America 18 4 1,31
Atlantic Southeast Airlines 18 3 0,98
Comair 18 3 0,98
Trans States Airlines 14 3 0,76
Cape Air 14 2 0,51
CommutAir 12 2 0,44
Executive Airlines 12 2 0,44
American Eagle Airlines 10 2 0,36
Compass Airlines 8 2 0,29
Frontier Airlines 8 2 0,29
Spirit Airlines 8 2 0,29
Piedmont Airlines 10 1 0,18
Great Lakes Aviation 4 2 0,15
PSA Airlines 8 1 0,15
SeaPort Airlines 8 1 0,15
Allegiant Air 6 1 0,11
ABX Air 4 1 0,07
Amiyi Airlines 4 1 0,07
Midwest Airlines/Frontier Airlines/US airways express 4 1 0,07
Pacific Wings 4 1 0,07
Turkish Airlines 4 1 0,07
Virgin America 4 1 0,07
Westair Industries, Inc. 4 1 0,07
IBC Airways 2 1 0,04
Porter Airlines 2 1 0,04
UPS 2 1 0,04
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5.2 – A Game theory plot 
In these paragraphs possible applications of games the games theory is 
presented, without being solved as complicated hypothesis on costs have to 
be made.  
The game is built on the basis of the one presented by C. Bardot (2008) and 
it refers to the possible interactions between airport and airlines as the 
characteristics and the conditions under which the two firms operate vary. 
First of all, airports might be in competition if they have partially 
overlapping catchment areas and they address the same passenger target. 
This might happen at large cities served by more than one airport or at 
borders between two countries. We take into consideration a passenger 
determined to go from A to N. He can choose to go to N either departing 
from one airport or from the other according to the total price. That is to say 
that the passengers will choose the airport which permits him to minimize 
the sum between travel time, waiting time at the airport (which depends on 
the scheduled timetable) and travel fare. So, the competition is between two 
airports taken together with their respective airline which might take the 
passenger to N.  
There are two airlines and two airports, so that it is a situation of 
“successive duopolies”. Each airline operates uniquely in one of the 
airports. Let B and D stand for the airports (and their variables’ subscripts) 
and A1 and A2 for the airlines (and the numbers 1,2 for their variables’ 
subscripts). A1 operates in airport B and A2 in airport D. Airlines sell 
tickets directly to passengers, at prices p1 and p2, and have demands of y1 
and y2, respectively. Airports sell slots and other services to airlines, for 
which they pay the prices Pb and Pd, respectively in airports B and D. In 
order to get uniform variables Pb and Pd are prices by passenger.   
Consumers will choose either A1+B or A2+D. Airports have location 
differentiation but flights are first assumed as homogenous services, both 
airlines A1 and A2 having identical quality. Besides, A1 and A2 are 
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supposed to have an important share in, respectively, airports B and D. 
Furthermore, we admit that there are no transaction costs of colluding and 
no discount rate. 
As we have seen before, airport and airline are not two separated entities: in 
the paragraph 5.1 market concentration has been taken into consideration as 
the more market share an airline has, the more powerful it is towards the 
airport management body. Vertical interaction between airport and airline 
may take several forms and each form might take to different results in 
terms of competition.  
Three possible options appear feasible:  
- the two airlines operating each one from a different airport have the 
same cost structure; 
- the two airlines have the same cost structure but one of the two offers 
flights at a higher frequency, that is to say it has more market power. It 
is foreseeable than that the airline and the airport would try and find an 
agreement aiming at maximizing the joint revenue; 
- the two airlines have a different cost structure, that is one airport is a hub 
and the airline is a legacy carrier while the second airport is a secondary 
airport and the airline is a low cost carrier. 
What airport and airline would decide to do may be depicted with a 
sequential two-stage game: in the first stage airports sets prices and in the 
second stage airlines compete with reference to these prices as well. There 
are four possible outcomes: one of competition without any collusion, one 
of a two sided collusion and two mixed (one-sided collusion).  
 
In the first case, the game is under market and quality symmetry and airlines 
prefer not to collude as, if only one colludes its revenues would fall. If both 
airlines and airports collude both revenues would fall. 
In the second case, one airline operates on two markets; at one market it act 
as a monopolist and at the other it is in competition with the other airline. 
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The airlines provide the same service and experiment the same costs. If the 
more powerful airline colludes with the airport, the joint profit is bigger as 
bigger is the market share and lower are the prices. If the less powerful 
airline does not collude, its revenue will decrease so it is forced to collude as 
well. 
In the third case, airline costs are different as one airline is a legacy carrier 
and the other is a low cost which operates from a secondary airport with 
lower charges. Again each airline operates from its airport but the low cost 
airline offers the flight at a lower price. But the quality offered by the low 
cost airline is lower and Bardot decided to assume the loss in quality as a 
longer distance to cover. In this case the relative differences are important: 
if the cost difference between the LCC and the FSC is large enough, or 
exceeds a weighed sum of their inverse measures of quality, both airlines 
and airports are interested in collusion. If the cost difference is smaller the 
two airlines will revert to the first case.  
 
Conclusions 
Since the advent of the liberalization process, both the airport and the airline 
the market have witnessed substantial changes. The greatest improvement in 
airport management has been the adoption of more commercial-oriented and 
efficient policies. Before the advent of liberalization, airports were mere 
infrastructural providers, often dependant only on public financings and 
focused on the fulfilments of the national carrier’s needs. The new point of 
view envisages a complex business, capable of self-financing and of 
responding to the customers’ needs. The shift from 100% public ownership 
to some forms of private ownership has not been even worldwide; therefore 
there are countries in which the private investors’ involvement is welcome 
and others in which the word “privatization” is still perceived as 
synonymous of higher taxes and lower services. Nevertheless the recent 
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economic downturns are forcing governments to divest part of their assets 
(among those also participation at airports) or to put a hold at massive 
airport financing. In chapter 1 the forms of airport ownership and 
management in force on a worldwide basis have been investigated in order 
to highlight strengths and weak points. As airport economy is becoming an 
urgent issue, traditional forms of regulations as well as the characteristics of 
the commercial management have been investigated: as profitable airports 
are considered a desirable investment, management bodies are shifting their 
economic focus also on non-aeronautical revenues in order to finance 
infrastructure development without relying on government financing. 
Restaurants, shops, parking garages, leasing terminal space but also 
facilities like congress centres and participation/sponsorships in welfare 
projects are all viable ways to improve the airports’ economic status.  
A sample of twelve representative countries has been chosen in order to 
investigate the situation of air transport market worldwide. Countries with a 
mature airport system (USA, Australia, Canada, UK, Spain, France, 
Germany, Italy) together with emerging countries (Brazil, China, India, 
Turkey) are included in the sample. Regulation and ownership have been 
examined together with the effects of recent juridical innovations on 
competition. A deep digression has been reserved to Italy and to European 
countries as well. The long term trend foresees a strong traffic demand on 
2030, so IATA and regulators are urging governments and managing bodies 
to take actions to cope with it, avoiding a capacity collapse. Nevertheless, 
the short term trend highlights a market contraction due to the economic 
crisis, exacerbated by terrorism, natural disasters and high fuel prices. 
Airline profits are being undermined and a relevant number of airlines 
worldwide filed for bankruptcy (recent examples are Alitalia, Malev, 
Spanair, Air Japan and American Airlines).    Air traffic demand is predicted 
to grow in the long term; nevertheless recently the trend is a slight 
contraction of the market. Most airports worldwide have experimented 
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sharp reductions of both passengers and aircraft movements. Airlines 
competition led to the emerging of the low cost method and to the re-
organization of the national carriers in order to cope with competition: over 
time, network airlines have decided to cut their costs adopting some of the 
low cost carriers’ strategies while low cost carriers have adopted simple 
hubbing models and have been continuously increasing the number of major 
airport served. That’s why some researchers thinks that with new steps to be 
taken in market deregulation and liberalization (for example, no more 
restriction on the airlines’ ownership) the existing distinction between low 
cost and legacy carrier airlines will be overcome.  
The response to this uncertain and volatile scenario seems to be stability: 
airlines are merging in order to create mega-carriers with an established and 
resilient network, phenomena of vertical integration between airports and 
airlines (buyout of airport operator’s shares, partnership for ad-hoc 
infrastructure development) are becoming common, shared knowledge 
between airport operators to keep a negotiating power over airlines through 
the establishment of airport groups are notable exempla. Similar trends are 
traceable also in other fields or air transport, like ground handling. 
Updated traffic data at the sample of airports taken into consideration have 
been collected in order to derive some useful informations: n° of carriers 
operating, service provided, market share on the basis of the daily traffic 
movements and concentration indexes as well as dominance indexes (which 
combines market share at airports with market share in a target nation 
system). The traffic distribution at airports has been analysed with the HHI 
with the aim of highlighting those airports with a concentration higher than 
0,25 (according to US normative); the airport system has been analysed 
through the use of both the Gini concentration index and the Dominance 
Index. 
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High values of the Gini index show an higher concentration thus meaning 
that few big airports handle most of the traffic; on the other hand lower 
values of the index stand for even traffic distribution among a higher 
number of airports. 
 
 
 
Table 125: Concentration Index
Country N° airports Pax 2010 % tot pax Pax 2006 % tot pax ∆ 2010-2006 ∆% 2010-2006 Gini
USA 55 1.234.484.472 89,95% 1.272.315.771 88,47% -37.831.299 -2,97% up
China 33 561.371.626 91,28% 362.911.649 92,72% 198.459.977 54,69% down
UK 10 181.807.542 82,16% 189.729.411 82,27% -7.921.869 -4,18% down
Germany 10 170.201.388 89,26% 159.654.752 91,64% 10.546.636 6,61% constant
Spain 10 153.398.950 79,57% 154.374.428 79,76% -975.478 -0,63% up
France 10 125.565.399 90,17% 122.845.248 91,23% 2.720.151 2,21% down
Brasil 12 120.726.471 77,71% 80.903.692 79,17% 39.822.779 49,22% down
Australia 10 118.233.486 87,55% 97.991.824 87,43% 20.241.662 20,66% constant
Italy 10 103.604.532 74,58% 96.029.111 78,14% 7.575.421 7,89% down
Turkey* 10 93.581.123 91,12% 78.230.893 91,81% 15.350.230 19,62% down
Canada 10 91.736.175 83,91% 87.112.069 85,68% 4.624.106 5,31% constant
Passengers and movements traffic trend x country 2010 - 2006
Data Passengers
Country N° airports Mov 2010 % tot mov mov 2006 % tot mov ∆ 2010-2006 ∆% 2010-2006 Gini
USA 55 16.706.858 61,24% 19.100.354 62,71% -2.393.496 -12,53% up
China 33 4.546.713 88,88% 3.258.668 89,85% 1.288.045 39,53% down
UK 10 1.469.163 65,74% 1.631.546 67,56% -162.383 -9,95% constant
Germany 10 1.722.461 87,97% 1.786.551 89,99% -64.090 -3,59% down
Spain 10 1.402.697 66,18% 1.530.463 66,01% -127.766 -8,35% up
France 10 1.279.786 79,83% 1.306.622 75,56% -26.836 -2,05% down
Brasil 12 1.474.225 55,66% 1.060.602 55,28% 413.623 39,00% down
Australia 10 996.544 72,46% 861.005 71,16% 135.539 15,74% down
Italy 10 1.022.343 71,33% 1.054.875 74,29% -32.532 -3,08% down
Turkey* 10 790.714 65,18% 689.393 64,67% 101.321 14,70% down
Canada 10 1.298.476 57,25% 1.217.953 57,53% 80.523 6,61% constant
Data
Passengers and movements traffic trend x country 2010 - 2006
Aircraft movements
pax mov pax mov pax mov pax mov pax mov pax mov
Australia 27% 21% 47% 36% 62% 48% 70% 55% 76% 60% 100% 100%
Brasil 17% 9% 27% 17% 36% 24% 44% 28% 49% 33% 100% 100%
Canada 28% 17% 43% 26% 54% 34% 66% 41% 71% 45% 100% 100%
China 12% 10% 20% 16% 27% 23% 33% 29% 38% 33% 100% 100%
France 42% 31% 60% 44% 67% 53% 72% 61% 78% 67% 100% 100%
Germany 28% 23% 46% 42% 56% 52% 64% 60% 71% 67% 100% 100%
India* 23% 17% 46% 34% 58% 43% 69% 51% 77% 57% 100% 100%
Italy 26% 23% 39% 36% 45% 43% 51% 48% 56% 52% 100% 100%
Spain 26% 20% 41% 34% 52% 42% 58% 47% 63% 52% 100% 100%
Turkey 31% 24% 53% 36% 64% 45% 71% 51% 78% 56% 100% 100%
UK 30% 21% 44% 32% 53% 39% 62% 46% 66% 51% 100% 100%
USA 7% 3% 11% 7% 16% 9% 20% 12% 24% 14% 100% 100%
total
CONCENTRATION AT AIRPORTS 2010
Country
% 1st airport % 1st-2nd airport % 1st-3rd airport % 1st-4th airport % 1st-5th airport
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Fig. 62: Gini Index Passengers total 
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Fig. 63: Gini Index Movements Total 
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Fig. 64: Concentration Index 
 
Tab. 125 and fig. 62 and 63 show that at growing market, the trend is of a 
sharp reduction of the Gini index as traffic is entering second airports. At 
mature markets there is some exempla of concentration growth in USA and 
Spain explicable with the growth at Madrid or with the fact that traffic 
decreases faster at secondary airports than at bigger airports (as for Atlanta). 
In other countries with decreasing Gini index – that is market widening – 
the explanation lies in the fact that secondary airports are gaining traffic 
shares faster than the major hub or that are losing traffic at a slower pace, 
thus the market share in % terms grows.  
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From fig. 64 it is possible to distinguish the bigger markets (China, USA 
and Brazil) as the total share handled by top 5 airports is lower; on the other 
hand, Australia, India and Turkey have still centralized airport systems 
(both for geographical and political reasons) then top 5 airports handle 
approximately the 80% of the passengers. With regard to aircraft 
movements, the highest value of top5 airports’ share is traceable at countries 
whose major airport is (due to either political or economic reasons) the 
centre of the network.  
Finally, the games theory has proven to be a valid support to the study of air 
traffic market, even by the use of simple Prisoner’s dilemma-like games. 
Unfortunately, scientific literature on the matter is not so vast. 
 
As for Italy, some innovations are needed in order to free the system: 
- follow the trend of aggregation of airports managing companies 
through the mutual purchasing, the creation of actual airport systems, 
partnership projects 
- the passage by the government of a national plan on airports in order 
to define a national strategy of investment 
- a better linkage is needed for our national airport system, for example 
it would have been a good idea the installation of high speed rail’s 
stops at major airports. 
 
 
